CIS 


I 


ALEXANDER    HAMILTON 


'  And  in  regions  far, 
Such  heroes  bring  ye  forth 
As  those  from  whom  we  came ; 
And  plant  our  name 
Under  that  star 
Not  known  unto  our  North.' 

To  the  Virginian  Voyage. 

— DEAYTON. 


ALEXANDER   HAMILTON 

An  Essay  on  American  Union 


BY 


FREDERICK    SCOTT    OLIVER 


NEW  EDITION 
WITH  FRONTISPIECE  AND  A    MAP 


NEW  YORK:  G.  P.  PUTNAM'S  SONS 
LONDON:  ARCHIBALD  CONSTABLE  &  CO.  LTD. 

1907 


Edinburgh  :  T.  and  A.  CONSTABLE,  Printers  to  His  Majesty 


TO 

THE   MEMORY   OF 

CHARLES  WELLINGTON   FUKSE 

WHOSE   FRIENDSHIP  ENCOURAGED  ME 
TO  UNDERTAKE   THIS  WORK. 


(F 


63Z 


PEEFACE 

I  WISH  to  acknowledge  the  debt  I  owe  to  various  friends 
who  have  done  me  the  honour  to  read  the  proofs  of  this 
essay.  I  have  not  ceased  to  marvel  at  their  kindness  and 
their  patience.  Their  advice  has  helped  me  at  many  points, 
and,  although  their  frankness  has  occasionally  been  some- 
what disconcerting,  it  has  been  mingled  with  encourage- 
ment. As  a  result  I  have  completed  a  task  which  less 
biased  critics  may  well  consider  to  have  been  presump- 
tuously undertaken 

In  particular  I  have  to  thank  Miss  Mary  Stubbert  for  her 
valuable  assistance ;  but  at  the  same  time  it  is  necessary  to 
make  it  clear  that  she  is  not  to  be  held  responsible  for  the 
opinions  I  have  ventured  to  express  on  men  and  events. 
I  am  well  aware  that  in  several  instances  she  is  in  dis- 
agreement with  my  conclusions.  I  wish  also  to  thank  Mr. 
William  Wallace,  who  has  read  and  corrected  all  the  proofs 
for  the  press,  and  has  compiled  the  chronological  table 
which  will  be  found  on  pages  490-4. 

The  references  need  a  few  words  of  explanation.  The 
Works  of  Alexander  Hamilton,  in  twelve  volumes,  edited 
by  Senator  H.  C.  Lodge  (2nd  Federal  Edition,  1904),  and  The 
History  of  the  Republic  of  the  United  States  of  America, 
as  traced  in  the  Writings  of  Alexander  Hamilton  and  of 
his  Co-temporaries,  in  seven  volumes,  by  his  son  John  C. 


vii 


viii  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

Hamilton  (1857),  are  mentioned  in  the  footnotes  for  the 
sake  of  brevity  as  Works  and  History  respectively.  The 
Life  which  is  quoted  is  The  Life  of  Alexander  Hamilton, 
in  one  volume,  also  by  his  son  (1834).  There  are  several 
modern  lives  and  studies  of  Alexander  Hamilton — by  Mr. 
John  T.  Morse,  jr.,  in  two  volumes  (1882);  by  Senator  H.  C. 
Lodge  (1886,  'American  Statesmen'  series);  by  Dr.  W.  G. 
Sumner  (1890, '  Makers  of  America '  series) ;  Hamilton  and 
his  Contemporaries,  by  Mr.  C.  J.  Riethmuller  (1864);  Alex- 
ander Hamilton:  a  Historical  Study  (1877),  and  The  Life 
and  Epoch  of  Alexander  Hamilton  (1879),  by  Mr.  G.  Shea. 
A  comprehensive  bibliography  of  the  period  will  be  found 
in  the  Cambridge  Modern  History,  vol.  vii.  pp.  780-810. 

The  History  by  John  C.  Hamilton  is  open  to  all  the 
objections  that  may  be  alleged  against  a  life  written  by  a 
son.  It  is  the  work  of  a  vehement  partisan.  Nothing  that 
Alexander  Hamilton  did  is  wrong,  and  all  the  deeds  of  his 
opponents  are  as  black  as  ink.  But,  notwithstanding,  it  is 
a  book  of  great  value.  Of  the  subject  as  a  man  it  does  not 
afford  a  single  glimpse;  but  it  abounds  in  evidence  with 
regard  to  his  career.  It  is  full  of  quotations  from  the 
letters  of  friends  and  enemies,  and  the  abstracts  of  debates 
are  illuminating.  Dr.  Sumner's  volume,  on  the  other  hand, 
has  a  considerable  interest  because  it  is  written  from  the  point 
of  view  of  the  American  free-trader,  and  although  the  author 
generously  acknowledges  the  great  qualities  of  Hamilton, 
he  boldly  challenges  his  economic  conclusions.  Mr.  Rieth- 
muller's  book  was  written  during  the  War  of  Secession.  It 
is  full  of  sympathy,  but  arrives  at  a  strange  conclusion. 
Hamilton,  in  his  opinion,  would  have  acquiesced  in  the  dis- 
memberment of  the  Union. 


PREFACE  ix 

It  must  be  frankly  admitted  that  no  adequate  life  of 
Hamilton  has  yet  been  written.  His  achievements  have 
been  chronicled,  praised  and  condemned;  but  in  the  case 
of  such  a  character  it  is  impossible  to  rest  content  with  an 
account  of  his  public  deeds.  Hamilton  awaits  a  true  inter- 
preter, and  it  is  hardly  necessary  to  say  that  the  present 
volume  does  not  aim  at  supplying  the  deficiency. 

The  only  vivid  account  of  'the  man'  with  which  I  am 
acquainted  is  to  be  found  in  the  historical  romance  by 
Mrs.  Atherton,  entitled  The  Conqueror.  If  the  writer  of 
a  dusty,  historical  essay  may  speak  without  impertinence 
of  the  merits  of  such  a  work,  I  should  venture  to  express 
my  admiration  for  the  insight  of  the  authoress.  Her  pre- 
sentment of  Hamilton,  in  my  humble  judgment,  is  not 
merely  a  masterly  work  of  art,  but  a  most  serious  and 
truthful  portrait. 

Mrs.  Atherton  has  led  us  to  expect  that  one  day  she  will 
give  us  an  authentic  life  of  her  hero.  I  could  have  wished 
that  she  had  accomplished  her  task  before  I  had  engaged 
on  mine.  At  any  rate  I  venture  to  express  the  hope,  which 
many  others  must  entertain,  that  her  promise  will  not 
remain  for  long  unfulfilled. 

F.  S.  0. 

CHECKENDON  COURT,  OXFORDSHIRE, 
22nd  January  1906. 


CONTENTS 

PAGE 

INTRODUCTION,         ......  3 

BOOK    I 
THE  INDEPENDENCE  OF  THE  STATES   (A.D.   1757-1783) 

CHAP. 

I.  Boyhood,         .  .  .  .  .  .11 

II.  The  Quarrel  with  Great  Britain,          .  .  .  19 

in.  Early  Writings,  ...  .27 

IV.  The  Beginning  of  the  War,  ....  33 

V.  The  Course  of  the  War,  .  .  .  .44 

VI.  The  End  of  the  War,  .....  56 
vii.  The  Military  Secretary,  .  .  .  .68 


BOOK    II 

THE  UNION  OF  THE  STATES  (A.D.  1780-1788) 

I.  Political  Writings  during  the  War,     ...  83 

n.  Congress  and  the  Conduct  of  the  War,  .  .          96 

in.  Centrifugal  Force  and  its  Consequences,  .  .         Ill 

IV.  Disorder  and  Anarchy,            .            .  .  .123 

V.  The  Power  of  a  Vision,            .            .  .  .138 

VI.  The  Convention  of  Philadelphia,         .  .  .         147 

VII.  The  Federalist,             .            .            .  .  165 


xii  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

BOOK   III 

THE  FEDERALISTS  (A.D.   1789-1791) 

CHAP.  PAQK 

I.  President  Washington,            .            .            ,  .183 

II.  The  Threefold  Policy,             .  .191 

III.  Hamilton's  Difficulties,            .            .            .  .199 

IV.  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,      .            .            .  .206 
v.  The  Public  Credit,       .            .            .            .  .215 

VI.  Commerce  and  the  Union,       ....         228 

vii.  The  Stewardship  of  the  Estate,           .            .  .        240 

BOOK    IV 

THE  DEMOCRATS   (A.D.   1791-1794) 

I.  Thomas  Jefferson,        .            .            .            .  .251 

II.  The  Origin  and  Growth  of  Parties,     .            .  .         270 

in.  Charges  of  Corruption,  ....         285 

IV.  Foreign  Dangers,         .            .             .            .  .303 

v.  The    French    Eevolution    and    the    Declaration    of 

Neutrality,  .            .            .            .            .  .317 

VI.  The  Treaty  with  Great  Britain,           .            .  .341 

VII.  The  Foundations  of  Foreign  Policy,    .            .  .        350 

BOOK   V 

THE  POLITICIANS  (A.D.   1795-1804) 

I.  The  End  of  an  Epoch,              .            .            .  .371 

II.  James  Monroe,            .            .            .            .  .380 

ill.  John  Adams,  .             .            .            .            „  .390 

IV.  The  Victory  of  Jefferson,         .            .            .  .396 

v.  Aaron  Burr,    ......         406 

VI.  Duel  and  Death,          .            .            .            .  .420 

vii.  The  Failure  of  the  Democrats,  429 


CONTENTS  xiii 
BOOK   VI 

CONCLUSION 

CHAP.  PAGE 

I.  Some  General  Eemarks,           .            .  .            .441 
II.  Whig  or  Tory  1            .....         448 

III.  Union  and  its  Difficulties,        ....         454 

IV.  Nationality  and  Empire,          .            .  .            .461 

V.  Commerce  under  Two  Aspects,            .  .             ,         466 

VI.  Sovereignty,    .            .            .             ,  .            .473 
vii.  The  Duties  of  Empire,             .            .  .            ,479 

APPENDIX  I., .            .            .            .  ,            ,        489 

APPENDIX  II. :  Chronological  Table,  .            ,        490 

INDEX,           .  495 


INTRODUCTION 


But  be  the  worke-men  what  they  may  be,  let  us  speake  of  the 
Worhe;  that  is;  the  true  greatnesse  of  kingdoms  and  estates; 
and  the  meanes  thereof. — BACON. 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 


INTRODUCTION 

ENGLISHMEN  for  the  most  part  are  not  learned  in  American 
history.  Possibly  at  the  bottom  of  their  neglect  lies  an 
opinion  that  the  study  would  prove  more  profitable  than 
entertaining,  richer  in  useful  lessons  and  estimable  characters 
than  in  stirring  events  and  figures  of  a  romantic  interest. 
It  is  necessary  to  admit  that  the  whole  narrative  has  fallen 
under  the  suspicion  of  being  somewhat  akin  to  a  moral  tale, 
in  which  persons  of  Radical  and  Tory  proclivities  play  the 
parts  respectively  of  Sandford  and  Merton,  in  order  that,  in 
the  end,  democracy  and  business  methods  may  be  glorified 
in  the  eyes  of  men. 

The  wars  of  Independence  and  Secession  are  the  only 
events  with  which,  as  a  rule,  an  Englishman  pretends  to  an 
acquaintance,  and  when  he  has  stated  it  as  his  opinion  that 
the  former  was  a  wise  resistance  to  an  intolerable  oppres- 
sion, and  the  latter  a  humane  and  heroic  enterprise  to  put 
an  end  to  slavery,  he  has  usually  come  to  the  end  of  his 
conversation.  It  is  not  the  purpose  of  this  essay  to  ques- 
tion either  of  these  judgments,  but  to  consider  a  struggle 
entirely  different  in  its  character,  which  had  its  origin  in 
the  war  with  Britain  and  its  sequel  in  the  war  between 
North  and  South. 

When  peace  was  signed  in  1783  the  States  had  indeed 
secured  their  independence,  but  union  seemed  even  more 
remote  and  difficult  of  attainment  than  nine  years  earlier 

8 


4  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

when  the  war  began.  The  United  States  are  to-day  so  firm  a 
political  fact  that  it  is  not  unusual  to  overlook  the  critical 
and  dangerous  period  during  which  they  were  disunited.  We 
are  apt  to  imagine  that  the  war  was  waged  against  an 
enemy  as  compact  as  ourselves,  not  against  thirteen  jealous 
allies  whose  only  serviceable  bonds  of  union  were  an  aspira- 
tion towards  independence  and  a  common  enemy. 

Another  view  of  the  matter  has  been  put  forward  upon 
high  authority.  We  have  been  told  that,  in  the  passionate 
heat  of  victory,  a  unanimous  and  patriotic  impulse,  working 
in  half-molten  metal,  wrought  and  fashioned  a  noble  con- 
stitution. This  statement  is  dramatic,  but  untrue.  No 
travesty  of  the  facts  could  indeed  be  more  complete.  The 
metal  was  stone-cold,  full  of  cracks  and  flaws  and  fissures, 
when  the  Convention  of  Philadelphia,  six  years  later,  welded 
it  together.  After  more  than  four  months  of  angry  debate, 
the  Union  was  in  the  end  confirmed,  but  only  by  a  narrow 
majority,  and  amid  indignant  protests.  Upon  its  first 
announcement,  it  had  many  more  enemies  than  friends 
throughout  the  continent.  For  every  state  claimed  a 
separate  sovereignty,  and  was  reluctant  to  part  with  any 
shred  of  its  authority.  Only  after  a  long  and  difficult 
assault  were  they  persuaded  that  there  would  be  a  greater 
benefit  in  the  surrender. 

When  the  Constitution  was  at  last  acknowledged  there 
remained  a  still  more  arduous  undertaking;  for  it  was 
necessary  to  set  Government  to  work,  to  defend  it  against 
the  open  and  covert  attacks  of  the  party  of  disintegration, 
and  to  devise  a  policy  which  should  have  sufficient  strength 
and  dignity,  and  hold  upon  the  hearts  of  men  to  support  the 
fabric  of  the  Union. 

In  dramatic  quality  the  history  of  the  war  is  inferior  to 
the  course  of  events  after  the  war  had  ended.  The. whole 
situation  becomes  more  tense.  The  clash  of  personal 


INTRODUCTION  5 

forces  is  fiercer,  the  action  swifter ;  motives,  principles  and 
tendencies  are  easier  to  comprehend.  War  is  always  a 
confusion,  filled  with  irrelevant  and  distracting  excitement. 
The  hero,  indeed,  is  visible,  but  his  subordinates  are  a  part 
of  the  spectacle,  not  actors  in  a  drama.  Private  character  is 
smothered  by  discipline  or  overwhelmed  in  a  single  patriotic 
purpose.  On  the  signing  of  peace  men  begin  to  regain  their 
humanity.  Their  tongues  are  loosened.  Ideas  and  counter 
ideas  spring  up  as  soon  as  the  frost-bound  repression  is 
relaxed.  The  interest  shifts  from  the  opposition  of  masses 
to  the  visions  and  beliefs,  the  rivalries  and  hatreds,  of  indi- 
vidual men. 

In  the  Revolution,  Alexander  Hamilton  played  no  promi- 
nent part.  He  was  a  boy  at  college  when  discontent  drew  to 
a  head,  and  at  the  date  of  the  skirmish  of  Lexington  was 
only  eighteen  years  of  age.  In  the  War  of  Independence  his 
share  was  subordinate,  though  it  was  brilliant  and  effective. 
But  when  the  war  had  ended,  he  became  the  master  spirit  of 
America. 

In  the  great  rebellion  Washington  was  the  master  spirit. 
In  the  great  struggle  to  prevent  the  breaking  of  the  Union, 
Lincoln  was  the  master  spirit.  In  his  fitness  for  the  par- 
ticular crisis  Hamilton  was  the  equal  of  these  men,  and  it 
would  be  hard  to  find  higher  praise.  In  character  he  was 
their  equal;  in  force  of  will;  in  efficiency;  in  practical 
wisdom ;  in  courage  and  in  virtue.  But  in  a  certain  sense 
his  greatness  surpasses  theirs,  for  it  is  more  universal  and 
touches  the  interest  of  the  whole  world  in  a  wider  circle.  He 
was  great  in  action  which  is  for  the  moment,  and  in  thought 
which  is  for  all  time;  and  he  was  great,  not  merely  as  a 
minister  of  state,  but  as  a  man  of  letters.  In  constancy  it  is 
customary  to  compare  him  with  the  younger  Pitt,  who  was 
his  contemporary.  In  political  foresight  and  penetration  it 


6  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

is  no  extravagance  to  place  him  by  the  side  of  Burke.    He 
shares  with  Fox  his  astounding  genius  for  friendship. 

The  end  of  the  eighteenth  century  was  a  fertile  period. 
Great  men  abounded  in  it.  Talleyrand  had  known  them 
all,  and  had  contended  with  most  of  them.  He  was  himself 
one  of  the  greatest;  certainly  one  of  the  coolest  observers.  He 
cherished  few  illusions,  and  it  has  never  been  said  of  him,  even 
by  his  bitterest  enemy,  that  he  suffered  his  judgment  to  be 
duped  by  his  affections.  In  statecraft  he  had  a  wide  horizon, 
and  his  experience  enabled  him  to  make  just  comparisons. 
He  mentions  Hamilton  with  the  greatest  of  his  contem- 
poraries, even  with  Napoleon,  and  mentions  him  with  them 
in  order  to  place  him  above  them.  Hamilton's  portrait  hung 
hi  his  study  till  he  died,  and  on  it  was  an  inscription  in  his 
own  hand,  '  that  he  had  loved  Hamilton  and  that  Hamilton 
had  loved  him/ 

To  subjects  of  King  Edward  the  history  of  the  Union  of 
the  States  should  be  of  profound  interest  at  the  present 
time.  Under  many  aspects  the  problems  in  America  at 
the  end  of  the  eighteenth  century  and  in  the  British 
Empire  at  the  beginning  of  the  twentieth  bear  a  startling 
likeness  to  each  other.  In  the  memoirs  of  the  chief  actors 
we  find  a  frequent  echo  of  our  own  phrases.  The  attitudes 
of  men,  according  to  their  various  temperaments,  are  the 
same.  There  are  the  same  enthusiasms  and  the  same 
suspicions ;  the  same  vehement  desires,  indignant  against 
all  the  race  of  sceptics ;  the  same  pleas  of  insuperable 
obstacles  and  the  imprudence  of  a  rash  initiative.  A 
slightly  formal  and  old-fashioned  speech  enhances  rather 
than  conceals  the  likeness,  as  the  portrait  of  an  ancestor  in 
prim  cap  or  flowing  periwig  startles  the  beholder  by  its 
resemblance  to  some  familiar  youthful  face. 

This  romantic  influence  is  not  without  its  danger,  and  is 


INTRODUCTION  7 

apt  to  work  in  our  minds  with  an  excessive  vivacity,  luring 
us  too  readily  to  the  conclusion  that  history  is  about  to 
repeat  itself.  It  is  well  to  remember  that  when  the  gods 
arrange  the  pieces  upon  their  broad  chessboard  in  situations 
which  surprise  us  by  their  similarity  to  the  order  of  some 
previous  game,  it  is  commonly  with  the  whimsical  intention 
of  solving  the  problem  in  an  altogether  different  manner. 
Viewed  with  less  excitement,  the  things  themselves  lose  not 
a  little  of  their  likeness,  and  important  differences  appear. 
"We  are  therefore  well  advised  if  we  are  wary  and  do  not 
assume  too  much. 

To  say,  at  the  present  crisis,  that  the  study  of  American 
history  may  prove  useful  and  suggestive,  is  so  obvious  a 
reflection  that  it  can  only  be  excused  by  the  almost  uni- 
versal omission  to  undertake  the  labour;  but  to  conclude 
that  the  Union  of  the  States  is  a  precedent  governing  our 
own  case  would  be  idle  talk.  For  it  is  the  business  of  the 
British  people  to-day,  as  it  has  been  for  four  centuries  past, 
not  to  follow  precedents,  but  to  make  them.  If  it  were 
possible  to  find  among  the  lives  of  the  nations  any  parallel 
to  the  British  Empire,  it  might  be  different;  but  no  parallel 
exists  in  any  records  for  so  diverse  and  marvellous  a  growth. 

One  of  the  chief  merits  of  the  Americans  when  they 
framed  their  constitution  was  their  earnest  determination 
to  consider  the  facts  of  their  own  case  before  all  else,  and 
their  firm  refusal  to  be  led  blindfold  either  by  history  or 
logic ;  and  these,  perhaps,  are  the  only  rules  which  can  be 
recommended  absolutely  for  every  quandary,  the  only 
examples  which  it  is  safe  to  follow  to  the  letter.  Our 
eternal  warning  should  be  the  Chinese  tailor  who  copies 
a  coat  even  to  its  patches.  When  we  begin  to  grope  and 
rummage  for  precedents,  our  decadence  cannot  be  long 
delayed.  The  situation  must  be  viewed  by  each  race  and 
generation  boldly  through  its  own  eyes,  not  timorously 


8  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

with  a  forefinger  in  the  guide-book  of  history.  For  though 
we  turn  over  pages  never  so  industriously  to  discover  how 
foreigners  or  our  own  kinsmen  have  acted  in  circumstances 
somewhat  alike,  we  shall  never  arrive  at  any  ready-made 
solution  of  our  difficulty. 

Nor,  on  the  other  hand,  is  it  the  highest  wisdom  to 
entertain  an  undue  reverence  for  our  own  institutions,  for 
though  these  are  an  elastic  garment,  there  may  come  a  time 
when  they  will  no  longer  serve.  It  is  a  vain  hope  that  by 
cheerfully  ignoring  danger  we  shall  avoid  it.  It  is  rash  to 
assume  that  a  constitution  must  always  grow,  and  that 
it  can  never  be  made;  or  that,  by  spiriting  and  conjuring 
over  the  respectable  antiquity  of  the  Privy  Council,  we  shall 
be  able  to  convert  the  loose  confederation  of  our  Empire 
into  a  firm  union. 


BOOK    I 

THE  INDEPENDENCE  OF  THE  STATES 
A.D.  1757-1783 


Character  is  of  a  stellar  and  undiminishable  greatness.  What  others 
effect  by  talents  or  by  eloquence,  this  man  accomplishes  by  some  mag- 
netism. 'Half  his  strength  he  put  not  forth.'  His  victories  are  by 
demonstration  of  superiority,  and  not  by  crossing  of  bayonets.  He 
conquers,  because  his  arrival  alters  the  face  of  affairs.  '  0  Me  I  how 
did  you  know  that  Hercules  was  a  God  ? '  *  Because,'  answered  Me, 
(I  was  content  the  moment  my  eyes  fell  on  him.  When  I  beheld 
'  Theseus,  I  desired  that  I  might  see  him  offer  battle,  or  at  least  guide 
1  his  horses  in  the  chariot  race  ;  but  Hercules  did  not  wait  for  a  contest ; 
'  he  conquered  whether  he  stood,  or  walked,  or  sat,  or  whatever  thing  he 
f  did.'  Man  ordinarily  a  pendant  to  events,  only  half  attached,  and 
that  awkwardly,  to  the  world  he  lives  in,  in  these  examples  appears  to 
share  the  life  of  things,  and  to  be  an  expression  of  the  same  laws  which 
control  the  tides  and  the  sun,  numbers  and  quantities. — EMERSON. 


BOOK    I 

THE  INDEPENDENCE  OF  THE  STATES 

CHAPTER  I 

Boyhood 

THE  childhood  of  Alexander  Hamilton  ended  when  he  A.D.  1757 
was  eleven  years  of  age.  For  four  years  he  was  a  store- 
keeper's clerk  at  St.  Croix,  in  the  Leeward  Islands;  for 
three  he  was  a  college  student  at  New  York;  for  six  he 
was  a  soldier  in  the  War  of  Independence.  After  these 
experiences,  at  the  age  of  twenty-five,  he  was  admitted  to 
the  bar.  His  professional  career  covered  a  period  of  twenty- 
two  years ;  but  during  five  of  these  he  was  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury  in  General  Washington's  cabinet,  and  withdrew 
entirely  from  practice  during  the  term  of  his  office.  He 
was  killed  in  a  duel  at  the  age  of  forty- seven,  when  his 
fame  as  a  lawyer  stood  at  its  highest. 

These  are  the  main  divisions  of  his  life;  but  the  bare 
catalogue  gives  an  incomplete  idea  of  his  activity.  While 
he  was  a  student  he  wrote  and  spoke  so  as  to  produce  a 
considerable  influence  upon  the  whole  State  of  New  York. 
While  he  was  a  soldier  he  was  also  an  organiser,  a  diplo- 
matist and  a  writer  of  despatches  that  have  a  world-wide 
celebrity.  From  the  time  he  left  the  army  and  joined  the 
bar  until  he  became  head  of  the  most  arduous  department 
of  government,  his  energies  were  more  deeply  engaged  in 

promoting  the  Union  of  the  States  than  in  the  practice  of 

11 


12  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1757  the  law.  From  the  date  of  his  retirement  from  the  cabinet 
until  his  death  he  was  at  the  same  time  leader  of  the  bar 
and  the  acknowledged  chief  of  a  powerful  political  party. 
He  was  a  boy  for  eleven  years  only.  Perhaps  it  would  be 
truer  to  say  of  him  that  he  was  a  boy  throughout  the 
whole  of  his  marvellous  career. 

For  youth  was  the  distinguishing  note  of  his  career. 
His  triumph  was  the  triumph  of  youth:  his  failure  the 
failure  of  youth.  His  personal  charm  and  exuberant  con- 
fidence did  not  follow  the  normal  course,  mellowing  in 
middle  life  into  a  genial  tolerance,  a  quieter  wisdom,  a  less 
vehement  but  more  masterful  efficiency.  The  change  was 
in  a  contrary  direction.  He  beheld  mankind  hobbling  and 
hurrying  after  impossible  compromises,  striving  timidly  to 
keep  the  peace  among  their  ideas  by  smiling  with  an  equal 
favour  upon  the  most  irreconcilable  and  deadly  enemies. 
It  is  true  that  under  this  disappointment  his  courage  never 
flagged.  His  efforts  were  as  heroic  at  the  end  as  at  the 
beginning.  But  his  heart  was  filled  with  a  fierce  impatience 
and  an  anger  which  broke  away  at  times  from  his  control. 
Like  a  boy  who  has  dreamed  a  dream,  but  cannot  prevail 
with  men  to  accept  it  in  all  its  glorious  symmetry,  he  came 
to  despair  of  the  consequences  to  a  world  containing  so  much 
obstruction  and  so  many  fools. 

It  is  a  rare  occurrence  under  popular  government  for  a 
young  statesman  to  hold  the  predominant  power,  for  the 
policy  of  a  nation  to  be  moulded  by  the  thoughts  of  a  fresh 
and  eager  mind,  and  executed  by  the  vigour  of  a  spirit  not 
yet  tamed  to  an  immoderate  reverence  for  obstacles.  For 
where  the  people  hold  the  ultimate  control,  a  patient 
dexterity,  with  which  no  man  was  ever  born,  has  in  the  long 
game  of  politics  an  undue  advantage.  Youth,  with  a  wise 
instinct,  abstains  as  a  rule  from  conspicuous  activity  in 
serious  matters  until  it  has  acquired  the  craft  which  is  the 


THE  INDEPENDENCE  OF  THE  STATES         13 

necessary  complement  of  its  force,  and  when  it  bursts  at  A.D.  1757 
last  upon  the  admiration  of  its  fellow-citizens,  has  entered 
into  the  shadowless  and  dusty  realm  of  middle  age. 

This  unfortunate  exclusion  of  youth  is  to  be  lamented, 
for  age  is  too  considerate  of  rubbish.  Like  a  housewife  in 
her  lumber-room,  it  shrinks  from  the  wise  sacrifice  of  useless 
possessions,  pleading  ever  that  at  some  future  day  they  may 
recover  a  portion  of  their  former  value.  The  destructiveness 
and  extravagance  of  youth  are  in  many  cases  the  best 
economy  and  the  wisest  defence  of  a  nation.  The  perfect 
government  would  maintain  the  balance  of  youth  and  age, 
of  confidence  and  experience,  no  less  carefully  than  the 
balance  of  poor  and  rich,  of  force  and  breeding,  of  honesty 
and  honour.  The  embargo  on  youth  impoverishes  the 
quality  of  statesmanship ;  but  how  to  remedy  the  evil  is  a 
problem  which  still  seeks  an  answer.  All  that  is  most 
excellent  in  popular  government,  the  wide  interest  in  public 
affairs,  the  sense  of  duty,  the  pursuit  of  a  worthy  ambition, 
tend  to  swell  the  ranks  of  old  age ;  while  each  fresh  com- 
plexity of  the  conditions  and  growth  of  the  great  machine 
entrenches  the  veterans  more  firmly  in  their  advantage. 

Hamilton  was  not  merely  a  good  soldier,  a  great  lawyer, 
a  statesman  of  rare  and  exceptional  splendour,  but  also  a 
figure  of  deep  romantic  interest.  Such  an  endowment  is 
uncommon,  especially  in  Anglo-Saxon  communities,  where  a 
wise  absorption  in  a  single  activity  is  approved  by  public 
opinion,  and  any  variety  of  talents  is  viewed  askance.  But 
the  explanation  of  his  character  is  not  to  be  found  in  the 
dramatic  temperament.  Had  he  been  a  better  actor  he 
must  assuredly  have  been  a  more  successful  politician.  He 
was  as  heedless  of  all  matters  of  style  and  deportment  as  of 
his  popularity,  or  even  of  his  life.  Ever  intent  on  objects, 
he  followed  them  in  and  out  through  the  crowd  of  rapidly 
changing  events,  caring  infinitely  less  for  the  opinion  people 


14  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1757  formed  upon  his  personal  merits  than  for  the  ultimate 
success  of  his  pursuit.  Few  men,  filling  so  large  a  space  in 
history,  have  been  less  concerned  with  their  own  particular 
appearance  or  fame  in  the  pageant  of  affairs.  He  became  a 
soldier  upon  a  generous  impulse,  a  lawyer  for  a  living,  a 
statesman  because  it  was  the  strongest  passion  of  his  nature 
to  promote  union,  order  and  progress.  The  circumstances 
of  his  birth  and  of  his  death,  his  private  adventures  and 
the  publicity  that  political  malice  has  caused  them  to 
assume,  cannot  by  any  ingenuity  be  traced  to  a  disposition 
for  the  picturesque. 

To  pretend  that  he  had  no  joy  in  battle,  no  exultation  in 
victory,  would  be  absurd,  for  his  nature  was  frank  and 
vehement.  He  was  never  detached  and  seldom  reticent. 
To  endure  human  folly  in  patient  and  hopeful  expectation 
of  the  inevitable  reaction  was  contrary  to  his  character.  He 
had  no  hatred  of  limelight  nor  horror  of  applause,  but  both 
with  him  were  secondary  matters.  Throughout  his  whole 
life  the  paramount  motive  was  to  get  things  done,  not  to 
make  himself  a  great  fame  by  doing  things.  So  unusual  an 
ambition  has  caused  him  to  be  suspected  of  an  inordinate 
subtlety.  To  the  common  politician  whose  main  sincerity 
is  his  determination  to  ride  into  popular  notice  on  the  back 
of  a  grievance  or  a  fit  of  hysterics,  such  an  attitude  is 
wholly  incredible.  He  cannot  fathom  the  depths  of  a 
spirit  that  loves  union,  and  order,  and  progress  for  their 
own  sakes,  and  seeks  power,  not  as  an  end  in  itself,  but  as 
a  means  to  the  accomplishment  of  a  vision.  And  yet,  to 
the  candid  reader  of  Hamilton's  life  and  writings,  nothing 
is  clearer  at  every  turn  than  that  he  came  to  enact  his  high 
and  notable  part  in  public  affairs  chiefly  because  it  seemed 
to  be  the  only  way  open  to  him  of  getting  the  work  done 
which  he  considered  essential  for  the  salvation  of  his 
adopted  country. 


THE  INDEPENDENCE  OF  THE  STATES         15 

Alexander  Hamilton  was  born  a  British  subject  in  the  A.D.  1757 
island  of  Nevis,  in  the  Leeward  Group,  on  the  llth  of  January 
1757.  On  both  sides  he  was  of  gentle  descent.1  His  father 
was  one  James  Hamilton,  a  younger  son  of  Hamilton  of 
Grange,  in  Lanarkshire ;  his  mother,  Kachel2  Faucette,  the 
daughter  of  a  Huguenot  emigrant.  Rachel  Faucette  had 
been  previously  married  to  a  Dane,  but  finding  her  life 
insupportable  had  left  him.3  Gossip  asserts  that,  divorce 
having  proved  to  be  impracticable,  she  took  the  law  into 
her  own  hands  and  accepted  James  Hamilton  as  her  second 
husband,  but  without  the  blessing  of  the  Church.  While 
we  cannot  accept  Alexander  Hamilton's  illegitimacy 4  to  be 
a  matter  of  certainty,  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  it  was 
believed  in  by  his  contemporaries,  and  was  made  the  subject 
of  sneering  references  in  the  correspondence  of  his  political 
enemies.5  His  father  was  a  merchant;  an  amiable  man, 
but  feckless  and  unfortunate,  so  that  almost  from  infancy 
the  boy  owed  his  support  to  relatives  of  his  mother. 

In  the  small  and  leisured  society  of  a  sugar  island  the 
circumstances  of  a  family  can  hardly  have  been  a  close 
secret  from  its  neighbours.  Even  if  no  stain  attached  to 
Hamilton's  birth,  his  poverty  and  dependence  were  obvious 
to  all  men.  He  was  a  boy  of  strange  precocity  and  a 
remarkable  intelligence,  sensitive,  affectionate  and  deeply 
attached  to  his  mother — a  brilliant  and  beautiful  woman 
who  died  while  he  was  still  a  child.  In  temper  he  was 
fiery  and  passionate,  but  delicate  in  frame  and  puny  of 
stature.  With  such  a  constitution  of  mind  and  body,  and 
in  such  circumstances  of  poverty  and  dependence,  it  needed 
something  greater  than  an  ordinary  hero  to  emerge  unhurt. 

The   most   remarkable  fact  about    his  boyhood  is  the 

1  Appendix  I.  2  The  Christian  name  is  given  by  Mrs.  Atherton. 

*  History,  i.  pp.  40-43.     4  Lodge's  Hamilton,  Appendix,  pp.  285-297. 
6  Stunner's  Hamilton,  p.  1. 


16  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1769  early  development  of  his  character.  Before  he  was  sixteen 
^Erft  12  he  had  served  an  apprenticeship  to  practical  affairs  in 
the  warehouse,  or  store,  of  Nicholas  Cruger,  a  substantial 
merchant  of  St.  Croix,  by  whom  he  was  sent  to  other 
islands  on  important  business,  and  left  in  complete  control 
of  the  staff,  correspondence  and  undertaking,  during  the 
prolonged  absence  of  his  master  in  the  Northern  colonies. 
There  is  a  letter1  of  this  period  to  the  firm's  agent  in 
New  York  in  reference  to  the  cargo  and  return  cargo  of 
the  sloop  Thunderbolt,  which  shows  more  than  a  mere 
facility  in  business  forms  and  phrases.  What  most  impresses 
us  in  the  document  is  the  careful  foresight  and  arrange- 
ments of  which  it  forms  the  record.  It  is  the  letter  of 
one  who  feels  his  responsibilities,  but  is  not  overburdened 
by  their  weight. 

Another  letter  of  an  even  earlier  date  has  a  wider  celebrity, 
but  in  spite  of  its  precocity  of  language  is  of  less  value  as 
illuminating  his  character.  It  is  addressed  to  his  school- 
fellow Stevens.2  "To  confess  my  weakness,  Ned,  my 
'  ambition  is  prevalent,  so  that  I  contemn  the  grovelling 
'  condition  of  a  clerk  or  the  like,  to  which  my  fortune,  etc., 
'  condemns  me,  and  would  willingly  risk  my  life,  though 
'  not  my  character,  to  exalt  my  station.  I  am  confident, 
'  Ned,  that  my  youth  excludes  me  from  any  hopes  of 
'  immediate  preferment ;  nor  do  I  desire  it ;  but  I  mean 
'  to  preface  the  way  for  futurity.  I  'm  no  philosopher,  you 
'  see,  and  may  justly  be  said  to  build  castles  in  the  air ;  my 
'  folly  makes  me  ashamed,  and  I  beg  you  11  conceal  it ;  yet, 
'  Neddy,  we  have  seen  such  schemes  successful  when  the 
'  projector  is  constant.  I  shall  conclude  saying,  I  wish  there 
'  was  a  war." 

Here  indeed  is  the  accustomed  language  of  the  infant 
prodigy.  Both  words  and  sentiments  are  striking,  but  they 
1  Works,  ix.  pp.  38-39.  a  Ibid.  ix.  pp.  37-38. 


THE  INDEPENDENCE  OF  THE  STATES         17 

are  the  convention  of  youthful  genius.    They  reflect  a  glin   A.D.  1769 
of  the  dramatic  from  the  great  light  of  subsequent  events ;         * 12 
but  are  really  less  remarkable  than  the  quiet,  executive 
letter  on  freight  and  accounts,  staves,  hogsheads,  mules, 
and  the  armament  which  is  desirable  in  view  of  the  '  Guarda 
Costas  which  are  said  to  swarm  upon  the  coast/ 

We  may  believe  him  to  have  been  sincere  in  his  contempt 
for  '  the  grovelling  condition  of  a  clerk/  but  he  soon  had 
reason  to  bless  the  results  of  his  service.  For  a  boy  loving 
books  and  conscious  of  an  extraordinary  facility  in  the  use 
of  language,  there  is  a  constant  danger  that  his  intelligence 
may  be  brought  under  the  domination  of  words.  At  the 
most  impressionable  period  of  his  life  Hamilton  learned  the 
hard  lesson  that  the  finest  phrases,  though  they  may  tem- 
porarily sway  the  dispositions  of  men,  will  never  alter  a 
single  fact  of  their  existence ;  that  the  most  fluent  explana- 
tion will  never  wipe  out  the  ill  results  of  a  bad  bargain, 
a  want  of  foresight  or  a  misplaced  confidence.  Through- 
out the  whole  of  his  writings  we  are  conscious  of  this 
quality — that  he  was  ever  striving  to  express  in  language 
which  admitted  of  no  misunderstanding,  ideas  which  he  had 
already  brought  to  the  test  of  things.  It  is  a  rare  quality 
in  any  man,  but  more  than  usually  rare  in  lawyers  and 
politicians,  never  to  allow  words  a  part  in  completing  the 
fabric  of  an  imperfect  thought.  The  experience  gained 
in  Nicholas  Cruger's  store  was  of  great  value  in  itself; 
but  the  habit  which  it  imposed  upon  his  mind  of  going 
always  to  the  facts  was  immeasurably  beyond  all  other 
benefits. 

With  so  much  knowledge  of  his  temperament  and 
circumstances  it  is  natural  to  picture  an  austere  youth: 
courageous  certainly,  but  somewhat  bitter  and  sardonic, 
narrow  in  his  sympathies,  chary  of  his  confidence.  But 
early  responsibility  failed  to  give  him  even  a  grave  face. 

B 


18  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1772  The  imaginary  portrait  is  wholly  at  fault.  The  real  picture 
15  shows  a  boy  of  a  gay  and  affectionate  disposition,  bubbling 
over  with  hope,  naively  exulting  in  the  consciousness  of  his 
powers,  winning  friends  wherever  he  goes  and  keeping  them 
without  an  effort  or  a  calculation,  merely  by  the  charm  and 
sincerity  of  his  spirit. 

His  'grovelling'  clerkship  ended  and  he  became  a  student, 
as  the  result  of  a  hurricane.1  Shortly  after  midsummer 
1772  the  Leeward  Islands  were  devastated  by  a  tempest 
of  remarkable  violence.  Hamilton  wrote  a  description 
which  was  published  anonymously  in  the  adjacent  island 
of  St.  Kitts.  The  principal  personages  were  impressed  by 
its  vigorous  merits,  and  the  authorship  was  soon  discovered. 
It  was  felt  that  a  boy  of  so  great  talent  deserved  to  have  a 
chance  given  him  in  the  world.  His  proud  relatives  were 
not  hard  to  persuade.  Their  kindness  supplied  the  funds 
necessary  for  a  college  education,  and,  armed  with  intro- 
ductions from  his  friend  Dr.  Knox,  a  Presbyterian  minister 
he  set  out  for  New  York  a  few  weeks  later.  The  vessel 
caught  fire  on  the  voyage,  but  the  flames  being  got  under 
she  landed  her  passengers  in  safety  at  Boston  Harbour 
sometime  in  the  month  of  October. 

Hamilton  appears  to  have  directed  his  course  of  studies 
without  the  aid  of  any  guardian.  His  first  step  was  to 
enter  himself  at  a  grammar  school  where  he  remained 
for  a  year.  He  then  presented  himself  to  the  head  of 
Princeton  College  and  underwent  a  private  examination. 
We  may  presume  it  was  entirely  satisfactory,  seeing  that 
he  thereupon  proposed  to  the  principal,  and  the  principal 
gravely  recommended  to  the  trustees,  that  he  should  not  be 
fettered  by  the  usual  regulations  as  to  years,  but  should 
be  allowed  to  pass  through  the  curriculum  as  rapidly  as  his 
progress  justified.2  The  trustees  not  being  amenable  he 

1  Life,  pp.  6  and  7.  2  Ibid.  p.  9. 


THE  INDEPENDENCE  OF  THE  STATES         19 

entered  at  King's  College  (Columbia),  which  was  ready  to  A.D.  1773 
take  him  upon  his  own  terms.     Here  he  remained  for  two    Mr' ie 
years,  working  with  an  extraordinary  swiftness  and   in- 
dustry, but  finding  time  notwithstanding  for  college  debates, 
political  pamphlets,  the  writing  of  verses  and  for  general 
society.    He  appears  also  to  have  given  much  of  his  time 
and  thought  to  religion,  and,  by  the  testimony  of  his  friend 
Robert  Troup,  was  an  earnest  believer  in  the  doctrines  of 
Christianity. 

The  plan  of  his  education  was  therefore  a  curious  inver- 
sion. After  a  training  in  affairs  he  submitted  himself  to  an 
academic  course,  and  the  unusual  order  of  events  had  at 
least  this  advantage,  that  he  knew  with  greater  clearness 
than  most  students  what  he  wished  to  learn,  and  why  he 
wished  to  learn  it. 


CHAPTER    II 

The  Quarrel  with  Great  Britain 

IN  the  autumn  of  1773,  within  a  few  months  of  Hamilton's 
enrolment  as  a  student  at  King's  College,  Boston  Harbour 
was  black  with  tea.  He  visited  friends  in  that  town  in  the 
following  spring,  and  returned  to  New  York  a  convert  to 
the  policy  of  resistance.1 

The  true  importance  of  Hamilton  is  not  in  the  events 
which  led  to  the  great  rebellion,  but  in  those  which  flowed 
from  it.  It  would  therefore  be  out  of  place  to  enter  upon 
an  elaborate  discussion  of  the  causes  of  the  war;  but  in 
attempting  even  the  briefest  summary  of  the  situation,  we 
are  met  at  once  by  the  difficulty  which  arises  when  popular 
opinion  has  accepted  and  embalmed  an  explanation  which  is 
not  in  accordance  with  the  facts. 

1  Life,  p.  25. 


20  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1773  '  The  Revolution,'  it  has  been  said, '  was  merely  an  episode 
Mi.  16  -n  Irtish  history,  but  it  is  the  American  epic.'  The  early 
chroniclers  of  the  Republic  abounded  in  pious  panegyric. 
They  chanted  paeans,  and  pointed  morals,  and  delivered 
philippics  against  tyranny  and  oppression  without  check 
or  contradiction;  for  in  England  the  minds  of  men  were 
turned  away  from  a  distasteful  subject  to  matters  of  more 
immediate  and  absorbing  interest.  A  war  which  has  failed 
is  a  dreary  topic,  and  in  the  events  which  crowded  upon 
Europe  at  the  end  of  the  eighteenth  century,  achievements 
of  a  contrasting  glory  were  not  far  to  seek. 

In  these  propitious  circumstances,  the  crude  theory  that 
right  lay  wholly  upon  one  side,  and  wrong  upon  the  other, 
was  boldly  put  forward.  So  careless  were  our  ancestors  in 
the  matter,  that  the  growth  of  this  heroic  legend  has  had  a 
free  course  until,  in  popular  discussions  upon  both  sides  of 
the  Atlantic,  it  is  now  usually  assumed  to  be  outside  the 
region  of  criticism.  The  world  is  required  to  believe  that 
in  1776  the  majority  of  Americans  were  good  men,  and  the 
majority  of  Britons  bad  ones;  that  the  former  were  liberal 
and  intelligent,  the  latter  dull  and  furious ;  that  the  leaders 
in  the  one  case  were  disinterested  patriots,  in  the  other  the 
corrupt  sycophants  of  a  tyrannical  madman,  and  that,  in 
Washington's  vigorous  words,  all  loyalists  and  Tories  were 
merely  '  abominable  pests  of  society.'  This  opinion  in  time 
came  to  be  accepted,  like  a  quack  medicine,  mainly  because 
it  was  well  advertised.  The  plain  man  was  captivated  by 
the  simplicity  of  a  statement  which  his  intelligence  could 
grasp  almost  without  an  effort.  Fluent  moralists  among  us, 
writing  with  no  more  serious  motive  than  to  celebrate  the 
triumph  of  their  own  party  principles,  found  the  explanation 
admirably  suited  to  their  purpose,  and  gave  their  solemn 
blessing  and  approval  to  the  myth  which  our  kinsmen  had 
invented,  as  Romans  before  them  had  devised  the  legend  of 


THE  INDEPENDENCE  OF  THE  STATES         21 

Romulus,  Remus  and  the  she-wolf  to  adorn  the  illustrious  A.D.  1773 
foundation  of  the  city.  T' lf 

The  balance  of  legal  right  was  almost  as  plainly  in 
favour  of  the  British  contentions  as  the  balance  of  common- 
sense  was  against  them.  The  Supreme  Courts  of  Appeal  in 
this  country  and  the  States,  sitting  in  bane  for  a  new  trial 
of  the  issues  involved,  would  probably  be  forced  to  decide, 
as  a  matter  of  law,  that  upon  most  of  the  essential  points 
our  ancestors  were  technically  in  the  right.  On  the  other 
hand,  a  jury  of  men  of  the  world  would  almost  as  certainly 
conclude  that  imprudence  rarely  steered  a  more  perilous 
course  or  followed  it  in  a  spirit  less  likely  to  escape  ship- 
wreck. It  is  difficult  to  believe  that  legal  right  really 
mattered  a  great  deal  to  any  one.  The  fundamental,  para- 
mount, determining  cause  of  the  war  with  Britain  was  the 
need  of  getting  free  from  restraint,  and  this  need  was 
realised  rather  by  a  kind  of  instinct  than  by  any  reasoning. 
It  drew  its  main  force  much  more  from  a  vague  fear  of 
what  might  happen  in  the  future  than  from  any  material 
damage  or  political  injury  that  had  actually  occurred. 

As  things  then  stood,  the  simplest  and  most  obvious  way 
of  dealing  with  the  difficulty  seemed  to  the  one  side  to  be 
coercion,  to  the  other  side  revolt.  On  the  one  hand  there 
was  a  new  country,  vigorous  and  remote,  possessing  enormous 
resources  of  which  it  was  at  least  dimly  conscious,  eager, 
hopeful  and  impatient  in  pursuit  of  its  destiny;  on  the 
other  an  old,  dignified,  slow- moving,  sceptical  people,  lack- 
ing certainly  in  sympathy,  but  lacking  most  of  all  in 
knowledge  of  any  circumstances  but  its  own.  By  the 
constitution,  imperial  sovereignty  was  in  the  hands  of  the 
second,  and  the  real  danger  of  the  situation  lay  in  the 
mixture  of  sense  of  duty,  selfish  interest  and  ignorance 
which  the  British  cabinet  brought  into  its  attempt  to  rule 
over  an  imoetuous  subject  at  such  a  distance  in  time  and 


22  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1773  miles.  But,  granting  so  much,  we  may  dismiss  without 
^T>  lf  ceremony  all  the  bogeys  with  corked  eyebrows  which  the 
patriotism  of  early  American  historians  has  constructed. 
The  evil  was  hindrance,  not  tyranny;  vexatious,  but  not 
ill-meant,  delays ;  a  tendency  to  strangle  colonial  ambitions 
and  to  impede  action  by  processes  and  references,  cere- 
monies and  forms,  by  disparaging  criticisms  and  buckets 
of  elder-brotherly  cold  water.  But  a  settled  policy,  even 
serious  isolated  acts,  of  tyranny,  as  tyranny  has  generally 
been  understood,  never  did  happen  and  never  could  have 
happened. 

It  is  impossible  to  conduct  successfully  the  infinitely  less 
complex  affairs  of  an  ordinary  business  from  a  centre 
separated  by  great  distances  from  its  branches,  unless  the 
manager  be  given  so  free  a  hand  that  he  becomes  in  fact 
the  predominant  partner  within  his  own  sphere.  The  British 
king  and  people  failed  to  realise  this  essential  limitation  of 
their  sovereignty.  It  was  no  wonder,  for  no  country  in  the 
world  had  ever  realised  it  before  them.  The  essence  of  the 
difficulty  was  never  clearly  stated  by  either  side,  so  little 
was  it  grasped  by  reason,  so  much  was  it  a  matter  of  mere 
instinct.  Americans  felt  that  a  free  hand  was  a  necessity,  and 
that  under  existing  circumstances  they  would  never  obtain 
it.  It  seemed  to  them  that  they  were  not  understood,  which 
was  true,  and  that  they  could  never  hope  to  be  understood, 
which  was  probable ;  for  it  was  impossible  at  that  date  to 
foresee  ocean  greyhounds  and  Marconi  installations,  and  a 
system  of  news — truthful,  rapid  and  cheap — which  at  the 
present  time  seems  not  beyond  reasonable  hope.  When  it  is 
a  question  of  preserving  or  accomplishing  a  political  union, 
it  is  time,  not  distance,  that  is  the  great  obstacle.  The  swift 
interchange  of  thought  and  the  simultaneous  impulses  which 
spring  therefrom  are  even  greater  forces  for  binding  nations 
together  than  are  safety  and  speed  of  travel  to  and  fro. 


THE  INDEPENDENCE  OF  THE  STATES         23 

The  two  nations,  therefore,  came  in  the  end  to  a  A.D.  1773 
desperate  struggle,  the  one  side  for  its  independence,  the  ' 
other  for  its  dignity,  and  being  for  the  most  part  of  the 
Anglo-Saxon  stock,  they  brought  up  their  batteries  and 
engaged  in  a  solemn  and  interminable  argument  on  the 
principles  of  constitutional  law.  Beyond  sharpening  the 
wits  of  the  disputants  and  improving  the  education  of  their 
readers,  this  long-range  duel  of  claims  and  counter-claims 
served  no  important  purpose  and  has  needlessly  obscured 
the  issue  for  future  generations.  In  great  events  it  is 
always  well  to  look  for  the  idea,  and  the  idea  in  this  case 
was  neither  legal  right  nor  private  rights,  was  not  even 
freedom,  but  only  independence. 

The  American  loyalists  or  Tories  suffered  greater  evils  and 
showed  a  finer  judgment  than  either  Parliament  or  Congress ; 
but  as  loyalty,  like  treachery,  bears  a  certain  relation  to  the 
issue  of  any  struggle,  the  virtues  of  these  men  have  rarely 
received  a  fit  acknowledgment.  They  failed  in  their 
endeavour.  The  great  Washington  denounced  them  in  the 
harsh  terms  which  have  been  already  quoted.  The  epic 
required  that  they  should  be  painted  black.  Consequently 
they  have  been  set  down  for  the  most  part  as  sordid 
schemers,  and  for  the  rest  as  unreasoning  fanatics  moved  by 
a  spirit  of  impossible  loyalty.  But  the  motive  of  the  Ameri- 
cans who  stood  out  against  their  fellow-colonists  was  neither 
a  private  advantage  nor  a  sentimental  attachment.  Their 
aim  was  the  security  of  an  inheritance,  and  they  judged  any 
attempt  to  sever  or  divide  it  to  be  the  greatest  of  all  political 
crimes.  The  Empire  had  been  built  up  with  painful  effort,  and, 
in  their  opinion,  a  people  that  was  worthy  of  it  would  have 
endured,  in  order  to  maintain  it,  much  greater  sufferings 
than  had  ever  been  inflicted  by  British  statesmen.  Oppres- 
sion and  injustice  were  evils  which  time  would  surely  abate. 
The  Tories  had  a  settled  belief  in  their  countrymen  on  both 


24  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1773  sides  of  the  ocean,  and  foresaw  what  is  obviously  the  truth, 
that  when  the  temper  of  the  disputants  should  have  cooled, 
the  wrongs  and  grievances  would  gradually  disappear.  They 
were  people  of  the  old  school,  who  considered  patience  to  be 
the  final  test  of  national  greatness.  They  had  a  sound 
instinct  of  statesmanship,  a  memory  of  the  slow  movement 
and  ultimate  triumph  of  England  under  the  Tudors ;  and 
they  were  content,  as  their  ancestors  had  been  content,  who 
lived,  and  fought,  and  grumbled  under  the  two  Henrys  and 
Elizabeth,  to  endure  obstruction  and  delay,  regarding  these 
things  even  with  a  measure  of  gratitude  as  a  precaution 
imposed  by  Providence  in  order  that  the  mortar  might  have 
time  to  set.  They  abhorred  the  idea  of  a  jerry-built  nation. 
The  desire  of  their  hearts  was  a  British  North  America ;  the 
chief  of  their  fears  was  a  foreign  conquest,  settlement,  or 
intrusion. 

Foreign  interference,  as  their  terrors  painted  it,  has  been 
successfully  withstood,  but  it  must  be  remembered  that 
within  a  few  years  of  the  foundation  of  the  new  republic  the 
attempt  was  made  and  reached  the  height  of  a  serious 
danger.  The  great  majority  of  the  citizens  were  ready  to 
welcome  it.  The  leaders  of  the  popular  party  even  invited 
it,  and  it  was  prevented  only  by  the  efforts  of  Washington, 
Hamilton  and  a  few  others  who  were  covered  with  oppro- 
brium as  their  reward.  But  if  in  one  form  the  disaster  of 
foreign  influence  has  been  avoided,  almost  by  a  miracle,  it 
is  worth  considering  whether  in  another  the  fears  of  the 
loyalists  have  not  been  to  some  extent  realised.  A  cosmo- 
politan America,  though  they  did  not  foresee  the  possibility, 
would  certainly  have  been  distasteful  to  their  principles. 
They  did  not  desire  a  huge  immigration  of  strange  people, 
and  would  hardly  have  accepted  the  mere  predominance  of 
the  English  tongue  throughout  the  union  as  a  proof  that 
their  aim  of  a  British  North  America  had  been  realised. 


THE  INDEPENDENCE  OF  THE  STATES         25 

The  central  idea  of  these  Tories  was  the  preservation  at  A.D.  1773 
all  costs  of  an  existing  union,  and  their  failure  to  achieve  it 
was  due  no  less  to  the  raw  impatience  of  their  fellow- colonists, 
than  to  the  blundering  management  of  the  British  Cabinet, 
which  always  pushed  things  to  extremes  at  the  wrong 
moment.  Between  these  headstrong  opponents  there  was 
no  possibility  of  accommodation.  Every  act  of  either  party, 
after  disagreement  first  arose,  appeared  to  the  other  in  lurid 
colours.  The  Canadian  War  had  left  a  legacy  of  ill-feeling 
and  distrust.  The  British  considered,  with  some  reason,  that 
the  colonials  had  often  shirked  their  fair  share  of  danger 
and  hardship ;  that  their  governments  had  been  niggardly, 
cheese-paring  and  ungenerous  in  the  matter  of  supplies;  that 
they  had  created  difficulties  and  sought  a  profit  at  a  time  of 
national  crisis.  They  argued  further  that  the  taking  of 
Quebec  and  the  total  expulsion  of  the  French  from  the 
north  and  west  of  the  continent  were  of  much  greater  benefit 
and  moment  to  Americans  than  to  Englishmen.  The 
colonies  had  been  preserved  from  the  imminent  danger  of  a 
French  envelopment,  their  borders  had  been  placed  in  a 
position  of  comparative  security  from  the  instigated  raids 
of  ferocious  savages,  mainly  by  British  arms  and  treasure. 
As  a  consequence,  the  indignant  Briton  viewed  the  American 
as  a  creature  of  the  blackest  ingratitude,  canting  about  his 
rights,  like  a  fraudulent  bankrupt,  in  order  to  escape  the 
payment  of  his  just  debts. 

The  colonial  opinion  of  the  mother  country  was  equally 
unflattering,  and  probably  equally  just.  The  colonists 
despised  the  home  Government  for  its  lack  of  foresight, 
knowledge  of  conditions  and  estimate  of  difficulties.  The 
British  officer,  who  is  apt  upon  occasions  to  be  wanting  in 
tact,  had  not  brought  any  exceptional  qualities  of  efficiency 
tr  resource  to  reduce  the  balance  of  his  social  imperfec- 
tions. In  consequence,  the  colonial  picture  of  his  patronising 


26  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1773  kinsman  represented  him  as  a  swaggering  bully,  bloated 
^ET.  16  yfifa  a  fatuous  and  misplaced  self-confidence,  who  misunder- 
stood everything  and  everybody,  and  by  reason  of  his 
natural  endowment  of  stupidity,  was  destined  in  the  nature 
of  things  to  continue  to  misunderstand  until  the  end  of 
time. 

The  old  country  was  wounded  in  its  feelings,  the  new 
country  in  its  pride,  and  both  doubtless  with  much  reason ; 
but  if  all  the  evil  that  each  thought  of  the  other  had  been 
true,  it  was  still  entirely  unimportant.  There  are  moments 
in  the  happiest  history  of  the  best  husbands  and  the  most 
perfect  wives  when  the  estimate  is  equally  black;  but 
circumstances  being  favourable,  charity,  laughter  and  a 
true  sense  of  proportion  enter  in  to  set  the  matter  right. 
But  in  this  unfortunate  union  the  circumstances  were 
unfavourable,  and  time  only  widened  the  cleavage.  The 
difficulty  was  that  Britain  would  not  consent  to  a  partner- 
ship, which  was  the  only  solution,  but  insisted  upon  a 
dependency.  The  American  colonists  therefore  hardened 
their  hearts  and  would  accept  nothing  short  of  indepen- 
dence. 

Raw  feelings  alone  will  never  make  a  great  revolution. 
They  are  but  light  and  trivial  breezes.  Blowing  with  the 
current  they  would  hardly  have  raised  a  ripple,  but  blowing 
against  it  they  covered  the  surface  with  a  thousand  white 
and  angry  waves,  which  overwhelmed  all  the  light  craft  of 
conciliation  and  drowned  every  peacemaker,  lay  and  official. 
Lord  Rockingham,  with  Burke  to  find  him  brains,  was  as 
helpless  as  Lord  North.  Every  act,  word  and  proposal  of 
every  negotiation  was  suspect  by  the  other  side.  Little 
things  not  worth  a  second  thought,  the  small  blunders  of 
obscure  officials,  old  wives'  grievances,  and  the  absurd  and 
unintended  wrongs  done  by  pompous  men,  elevated  them- 
selves into  national  questions,  and  became  the  food  and 


THE  INDEPENDENCE  OF  THE  STATES         27 

nourishment  of  disputants  upon  constitutional  and  legal  A.D.  1773 
.  ,  ,  MT.IQ 

right. 

We  may  dismiss  the  theory  of  malign  intriguers  who 
perverted  the  judgment  and  poisoned  the  affections  of  the 
American  people.  The  misrepresentations  of  Samuel  Adams, 
the  craftiness  of  Franklin,  the  heroics  of  Henry,  and  the 
phrases  of  Jefferson,  were  no  more  the  cause  of  the  rebellion 
than  the  obstinacy  of  George  the  Third,  the  pedantry  of 
Grenville,  the  flippancy  of  Townshend,  the  indecency  of 
Wedderburn,  or  the  easy,  good-natured  facing-both-ways 
of  Lord  North.  We  have  been  inclined  to  dwell  too  much 
upon  the  defects  of  individual  men  and  to  attribute  too 
great  a  power  to  minor  influences,  which,  although  they 
exasperated  the  combatants,  could  never  have  caused  the 
combat  and  in  many  instances  were  merely  the  external 
phenomena  of  a  great  struggle. 


CHAPTER    III 

Early  Writings 

BY  his  own  account  Hamilton  started  as  a  loyalist,  and  was 
converted  to  the  popular  side  by  his  visit  to  Boston.1  His 
sympathies  were  always  aristocratic,  and  he  was  born  with 
a  reverence  for  tradition ;  but  his  strongest  instinct  was  for 
the  orderly  achievement  of  a  practical  end.  He  was  ever 
quick  to  make  up  his  mind,  and  having  come  to  a  decision, 
to  take  all  the  steps  needful  for  attaining  the  objects  of  his 
policy. 

In  the  month  of  July  (1774)  following  his  matriculation, 
a  great  meeting  was  held  *  in  the  fields '  with  the  purpose 
of  influencing  the  vote  of  New  York  in  the  election  of 

1  L\fet  p.  25. 


28  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1774  delegates  to  the  first  Continental  Congress.  It  was  a 
^T'  ^  popular  convocation,  and  had  the  advantage  of  a  political 
martyr  as  its  president.1  The  speeches  were  hearty  enough, 
but,  as  might  have  been  expected,  ignored  the  most  essential 
points  of  the  argument.  Hamilton,  instigated  thereto  by  his 
friends,  mounted  upon  the  platform,  and  supplied  the 
deficiencies.  He  was  a  young-looking  boy  of  seventeen,  and 
began  with  hesitation;  but  being  desperately  in  earnest, 
and  having  a  natural  gift  of  expression,  he  held  his 
audience,  gaining  confidence  as  he  proceeded.  "  His  mind 
'  warmed  with  the  theme,  his  energies  were  recovered; 
'  and,  after  a  discussion  clear,  cogent,  and  novel,  of  the 
'  great  principles  involved  in  the  controversy,  he  depicted 
'  in  glowing  colours  the  long-continued  and  long-endured 
'  oppressions  of  the  mother  country;  he  insisted  on  the 
'  duty  of  resistance,  pointed  to  the  means  and  certainty  of 
'  success,  and  described  the  waves  of  rebellion  sparkling 
*  with  fire,  and  washing  back  on  the  shores  of  England  the 
'  wrecks  of  her  power,  her  wealth,  and  her  glory." 2 

This  incident  has  a  great  celebrity,  and  we  can  well 
believe  it  all.  But  here  again  we  are  face  to  face  with  the 
infant  prodigy,  the  same  who  wrote  in  his  twelfth  year  to 
Ned  Stevens  that  'his  ambition  was  prevalent.'  Our 
astonishment  is  less  that  he  should  have  made  such  a  gifted 
speech,  than  that  having  made  it  he  was  ever  heard  of  again. 

Of  a  different  character  altogether  from  this  incident  are 
his  pamphlets,  which  were  printed  in  quick  succession 
between  the  end  of  the  same  year  and  the  midsummer 
following.  Before  Christmas  he  had  undertaken  the  defence 
of  the  first  Continental  Congress  against  the  attack  of  Dr. 
Seabury,  a  clergyman  (afterwards  a  bishop)  who  wrote 
under  the  signature  of  a  '  West  Chester  farmer.'  Hamilton's 

1  Captain  Alexander  M'Dougal,  imprisoned  1770  for  seditious  libel. 
8  Life,  pp.  22-23. 


THE  INDEPENDENCE  OF  THE  STATES         29 

Full  Vindication1  provoked  a  reply,  and  in  February  there  A.D.  1775 
came  a  rejoinder,  The  Farmer  Refuted.2    He  continued  to    "ET-  18 
write  upon  similar  themes  in  Holt's  Journal,  and  in  June 
he  published  another  pamphlet  under  the  title  of  Remarks 
upon  the  Quebec  Bill.3 

These  works,  although  enjoying  a  considerable  fame  (they 
were  generally  attributed  to  the  experienced  pen  of  Mr.  Jay),4 
are  not  of  great  importance  either  as  history  or  literature. 
But  they  speak  a  different  language  from  the  infant  prodigy, 
and  bear  a  nearer  family  resemblance  to  the  letter  that  dealt 
with  staves  and  hogsheads  and  Guarda  Costas.  There  is,  of 
course,  a  considerable  number  of  words  expended  upon  the 
texts  of  slavery  and  tyranny.  The  future  bishop  is  well 
bethumped.  The  premises  are  not  reasoned  but  accepted, 
as  we  should  expect  in  the  case  of  a  boy  of  eighteen; 
but  nevertheless,  rhetorical  exaggeration  and  turgid  general- 
ities play  but  a  small  part.  In  the  first  pamphlet  the  most 
telling  argument  is  a  sober  and  practical  analysis  directed 
to  disprove  the  assertion  that  Britain  had  but  little,  the 
colonies  everything,  to  lose  by  such  a  stoppage  of  trade  as 
was  advocated  by  Congress.  It  concludes  with  a  vigorous 
epistle  to  the  farmers  of  the  New  York  colony,  somewhat  in 
the  manner  of  the  Drapier  Letters]  as  simple  and  direct, 
almost  as  hearty  in  its  intolerance,  but  a  few  degrees  more 
just  in  its  foundation. 

In  the  second  pamphlet  Hamilton  pursued  his  victim 
with  an  ardour  whetted  on  applause.  It  abounds  in  bad 
law,  bad  history  and  bad  philosophy,  but  is  more  than 
redeemed  by  an  exuberance  of  common-sense.  The  cen- 
tral argument  admits  the  allegiance  due  by  the  American 
colonists  to  a  common  sovereign,  but  repudiates  the  authority 
$f  the  British  Parliament.  A  democracy  attempting  to  rule 

1  Works,  i.  p.  4.  2  Ibid.  i.  p.  55. 

8  Ibid.  i.  p.  181.  4  L\fe,  p.  37. 


30  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1775  over  another  democracy  he  holds  to  be  a  worse  tyrant  than 
MT-  1S  any  autocrat.1  He  deals  with  the  pretensions  of  the  home 
Government  in  the  first  place  on  the  theory  of  the  British 
constitution,  and  having  established  their  absurdity  by  this 
examination,  he  next  overwhelms  them  by  an  appeal  to  the 
Natural  Rights  of  Man.  Satisfied  with  his  victory  in  this 
empty  game  of  battledore  and  shuttlecock,  he  proceeds  to  a 
technical  argument  drawn  from  the  charters  of  the  colonies, 
and  concludes  triumphantly  by  denying  the  rights  of  Britain 
to  tax  her  colonists  or  to  legislate  for  them.  He  justifies, 
however,  upon  the  ground  of  an  implied  concession,  her 
claim  to  regulate  their  trade  for  the  advantage  of  the 
empire,  and  even  for  her  own  particular  advantage  as  a 
return  for  the  protection  afforded  by  her  navy. 

The  alternative  to  a  slavish  submission  is  civil  war, 
and  accordingly  to  sustain  the  confidence  of  his  country- 
men in  such  a  struggle  he  describes  in  a  hopeful  spirit 
the  boundless  resources  of  the  colonies,  their  indepen- 
dence of  external  commerce,  their  fitness  for  the  peculiar 
warfare  that  is  likely  to  be  pursued,  and  paints  in  the 
gloomiest  colours  the  difficulties  and  embarrassments  against 
which  their  oppressors  will  be  forced  to  contend.  No  hope 
remains  in  patience  and  loyalty,  in  petitions  and  remon- 
strances, but  only  in  arms.  The  discipline  of  Britain  will 
in  the  end  prove  powerless  against  the  patriotism  of 
America,  and  a  favourable  neutrality,  if  not  an  active 
interference,  on  the  part  of  France  and  Holland,  will  sustain 
them  in  their  struggle  for  freedom.  "I  earnestly  lament 
'  the  unnatural  quarrel  between  the  parent  state  and  the 
'  colonies,  and  most  ardently  wish  for  a  speedy  reconciliation 
'  — a  perpetual  and  mutually  beneficial  union " ;  and  he 
protests  that  he  is  '  a  warm  advocate  for  limited  monarchy, 
and  an  unfeigned  wellwisher  to  the  present  Royal  Family.' 2 

»  Works,  i.  p.  81.  2  Ibid.  i.  p.  176. 


THE  INDEPENDENCE  OF  THE  STATES         31 

This  pamphlet  was  published  early  in  February.  In  the  A.D.  1775 
third  week  of  April  the  British  troops  were  routed  as  they  ^T>  ls 
withdrew  from  Lexington,  and  before  the  middle  of  May 
the  strong  posts  of  Ticonderoga  and  Crown  Point  had  fallen 
into  the  hands  of  rebel  raiders  under  Allen  and  Benedict 
Arnold.  In  June  the  American  militia  was  defeated 
at  Bunker  Hill  after  a  gallant  resistance,  and  George 
Washington  was  appointed  by  the  Second  Congress  to  the 
office  of  commander-in-chief.  Henceforth  for  many  years  to 
come  the  written  word  was  to  exercise  less  influence  than  the 
loaded  musket.  The  Remarks  on  the  Quebec  Bill,  a  short 
and  acrimonious  document,  whose  chief  object  appears  to 
have  been  to  excite  religious  prejudice  against  the  British 
Government  for  their  toleration,  or,  as  Hamilton  preferred 
to  allege,  their  establishment  of  Roman  Catholicism  in 
Canada,  marks  the  ending  of  his  youthful  fertility.  It  was 
published  in  the  same  month  that  saw  the  battle  of  Bunker 
Hill. 

The  pamphlets  ceased,  and  by  degrees  the  speeches  ceased 
also.  Hamilton  joined  a  volunteer  corps  called  the  Hearts 
of  Oak,  drilled  early  in  the  morning,  and  wore  a  uniform  of 
green,  with  brown  leather  facings,  and  the  appropriate  motto, 
Freedom  or  Death.  He  turned  from  constitutional  law  to 
the  study  of  strategy  and  tactics,  and  had  the  honour,  with 
his  comrades  in  arms,  to  draw  the  first  fire  of  his  Britannic 
Majesty  in  the  colony  of  New  York  while  engaged  in  re- 
moving the  guns  from  the  harbour  battery.  The  chronicler, 
searching  for  evidence  to  support  his  favourite  idea  of  the 
infant  prodigy,  has  recorded  that  when  H.M.S.  Asia,  lying 
at  anchor,  let  off  a  broadside  at  her  godsons  of  the  Hearts 
of  Oak,  "  Hamilton,  who  was  aiding  in  the  removal  of  the 
1  cannon,  exhibited  the  greatest  unconcern,  although  one  of 
'  his  companions  was  killed  by  his  side." 1  We  may  believe 

i  Life,  p.  48. 


32  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1775  it  or  not  as  we  choose,  but  such  events  are  at  any  rate  un- 
^T>  18  favourable  to  the  composition  of  pamphlets. 

We  hear  of  him  again  on  three  occasions  during  these 
months,  playing  a  part  which  is  noteworthy  and  highly 
characteristic.  For  all  his  love  of  freedom,  his  hatred  of 
lawlessness  was  the  stronger  passion.  Both  indeed  had 
their  origin  in  his  detestation  of  injustice  and  oppression. 
His  fame  stood  high  with  the  revolutionary  party,  whose 
enthusiasm  had  christened  him  'the  oracle';1  but  he  did 
not  hesitate  to  risk  his  popularity  by  withstanding  the 
violence  of  the  mob  against  private  individuals  suspected  of 
Tory  proclivities.  There  is  an  element  of  comedy  in  the 
student  of  King's  delivering  a  lengthy  harangue  from  the 
College  steps  in  order  to  give  his  principal  the  opportunity 
of  escape  to  a  British  ship  of  war;  while,  from  an  upper 
window,  this  worthy  gentleman,  mistaking  the  object  of  the 
address,  besought  the  people  who  had  come  to  tar  and 
feather  him  not  to  listen  to  his  defender  because  he  was 
'crazy.'  With  less  success  he  attempted  to  prevent  the 
destruction  of  Rivington's  press.2 

It  is  not  without  importance  that  upon  the  appearance 
of  the  first  pamphlet  Hamilton  was  approached  by  the 
loyalist  party  with  flattering  offers  of  employment  if  he 
would  transfer  his  services  to  the  other  side.  Such  proposals 
must  have  been  attractive  not  only  on  account  of  his  youth 
and  poverty,  but  for  the  further  reason  that  so  many  of  his 
sympathies  were  bound  up  with  the  ideas  of  monarchy  and 
a  settled  constitution.  His  prompt  rejection  of  the  offer 
is  all  the  more  remarkable,  when  we  remember  that  it  has 
been  the  ignorant  habit  of  Democrat  historians  to  write  of 
him  as  if  he  had  been  a  pure  adventurer,  and  that  even 
in  recent  times  apologies  for  his  career  and  appreciations  of 
his  character,  with  equal  ignorance  and  less  excuse,  have 
1  Life,  p.  37.  2  Ibid.  pp.  48,  49. 


THE  INDEPENDENCE  OF  THE  STATES         33 

tacitly  assumed  the  justice  of  the  charge.  Only  in  the  most  A.D.  1775 
romantic  sense  can  Hamilton  be  termed  an  adventurer :  ^T<  1J 
only  because  he  was  a  young  man  from  a  strange  land 
seeking  adventures;  never  because  he  sold  his  sword.  A 
character  less  mercenary,  and  less  concerned  in  any  personal 
advancement,  save  as  a  means  of  rendering  better  service 
to  the  state,  has  never  played  a  part  upon  the  public  stage. 
To  the  Dugald  Dalgettys  of  history  he  bore  no  resemblance 
save  in  his  courage ;  and  if  we  are  in  search  of  an  analogy 
we  shall  find  it  rather  among  the  knights  of  the  Bound 
Table  than  among  the  soldiers  of  fortune. 

We  cannot  deplore  the  interruption  of  his  pamphleteering ; 
but,  on  the  contrary,  and  in  spite  of  the  merits  of  his  work 
in  this  direction,  must  judge  it  to  have  been  most  fortunate. 
Such  extraordinary  facility,  such  dangerous  precocity, 
needed  the  sternest  antidotes.  In  the  moulding  of  Hamil- 
ton's great  character,  the  counting-house  of  Nicholas  Cruger 
and  the  campaigns  of  Washington  were  the  severest  and  the 
best  influences,  for  both  called  upon  him  in  harsh  tones  to 
be  certain  that  his  words  corresponded  with  some  fact,  and 
were  not  merely  words.  The  questioning  of  such  experiences 
will  take  no  denial ;  and  the  man  who,  possessing  high  gifts 
of  thought  and  eloquence,  finds  himself  forced  by  circum- 
stances to  endure  their  relentless  catechism,  may  hope  to 
enjoy  his  reward  by  escaping  for  ever  from  the  bondage  of 
phrases. 


CHAPTER  IV 

The  Beginning  of  the  War 

THE  War  of  Independence  covered  a  period  little  short  of 
nine  years,  if  we  reckon  it  to  have  begun  at  the  skirmish  of 

c 


34  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.  D.  1775  Lexington1  and  to  have  ended  when  General  Washington 
^T* 18  bade  farewell  to  his  officers  at  Fraunces'  Tavern.2  During  the 
whole  of  this  time  there  was  a  military  organisation  and  an 
army  in  being.  The  issue  indeed  was  decided  at  Yorktown 8 
more  than  two  years  earlier.  After  that  event  Britain  gave 
up  the  hope  of  regaining  her  colonies  and  undertook  no 
further  enterprises. 

The  maxim  which  insists  upon  strategy  as  a  deciding 
factor  in  a  long  and  dreary  struggle  never  found  a  more 
conspicuous  illustration.  With  bad  strategy  victories 
brought  no  profit,  while  with  good,  defeats  were  matters  of 
but  little  moment.  Strategy  may  be  defined  as  a  wise  alliance 
with  circumstances  which,  in  case  of  success,  will  follow  up 
the  pursuit,  and  in  case  of  failure  will  screen  the  retreat. 
The  strong  sense  of  Washington  was  incapable  of  distraction 
from  this  consideration  either  under  adversity,  of  which  he 
had  a  wide  experience,  or  in  good  fortune,  which  occasionally 
rewarded  his  devotion. 

It  has  been  assumed  that  in  the  case  of  the  colonists 
strategy  was  an  easy  matter ;  that  it  was  obvious,  and  from 
the  beginning  had  determined  the  course  of  their  efforts  and 
the  ultimate  issue  of  the  war.  The  Americans  had  a 
base  of  operations  in  every  village,  an  army  in  the  whole 
population.  Before  a  British  advance  the  waves  parted, 
as  the  Red  Sea  before  the  army  of  Pharaoh,  only  to 
engulf  and  overwhelm  them.  Our  own  countrymen,  on  the 
other  hand,  had  but  one  base — the  sea.  Yet  when  we  con- 
sider the  matter,  the  contest  was  not  so  unequal  as  our 
apologists  have  alleged.  A  population  of  some  two  and 
a  half  millions  sprinkled  upon  a  coastline  of  twelve  hundred 
miles  as  the  crow  flies,  or,  if  we  count  the  great  bays  and 
indentations  and  the  extent  of  navigable  rivers,  more  than 
twice  as  much  again,  must  in  the  end  fall  a  victim  to  any 

1  19th  April  1775.  2  4th  December  1783.  3  19th  October  1781. 


THE  INDEPENDENCE  OF  THE  STATES        35 

great  power  holding  command  of  the  sea.     Nothing  appears  A.D.  1775 
more  certain  than  that,  had  our  ancestors  maintained  their    9*? 1S 
maritime  supremacy,  the  rebellion  must  have  perished  of 
sheer  exhaustion. 

At  the  critical  moment,  when  the  resources  of  Congress 
were  at  their  last  extremity,  naval  superiority  upon  the 
coasts  of  North  America  passed  into  other  hands.  What 
it  is  also  easy  to  forget  is  that  Britain,  as  happens  from 
time  to  time,  was  at  war  with  the  world.  France  and 
Spain  and  Holland  were  at  open  war  with  her.  The 
Baltic  States — Russia,  Denmark  and  Sweden — had  allied 
themselves  in  an  armed  neutrality.  At  all  points  through- 
out our  dispersed  empire  we  were  outnumbered  and  on 
the  defensive.  "The  Marquis  de  Lafayette,"  Washington 
wrote  in  July  1780,  "will  be  pleased  to  communicate 
'  the  following  general  ideas  to  Count  de  Rochambeau  and 
'  the  Chevalier  de  Ternay  as  the  sentiments  of  the  under- 
'  written : — In  any  operation,  and  under  all  circumstances,  a 
'  decisive  naval  superiority  is  to  be  considered  as  a  funda- 
'  mental  principle,  and  the  basis  upon  which  every  hope  of 
'  success  must  ultimately  depend." 1  On  land  the  great 
captain  had  done  his  utmost.  Circumstances  of  hill  and 
river,  swamp  and  forest,  farm  and  desert,  had  been  bound  in 
alliance  to  his  victorious  arms ;  but  for  the  supreme  victory 
there  was  need  of  a  general  strategy  in  which  the  blue 
ocean  played  a  part.  Failing  that  confederate,  the  only  choice 
for  his  wearied  veterans  and  a  devastated  people  was  submis- 
sion to  the  British  Parliament,  or  some  great  trek  into  the 
prairies  of  the  West.  It  is  not  the  least  of  the  glories  of 
an  imperishable  fame  that  one  who  was  so  hot  and  eager  a 
soldier  should  have  grasped  thus  coolly  and  considerately 
the  essential,  unalterable  condition  of  final  success. 

1  Sparks's  Washington,  vii.  p.  509. 


36  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1775  At  the  beginning  of  the  war  (1775)  the  King's  army 
^ET<  18  under  General  Gage  held  Boston,  in  Massachusetts.  The 
distinguishing  note  of  this  period  was  a  fear  on  the  part  of 
the  British  to  strike  hard  while  conditions  were  still  favour- 
able to  their  arms.  This  fear  arose  from  an  ill-grounded 
hope  that  the  mere  display  of  military  strength  in  a  defensive 
attitude  might  be  sufficient  to  overawe  and  suppress  the 
rebellion  without  recourse  to  sterner  measures  which  would, 
it  was  thought,  add  to  the  difficulties  already  existing  the 
further  obstacle  of  bitter  memories. 

The  centre  of  disaffection  was  in  the  northern  states  of 
New  England,  and  the  object  of  King  George's  Government 
was  to  overawe  the  rebels  by  pressure  on  the  heart.  General 
Washington  received  from  Congress  his  commission  as 
commander-in-chief  shortly  before  midsummer.  In  July  he 
settled  down  to  the  siege  of  Boston.  His  army,  though  full  of 
spirit,  lacked  both  organisation  and  discipline.  When  he  had 
to  some  extent  remedied  these  defects,  it  was  discovered  that 
there  was  no  gunpowder.  His  opponent,  on  the  other  hand, 
commanded  a  body  of  troops,  as  well- trained  and  courageous 
as  Europe  could  produce.  He  was  superior  in  numbers  and 
well  supplied  with  ammunition.  He  was  not  a  brilliant 
man,  but  had  he  merely  consulted  the  drill-book  and  moved 
his  pieces  in  a  mechanical  fashion,  he  must  have  destroyed 
the  beleaguering  army  of  militiamen. 

Dulness  in  a  general  officer  is  in  itself  a  serious  obstacle ; 
but  when  one  of  that  quality  is  bound  by  the  careless 
pedantry  of  instructions,  his  unfortunate  army  becomes 
mere  food  for  bullets.  The  idea  of  reconciliation  was  in 
the  air.  The  tone  of  despatches  from  one  of  the  most 
incompetent  ministers  for  war  that  ever  sat  in  a  British 
cabinet  filled  the  slow  mind  of  Gage  with  a  fear  of  winning 
a  bloody  but  decisive  battle.  From  the  beginning  it  was 
an  ill-conducted  war.  Mediocrity  appointed  mediocrity; 


THE  INDEPENDENCE  OF  THE  STATES        37 

lectured  it  to  be  dilatory ;  dwelt  with  a  kind  of  drunken  A.D.  1775 
wisdom  upon  the  advantage  of  building  golden  bridges ;    ^T* 18 
paralysed  it  with  a  fear  to  strike ;  failed  to  send  it  reinforce- 
ments ;  from  time  to  time  forgot  even  that  it  existed ;  and 
only  under  the  cold  douche  of  disaster  roused  itself  to  deal 
out  solemn  blame.    So  during  the  whole  of  that  summer, 
autumn  and  winter  General  Gage  sat  in  Boston,  growing 
more  and  more  uncomfortable,  doing  nothing,  and  allowing 
Washington  to  drill  his  men,  find  gunpowder,  and  hem 
him  in. 

As  the  days  began  to  shorten,  an  American  expedition 
under  Montgomery  departed  up  the  Hudson  by  the  lakes 
George  and  Champlain  to  invade  Canada.  Early  in 
November  St.  John  surrendered  to  him  after  a  siege  of 
fifty  days,  and  before  the  middle  of  the  month  Montreal 
was  also  taken.  In  September  a  second  column  under 
Arnold  set  out  through  the  woods  of  Maine,  and  after 
incredible  hardships  arrived  before  the  Heights  of 
Abraham.  Carle  ton,  with  a  thousand  men,  held  Quebec 
for  the  King. 

Contrary  to  colonial  expectations,  the  country  did  not 
rise  at  their  coming  in  any  enthusiasm  for  freedom. 
Possibly  there  was  some  lurking  suspicion  that  King  Stork 
would  prove  a  worse  tyrant  than  King  Log.  Hamilton's 
eloquent  pamphlet  against  the  establishment  of  Papacy  and 
the  applause  which  greeted  it  may  well  have  disturbed 
Canadian  minds.  The  invaders  received  but  scant  help. 
Their  two  columns  joined  forces  before  Quebec,  but  on  the 
last  day  of  the  year  Carleton  drove  back  the  assault.  Mont- 
gomery, a  gallant  and  noble  figure,  was  killed  in  the 
attempt;  and  Arnold,  no  less  brave,  was  forced  to  retreat 
with  great  loss  and  hardship,  having  gained  nothing  by  the 
attempt. 

Meanwhile,  Washington  was  engaged  in  a  great  struggle 


38  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1775  to  make  his  army  effective.  Patriotism  was  prevalent,  but 
by  no  means  universal.  Corruption,  stock-jobbing,  and 
an  eagerness  to  make  a  profit  out  of  army  supplies  were 
matters  which  stirred  his  indignation  even  in  the  early 
days  of  the  contest.  Congress  was  inclined  to  argue, 
and  to  make  long  speeches,  and  to  invoke  general  prin- 
ciples of  considerable  grandeur  but  no  practical  utility. 
It  was  invested  with  high  duties  but  meagre  powers.  All 
affairs,  military  and  diplomatic,  were  in  its  hands ;  but  as 
funds,  without  which  duties  have  little  chance  of  getting 
themselves  performed,  depended  entirely  upon  the  voluntary 
contributions  of  the  various  States,  Congress  lacked  the  right 
to  enforce  its  will,  and  had  to  rely  upon  moral  influence 
for  its  supplies. 

In  spite  of  the  danger  that  menaced  them,  the  states, 
from  memory  of  British  oppression,  were  deeply  con- 
cerned with  a  pedantic  idea  of  liberty,  and  never  abandoned 
an  unreasonable  suspicion  of  a  strong  central  govern- 
ment. Their  jealous  refusal  to  delegate  power  or  to  part 
with  any  of  their  individual  rights,  even  to  a  congress  elected 
by  their  own  citizens,  was  the  cause  of  more  disasters 
to  their  arms  and  more  embarrassment  to  their  leaders 
than  all  the  assaults  of  the  enemy.  Their  prejudice  against 
a  regular  army  was  ineradicable.  They  sought  to  preserve 
the  superiority  of  the  civil  power  over  the  military  by  a 
system  of  short  enlistments  that  regarded  four  months  as 
the  proper  term  of  service,  and  a  year  as  justifiable  only  in 
circumstances  of  extreme  emergency.  To  make  the  task 
of  the  commander-in-chief  quite  beyond  the  wit  of  man, 
Congress,  in  its  anxiety  to  conform  to  this  general  idea  of 
political  liberty,  decreed  that  a  want  of  discipline  should 
not  be  punished  without  the  consent  of  the  state  to  which 
the  delinquent  had  the  honour  to  belong. 


THE  INDEPENDENCE  OF  THE  STATES         39 

The  Second  Year  of  the  war  (1776),  despite  the  failure  of  A.D.  1776 
the  Canadian  invasion,  opened  gloomily  for  the  British.  Their  ^T- 19 
stolid  occupation  of  Boston  had  entirely  failed  to  win  over 
colonial  opinion,  or  to  daunt  the  rebellious  spirit  of  the  New 
England  states.  Sir  William  Howe  had  succeeded  General 
Gage.  Easy,  indolent  and  good-humoured,  he  was  entirely 
lacking  in  the  quality  of  swift  decision.  Like  his  elder 
brother,  the  distinguished  admiral,  he  was  a  friend  of 
Benjamin  Franklin's.  He  had  much  sympathy  with  the 
colonial  grievance,  and  was  appointed  partly  on  his  merits 
as  a  soldier,  partly  with  a  vague  idea  of  conciliation.  It  is 
always  dangerous  to  attempt  a  combination  of  these  func- 
tions while  victory  hangs  in  the  balance. 

Early  in  March  Washington,  having  organised  and  in- 
creased his  army,  occupied  Dorchester  Heights  and  com- 
manded the  British  position.  A  fortnight  later  Sir  William, 
finding  his  lines  untenable,  embarked  the  troops  and  sailed 
to  Halifax,  where,  until  June,  he  waited  for  reinforcements 
which  had  been  promised  but  never  came.  Washington, 
foreseeing  that  the  next  move  of  the  British  must  be  against 
New  York,  marched  southwards,  arriving  in  that  city  towards 
the  middle  of  April. 

The  British  general,  holding  the  absolute  command  of  the 
sea,  determined,  as  had  been  foreseen,  to  occupy  New  York 
and  to  make  it  the  base  of  operations  for  his  main  army. 
Between  Boston  and  New  York,  as  strategical  positions,  no 
hesitation  was  possible ;  for  the  latter  city,  commanding 
the  mouth  of  the  navigable  waterway  of  the  Hudson,  was 
immensely  superior.  Moreover,  it  was  to  a  large  extent  a 
friendly  city,  full  of  rich  and  respectable  Tories.  But 
although  from  a  purely  military  point  of  view  the  exchange 
was  profitable,  the  loss  of  Boston  was  in  the  political 
aspect  a  damaging  blow  to  British  prestige.  It  filled 
the  raw  colonial  troops  with  confidence  in  themselves 


40  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1776  and  in  their  leader,  and  relaxed  that  pressure  upon  the 
^T* 1J  heart  of  the  rebellion  which  had  been  rightly  judged  of  high 
importance  by  the  King's  Government. 

For  the  moment  Britain  was  at  peace  with  the  rest  of  the 
world,  and  providing  she  could  have  kept  the  flames  under 
and  conserved  her  authority  among  the  colonists,  there 
was  no  immediate  menace  of  foreign  attack.  Holding  an 
absolute  command  of  the  sea,  it  seems  as  if  her  right  strategy 
would  have  been  to  strain  every  nerve  for  the  provision  of 
enough  troops  to  seize  and  hold  the  great  towns  along  the 
coast — Boston  in  the  north,  Charleston  in  the  south,  New 
York  commanding  the  mouth  of  the  Hudson,  Philadelphia 
the  estuary  of  the  Delaware ;  from  these  strong  positions  upon 
a  common  base,  the  sea,  to  have  pressed  and  strangled  the 
revolution  by  a  grinding  occupation,  to  have  discouraged  its 
forces  by  frequent  expeditions,  and  to  have  worn  down  resist- 
ance by  sheer  exhaustion  of  funds.  When  we  remember 
how  nearly  the  revolt  came  to  failure  from  lack  of  money  on 
more  than  one  occasion,  and  even  when  in  a  military  view 
affairs  wore  a  fortunate  appearance  for  the  colonists,  we  can 
hardly  resist  the  conclusion  that  had  the  war  been  directed 
at  its  beginning  in  the  grand  manner  of  Pitt  instead  of  by 
the  diffidence  of  Lord  North,  if  the  advantage  of  sea-power 
and  of  the  long  purse  had  been  fully  realised  and  used 
with  intelligence  and  without  mercy,  neither  the  genius  of 
Washington  nor  the  devotion  of  his  troops  could  have 
secured  independence  for  the  allied  states. 

But  no  nerves  were  strained.  Energy  and  intelligence 
did  not  exist.  Sir  William  Howe,  disappointed  of  reinforce- 
ments and  paralysed  by  dilatory  instructions,  sailed  towards 
midsummer  for  New  York  and  established  himself  at  Sandy 
Hook  and  Staten  Island.  On  the  4th  of  July  an  eloquent 
document,  drafted  by  one  Thomas  Jefferson  of  Virginia — a 
ready  penman  but  a  shrinking  antagonist — was  issued  to 


THE  INDEPENDENCE  OF  THE  STATES        41 

the  world.     The  Declaration  of  Independence  was  a  useful  A.D.  1776 
assertion,  for  it  had  a  dramatic  quality  which  stirred  men's    ^T* 1£ 
hearts. 

A  few  days  later  Admiral  Lord  Howe  arrived  with  an 
addition  to  the  fleet  and  reinforcements  for  the  army,  bring- 
ing powers  to  offer  pardon  and  amnesty,  which  unfortunately 
the  evacuation  of  Boston  and  the  enthusiasm  excited  by 
the  famous  Declaration  had  shorn  of  all  hopes  of  success. 
The  failure  of  an  expedition  against  Charleston  brought  the 
forces  who  had  been  engaged  in  it  back  from  the  south. 
Sir  William  Howe  accordingly  found  himself  in  command 
of  some  twenty-five  thousand  men  with  a  fleet  in  support 
excellent  in  itself  and  admirably  officered.  Against  him 
were  thirty  thousand  American  levies. 

Washington  held  New  York.  A  part  of  his  army,  five 
thousand  strong,  was  in  August  entrenched  at  Brooklyn,  in 
Long  Island,  separated  from  the  city  by  a  sea  channel 
a  mile  in  width.  On  the  27th  the  British  general  attacked 
and  inflicted  a  severe  defeat  upon  his  opponents,  who 
lost  two  thousand  men.  But,  fearing  great  bloodshed  and 
a  crowning  victory,  he  failed  to  storm  the  trenches.  His 
delay  allowed,  or  tempted,  Washington  to  bring  up  more 
troops,  making  his  effective  total  nine  thousand  combatants. 
It  was  a  mistaken  policy,  which  with  a  swifter  antagonist 
must  have  resulted  in  ruin.  But  Sir  William,  though  a 
sound  man,  was  leisurely,  and  by  the  time  he  had  matured 
his  plans,  the  prompt  action  of  the  American  general  had 
rendered  them  fruitless.  The  obvious  measure  was  to  make 
use  of  the  fleet  and  cut  the  nine  thousand  off  from  the 
mainland.  While  Sir  William  was  considering  this  excellent 
method  Washington  realised  his  danger.  A  fog  fell  oppor- 
tunely, as  in  some  Homeric  contest,  and  under  the  protec- 
tion of  the  gods  the  colonial  troops  withdrew  in  good  order, 
and  unmolested,  across  the  dividing  arm  of  the  sea.  It  was 


42  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1776  a  masterly  performance,  and  atoned  for  the  bad  judgment 
which  had  incurred  the  risk. 

Washington  realised  that  New  York  could  no  longer  be 
held.  On  military  grounds  he  desired  to  bum  it,  but 
political  considerations  rendered  this  course  impracticable. 
About  the  middle  of  September  Admiral  Howe  forced  his  way 
up  the  Hudson,  threatening  to  cut  off  the  American  army 
who  found  themselves  obliged  to  evacuate  the  city  and  to 
retreat  up  the  east  bank  of  the  river.  But  General  Howe  was 
dilatory  and  made  no  effective  pursuit.  A  month  went  by, 
during  which  the  colonial  army  dwindled  to  twelve  thousand 
men.  In  the  middle  of  October  the  fleet  forced  its  way  still 
further,  past  forts  and  obstructions,  causing  Washington  to 
retreat  to  White  Plains,  where  he  took  up  a  strong  position. 
Sir  William,  without  undue  haste,  attacked  him  towards  the 
end  of  the  month  and  drove  him,  but  in  good  order,  out 
of  his  entrenchments.  Again  there  was  delay,  and  after- 
wards a  spell  of  unpropitious  weather  which  induced  the 
British  commander  to  withdraw.  A  few  days  later  he 
successfully  attacked  the  American  forts  on  both  sides  of 
the  river,  capturing  two  thousand  men  and  a  large  store  of 
munitions.  Under  this  heavy  blow  Washington  withdrew 
to  the  west  bank  of  the  river,  and,  during  November,  with 
a  rapidly  shrinking  army,  was  pursued  by  Cornwallis  south- 
wards across  New  Jersey;  but  always  without  disorder  or 
defeat.  In  the  early  days  of  December  he  arrived  at 
Princeton  with  barely  three  thousand  ragged  men,  and  the 
British  troops  at  his  heels.  Finding  his  position  impossible, 
he  crossed  the  Delaware  river,  destroying  behind  him  all  the 
boats  for  many  miles  along  its  course.  The  population 
wavered,  and  many  of  them  came  in  seeking  the  royal  pardon. 
Congress  was  helpless,  though  still  loquacious.  Considering 
Philadelphia,  where  they  sat,  to  be  in  serious  danger  of 
capture,  they  departed  to  Baltimore.  Their  fears,  however, 


THE  INDEPENDENCE  OF  THE  STATES         43 

were   groundless,  for  to  a  commander  like   Sir  William  A.D.  1776 
Howe  the  difficulties  of  transport  through  an  unfriendly    *•" 
country,  in  the  depth  of  winter,  presented  too  great  an 
obstacle. 

It  was  the  fate  of  the  British  general  to  nourish  himself 
upon  text-book  probabilities  and  the  phrases  of  war.  He 
appears  to  have  concluded,  upon  the  best  possible  grounds, 
that  the  American  army  had  dissolved.  Accordingly,  with- 
drawing a  great  portion  of  his  troops  to  comfortable  winter 
quarters  in  New  York,  he  left  a  long,  straggling  line  of 
posts  parallel  to  the  Delaware. 

Washington  may  have  harboured  illusions  contrary  to 
the  teaching  of  the  Pundits,  but  he  had  the  great  gift  of 
turning  them  into  realities.  With  small  thanks  to  Congress 
he  brought  his  ragged  and  bootless  army  up  to  the  strength 
of  six  thousand  men,  and  planned  an  elaborate  attack  at 
different  points  upon  the  extended  British  line.  But  he 
reckoned  without  his  generals,  and  to  a  certain  extent 
without  natural  obstacles.  Gates,  Ewing,  Griffin,  Putnam, 
Cadwalader,  some  for  good  reasons  and  others  for  bad, 
all  failed  him,  and  he  went  with  his  lonely  column 
across  the  Delaware  on  a  bitter  night.  With  less  than 
twenty-five  hundred  men  he  marched,  after  the  arduous 
crossing,  nine  miles  through  darkness,  with  a  sleet-storm 
driving  in  his  face.  As  he  approached  the  village  of 
Trenton,  held  by  Hessians,  word  reached  him  that  the  arms 
of  his  right  flank  were  wet.  He  sent  them  word  'to  use 
the  bayonet,  for  the  town  must  be  taken/  At  Christmas 
daybreak  he  stormed,  took  two  thousand  prisoners,  and  re- 
turned whence  he  came. 

The  alarm  reached  New  York,  and  Cornwallis,  the  ever- 
vigorous,  sallied  out  to  inflict  punishment.  Leaving  three 
regiments  at  Princeton  he  pushed  on  against  the  enemy, 
who  had  again  crossed  to  the  east  bank  of  the  river. 


44  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1776  But  Washington,  evading  the  rush,  slipped  past  him,  and 
^T<  19  cut  to  pieces  the  three  regiments  left  behind  at  Princeton. 
Upon  this  unlooked-for  event  Sir  William  judged  it  wiser 
to  leave  the  line  of  the  Delaware  and  concentrate  his 
main  army  for  the  winter  in  New  York.  The  colonists, 
dispirited  by  the  autumn  reverses,  were  now  filled  with  new 
courage,  and  the  task  of  withdrawing  the  British  posts  was 
none  too  easy. 

It  was  a  gallant  campaign,  and  from  the  political  stand- 
point something  even  greater.  In  the  severest  weather, 
with  starved  and  ill-clad  troops,  absurdly  inferior  in  num- 
bers, and  depressed  by  the  memory  of  many  months  of 
defeat,  Washington  twice  within  a  few  days  succeeded  by  the 
force  of  his  great  will  in  concentrating  his  small  column  in 
superior  strength  and  destroying  his  enemy  unawares.  The 
mobility  of  footsore  men  in  wintry  weather  is  a  contingency 
that  text-books  dealing  with  average  conditions  are  justified 
in  ignoring.  But  as  Britons  we  must  concede  that  there  is 
a  contrast  not  wholly  in  our  favour  between  Sir  William 
Howe,  comfortably  eating  his  Christmas  dinner  by  a  warm 
fire  in  New  York  city,  and  this  calm  American,  undeluded 
and  undismayed,  deaf  equally  to  false  hopes  and  to  despair, 
who,  realising  that  the  thing  most  necessary  to  his  country 
at  the  moment  was  victory,  lifted  his  weary  militia  through 
the  snow  and  won  it. 


CHAPTER  V 

The  Course  of  the  War 

IN  January  (1777),  at  the  beginning  of  the  Third  Year  of  the 
war,  Washington  took  his  troops  into  winter  quarters  at 
Morristown,  keeping  close  watch  upon  New  York,  where 


THE  INDEPENDENCE  OF  THE  STATES         45 

all  the  British  regiments  lay  huddled  together,  after  their  A.D.  1777 
evacuation  of  New  Jersey. 

By  March  his  five  thousand  men  had  again  dwindled  to 
three  thousand  under  the  hardships  of  famine  and  an  ill- 
equipped  camp.  Congress  did  little  to  support  his  arms 
beyond  passing  resolutions  that  victories  ought  to  occur.  It 
intermeddled,  making  unfit  military  appointments,  and  giving 
commissions  to  foreigners  flown  with  European  tactics  and 
personal  complacency.1  Boots  and  stockings,  food  and  great- 
coats, even  muskets  and  gunpowder,  were  sadly  wanting. 

In  May,  having  collected  seven  thousand  men  with  much 
difficulty,  and  mainly  by  his  personal  exertions,  Washington 
broke  up  his  cantonments.  Sir  William  Howe's  plan  of 
campaign  was  re-formed  partly  upon  his  own  experience  and 
partly  by  help  of  the  valuable  suggestions  which  packet 
boats  brought  him  from  the  War  Office.  His  main  army 
was  to  take  Philadelphia  for  its  objective,  and  he  formed  the 
intention  of  marching  upon  that  city  through  New  Jersey. 

From  Canada  an  expedition  under  General  Burgoyne  (a 
gifted  and  fashionable  soldier  with  a  reputation  for  wit,  who 
had  passed  over  the  head  of  Carleton,  in  spite  of  the  merit 
which  attached  to  that  officer's  defence  of  Quebec)  was  to 
force  its  way  south  by  Lake  Champlain  and  the  Hudson  river. 
A  junction  was  to  be  made  with  Sir  Henry  Clinton,  who, 
according  to  the  arrangement,  was  to  sally  out  from  New 
York.  The  objective  of  this  combination  was  the  isolation 
of  the  disaffected  New  England  states.  This  part  of  the 
plan  was  arranged  between  Burgoyne  and  Lord  George  Ger- 
maine,  the  Secretary  of  State  for  War,  and  was  not  even 
communicated  to  the  British  commander-in-chief  until  he 
was  committed  to  his  southern  movement. 

Two   figures    in    this    war   occupy    a   unique   position :  ' 
Washington,  because  it  has  never  been  possible  to  praise 

1  Hamilton  to  Duer,  History,  L  p.  431. 


46  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1777  him  beyond  his  merits ;  Germaine,  for  the  reason  that 
2En.  20  no  kiame  nas  ever  done  justice  to  his  incompetency.  A 
nation  can  only  expect  humiliation  when,  regardless  of 
its  interest  and  its  honour,  it  entrusts  its  War  Office 
to  a  soldier  of  battered  reputation,  incapable  of  transact- 
ing the  simplest  business  with  industry  and  despatch.  If 
a  layman  may  presume  to  offer  an  opinion  upon  such  high 
matters,  it  would  be  that  the  Canadian  expedition  was 
singularly  futile  in  its  design,  and  was  based  upon  a  mis- 
apprehension of  books  rather  than  upon  any  understanding 
of  the  facts.  For  Burgoyne's  column  was,  as  the  saying  is, 
'  in  the  air.'  It  was  obliged  to  carry  its  supplies,  and  could 
never  have  hoped  to  hold  any  lines  of  communication. 
When  it  had  passed  on  its  way,  except  for  a  certain  devasta- 
tion, it  might  as  well  never  have  been  there.  It  is  only 
dream-strategy  which  attempts  to  cut  off  a  province  by 
drawing  a  line  which  is  immediately  rubbed  out  behind  the 
pencil. 

The  Hudson  river  was  a  different  matter.  There  was  a 
possibility  of  holding  that  waterway,  and  thereby  making  a 
division  that  it  would  have  been  difficult  for  the  colonists 
to  obliterate.  But  to  such  an  end,  concentration  of  the 
whole  British  army  was  necessary.  For  this  purpose  Bur- 
goyne  was  wanted  at  New  York,  not  at  Ticonderoga ;  and 
Sir  William  Howe,  having  regard  to  the  smallness  of  his 
total  force,  had  no  business  to  be  thinking  of  Philadelphia. 
But  the  strategy  was  arranged  from  home.  That  in  itself 
was  an  evil  of  the  first  magnitude;  but  having  been  so 
arranged,  it  was  essential  that  it  should  have  been  firmly 
imposed  upon  the  generals  who  were  to  carry  out  the 
campaign.  This  was  omitted,  although  Germaine  appears 
at  one  time  to  have  realised  the  necessity  of  clear  orders  and 
afterwards  to  have  forgotten.  A  letter  directing  the  British 
cominander-in- chief  to  operate  upon  the  Hudson  so  as  to 


THE  INDEPENDENCE  OF  THE  STATES         47 

support  Burgoyne  was  actually  written ;    but  the  Secre-  A.D.  1777 
tary  for  War  refused  to  sign  it  because  no  copy  had  been    ^T- 20 
taken,  and  being  committed  to  a  holiday  in  Kent,  he  would 
not  wait  until  this  omission  had  been  rectified.    The  letter 
was  never  sent,  and  Sir  William  Howe,  who,  with  many 
merits,  lacked  a  swift  intelligence,  was  left  to  guess  at  the 
meaning  of  a  plan  made  by  other  people. 

In  the  third  week  of  July,  General  Howe,  judging 
it  impracticable  to  march  south  upon  Philadelphia  with 
Washington  hovering  upon  his  right  flank,  put  his  troops 
into  transports  and  rounded  Cape  May  into  the  estuary 
of  the  Delaware.  But  finding  himself  confronted  with 
forts  and  other  difficulties,  he  put  about  and  sailed  away 
to  the  south,  round  the  Capes  of  Delaware,  up  the  long 
Chesapeake  Bay  to  the  Head  of  Elk,  where  he  finally 
disembarked.  His  expedition  had  occupied  more  than  a 
month,  and  it  was  now  near  the  end  of  August.  As  the 
result  of  much  seafaring  the  indefatigable  traveller  was 
nearly  as  far  from  Philadelphia  as  when  he  started,  and  the 
army  of  Washington  was  hovering  on  his  left  flank  instead  of 
on  his  right.  He  was  separated  from  his  base  at  New  York 
by  a  hundred  and  forty  miles  or  thereabouts  of  hostile 
country  (measuring  as  the  crow  flies);  or,  if  it  were  a 
question  of  returning  as  he  came,  by  some  four  hundred  and 
fifty  miles  of  sea.  Washington  on  the  easy  interior  lines 
had  moved  his  army  south  to  Germantown  with  the  idea  of 
defending  Philadelphia. 

On  the  llth  of  September  the  British  army  in  superior 
numbers  defeated  Washington  at  the  Forks  of  the  Brandy- 
wine  and  opened  the  way  north  to  Philadelphia,  which 
they  occupied  towards  the  end  of  the  month,  after  fighting 
another,  but  smaller,  engagement,  in  which  they  were  also 
victorious. 

Sir  William  then  divided  his  army.     One  portion  held 


48  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1777  Germantown,  while  the  other  attempted  to  reduce  the 
^T<  20  American  forts  which  surrounded  the  mouth  of  the  Dela- 
ware. Washington,  undismayed  by  his  ill-luck,  brought  up 
his  army,  now  diminished  to  eight  thousand  men,  to  the 
attack  of  Germantown.  It  is  probable  that  with  seasoned 
troops  and  favourable  weather  he  would  have  been  successful. 
Fortune  favoured  him  to  begin  with,  but  a  mist  fell  (not 
opportunely,  as  at  Brooklyn)  which  confused  and  misled 
his  officers.  A  panic  ensued,  and  he  suffered  a  severe 
defeat.  What  is  remarkable  about  the  performance  is  the 
tenacity  it  displays.  With  a  raw  army  he  had  suffered 
two  defeats  and  lost  the  city  which  it  had  been  his  object 
to  cover;  but  a  little  more  than  a  fortnight  later  he  had 
inspired  sufficient  spirit  in  his  men  to  attack  his  victorious 
enemy  in  its  lines.  Beaten  once  more,  he  withdrew  un- 
dismayed to  prepare  for  further  operations.  Partly,  no 
doubt,  it  was  the  personal  qualities  of  the  man,  but  partly 
also  the  wise  alliance  with  circumstances  which  the  British 
had  disdained,  but  which  Washington  had  priced  at  its  true 
value.  In  spite  of  victories  Sir  William  Howe  was  ever 
unable  to  pursue. 

Burgoyne  had  moved  from  Canada  shortly  after  mid- 
summer with  three  thousand  regular  troops  and  five 
hundred  Indians,  and  had  recaptured  Ticonderoga  with 
stores  and  guns  during  the  first  week  of  July. 

But  Clinton  at  New  York  had  found  himself  too  weak 
to  venture  within  striking  distance  to  support  the  expedi- 
tion, which  was  slowly  struggling  south  through  swamps 
and  forests  with  a  heavy  train  of  artillery,  baggage,  and 
supplies ;  harassed  by  a  multitude  of  invisible  foes  in  camp 
and  upon  the  march. 

In  the  middle  of  October  all  Washington's  anxieties  for 
the  safety  of  the  New  England  states  were  brought  to  an 
end  by  the  surrender  of  Burgoyne  with  between  three  and 


THE  INDEPENDENCE  OF  THE  STATES        49 

four  thousand  men  to  a  force  five  times  his  number  at  A.D.  1777 
Saratoga,  thirty  miles  to  the  north  of  Albany,  and  about  a    ^T-  20 
hundred  and  eighty  from  New  York. 

The  full  consequences  of  the  surrender  at  Saratoga  can 
hardly  have  been  clear  at  once  even  to  the  sagacious  mind 
of  the  American  commander-in-chief.  It  was  one  of  those 
small  battles  which  are  remarkable  in  history  for  having 
changed  the  whole  face  of  a  situation.  It  secured  the 
northern  states  from  any  serious  attack;  raised  the  con- 
fidence of  the  American  army,  Government,  and  citizens ; 
depressed  in  equal  proportion  the  spirits  of  their  enemy; 
dislocated  his  plan  of  campaign,  and  endangered  the  posi- 
tion of  his  main  army  at  Philadelphia  by  releasing  large 
reinforcements.  These  were  the  obvious  results,  but  also 
the  least  important. 

Up  to  this  time  Britain  had  not  only  held  com- 
mand of  the  sea,  but  had  enjoyed  complete  immunity. 
She  could  carry  her  troops  to  and  fro  along  the  coasts  where 
and  when  she  liked.  A  few  frigates  were  sufficient  pro- 
tection against  American  privateers.  The  immediate  effect 
of  Saratoga  was  to  menace  this  invaluable  security.  The 
ultimate  effect  was  to  destroy  her  naval  superiority  in  those 
waters,  and  by  this  means  to  bring  the  war  to  a  disastrous 
ending.  An  alliance  with  a  great  sea  power  was,  from 
the  point  of  view  of  the  states,  the  most  important  object 
of  diplomacy,  and  Saratoga  is  a  memorable  battle  chiefly 
because  it  was  the  direct  cause  of  such  an  alliance. 

The  neutrality  of  France  had  no  tinge  of  benevolence  for 
Britain.  The  ministers  of  Louis  xvi.  were  watchful  and 
jealous.  The  loss  of  Canada  and  the  triumphant  adminis- 
tration of  Pitt  were  memories  which  still  rankled.  Under  a 
thin  veil  of  private  adventure  France  had  sought  from  the 
beginning  to  furnish  the  rebellious  colonists  with  the  sinews 
of  war.  She  had  regarded  with  a  favourable  eye  the  enlist- 

D 


50  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1777  ment  of  her  subjects  as  volunteers.  But  the  prestige  of  her 
T'  ancient  rival  was  as  yet  unshaken.  France  was  willing  to 
comfort  the  enemies  of  the  King  of  England,  but  her  policy 
stopped  short  of  open  war.  For  this  step  more  was  requisite 
than  the  Bourbon  alliance.  The  revolutionary  states  must 
first  give  some  signal  proof  of  their  superiority.  In  the 
surrender  of  Saratoga  she  found  a  justification  for  bolder 
measures.  Britain  thenceforth  was  no  longer  engaged  in 
a  purely  domestic  warfare  with  her  rebellious  children,  but 
had  to  defend  herself  also  against  two  great  European 
powers — France  and  Spain. 

Towards  the  end  of  November,  Sir  William  Howe  had 
taken  the  forts  upon  the  Delaware,  and  his  supporting  fleet 
had  safe  access  to  the  estuary.  In  the  beginning  of  De- 
cember he  made  preparations  for  a  forward  movement 
against  the  American  army,  but  nothing  came  of  it,  and 
Washington  retired  unmolested  into  winter  quarters  at 
Valley  Forge. 

If  the  results  of  a  campaign  could  be  measured  by 
the  comfort  of  the  adversaries  when  it  has  ended,  or 
even  if  it  bore  any  fixed  relation  to  the  number  of  victories 
won  in  the  field,  the  British  general  would  have  had 
good  reason  for  complacency.  But  the  hard  order  of  facts 
ignores  these  minor  considerations.  It  was  probably  clear 
even  to  Sir  William  Howe,  amiable,  courteous,  liberal,  but  a 
frank  hater  of  all  arduous  affairs,  that  the  starved  and  shiver- 
ing regiments  in  the  hills  fifteen  miles  away  were  the  real 
victors,  although  he  lay  pleasantly  at  Philadelphia  with  his 
fleet  anchored  in  the  Delaware  under  silenced  forts. 


A.D.  1778  At  the  beginning  of  May  (1778),  in  the  Fourth  Year  of  the 
war,  the  French  alliance  became  known  and  was  eagerly 
welcomed  in  America.  A  fortnight  earlier,  Admiral  d'Estaing 
had  set  sail  with  twelve  ships  of  the  line,  his  total  force  both 


THE  INDEPENDENCE  OF  THE  STATES         51 

in  numbers  and  weight  of  armament  being  greatly  superior  A.D.  1778 
to  the  fleet  serving  under  Lord  Howe.     But  his  voyage  was    M^' 21 
performed  with  all  the  deliberation  that  had  marked  British 
enterprises  on  land.     He  had  no  luck  with  the  elements,  nor 
much  skill.     It  took  him  twelve  weeks  to  arrive. 

Meanwhile  it  had  been  arranged  that  the  Howes,  upon 
their  own  request,  were  to  be  relieved.  They  heartily  dis- 
liked the  job,  and  they  disliked  even  more  the  ministry 
under  which  they  had  the  honour  to  serve.  Sir  William 
was  superseded  by  Sir  Henry  Clinton  before  the  middle  of 
May.  The  stout  old  admiral  should  shortly  have  followed  his 
brother  home,  but  as  he  was  on  the  point  of  handing  over  his 
command,  news  reached  him  of  d'Estaing  and  his  superior 
fleet.  In  such  circumstances  he  let  his  resignation  wait  over. 

Also  in  the  month  of  May  (though  for  all  the  effect  that  came 
of  it  'tis  hardly  worth  mentioning)  commissioners  arrived, 
appointed  under  the  Conciliatory  Bills — Lord  Carlisle,  Eden, 
and  Johnstone — to  offer  concessions  and  accommodations. 
But  as  the  Americans,  bound  by  the  terms  of  their  alliance 
with  France,  demanded  the  recognition  of  their  indepen- 
dence, or  the  withdrawal  of  King  George's  troops  as  a 
preliminary  to  all  negotiations,  nothing  but  some  delay  was 
the  result  —  delay  hurtful  to  Britain,  having  regard  to 
d'Estaing,  who  was  approaching  with  his  superior  fleet. 

A  few  days  before  midsummer,  Clinton  evacuated 
Philadelphia,  and  started  to  march  northward,  through  New 
Jersey,  to  his  base  at  New  York— none  too  early,  for  d'Estaing 
was  already  much  overdue.  Lord  Howe,  in  his  cool, 
workmanlike  manner,  unperturbed  by  the  British  Govern- 
ment's neglect  to  reinforce  him,  or  even  to  send  him  word 
of  the  sailing  of  the  French  admiral  (such  oversights  he 
appears  to  have  taken  with  resignation,  as  he  did  gales, 
shoals,  and  tides,  and  the  other  natural  hazards  and  condi- 
tions of  his  service),  got  on  board  his  transports  all  the 


52  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1778  stores  and  supplies  and  sailed  for  New  York,  arriving  there 
^T-  21  without  misadventure. 

Clinton  was  less  fortunate.  He  had  been  compelled  to 
return  north  with  his  army  by  land,  for  the  reason  that  his 
ships  afforded  barely  sufficient  accommodation  for  the  large 
numbers  of  loyalist  refugees  whom  it  was  considered  unsafe 
to  leave  to  the  tender  mercies  of  Congress.  His  force  num- 
bered ten  thousand,  Against  him  were  thirteen  thousand 
colonials,  who  hung  upon  his  left  flank  and  threatened  to 
envelop  his  rear. 

On  June  28  Washington  sent  orders  to  General  Lee,  who 
commanded  the  advanced  division,  to  attack  the  British  at 
Monmouth  Court-house.  But  Lee  was  a  thoroughly  in- 
competent soldier,  and  evidence  has  come  to  light  in  recent 
years  which  raises  the  suspicion  that  he  was  also  a  traitor.1 
He  hesitated,  expressed  grave  doubts  and  found  delay  wiser 
than  action.  Cornwallis,  realising  the  danger,  pushed  forward 
his  baggage,  and  came  to  the  aid  of  the  rearguard.  Being 
met  by  no  attack,  he  proceeded  with  his  usual  prompt  valour 
to  deliver  one.  Lee  thereupon  ordered  a  general  retreat. 

It  was  a  day  of  excessive  heat,  when  the  astonished 
Washington,  riding  forward  at  the  head  of  his  main  army, 
encountered  a  string  of  fugitives.  They  were  ignorant 
of  any  reason  for  their  flight  except  that  it  was  by  order. 
With  the  aid  of  his  staff,  the  rout  was  checked  and  the 
battle  re-formed.  Cornwallis  was  driven  back,  the  lost 
ground  recovered,  and  the  exhausted  troops  bivouacked 
on  the  field.  The  British  had  lost  a  rearguard  action,  but  the 
Americans  had  lost  the  opportunity  of  a  crowning  victory. 
By  the  following  morning  Cornwallis  had  withdrawn,  and 
Clinton's  army  was  safe,  if  not  from  effective  pursuit,  at 
least  from  annihilation. 

A  grateful  tradition  has  so   recklessly  transformed  the 

1  Fiske's  American  devolution,  i.  pp.  300-306. 


THE  INDEPENDENCE  OF  THE  STATES         53 

character  of  Washington  that  he  has  become  a  kind  of  A.D.  1778 
mechanical  monster  stuffed  with  incredible  copy-book  T*21 
headings,  strangely  unlike  the  altogether  human  and 
passionate  hero  that  he  was  in  fact.  At  Monmouth  Court- 
house on  that  blazing,  winking,  dusty  afternoon,  the  com- 
mander-in-chief  received  the  report  of  his  subordinate. 
A  blast  of  pale  anger,  a  terrific  eloquence  of  unprintable 
scorn,  and  General  Lee  vanished  from  all  part  and  promi- 
nence in  the  war.  After  a  feeble  recovery  of  the  spirits, 
a  few  months  of  inglorious  notoriety,  some  bursts  of  impu- 
dence and  muttering  discontent,  he  faded  utterly  out  of 
the  knowledge  of  men. 

Sir  Henry  Clinton's  retreat  had  cost  him  fifteen  hundred 
men  by  the  time  he  reached  the  southern  shore  opposite 
Staten  Island.  Here  he  put  his  army  on  board  Lord  Howe's 
transports,  which  having  disembarked  their  passengers  in 
safety  had  now  returned  across  the  bay  to  his  assistanca 
By  the  end  of  the  first  week  in  July  he  was  safe  in  New 
York,  but  only  in  the  nick  of  time. 

The  British  admiral,  unlike  his  adversary,  had  been 
fortunate  as  well  as  skilful.  Having  secured  the  army, 
he  prepared  to  encounter  d'Estaing,  who  commanded  a 
fleet  of  double  his  numbers  and  more  than  double  his 
armament.  The  episode  of  which  this  gallant  and  good- 
tempered  gentleman  was  the  hero  is  one  of  the  few  in  the 
history  of  the  American  War  to  which  the  British  nation 
can  look  back  with  unmingled  satisfaction.  He  disposed 
his  small  fleet  in  so  masterly  a  fashion  across  the  entrance 
to  New  York  harbour  that  d'Estaing  judged  him,  after  a 
careful  reconnaissance,  to  be  unassailable,  and  towards  the 
end  of  July  moved  to  Rhode  Island,  a  hundred  and  fifty  miles 
to  the  north,  where  a  colonial  force  under  General  Sullivan 
was  endeavouring  to  drive  the  British  out  of  Newport.1 

1  Mahan,  Types  of  Naval  Officers,  pp.  276-284, 


54  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1778  But  on  the  9th  of  August,  to  the  bewilderment  of  the 
^T* 21  allies,  the  British  fleet  appeared  off  the  entrance  to  Narra- 
gansett  Bay.  Lord  Howe  had  received  reinforcements,  which 
brought  his  strength  in  numbers  up  to  about  two- thirds  of 
the  French.  The  adverse  balance,  in  his  opinion,  might  be 
redressed  by  seamanship,  and  in  this  he  rightly  believed 
himself  to  hold  an  easy  superiority.  The  British  had  lost 
command  of  the  sea,  and  so  long  as  he  should  lie  at  anchor 
in  New  York  harbour,  the  allies  had  gained  that  inestimable 
advantage.  The  best  he  could  hope  for  with  so  inferior  a 
force  was  to  produce  a  deadlock  in  which  neither  party  held 
a  clear  predominance. 

His  unforeseen  arrival  and  daring  menace  drew  the 
French  admiral  in  pursuit.  After  two  days  during  which 
Lord  Howe  skilfully  manoeuvred  in  the  open  sea,  a  gale 
sprang  up  which  separated  the  two  fleets  and  inflicted  so 
great  damage  upon  d'Estaing  that  he  considered  it  impera- 
tive to  retire  to  Boston,  fifty  miles  further  north,  to  refit. 
Upon  this  General  Sullivan  was  obliged  to  withdraw,  which 
he  did  in  high  dudgeon,  relieving  his  wounded  feelings  in 
indiscreet  and  bitter  criticism  of  his  faint-hearted  ally. 
Colonial  opinion  echoed  these  hot  opinions,  so  that  it 
needed  all  the  cool  tactfulness  of  Washington  to  prevent 
the  prophecy  of  Chatham  coming  true,  and  the  '  unnatural ' 
alliance  which  had  been  welcomed  with  such  fervid  en- 
thusiasm from  falling  hopelessly  to  pieces. 

D'Estaing  sailed  for  the  West  Indies  early  in  November, 
and  his  departure  gave  back  the  command  of  the  sea  to 
Lord  Howe's  successor.  Under  favour  of  this  condition 
the  British  pressed  an  attack  in  the  southern  states,  cap- 
turing and  holding  the  town  and  harbour  of  Savannah. 

The  Fifth  Year  of  the  war  (1779)  lacked  the  excitement  of 
great  events.  The  want  of  French  co-operation  until  the 


THE  INDEPENDENCE  OF  THE  STATES        55 

late  autumn  produced  a  deadlock.      In  the  chief  seat  of  A.D.  1779 
the  war,  the  state  of  New  York,  Washington  did  not  feel    ^T-22 
himself  strong  enough  to   attack  the  British  lines,   while 
Clinton  was  too  weak  to  push  his  army  into  the  open  and 
risk  a  pitched  battle  in  a  hostile  country. 

For  the  first  time  since  the  beginning  of  the  war,  winter 
had  passed  without  famine  or  excessive  privation  among 
the  colonial  troops.  But  Congress  had  less  credit  for  this 
result  than  the  increased  authority  of  the  commander-in- 
chief  and  the  disastrous  experience  of  previous  years,  which 
even  the  state  governments  who  held  the  purse-strings 
were  driven  to  respect. 

Congress  was  in  fact  as  bankrupt  as  ever  of  executive 
powers,  and  still  more  bankrupt  in  the  matter  of  capable 
men.  For  the  need  of  officers  had  drawn  many  away,  while 
foreign  missions  had  found  more  congenial  employment  for 
others.  The  finances  of  the  country  were  in  a  most 
melancholy  state  of  exhaustion ;  while  profit-making  and 
corruption  took  a  heavy  toll  upon  the  meagre  funds. 
'  Speculation  and  peculation/  in  Washington's  phrase,  were 
deadlier  enemies  than  the  fleets  and  armies  of  King  George. 
In  such  circumstances  a  campaign  of  passive  resistance, 
upon  which  Washington  had  determined,  placed  a  severe 
strain  upon  the  spirits  of  his  dwindling  army. 

In  the  spring  the  British  operations  were  confined  to  a 
series  of  raids  which  have  raised  the  usual  cloud  of  charges 
and  countercharges  of  barbarity  which  are  incidental  to  the 
nature  of  such  a  plan  of  campaign.  Where  the  devastation 
of  homesteads  is  the  deliberate  policy  of  a  commander,  the 
argument  of  expediency  will  not  wipe  out  bitter  memories, 
whether  the  general  be  British  or  American — Clinton  in 
New  Jersey  or  Sherman  in  Georgia. 

In  June  the  British  showed  an  inclination  to  extend 
their  posts  along  the  Hudson.  Forts  were  captured 


56  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1779  and  recaptured,  occupied  and  demolished,  but  no  events 
^T'22  happened  which  gave  a  decided  advantage  to  either  side. 
Washington  turned  a  deaf  ear  to  all  heroic  advice,  and 
steadily  pursued  his  weary  strategy  of  squeezing  Clinton 
back  into  his  lines  as  often  as  he  showed  a  disposition 
to  move  out  of  them.  He  turned  an  equally  deaf  ear 
to  the  cries  of  Congress  for  a  more  ferocious  retaliation 
in  the  matter  of  the  raids.  He  knew  his  own  business 
and  the  nature  of  war.  Considering  he  was  but  a  plain 
country  gentleman  and  a  soldier,  he  also  understood  with 
marvellous  insight  those  orators  and  journalists,  drunk  with 
the  rumours  of  outrage  and  atrocity,  ignorant  of  warfare 
and  by  temperament  averse  from  it.  He  rated  the  value  of 
their  counsel  at  a  price  that  was  unflattering,  and  the 
opinion  of  the  army  supported  him  in  his  clemency. 

As  was  but  natural,  there  were  strong  murmurs  against 
the  French.  For  ten  months  the  alliance  had  lain  dormant. 
The  sea-power  of  Britain  was  as  absolute  as  it  had  been  in 
the  early  years  of  the  war.  On  the  1st  of  September, 
however,  d'Estaing  reappeared  off  Savannah,  which  was 
still  in  British  hands.  In  co-operation  with  the  Ameri- 
can besiegers  he  delivered  an  attack  which  was  repulsed. 
During  October  he  sailed  away  with  the  greater  part  of 
his  ships  for  France,  so  that  even  the  menace  of  a  superior 
hostile  fleet  in  the  West  Indies  was  withdrawn,  and  Britain 
resumed  her  command  of  the  sea. 


CHAPTER  VI 

The  End  of  the  War 

IN  the  early  days  of  the  Sixth  Year  of  the  war  (1780)  the 
outlook  of  the  American  States  seemed  as  hopeless  as  in  the 


THE  INDEPENDENCE  OF  THE  STATES         57 

black  autumn  of  76.  Men  suffered  less,  or  at  any  rate  felt  A.D.  1780 
their  sufferings  with  a  duller  ache,  but  no  excitement  would  M<*> 23 
have  been  so  dangerous  as  the  weariness  that  was  hanging  on 
their  shoulders.  It  seemed  to  them  as  if,  in  spite  of  all  their 
valour  and  devotion,  in  spite  of  the  capacity  of  their  leader 
and  the  success  of  his  strategy,  in  spite  even  of  their  superior 
numbers,  more  earnest  spirit,  and  the  advantage  of  a  well- 
known  and  friendly  country,  they  were  after  all  about  to  be 
crushed  by  the  sheer  weight  of  an  enemy  who,  possessing 
boundless  resources,  would  neither  budge  nor  yield.  Their 
treasury  was  as  dry  as  a  summer  sandbank,  and  foreign 
loans  were  hard  to  come  by. 

Congress  was  sometimes  hysterical,  often  absurd,  and 
always  impotent.  It  passed  resolutions,  gave  much  advice 
to  the  commander-in-chief,  and  sat  for  ever  whistling  for 
a  wind.  The  state  governments  were  filled  with  jealousy, 
spleen  and  suspicions,  by  no  means  groundless,  one  of 
another.  They  were  incapable  equally  of  effective  co-opera- 
tion and  of  delegation  of  their  petty  sovereignties  to  the 
hands  of  a  federal  power.  The  Army,  under  ill  treatment 
and  neglect,  was  dwindling,  and  had  even  become  mutinous. 
The  people  had  comforted  their  sad  hearts  with  a  splendid 
alliance,  but  the  nuptials  were  barely  concluded  when,  like 
the  citizen's  fashionable  wife,  the  partner  proved  gadding 
and  unprofitable.  The  British  enemy  remained  in  stolid 
occupation  of  the  chief  commercial  city ;  and  in  this  com- 
manding position,  which  enabled  them  always  to  menace 
injury,  and  often  to  inflict  it,  they  remained  unassailable  so 
long  as  they  held  command  of  the  sea.  In  the  early  weeks 
of  the  year  the  royalist  army  in  the  south,  reinforced  by 
sympathisers  among  the  American  citizens,  and  led  by  Sir 
Henry  Clinton  himself,  was  vigorously  pushing  on  the  siege 
of  Charleston  with  good  prospects  of  success. 

The  feeling  of  discouragement  was  not  only  excusable  as  a 


58  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1780  weakness  of  human  nature,  but  was  grounded  in  the  very 
•aST<23  facts  of  the  situation.  Had  the  British  government  been 
willing  to  risk  some  bold  stroke  of  magnanimity,  had  it  acted 
with  more  astuteness  and  greater  energy,  or  had  there  arisen 
some  statesman  of  the  mettle  of  the  elder  Pitt,  suddenly 
awakening  the  slumbering  spirit  of  patriotism  among  the 
people,  we  feel  that,  even  at  the  eleventh  hour,  our  ances- 
tors might  still  have  turned  the  tables  on  their  adver- 
saries and  prevented  the  disruption  of  the  empire.  The 
faults  of  King  George  the  Third  have  been  conceded  with  a 
liberal  hand,  and  are  written  large  in  every  schoolbook  of 
history.  It  is  but  due,  however,  to  his  memory  to  recognise 
that,  although  the  beginnings  of  the  quarrel  may  have  been 
owing  in  great  measure  to  his  defects  of  judgment  and  of 
temper,  he  stood  alone  among  his  ministers,  and  all  but 
alone  among  his  subjects,  in  the  possession  of  that  spirit 
and  pride  of  duty  that  made  the  strength  of  Washington 
and  his  ragged  army. 

In  April  Lafayette  returned  from  France  bringing  news 
of  a  French  fleet  and  army  to  sail  without  delay.  Washing- 
ton thereupon  turned  his  mind  to  plans  for  a  joint  attack 
upon  New  York,  and  to  the  alternative  scheme  for  a  com- 
bination against  the  enemy  in  the  south.  But  on  May  12 
Charleston,  hitherto  deemed  impregnable,  was  stormed  and 
captured  by  Clinton,  an  achievement  which  deserves  high 
praise  for  its  skill  and  daring.  His  losses  were  but  two 
hundred  and  fifty  men,  and  with  this  small  sacrifice  he 
secured  the  town  and  harbour,  and  took  six  thousand 
prisoners  and  four  hundred  guns.  Having  secured  his 
conquest,  he  left  Cornwallis  in  command  in  the  south, 
which  now  lay  open  to  invasion,  and  returned  to  New 
York.  Washington  held  grimly  to  the  Hudson  river,  and 
awaited  the  coming  of  the  French  forces. 

Towards  the  middle  of  July  an  army  of  five  thousand 


THE  INDEPENDENCE  OF  THE  STATES         59 

men  under  Rochambeau,  and  a  small  fleet  with  seven  ships  A.D.  1780 
of  the  line  under  de  Ternay,  arrived  once  more  off  Rhode    ^T* 23 
Island,  bringing  intelligence  of  a  larger  fleet  that  was  to 
follow.    Their  arrival  was  welcome;  but  the  orders  of  the 
French  Government  that  no  important  enterprises  were  to 
be  undertaken  until  the  promised  reinforcements  should 
appear  produced  much  heartburning.    Weeks  went  by,  and 
then  word  came  that  the  second  fleet  lay  in  Brest  Harbour 
blocked  by  a  British  admiral. 

Under  this  disappointment  the  heads  even  of  good 
soldiers  and  citizens  began  to  swim,  and  the  mouths  of  men 
were  full  of  contradictory  reasons  for  resting  from  the 
struggle.  Some  drew  attention  to  the  empty  treasury ; 
others  to  the  fact  that  the  French  had  now  come;  others, 
again,  demonstrated  convincingly  that  the  British  were  worn 
out,  and  as  good  as  beaten  already.  August  saw  the  army 
on  the  verge  of  dissolution.  But  Washington,  as  ever,  was 
calm,  industrious  and  determined ;  writing  with  suppressed 
passion  to  Congress ;  inspiriting  his  troops ;  reasoning  with 
men  by  letter  and  speech,  and  succeeding  somehow  in 
keeping  things  together. 

September  was  a  black  month  for  the  Americans.  Corn- 
wallis  in  the  south  with  two  thousand  men  utterly  de- 
feated their  army,  over  three  thousand  strong,  at  Camden, 
under  Gates,  the  conqueror  of  Burgoyne.  Washington 
returning  from  a  meeting  with  Rochambeau  learned  of 
the  treachery  and  flight  of  General  Arnold  commanding 
at  West  Point.  Meanwhile  the  army  watching  New  York 
starved  and  became  more  mutinous.  Admiral  Rodney 
with  a  portion  of  his  fleet  visited  the  city,  but  un- 
fortunately he  did  not  see  his  duty  in  the  same  light 
as  it  had  appeared  to  Lord  Howe.  The  French  were 
left  undisturbed  at  Newport,  and  he  sailed  back  to  the 
West  Indies. 


60  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1781  When  the  Seventh  Year  of  the  war  (1781)  opened,  Greene, 
^T-24  the  best  of  Washington's  generals,  took  command  against 
Cornwallis  in  the  south.  He  had  succeeded  Gates,  whose 
vanity  and  incompetence  were  at  length  manifest  even  to 
Congress  despite  his  flattery  and  intrigues.  A  column 
under  Arnold,  now  in  the  British  service,  ravaged  Virginia. 
Washington's  hands  were  full  of  disciplinary  matters. 
There  was  a  mutiny  of  the  Pennsylvania  regiments,  due 
to  the  misery  of  their  conditions,  and  when  that  was  settled, 
another  broke  out  among  their  comrades  of  New  Jersey. 
Some  hanging  was  necessary,  from  which  the  commander- 
in-chief  did  not  shrink. 

Greene,  opposed  to  the  main  army  under  Cornwallis,  made 
a  successful  retreat,  drawing  the  British  two  hundred  miles 
from  their  base,  but  leaving  both  the  Carolinas  at  their 
mercy.  On  March  15,  Greene  with  four  thousand  five 
hundred  men  judged  himself  to  be  in  sufficient  strength  to 
turn  and  risk  a  battle  with  his  redoubtable  antagonist,  who 
had  less  than  half  his  numbers.  But  he  was  heavily  defeated 
at  Guilford  Court-house ;  though,  like  many  of  the  British 
victories,  this  one  also  was  barren  of  good  results  for  the 
conquerors.  Cornwallis  found  himself  obliged  to  retreat  to 
Wilmington,  and  the  Americans  re-entered  South  Carolina. 
Again  at  Hobkirk  Hill  on  April  25  Greene  was  beaten  by 
a  small  force  of  nine  hundred  men  under  Lord  Rawdon,  but 
being  too  weak  to  pursue,  the  British  troops  were  forced 
to  retire  on  Charleston. 

At  the  end  of  March  de  Grasse  sailed  from  Brest  with  an 
overwhelming  fleet  of  twenty-six  ships  of  the  line  and  a 
large  convoy,  arriving  at  Martinique  in  the  last  days  of 
April.1 

Cornwallis  at  Wilmington  debated  whether  he  should 
rejoin  Rawdon  at  Charleston  or  push  on  to  Arnold  in  the 

1  Mahan,  The  Influence  of  Sea  Power  in  History,  chap.  x. 


THE  INDEPENDENCE  OF  THE  STATES         61 

north.    At  the  end  of  April  he  determined  on  the  latter  A.D.  1781 
course,  and  the  fate  of  the  war  was  decided. 

On  May  20  Cornwallis  met  Arnold  at  Petersburg,  when 
their  united  armies  amounted  to  five  thousand  men.  Taking 
command,  he  sent  Arnold  back  to  New  York.  Clinton  when 
he  heard  of  this  movement  condemned  it,  and  with  good 
reason.  The  position  of  an  army  resting  on  the  Chesapeake 
depended  for  its  safety  on  command  of  the  sea,  and  this  upon 
his  information  was  unlikely  to  be  retained  for  many  weeks 
longer. 

Washington,  having  full  knowledge  of  the  intentions  of  de 
Grasse,  discussed  with  Rochambeau  the  alternatives — a 
combined  attack  upon  Clinton's  army  in  New  York,  or  upon 
that  of  Cornwallis  in  the  south.  Having  decided  upon  the 
latter  course,  the  allies  determined  to  alarm  Clinton  by  the 
feint  of  an  attack,  which  succeeded  so  well  that  he  applied 
to  Cornwallis  for  reinforcements. 

Towards  the  middle  of  August  a  frigate  brought  word  that 
de  Grasse  might  shortly  be  expected  in  the  Chesapeake. 
Washington  wrote  immediately  in  reply  that  he  would  join 
him  with  as  many  troops  as  could  be  spared  from  the 
investment  of  the  main  army  of  the  British. 

In  Virginia,  Lafayette  with  light  troops  had  for  some  time 
been  watching  and  harassing  Cornwallis,  who  had  gradually 
withdrawn  to  the  coast,  and  was  established  with  his  prin- 
cipal force  at  York  town,  on  the  south  shore  of  the  estuary 
of  the  York  river. 

On  the  21st  of  August  Washington  began  to  move  his 
army  southwards.  On  the  23rd  and  24th  he  crossed  from 
the  east  to  the  west  bank  of  the  Hudson  river.  On  the 
27th  de  Barras,  the  French  admiral  at  Newport,  sailed  with 
his  fleet  of  eight  ships  of  the  line,  and  eighteen  transports 
carrying  troops  and  a  siege-train,  to  join  de  Grasse  in  the 
south. 


62  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1781  Rodney  in  the  West  Indies,  at  the  news  of  the  French 
MT'  24  departure  from  these  waters,  had  detached  Hood  with  four- 
teen ships  to  follow  them.1  Making  a  quicker  passage,  the 
British  arrived  in  Chesapeake  Bay  three  days  before  the 
enemy,  and  finding  no  trace  of  him  sailed  on  to  New  York. 
Admiral  Graves  at  that  station  had  five  ships  of  the  line, 
and  was  Hood's  senior  officer.  He  took  command  of  the 
united  fleet,  and  having  word  of  de  Barras's  departure  from 
Newport,  weighed  anchor  on  the  31st  in  the  hopes  of 
delivering  a  crushing  blow.  But  the  French  had  good  luck 
in  their  sluggishness,  and  Graves  went  past  without  sighting 
them.  When  he  arrived  in  Chesapeake  Bay  he  found  only 
the  fleet  of  de  Grasse,  which  outnumbered  him  by  five  ships 
of  the  line.  He  engaged  gallantly,  but  without  discretion, 
and  allowed  de  Grasse  to  manoeuvre  him  gradually  out  of 
the  bay,  declining  action  for  five  consecutive  days.  Mean- 
while de  Barras  arrived  with  his  contingent,  and  Graves, 
hopelessly  outnumbered,  withdrew  to  New  York.  It  was  a 
good  scheme  on  the  part  of  the  British,  and  miscarried 
partly  through  ill-fortune,  but  mainly  through  a  lack 
of  wits. 

September  opened  hopefully  for  the  allies.  On  the  2nd 
Washington,  having  taken  every  ingenious  precaution  to 
conceal  his  departure,  reached  Philadelphia  with  his  army. 
About  the  same  time  Clinton  appears  to  have  first  realised 
that  he  was  seriously  bent  on  a  southern  movement.  In 
the  south  Greene  engaged  Colonel  Stewart  at  Eutaw  Springs, 
and  fought  an  indecisive  battle,  but  the  result  was  to  force 
the  British  commander  to  fall  back  upon  Charleston,  thereby 
cutting  off  Cornwallis's  retreat  towards  the  south.  On  the 
22nd  French  transports  carried  Washington's  army  down 
the  Chesapeake  and  up  the  James  river  to  Williamsburg. 
On  the  28th  he  marched  on  Yorktown.  The  meshes  were 

1  Mahan,  The  Influence  of  Sea  Power  in  History,  chap.  x. 


THE  INDEPENDENCE  OF  THE  STATES        63 

being  drawn  very  tight  round   the  best  soldier  who  had  A.D.  1781 
fought  in  America  for  King  George. 

The  French  fleet  held  the  river  mouth  against  escape  or 
succour.  To  the  south,  the  estuary  of  the  James,  four 
hundred  miles  of  hostile  country,  and  the  army  of  Greene, 
cut  off  all  hope  of  a  retreat  on  Charleston.  To  the  north  the 
York  river,  over  a  mile  broad,  separated  Cornwallis  from  his 
outpost  at  Gloucester.  To  transport  his  little  army,  number- 
ing somewhat  more  than  seven  thousand  men,  in  open  boats 
across  such  an  obstacle,  exposed  during  the  process  to  attack 
from  the  fleet  at  anchor  in  the  bay,  having  transported  it 
in  safety,  to  traverse  Maryland  and  Pennsylvania  and  New 
Jersey  to  New  York,  four  hundred  miles  away,  with  an 
elated  enemy  on  his  heels  and  lining  every  wood  and  river 
bank  upon  the  march,  was  an  opportunity  so  slender  that 
only  desperation  could  have  thought  of  clutching  at  it. 
Across  the  peninsula  to  the  west,  cutting  him  off  entirely 
from  the  mainland,  lay  the  army  of  Washington,  eighteen 
thousand  strong — eleven  thousand  Americans  and  seven 
thousand  Frenchmen — with  a  heavy  and  well-appointed 
siege-train.  The  allies  were  full  of  fresh  hope  and  ardour, 
and  their  great  leader  was  calmly  confident  of  a  crowning 
victory  at  last.  Discouragement  and  disease  among  the 
British  and  their  Hessian  mercenaries  increased  the  odds 
against  Cornwallis.  So  matters  stood  on  the  1st  of  October 
1781. 

On  the  5th  the  Americans  opened  their  trenches. 
On  the  14th  two  commanding  redoubts  were  captured 
—the  first  by  a  light  corps  led  by  Colonel  Alexander 
Hamilton  with  great  judgment  and  gallantry,  the  second 
more  deliberately  by  the  French.  The  game  was  hopeless 
from  the  beginning,  and  now  it  was  all  but  played  out. 
Still  the  intrepid  defender  remained  obdurate  to  all  talk  of 
a  surrender.  If  he  could  not  avert  the  inevitable,  he  could 


64  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1781  at  all  events  add  another  example  of  courage  and  resource 
^T>  24  to  the  great  tradition  of  the  British  arms.  His  ammuni- 
tion was  giving  out,  and  many  of  his  soldiers  were  sick. 
He  made  a  night  attack,  spiked  guns,  destroyed  some  earth- 
works, but  to  no  purpose.  Then  he  formed  an  audacious 
scheme  of  escape  to  the  north.  One  contingent  crossed 
successfully  to  the  northern  shore ;  but  even  the  elements 
were  against  him.  A  gale  sprang  up  in  which  no  open 
boat,  weighted  to  the  gunwale  with  men  and  stores,  could 
ever  hope  to  live. 

So  upon  the  19th  of  October,  there  being  no  other  course 
available,  he  surrendered.  In  a  war  which  was  the  grave 
of  most  men's  reputations  who  had  in  it  any  prominent 
part,  military  or  civil,  Cornwallis  almost  alone  added  to 
his  fame.  For  not  only  was  he  a  soldier  of  stainless 
courage,  but  he  had  a  bold  and  steady  judgment,  and 
in  his  actions  a  promptness  that  was  lacking  in  all  the 
others. 

Yorktown  was  the  end  of  the  war.  Charleston  and 
Savannah  were  evacuated  in  the  succeeding  year,  and 
only  New  York  remained  in  possession  of  the  King's 
troops. 


Washington  was  not  less  admirable  in  success  than 
under  defeat.  He  had  no  thought  of  taking  his  ease 
until  not  only  victory,  but  the  fruits  of  victory,  had  been 
secured.  The  general  conviction  that  the  war  was  over 
seemed  to  him  to  be  fraught  with  dangerous  possibilities. 
Negotiation  must  follow,  supposing  both  parties  to  be 
inclined  to  peace.  Having  regard  to  the  alliance  with  France 
and  Spain,  who  as  yet  had  tasted  little  of  the  sweets  of 
conquest,  had  settled  but  few  of  their  old  accounts,  and  had 
enjoyed  revenge  only,  as  it  were,  vicariously,  in  the  profit 


THE  INDEPENDENCE  OF  THE  STATES         65 

taken  by  a  third  party  at  the  expense  of  their  ancient  foe,  A.D.  17S1 
it  was  probable  that  such  negotiations  would  extend  over  a    MT'  24 
long  period. 

Washington  was  still  too  weak  to  turn  Clinton  out  of 
New  York  without  French  aid,  and  the  French  had  other 
more  urgent  uses  for  their  ships  and  men.  But  it  was  a 
clear  necessity  that  Clinton  should  be  kept  fast  under  lock 
and  key,  otherwise,  when  it  came  to  a  treaty,  the  British 
Government  might  have  some  solid  advantage  to  throw 
into  the  scales.  At  all  costs  the  colonial  army  must  be  kept 
in  being,  an  effective  force,  capable  not  only  of  defence  but 
of  aggression.  In  this  attempt  it  was  necessary  to  reckon 
with  Congress  and  the  state  governments,  and  the  temper  of 
the  civil  population  and  the  army  itself,  who  were,  one  and 
all,  weary  of  the  war,  and  only  too  much  inclined  to  a 
complacent  admiration  of  their  past  valour.  At  no  period 
of  his  career  had  the  commander-in-chief  to  encounter 
difficulties  that  were  harder  to  contend  with,  and  his  credit 
stands  as  high  in  these  irksome  labours  as  it  did  at  Princeton, 
Yalley  Forge,  or  Yorktown. 


In  March,  in  the   Eighth  Year  of  the  war  (1782),  the  A.D.  1782 
British  House  of  Commons  voted  for  the  discontinuance  of    ^T<  25 
hostilities,  and  Lord  George  Germaine  resigned.     There  is  a 
touch  of  irony  in  the  event ;  for  his  retention  of  office  would 
now  no  longer  have  been  of  any  conspicuous  injury  to  his 
country. 

In  May  Washington  was  imploring  the  states  for  men, 
and  for  money  to  pay  the  troops  and  to  provide  them  with 
supplies.1  The  question  of  arrears  and  pensions  was  very 
urgent.  In  October  we  find  him  writing  to  the  Secretary 

1  Sparka's  Washington,  viii.  pp.  284-88. 


66  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1782  of  War  on  these  matters,  pressing  immediate  consideration 

'  ^    of  the  just  claims  of  his  soldiers,  "  after  having  spent  the 

'  flower  of  their  days,  and  many  of  them  their  patrimonies, 

'  in  establishing  the  freedom  and  independence  of  their 

'  country." 1 

But  in  Congress,  and  not  only  in  Congress,  but  also  in 
the  people,  there  was  an  exaggerated  standard  of  political 
morality  founded  upon  stock  phrases  regarding  the  sub- 
ordination of  the  military  to  the  civil  power.  In  times  of 
war  this  excessive  virtue  had  yielded  with  a  sigh  to  the 
importunate  violence  of  events,  but  with  the  return  of  peace 
it  sought  to  stifle  the  memory  of  its  lapse  under  a  prudish, 
circumspect,  precise  and  jealous  behaviour.  The  army  was 
at  last  told  in  plain  words  that  it  placed  too  high  an  estimate 
both  upon  its  importance  and  its  claims.  It  was  exhorted 
to  practise  the  virtue  of  patience.  By  and  by,  when  the 
civil  power  should  decide  in  its  wisdom  that  the  time  was 
ripe,  something  would  probably  be  done.  As  a  matter  of 
grace,  relief  would  then  be  doled  out,  of  such  a  kind  as 
prudent  citizens,  without  losing  sight  of  first  principles, 
could  allow  to  thoughtless  fellows  who  had  risked  nothing 
but  their  fortunes  and  their  reputations  for  the  common 
good.  Addressed  in  terms  of  so  cool  a  gratitude,  the  army 
began  to  murmur  mutinously,  and  to  consider  whether  after 
all  it  was  not  master  of  the  situation.  There  was  talk  of  a 
dictator,2  which  threw  Washington  into  a  rage  and  Hamilton 
into  a  fit  of  laughter. 

In  the  following  year  things  became  graver.  There  was 
open  sedition,  of  which  the  heroic  Gates  was  the  secret 
instigator.3  The  army,  urged  in  anonymous  broadsheets  to 
use  force  for  securing  its  well-earned  provision  of  half-pay, 
gave  an  attentive  ear.  Gates  in  former  years,  with  the  aid 

1  Sparks's  Washington,  viii.  p.  354.  2  History,  ii.  p.  111. 

3  Ibid.  ii.  pp.  393-94. 


THE  INDEPENDENCE  OF  THE  STATES         6*7 

of  Congress,  had  endeavoured  to  supplant  Washington  in  A.  D.  1782 
the  chief  command.     He  now  turned  upon  his  former  ally,    ^T>  25 
and  made  it  the  object  of  his  mean  intrigues  to  destroy  the 
affection  of  the  army  for  its  great  leader  by  forcing  him  to 
act  as  the  protector  of  Congress. 

There  was  only  one  man  in  America  capable  of  quelling 
the  mutinous  spirit,  and  he,  by  the  irony  of  fate,  was  in  full 
sympathy  with  the  grievance.  His  enemies  counted  safely 
that  to  Washington  disorder  and  civil  war  would  appear 
even  greater  evils  than  the  suffering  of  his  soldiers.  They 
judged  rightly  that  he  would  not  hesitate  in  his  course  of 
action.  A  meeting  of  the  discontented  assembled  upon  an 
appointed  day,  and  Gates  was  called  on  to  preside. 
Washington  attended  with  a  set  speech  in  writing  in  his 
pocket.  "  He,  who  had  never  been  greeted  but  with  affec- 
'  tion,  was  received  with  cold  and  calm  respect.  It  appeared 
'  as  though  sedition  had  felt  it  necessary  to  commence  her 
'  secret  work  by  engendering  suspicions  against  the  Father 
'  of  his  country.  He  arose :  he  felt  the  estrangement — 
'  he  paused,  and  he  doubted  of  the  issue.  As  he  uncovered 
'  his  venerated  head,  and  was  about  to  address  them  from 
'  a  written  paper  in  his  hand,  his  eye  grew  dun,  and  he 
'  uttered  this  pathetic  unpremeditated  remark :  '  Fellow 
'  soldiers,  you  perceive  I  have  not  only  grown  grey,  but 
'  blind  in  your  service.' " l  He  then  proceeded  to  read  his 
speech,  which  was  an  indignant  condemnation  of  the  con- 
spiracy; but  the  phrase  of  his  opening  had  been  enough. 
"Awed  by  the  majesty  of  his  virtue,  and  touched  with 
'  his  interest  in  their  sufferings,  every  soldier's  eye  was 
'  filled  with  a  generous  tear ;  they  reproved  themselves 
'  for  having  doubted  him  who  had  never  deceived  them : 
'  they  forgot  their  wrongs,  in  the  love  of  their  country 
'  and  of  their  chief." 2 

1  History,  ii.  p.  391.  *  Ibid.  p.  393. 


68  ALEXANDEB  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1783  By  the  autumn  of  1782  the  allies  of  the  states  were  in  a 
^T* 26  more  accommodating  humour  for  discussing  terms  of  peace. 
In  April,  Rodney  in  the  West  Indies  had  broken  the  line 
of  de  Grasse.  In  September,  Elliot  at  Gibraltar,  after  a 
three  years'  siege,  had  burned  de  Crillon's  famous  batteries 
to  the  water's  edge.  The  preliminary  articles  of  peace  were 
signed  on  January  the  20th,  1783,  and  the  welcome  news 
reached  Washington  in  March.  In  November  the  British 
army  left  New  York,  and  before  Christmas  Day  the  American 
commander-in-chief  had  bidden  his  officers  good-bye  and 
laid  down  his  commission  in  Congress. 


CHAPTER  VII 

The  Military  Secretary 

A.D.  1776  IN  March  '76,  a  few  days  before  Washington  drove  Sir 
«•  i£  William  Howe  out  of  Boston,  Hamilton  was  appointed  to 
the  captaincy  of  the  company  of  artillery  which  had  been 
raised  by  New  York  state.  In  January  of  the  same  year 
he  had  celebrated  his  nineteenth  birthday.  Murmurs  on 
the  score  of  his  youth  were  quieted  by  testimonials  from 
the  military  instructors,  and  at  the  earliest  opportunity  by 
his  conduct  in  the  field.  It  is  notable  that  he  laboured  at 
the  science  of  his  profession  during  the  twelve  months  that 
intervened  between  his  enrolment  in  the  Hearts  of  Oak 
and  the  battle  of  Brooklyn,  with  the  same  zeal  which  he 
had  previously  given  to  philosophy  and  the  classics.  In 
drills  and  gun-practice  he  was  equally  industrious,  and 
valued  the  smart  appearance  of  his  company  to  the  extent 
of  giving  the  larger  portion  of  his  allowance  from  the  West 
Indies  to  their  external  embellishment.1 

1  Life,  p.  52. 


THE  INDEPENDENCE  OF  THE  STATES         69 

In  the  famous  passage  from  Brooklyn  he  brought  up  A.D.  1776 
the  rear,  comported  himself  in  such  a  manner  as  to  win  ^T>  1{ 
considerable  credit,  and  lost  his  baggage  and  a  gun.  He 
attracted  the  favourable  notice  of  Greene,  the  best  general 
who  served  under  Washington,  and  afterwards,  during  the 
retreat  from  New  York,  of  the  commander-in-  chief  him- 
self, who  was  impressed  by  his  earthworks  at  Harlem,  and 
engaged  him  in  conversation.1  At  White  Plains  he  again 
won  admiration  for  the  coolness  and  courage  with  which 
he  used  his  battery  to  check  the  British  attack.2  In  October, 
after  the  fall  of  the  posts  on  the  Hudson  river,  he  volun- 
teered to  retake  Fort  Washington,  but  the  offer  did  not 
commend  itself  at  headquarters.3  In  the  late  autumn,  when 
the  American  army  was  falling  back  through  New  Jersey, 
dwindling  in  numbers  and  hope,  he  again  earned  high  praise 
by  the  bold  and  sagacious  handling  of  his  battery  for  the 
protection  of  the  rearguard  in  its  crossing  of  the  Raritan.4 
By  the  end  of  the  year  he  had  won  as  great  a  fame 
for  his  soldierly  qualities  as  a  few  months  earlier  for  his 
pamphlets  and  speeches.  A  contemporary  record  is  quoted 
by  his  biographer:  —  "I  noticed  a  youth,  a  mere  stripling, 
'  small,  slender,  almost  delicate  in  frame,  marching  beside 
*  a  piece  of  artillery  with  a  cocked  hat  pulled  down  over 
'  his  eyes,  apparently  lost  in  thought,  with  his  hand  resting 
'  on  the  cannon,  and  every  now  and  then  patting  it  as 
'  he  mused,  as  if  it  were  a  favourite  horse  or  a  pet  play- 
'  thing."  6 

On  the  1st  of  March  1777  he  was  appointed  aide-de-camp  A.D.  1777 
to  General  Washington  with  the  rank  of  lieu  tenant-  colonel,    MT-  20 
and    entered    into    close    relations   with  that  great    man 
which  lasted  for  the  whole  period  of  their  joint  lives.     It 
is  fair  to  assume  that  he  owed  this  appointment  as  much 

1  Life,  p.  56.  2  Ridt  p>  56.  3  IUdt  p<  56. 


1  Life,  p.  56.  2  Ridt  p>  56. 

4  Ibid.  p.  57.  8  History,  i.  pp.  137-8 


70  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1777  to  his  reputation  with  the  pen  as  to  the  handling 
MT.  20  0£  ^  battery.  The  combination  of  qualities  made  him 
invaluable.  Washington  was  overwhelmed  with  corre- 
spondence, and  although  he  wrote  well,  it  was  with  ex- 
treme difficulty  and  slowness,  and  innumerable  corrections 
even  in  such  details  as  grammar  and  spelling.  A  large 
proportion  of  his  letters  were  political  and  diplomatic, 
rather  than  military  in  the  strictest  sense.  A  boy  who 
was  not  only  a  ready  and  powerful  writer,  but  who  possessed 
in  addition  the  instinct  of  a  statesman  and  the  spirit  of 
a  soldier,  was  an  inestimable  discovery.  From  the  first 
he  acted  as  secretary,  sharing  the  duties  of  the  post 
with  one  who  became  at  once  his  devoted  friend,  '  the 
old  secretary/  General  Harrison.  The  affection  of  this 
colleague  invented  the  nickname  which  has  stuck — 'the 
little  lion.' * 

From  the  first,  also,  he  was  employed  to  write  important 
documents,  and  sent  upon  errands  that  required  character 
and  discretion.  It  is  beyond  question  that  the  messages 
to  Congress,  and  the  correspondence  with  British  generals, 
which  impressed  Europe  with  the  dignity  and  power  of  the 
American  leader,  were  mainly  the  work  of  Hamilton's  mind. 
The  official  correspondence  of  Washington  during  this  period 
had  a  wide  audience  and  a  great  celebrity,  and  while  we 
must  acknowledge  the  credit  due  to  his  secretary  in  the 
vigour,  the  logical  arrangement,  the  lucidity  and  the  stateli- 
ness  of  these  documents,  we  are  no  less  bound  to  beware  of 
the  absurd  explanation  which  has  depicted  the  commander- 
in-chief  as  a  kind  of  puppet.  It  is  a  favourite  device  of  a 
certain  class  of  commentators  upon  great  men  to  attribute 
their  excellences  always  to  some  one  else,  and  Hamilton  has 
not  altogether  escaped  this  indiscreet  tribute,  either  during 
his  life  or  subsequently.  But  certainly  he  never  sought  it, 

1  Lift,  P.  64. 


THE  INDEPENDENCE  OF  THE  STATES         71 

nor  gave  the  least  colour  to  the  legend.  Washington  was  A.D.  1777 
not  the  readiest  of  writers,  but  he  held  his  opinions  in  ^T-20 
a  vice;  and  we  may  safely  assume  that  if  his  vivacious 
secretary  had  happened  upon  any  occasion  to  set  forth 
his  own  views  and  not  those  of  his  chief,  the  despatch 
containing  them  would  have  been  rewritten  before  it  was 
signed.  It  is  not  unfair,  however,  nor  is  it  any  derogation 
from  the  splendid  character  of  the  commander-in-chief,  to 
say  that  Hamilton  began  by  writing  to  his  instructions, 
and  ended  by  divining,  interpreting  and  anticipating  his 
thoughts.1  In  counsel  no  less  than  in  action,  the  greatest 
of  Washington's  qualities  was  his  instinct  for  the  true 
relation  of  things.  Reasoning  and  argument  were  only  a 
degree  less  irksome  to  him  than  composition  and  penman- 
ship. It  has  been  said  of  him  by  one  who  had  acted  as 
his  secretary,  that  when  some  important  document  had  to 
be  acknowledged,  he  left  his  bewildered  amanuensis  to  find 
not  only  the  words,  but  even  the  answer  itself.  But  to 
live  on  close  terms  with  Washington  was  to  be  dominated 
by  his  opinions  to  such  an  extent  that  it  would  have  been 
difficult  to  run  counter  to  them. 

Of  one  of  Hamilton's  services  we  have  very  ample 
records.  At  the  end  of  October,  after  the  news  had  come 
of  Burgoyne's  surrender,  he  was  despatched  to  General  Gates 
for  reinforcements.  He  was  in  his  twenty-first  year,  and  had 
been  acting  as  military  secretary  for  a  period  of  only  eight 
months.  Gates  was  a  vain,  envious  and  foolish  creature,  but 
he  was  also  a  victorious  general.  He  had  reaped  where  others 
had  sown,  and  was  enjoying  an  immense  fame  and  popularity 
in  consequence.  His  success  at  Saratoga  was  contrasted  by 
shallow  and  impatient  people  with  the  defeat  at  Brandy  wine 
and  the  fall  of  Philadelphia.  There  was  a  strong  Gates  party, 
composed  of  his  own  henchmen  and  the  ill-wishers  of  the 

1  Pickering  to  Coleman,  History,  ii. ,  preface,  p.  viL 


72  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1777  commander-in-chief.  Gates,  in  the  first  flush  of  conquest, 
had  even  permitted  himself  certain  deliberate  slights  and 
discourtesies.  Altogether  it  was  a  difficult  embassy  for  a 
boy  to  accomplish  with  credit,  and  it  may  be  taken  as  proof 
of  the  confidence  which  Washington  reposed  in  Hamilton 
that  he  went  armed  with  a  letter,  to  use  if  there  were 
need  of  it,  clothing  him  with  absolute  power  and  leaving 
everything  to  his  discretion. 

Gates,  as  might  have  been  expected,  demurred  to  parting 
with  two  out  of  his  three  brigades,  and  pretended  danger 
from  Sir  Henry  Clinton  in  New  York  as  his  justification. 
He  would  give  one  of  the  three,  which  Hamilton,  mindful  of 
the  diplomacies,  was  about  to  accept  with  a  wry  face,  when  he 
discovered  that  it  was  less  than  half  the  strength  of  either  of 
the  others,  and  liable  to  still  further  diminution  at  an  early 
date  through  the  expiry  of  the  term  of  enlistment.  There- 
upon Hamilton  had  no  option  but  to  act  upon  his  powers. 
His  letter  to  Gates  is  a  masterpiece  of  courtesy  in  the  im- 
perative mood.  The  victorious  general,  surprised  in  sharp 
practice,  gave  up  more  than  he  need  otherwise  have  done, 
and  added  a  second  brigade. 

With  General  Putnam,  whom  he  met  by  the  way,  Hamil- 
ton dealt  more  cavalierly.  Putnam  was  a  better  man  than 
Gates,  braver  and  more  honest,  but  he  had  what  in  Scotland 
is  called  'a  bee  in  his  bonnet.'  With  him  high  matters 
were  a  complete  confusion,  and  the  little  things  usually  took 
precedence  of  the  big.  Like  many  brave  veterans  who 
are  dimly  conscious  of  their  own  lack  of  perspicacity,  he 
was  of  a  most  touchy  disposition.  Orders  given  without 
any  authority  by  a  very  youthful  staff  officer,  command- 
ing him  forthwith  to  detach  troops  to  the  south  when 
he  had  been  planning  a  baresark  descent  upon  Clinton  in 
New  York,  were  a  great  deal  more  than  he  could  stand  with 
equanimity. 


THE  INDEPENDENCE  OF  THE  STATES        73 

Hamilton  returned  a  few  days  later,  after  his  encounter  A.D.  1778 
with  General  Gates,  to  find  that  his  august  commands  to  ^T< 
General  Putnam  had  not  been  carried  into  execution.  His 
indignation  was  only  equalled  by  his  determination  to  be 
obeyed.  He  was  shivering  with  fever,  but  such  was  the 
force  of  his  youthful  spirit  that  from  his  sick-bed  orders 
went  forth  to  Putnam's  puzzled  subordinates  to  march  south 
immediately,  and  neither  the  unwillingness  of  one,  nor  the 
ingenious  pretext  of  another  that  his  men  were  undergoing 
'  an  operation  for  the  itch/  was  able  to  stand  against  such 
persuasions. 

In  the  following  year  we  find  for  the  first  time  murmurs 
against  the  undue  influence  exercised  by  Hamilton  upon 
the  mind  of  Washington.  The  charge  was  maintained  till 
the  end  of  his  days,  and  in  later  years  became  one  of 
the  chief  cries  of  the  Democratic  party.  The  power  which 
Hamilton  exercised  over  the  minds  of  his  fellows  and  over 
events  is  undeniable;  but  throughout  his  life  he  was  ever 
suspected  of  an  even  greater  personal  influence  than  he 
possessed.  The  superior  brilliance  of  his  personality  dis- 
torted the  true  proportions  of  every  word  and  action.  If 
something  noteworthy  was  done,  men  were  certain  that 
he  had  pulled  the  strings ;  if  something  remarkable 
was  said,  that  he  had  prompted.  All  admiration  and 
odium  were  concentrated  upon  him,  and  it  was  con- 
ceived to  be  impossible  for  any  colleague  to  retain  his 
independence  of  will  or  judgment  in  such  dangerous 
company. 

Hamilton's  correspondence  during  the  period  of  the  war  is 
full  of  interest,  and  bears  evidence  to  a  clear  and  soldierly 
view  of  the  situation.  But  what  has  been  preserved 
is  only  a  fragment,  and  where  we  should  most  desire  his 
commentary  there  is  usually  a  gap.  In  the  early  months 
of  the  year  he  was  engaged  at  Valley  Forge  with  a  com- 


74  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1779  mittee  of  Congress,  drafting  and  redrafting  their  reports 
Mr.  22  Up0n  t^  organisation  and  subsistence  of  the  army.  He 
kept  up  a  regular  but  unofficial  correspondence  in  his 
own  name,  but  on  his  general's  behalf,  with  the  friendly 
party  in  Congress.  At  the  battle  of  Monmouth  he 
appeared  once  more  as  a  soldier,  protesting  energetically 
against  the  tactics  of  Lee  and  rallying  the  retreating 
regiments.  Afterwards  he  was  sent  to  interview  Admiral 
d'Estaing. 

In  the  following  winter  (79),  while  the  army  lay  watching 
the  British,  a  plan  for  kidnapping  Sir  Henry  Clinton  was 
hatched  by  some  audacious  spirits.  "The  British  general 
'  was  then  occupying  a  house  near  the  Battery,  in  New  York, 
'  situate  a  few  yards  from  the  Hudson  river.  Intelligence, 
'  through  spies,  had  been  obtained  of  the  approaches  to  his 
'  bedchamber.  Light  whale-boats,  with  muffled  oars,  were 
'  to  be  placed  under  the  command  of  Colonel  Humphreys, 
'  of  Connecticut ;  and  the  party,  in  full  preparation,  were 
'  waiting  anxiously  the  approach  of  night  for  the  execution 
'  of  their  purpose.  .  .  .  Colonel  Hamilton,  in  the  interval, 
'  became  informed  of  the  intended  enterprise.  He  observed 
'  to  General  Washington  '  that  there  could  be  little  doubt 
'  of  its  success ;  but,  sir,'  said  he,  '  have  you  examined  the 
'  consequences  of  it  ? '  The  general  inquired,  '  In  what 
'  respect  ? '  '  Why,'  replied  Hamilton,  '  it  has  occurred  to 
'  me  that  we  shall  rather  lose  than  gain  by  removing  Sir 
'  Henry  Clinton  from  the  command  of  the  British  army, 
'  because  we  perfectly  understand  his  character;  and,  by 
'  taking  him  off,  we  only  make  way  for  some  other,  perhaps 
'  an  abler  officer,  whose  character  and  disposition  we  have 
1  to  learn.'  The  general  acknowledged  the  force  of  the 
'objection,  and  abandoned  the  project."1  .  .  .  There  is 
an  almost  preternatural  sagacity  in  such  reasoning.  The 

1  Life,  pp.  218,  219. 


THE  INDEPENDENCE  OF  THE  STATES         75 

scene  appeals  to  the  imagination  so  strongly  that  we  A.D.  1780 
pray  it  may  indeed  have  happened: — the  solemn  general,  T> 
with  the  weight  of  American  freedom  on  his  broad 
shoulders,  standing  six  feet  two  in  his  shoes  and  frown- 
ing over  his  big,  thick  nose  which  turned  to  so  bright  a 
scarlet  in  cold  weather  that  intelligent  strangers  visiting 
in  the  camp  suspected  the  sobriety  of  his  habits;  the 
little  secretary,  stretching  to  his  full  height  of  some  five 
feet  six,  delicate  and  dark-eyed,  propounding  with  an 
awful  and  relentless  gravity  the  logical  defects  of  this 
exuberant  plan — it  is  a  situation  filled  with  the  spirit 
of  eternal  humour.  For  beyond  doubt  either  of  the  two 
men  would  have  given  his  ears  to  go,  had  his  duty  allowed 
it,  in  the  light  whale-boat  with  muffled  oars  to  steal  Sir 
Henry  Clinton  from  his  bed-chamber  in  that  dark  night 
of  February. 

In  December  1780  Hamilton  was  married  to  Miss  Betsy 
Schuyler,  a  girl  of  great  charm  and  a  quick  and  humorous 
intelligence.  Her  father  was  that  General  Schuyler  who 
had  held  the  important  command  of  the  northern  army 
until  a  few  weeks  before  Saratoga,  when  Gates,  by  intrigues 
with  Congress,  contrived  to  supplant  him  and  to  reap  the 
credit  of  his  patient  strategy.  Despite  his  ill-treatment 
Schuyler  continued  to  serve  against  Burgoyne  as  a  volun- 
teer until  the  British  surrender,  when  he  showed  the  most 
considerate  hospitality  to  his  defeated  enemies.  He  was 
a  man  of  a  noble  and  magnanimous  nature,  greatly  trusted 
by  Washington,  and  possessing  much  political  influence, 
especially  in  his  native  state  of  New  York,  by  reason  of  his 
character,  his  old  family  traditions  of  public  spirit,  and  his 
wide  possessions.  To  what  extent  this  alliance  added  to 
Hamilton's  resources  is  uncertain,  for  he  was  of  a  fierce 
independence  with  respect  to  money  matters;  but  the 
marriage,  which  had  the  hearty  approval  of  his  wife's 


76  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1780  family,  assured  his  position  as  an  American  citizen.  It 
^Tt23  was,  in  other  respects  also,  a  fortunate  and  happy  union 
to  the  end.  For  in  spite  of  certain  scandals  that  were 
brought  to  light  in  later  days  through  the  industry 
of  political  malice,  the  confidence  and  affection  exist- 
ing between  the  two  was  never  shaken.  The  private 
shortcomings  of  Hamilton  cannot  be  denied.  He  has 
himself  admitted  them  gravely  and  with  dignity,  making 
neither  reservation  nor  excuse;  but  as  regards  his  loyalty 
there  has  never  at  any  time  existed  even  the  shadow  of 
a  doubt. 

The  circumstances  of  Hamilton's  resignation  of  his  staff 
appointment  have  been  made  the  subject  of  much  fine 
writing.  It  is  clear  that  even  so  early  as  the  spring  of 
1780  he  had  grown  somewhat  impatient  of  his  office,  and 
had  sought  without  success  an  independent  command  in  the 
south,  at  a  time  when  the  fortunes  of  the  colonists  were  by 
no  means  brilliant,  and  there  had  been  much  hard  fighting 
and  many  serious  defeats.  It  must  be  remembered  that 
he  valued  himself  more  highly  as  a  soldier  than  in  any 
other  capacity.  He  believed,  whether  rightly  or  wrongly 
can  never  be  decided,  that  war  was  his  true  profession, 
and  that  if  the  chance  were  given  he  could  prove  himself 
to  be  a  great  commander.  His  post  on  the  staff  was  a 
strict  and  literal  secretaryship,  more  civil  indeed  than 
military.  It  was  indeed  '  the  grovelling  condition  of  a 
clerk/  which  his  youthful  genius  had  contemned  with  such 
vivacity.  The  very  excellence  of  his  work  made  promotion 
nearly  impossible ;  for  Washington  could  find  many  capable 
men  to  lead  columns,  but  what  other  to  write  letters  to 
Congress  ? 

The  cause  of  the  severance  was  simple  enough,  but,  as 
the  incident  was  dramatic,  it  has  resulted  that  Hamilton 
has  sometimes  been  accused  of  ingratitude  to  his  bene- 


THE  INDEPENDENCE  OF  THE  STATES         77 

factor.  This  rupture,  or  quarrel,  assuredly  did  not  A.D.  1780 
produce  the  effect  that  such  occurrences  beget  in  the  ^T-23 
relations  of  common  men ;  for  within  a  week  or  two  of 
the  event  we  find  Washington  inviting  his  ex-secretary 
to  be  present  at  a  private  conference  with  Rochambeau, 
and  signing  himself  'yours  sincerely  and  affectionately/1 
Indeed,  there  is  not  the  slightest  evidence  of  any  slacken- 
ing in  their  mutual  confidence  either  then  or  afterwards. 
The  truth  of  the  matter  appears  to  lie  in  this — that  a 
great  man  will  not  continue  contentedly  to  be  secretary  to 
any  one,  not  even  to  another  great  man  many  years  his 
senior,  at  a  time  full  of  arduous  enterprises  and  stirring 
events.  It  is  a  trying  relationship,  and  must  soon  become 
intolerable  to  a  vigorous  and  independent  mind.  Hamilton 
longed  for  a  command  in  the  field,  and  the  work  which  in 
despondent  moments  he  may  have  regarded  as  that  of  a 
conduit  pipe  became  more  and  more  distasteful  to  him. 
In  the  end  he  seized  at  an  opportunity  that  let  him  escape 
into  freedom. 

The  evidence  against  him  is  his  own  letter.  He  had  the 
defects  of  his  qualities.  Not  to  write  upon  any  subject  which 
interested  him  was  an  impossibility ;  and  he  had  the  further 
Johnsonian  failing  that  he  made  his  minnows  speak  like 
whales.  There  is  often  a  touch  of  the  '  my-ambition- 
is-prevalent '  in  his  early  letters,  and  when  he  wrote  to  his 
admiring  father-in-law,  General  Schuyler,  to  explain  why 
he  had  ceased  to  be  a  member  of  General  Washington's 
'family/  his  statement  is  more  than  usually  pompous. 
The  commander-in-chief  had  met  him  on  the  stairs  and 
desired  his  immediate  attendance.  The  Marquis  de 
Lafayette  had  button-holed  him  as  he  was  hastening  to 
obey.  Washington  had  exploded,  as  the  best  man  will,  at 
having  been  kept  waiting;  imagined  it  was  ten  minutes 

1  Ltfet  p.  373. 


78  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1781  when  in  fact  it  was  but  two.  The  little  secretary  was 
"ET'24  icily  respectful  under  the  tempest,  but  adamantine  that 
the  incident  must  end  his  service.  As  to  the  alleged 
delay — 'I  am  not  conscious  of  it,  sir;  but  since  you 
have  thought  it,  we  part.' l  Nor  would  any  condescension 
move  him  one  hairsbreadth.  The  good  Washington  went 
further  than  any  but  a  great  man  would  have  gone  to 
soothe  the  ruffled  feelings;  but  it  was  unavailing,  not 
because  feathers  were  ruffled,  but  because  the  bird  longed 
for  freedom.  Doubtless  each  in  his  heart  understood  the 
other,  and  in  spite  of  some  display  of  temper  loved  him 
only  the  more. 

Hamilton  resigned  his  position  on  the  staff  in  February 
1781,  and  obtained  command  of  a  light  corps  late  in  the  follow- 
ing summer.  In  October,  when  Cornwallis  was  surrounded 
at  Yorktown,  he  found  the  chance  that  he  had  longed  for.  It 
was  indeed  too  late  in  the  day  to  dream  of  becoming  a  great 
general ;  but  the  opportunity  of  proving  himself  a  daring  and 
capable  officer  was  still  open,  and  Hamilton  seized  it,  or  it 
might  almost  be  said,  snatched  it  out  of  the  hands  of 
another  who  had  been  appointed  over  his  head.  His  assault 
upon  the  first  redoubt  at  Yorktown  did  not  determine  the 
issue  of  the  war ;  did  not  even  determine  the  surrender  of 
Cornwallis.  It  was  only  one  of  those  brilliant  and  particular 
actions  of  which  military  history  has  thousands  on  its 
record,  and  will  continue,  we  may  safely  believe,  to  inscribe 
thousands  more  so  long  as  there  are  wars  in  the  world  and 
brave  men.  But  although  from  the  general  view  of  the 
campaign  it  may  almost  be  ignored,  it  was  an  effective  deed, 
and  showed  the  highest  qualities  of  swiftness,  judgment, 
leadership  and  courage.  It  was  valuable  to  Hamilton  him- 
self because  it  confirmed  his  confidence,  and  to  his  descen- 
dants as  one  of  those  personal  heirlooms  that  will  never  be 

1  Works,  ix.  pp.  232-37. 


THE  INDEPENDENCE  OF  THE  STATES        79 

forgotten  even  in  a  greater  fame.    The  praise  of  Washington  A.D.  1781 
was  never  lightly  earned.     "Few  cases,"  he  wrote  of  the 
taking  of  the  first  redoubt,  "  have  exhibited  greater  proofs 
'  of  intrepidity,  coolness  and  firmness  than  were  shown  on 
'  this  occasion." 1 

1  Life,  p.  383, 


BOOK    II 

THE   UNION   OF  THE   STATES 
A.D.  1780-1788.      JEn.  23-31 


The  greatness  of  an  estate  in  bulk  and  territory  doth  fall  under  measure ; 
and  the  greatness  of  finances  and  revenue  doth  fall  under  computation. 
The  population  may  appear  by  musters ;  and  the  number  and  greatness 
of  cities  and  towns  by  cards  and  maps.  But  yet  there  is  not  anything 
amongst  civil  affairs  more  subject  to  error,  than  the  right  valuation  and 
true  judgment  concerning  the  power  and  forces  of  an  estate.  The 
Kingdom  of  Heaven  is  compared,  not  to  any  kernel  or  nut,  but  to  a 
grain  of  mustard  seed;  which  is  one  of  the  least  grains,  but  hath  in  it 
a  property  and  spirit  hastily  to  get  up  and  spread.  So  there  are  states 
great  in  territory,  and  yet  not  apt  to  enlarge  or  command;  and  some 
that  have  but  a  small  dimension  of  stem,  and  yet  apt  to  be  the  foundations 
of  great  monarchies. — BACON. 


BOOK    II      JATI  7*  iv 
THE  UNION  OF  THE  STATES 

CHAPTER  I 

Political  Writings  during  the  War 

THE  second  period  of  Hamilton's  career  began  in  the  sixth  A.D.  1780 
year  of  the  war.  As  military  secretary  he  had  seen  his 
commander-in-chief  hampered  and  distressed,  the  army 
starved  and  disheartened.  He  discovered  the  cause  in  the 
impotence,  faction  and  financial  discredit  of  a  Congress  which 
affected  to  represent  thirteen  jealous  and  discordant  states 
temporarily  and  imperfectly  united  by  a  common  danger. 
Being  what  he  was,  a  confidential  staff-officer,  he  viewed  the 
matter  in  the  first  instance  from  that  standpoint.  He  was 
impressed  by  the  bad  effects  of  misgovernment  upon  military 
affairs.  He  realised  that  the  federal  assembly  lacked  the  power, 
the  intelligence  and  the  will  to  support  its  generals  with 
vigour  and  consistency.  He  was  confronted  with  that  order 
of  difficulties  which  arises  when  a  debating-club  is  dressed 
up  in  the  lion's  skin  of  authority;  when  a  deliberative 
assembly,  upon  a  dubious  warrant,  endeavours  to  perform 
the  high  executive  functions  of  government.  The  routine  of 
his  office  brought  him  into  daily  touch  with  a  bustling  and 
eloquent  sham.  A  military  secretary,  whose  concern  is  with 
an  army  and  its  supplies,  may  be  forgiven  for  unfavourable 
opinions  of  a  government  that  can  neither  recruit  nor  pro- 
vide. To  discharge  its  proper  share  of  the  burdens  of  such 


84  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1778  a  time  it  needed  to  be  of  good  credit,  and  to  this  end  it 
^T>  21  was  essential  that  it  should  be  honest,  resourceful  and 
businesslike.  In  Hamilton's  opinion  it  was  lacking  in  all 
these  qualities. 

In  the  autumn  following  the  battle  of  Monmouth  (1*118) 
he  found  time  to  undertake  the  flagellation  of  a  certain 
legislator  of  Maryland,  who  had  made  a  corner  in  flour. 
This  gentleman  was  a  member  not  merely  of  Congress,  but 
of  the  very  committee  charged  with  provisioning  the  army 
and  the  French  fleet.  By  Hamilton's  account  he  would 
appear  to  have  been  a  worthy  pioneer  of  the  most 
modern  commercial  developments.  He  played  with  his 
committee,  postponing  its  decision,  while  his  emissaries 
bought  up  all  the  available  flour.  Prices  were  thereupon 
doubled,  and  the  speculation  wore  a  smiling  face,  when  by 
some  means  his  sins  were  discovered.  Over  the  signature 
Publius,1  which  a  few  years  later  was  to  become  immortal 
in  a  nobler  controversy,  Hamilton  is  forcible  enough,  but 
not  in  his  happiest  vein.  The  correspondence  is  a  pompous 
exercise  in  the  manner  of  Junius,  interesting  less  for  its 
intrinsic  merits  than  for  the  simple  fact  which  it  records. 
Little,  indeed,  is  left  of  the  offender  and  his  corner  in 
flour ;  but  we  feel  that  such  sentences  as  "  notwithstanding 
'  our  youth  as  a  nation  we  begin  to  emulate  the  most  veteran 
'  and  accomplished  states  in  the  art  of  corruption," 2  are  a 
trifle  too  grandiose  for  the  occasion  that  called  them  forth. 

Early  in  1780  Robert  Morris  undertook  the  desperate 
finances  of  the  Federal  Government.  He  was  a  rich  man 
and  an  able  administrator,  but  he  had  to  make  bricks  with- 
out straw.  The  great  plan  and  the  astute,  particular  re- 
source were  equally  within  the  field  of  his  practical  energy. 
He  ruined  his  own  fortune  for  the  state,  and  a  grateful 
country  allowed  him  in  later  years  to  gain  experience  in  a 

1  Works,  i.  p.  199.  2  Ibid.  i.  p.  202. 


THE  UNION  OF  THE  STATES  85 

debtor's  prison.     Money  was  harder  to  raise  at  this  time  A.D.  1780 
than  ever  before.     Supplies  were  more  deficient,  and  the    ^T* 23 
army  was  mutinous.     Hamilton,  who  held  Morris  in  great 
and  deserved  respect,  took  the  opportunity  of  his  appoint- 
ment to  present  him  with  an  anonymous  memorandum  on 
the  financial  situation. 

It  is  amazing  to  find  a  soldier  of  three-and-twenty,  with 
his  hands  full  of  a  laborious  official  correspondence,  with  no 
experience  of  business  beyond  what  he  had  gained  as  a  boy 
in  a  merchant's  office,  plunging  into  a  detailed  and  forcible 
argument  for  the  establishment  of  a  national  bank.1  "  The 
present  plan,"  he  announces  with  modesty,  "  is  the  product 
'  of  some  reading  on  the  subjects  of  commerce  and  finance, 
1  and  of  occasional  reflections  on  our  particular  situation ; 
'  but  a  want  of  leisure  has  prevented  its  being  examined  in 
'  so  many  lights  and  digested  so  materially  as  its  importance 
'  requires." 2  There  is  indeed  proof  of  considerable  reading 
in  this  lengthy  analysis,  though  how  he  can  have  found  the 
time  for  it  remains  a  mystery.  But  there  is  also  something 
a  great  deal  more  valuable.  It  is  an  argument  from  experi- 
ence. It  was  but  a  small  section  of  human  affairs  that 
formed  the  basis  of  his  theories — Cruger's  ledgers  and 
the  starvation  of  the  federal  army — but  he  viewed  these 
scraps  of  reality  in  a  light  of  such  intense  understanding 
that  they  were  sufficient  for  the  purpose  in  hand.  There  is 
eloquence  in  the  letter,  for  it  is  a  quality  always  present  in 
his  writings,  even  upon  the  driest  themes,  but  the  fabric  is 
substantial  and  practical.  The  bank  is  realised  down  to  its 
quills  and  ink-pots  as  vividly  as  in  its  grandest  international 
operations.  Mr.  Law,  he  argues,  was  right  in  his  main 
idea.3  For  Law  had  grasped  the  necessity  of  interesting  the 
moneyed  classes  to  co-operate  with  Government,  and  his 
policy  was  a  failure  only  because  Law  was  himself  dishonest 

1  Works,  Hi.  p.  319.  *  Ibid.  iii.  p.  341.  8  Ibid.  iii.  p.  332. 


86  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1781  In  the  following  year  Hamilton  returned  to  his  argument 
*' 24  in  a  second  letter  to  Morris,1  this  time  under  his  own  name. 
A  national  bank  still  appeared  to  him  to  be  the  only  way 
out  of  the  difficulty  which  had  arisen  owing  to  the  lack 
of  funds.  He  accordingly  provided  an  elaborate  plan,  with 
articles  of  constitution.  Britain,  he  argued,  had  failed 
to  subdue  the  states  by  force  of  arms ;  she  was  within  an 
ace  of  winning  by  their  financial  exhaustion.  He  urged 
the  advantages  of  a  national  debt,  a  blessing  if  not  ex- 
cessive, and  '  a  powerful  cement  of  our  union.'  The  idea 
of  an  alliance  with  the  moneyed  classes,  of  taking  hostages 
from  them,  was  enforced  once  more.  It  remained  to  the 
end  a  fundamental  article  of  his  financial  creed.  Later  on, 
in  his  own  famous  administration,  he  was  able  to  realise  it. 

Morris  in  answer  was  polite  and  appreciative.  He  in- 
formed his  correspondent  that  a  bank  was  about  to  be 
started,  following  the  lines  of  Hamilton's  project,  but  upon 
a  more  modest  scale.  That  a  soldier  should  have  sought  to 
intervene  in  these  weary  matters  with  so  much  zest  and 
vehemence  may  well  have  excited  wonder  in  the  mind  of 
the  statesman.  The  modern  reader  marvels  to  find  a 
military  secretary  discoursing  in  his  leisure  moments  on 
national  resources  and  foreign  loans,  on  imposts  and  taxes 
and  the  balance  of  trade,  propounding  a  plan  for  a  national 
bank,  elaborating  it  with  an  exuberant  energy,  a  comprehen- 
siveness of  vision,  a  directness  and  ease  and  force  of  expres- 
sion which  disclosed  the  blessed  quality  of  youth  in  every 
line  and  turn.  There  are  occasions  in  Hamilton's  career 
when  we  are  puzzled  whether  to  laugh  or  to  cry  out  with 
admiration  at  the  boyish  confidence  undaunted  by  the 
grimmest  difficulties.  There  is  a  heroic  quality  even  in  his 
longest  letters  on  taxation.  Their  passionate  sincerity,  their 
joyful  audacity,  bridge  the  gulf  of  years  and  create  an 

1  Works,  iii,  p.  342. 


THE  UNION  OF  THE  STATES  87 

intimacy  such  as  we  have  felt  with  our  heroes  of  romance —  A.D.  1780 
with  Quentin  Durward  and  with  d'Artagnan;   a  confusion       T<  £ 
of  wonder  with  personal  affection.    For  a  true  understanding 
of  Hamilton's  part  in  American  history  it  is  necessary  to 
realise  that  he  was  loved   by  his  contemporaries  in  this 
spirit. 

A  more  famous  letter  was  written  between  the  dates  of 
the  two  that  have  been  mentioned.  In  August  1780  there 
was  a  general  despondency,  not  wholly  financial.  French 
aid  had  arrived  at  Newport,  but  the  second  fleet  which  was 
looked  to  for  complete  supremacy  lay  in  Brest  Harbour 
blocked  by  the  tyrant  of  the  seas.  Americans,  with  an  easy 
lethargy,  affected  nevertheless  to  believe  that  Britain  was 
finally  exhausted.  A  few  days  later  Gates  was  routed  by 
Cornwallis  at  Camden. 

'  The  fundamental  defect/  wrote  Hamilton  to  Duane, '  is  a 
want  of  power  in  Congress.' l  Three  causes  contributed  to 
this  misfortune :  in  the  people  a  jealous  excess  of  the  spirit 
of  liberty;  in  Congress  a  diffidence  of  their  own  authority 
and  a  want  of  sufficient  means  at  their  disposal.  The  clear 
duty  of  Congress  was  to  usurp  powers  in  order  to  preserve 
the  Republic ;  but  its  courage  stopped  short  of  this  solution. 
The  confederation,  as  it  stood,  was  fit  neither  for  war  nor 
peace. 

Men,  mindful  of  the  pretensions  of  a  British  Parliament, 
were  jealous  of  sovereignty;  but  the  real  danger  of  the 
states  lay  in  too  little  sovereignty  and  not  in  too  much. 
The  defects  of  the  situation  were  plain  to  any  one  who 
was  not  blinded  by  phrases  or  misled  by  distrust. 

As  funds  were  the  basis  of  all  civil  authority,  the  central 
government  must  have  the  power  to  tax,  which  under  the 
existing  arrangement  was  denied  to  it. 

A  deliberative  body  was  unfit  to  rule,  for  a  powerful 

1   Works,  I  p.  213. 


88  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1780  executive  must  be  few  and  not  numerous ;  active,  not  merely 
' 23  loquacious.  Congress,  from  a  kind  of  vanity,  was  averse 
from  delegation  to  individuals.  The  small  powers  it 
possessed  were  whittled  down  to  an  absurdity  by  delegation 
to  boards ;  and  boards,  as  John  Stuart  Mill  pointed  out  in 
later  days,  are  screens. 

The  fluctuating  constitution  of  the  army,  the  imperfection 
and  inequality  of  its  supplies,  were  consequences  to  be  ex- 
pected from  such  conditions.  "It  is  now  a  mob,  rather 
'  than  an  army ;  without  clothing,  without  pay,  without 
'  provision,  without  morals,  without  discipline.  We  begin 
'  to  hate  the  country  for  its  neglect  of  us.  The  country 
'  begin  to  hate  us  for  our  oppressions  of  them.  Congress 
'  have  long  been  jealous  of  us.  We  have  now  lost  all  con- 
'  fidence  in  them,  and  give  the  worst  construction  to  all 
'  they  do.  Held  together  by  the  slenderest  ties,  we  are 
'  ripening  for  a  dissolution." l 

The  remedies  were  hard  to  achieve,  though  easy  to  name. 
Congress  must  have  greater  powers,  either  by  taking  its 
courage  in  both  hands  and  seizing  them  upon  the  plea  of 
necessity,  or  by  a  convention  of  the  states  empowered  to 
conclude  a  real  confederation.  Personal  responsibility  was 
an  essential,  and  the  only  safety  was  to  be  found  in  the 
appointment  of  great  officers  of  state,  ministers  for  foreign 
affairs,  for  war,  marine,  finance,  and  trade.  Recruits  must 
be  enlisted  for  the  period  of  the  war,  or  at  the  least  for 
three  years.  Congress  itself  must  have  the  duty  of  supply, 
and  the  means  for  exercising  it.  Officers  who  sacrificed 
their  prospects  for  patriotism  deserved  consideration.  The 
least  they  had  a  right  to  was  half-pay  for  life.  But  the 
question  of  funds  lay  at  the  bottom  of  everything.  A  foreign 
loan,  a  federal  revenue,  a  tax  in  kind,  and  a  national  bank 
were  Hamilton's  prescriptions ;  and,  as  he  added  shrewdly, 

1    Works,  i.  p.  221. 


THE  UNION  OF  THE  STATES  89 

they  need  not  want  for  the  first  of  these,  since  they  could  A.D.  1780 
coerce  France  with  a  threat  of  peace. 

This  letter  to  Duane  is  an  important  landmark.  It  shows 
that  even  at  this  early  date  Hamilton  had  fully  and  firmly 
grasped  the  essentials  of  the  situation.  In  his  cogent  and 
unambiguous  fashion  he  led  his  various  arguments  up  to 
the  final  conclusion  that  the  supreme  need  of  the  moment 
was  the  need  of  a  nation.  The  artificial  nature  of  the  states, 
with  their  unreasonable  sentiments,  eternal  jealousies  and 
disastrous  pretensions  to  separate  sovereignty,  was  no  doubt 
easier  to  understand  and  harder  to  excuse  when  viewed  by 
one  who  was  an  American  only  by  adoption,  and  had  become 
a  citizen  of  one  of  these  rival  communities  almost  by  an 
accident.  His  foreign  birth  was  therefore  an  advantage, 
since  it  enabled  him  to  consider  the  problems  and  forces  of 
the  time  in  a  spirit  of  detachment,  without  the  heat  of 
local  prejudice  and  in  their  true  proportions. 

Hamilton,  it  will  be  remembered,  resigned  his  appointment  A.D.  1781 
as  military  secretary  in  February  1781,  and  it  was  not  until  ' 
August  that  he  obtained  a  command  and  marched  south 
against  Cornwallis  in  Yorktown.  During  these  seven  months 
of  leisure  he  had  time  to  meditate  more  deeply  upon  the 
political  situation.  The  fruits  were  The  Continentalist,1  a 
series  of  six  papers,  of  which  four  were  written  during  this 
interval,  and  the  remaining  two  in  the  spring  and  summer 
of  the  following  year.  It  is  an  odd  but  magnificent  way 
of  spending  a  short  leave,  after  five  years  of  uninterrupted 
labour  and  hardship.  For  the  great  Washington  was  an 
exacting  taskmaster,  and  his  campaigns  were  not  conducted 
with  much  regard  for  a  generous  diet,  warm  feet,  or  soft 

tying- 

In  these  letters,  which  contain  the  kernel  of  Hamilton's 
theory  of  statesmanship,  he  goes  further  back  into  causes 

1   Works,  i.  p.  243. 


90  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1781  in  search  of  a  cure  for  the  national  disorders.      There  is 
^T'  ^    no  contradiction  of  his  former  ideas,  but  only  a  greater 
completeness. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  war  there  was  a  lack  of  men 
experienced  in  government.  The  majority  of  this  class 
adhered  to  the  other  side,  and  the  influence  of  the  small 
number  who  were  available  '  was  too  commonly  borne  down 
by  the  prevailing  torrent  of  ignorance  and  prejudice.'  'An 
extreme  jealousy  of  power  is  the  attendant  on  all  popular 
revolutions.'  It  was  not  marvellous,  therefore,  that  both 
the  people  and  the  states  were  jealous  of  the  authority  of 
Congress;  or  that  Congress,  being  subject  to  the  epidemic 
timidity,  was  jealous  of  the  army.  With  courageous  iteration 
Hamilton  returned  to  his  old  argument.  The  capital  defect 
was  a  want  of  power  in  Congress.  Unsupported  by  the 
confidence  of  its  constituents,  it  had  none  to  bestow  upon  its 
servants.  There  was  a  want  of  agreement  as  to  the  proper 
remedies ;  but  every  man  admitted  that  the  confederation 
was  unequal  either  to  a  'vigorous  prosecution  of  the  war, 
or  to  the  preservation  of  the  union  in  peace,'  The  great 
danger  of  a  popular  government  is  ever  its  jealousy  of 
power.  "  In  a  government  framed  for  durable  liberty,  not 

*  less  regard  must  be  paid  to  giving  the  magistrate  a  proper 
'  degree  of  authority  to  make  and  execute  the  laws  with 
'  rigour,  than  to  guard  against  encroachments  upon  the 
'  rights  of  the   community ;  as  too   much  power  leads  to 

*  despotism,  too  little  leads  to  anarchy,  and  both  eventually 
'  to  the  ruin  of  the  people." l 

In  the  case  of  a  single  state  the  commonest  danger  is  that 
the  sovereign,  whether  a  monarch  or  a  republican  council, 
will  make  himself  too  powerful  for  his  subjects;  but  in 
federal  governments  which  have  to  deal  with  the  affairs 
of  a  group  of  states  the  peril  is  of  an  opposite  character. 

1   Works,  i.  p.  246. 


THE  UNION  OF  THE  STATES  91 

In  such  a  case  it  usually  happens  that  the  members  are  A.D.  1781 
an  overmatch  for  the  common  head,  and  that  the  central  ^T*24 
power  is  lacking  in  authority  sufficient  to  secure  the  obedi- 
ence of  the  several  parts  of  the  confederacy.  States  sub- 
scribing to  a  league  or  union  may  have,  or  seem  to  have, 
at  certain  times  an  advantage  in  things  contrary  to  the  good 
of  the  whole,  or  a  disadvantage  in  things  conducive  to  the 
common  weal.  And  under  this  aspect  states  are  like  private 
men  who,  when  they  have  the  power  of  disregarding  the  laws 
of  their  country,  frequently  find  a  sufficient  reason  for  doing 
so  in  their  own  interest.  But  the  danger  that,  upon  a  cool 
estimate,  the  members  may  discover  a  real  or  imaginary 
gam  in  disobedience  to  the  titular  sovereign,  is  not  the 
end  of  the  evil.  Prejudice,  vanity  and  passion  have  also 
to  be  taken  into  account.  The  ambitions  of  persons  holding 
office  in  the  several  states  foster  ideas  hostile  to  the  con- 
federacy, in  order  to  preserve  their  own  consequence ;  while 
the  people  tend  also  in  the  same  direction,  being  more 
devoted  in  their  attachment  and  obedience  to  their  own 
particular  government,  which  acts  upon  them  directly,  than 
towards  the  central  power  which  can  only  touch  them  in- 
directly, and  possesses  no  officers  clothed  in  a  calm  assur- 
ance to  enforce  its  laws. 

When  the  war  came  to  an  end  all  danger  from  foreign 
aggression  would  temporarily  disappear.  Relieved  from  this 
menace,  centrifugal  tendencies  would  then  run  riot.  Societies 
whose  true  aim  and  only  security  against  attack  lay  in  a 
close  political  union  "must  either  be  firmly  united  under 
'  one  government,  or  there  will  infallibly  exist  emulations  and 
1  quarrels ;  this  is  in  human  nature." 1  Even  when  Hamilton 
wrote,  in  the  midst  of  war  and  of  danger  too  serious  for 
trifling,  some  of  the  states  had  evaded  or  refused  compliance 
with  the  demands  of  Congress  on  points  of  the  greatest 
1  Works,  i.  p.  254. 


92  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1781  moment.  Peace  would  bring  the  danger  of  disunion  much 
^T-24  more  near. 

After  the  final  defeat  of  British  policy  it  ought  to  be  the 
aim  of  American  statesmanship  to  prevent  and  frustrate  for 
all  time  European  interference  with  the  development  of  the 
states,  and  even  with  the  destinies  of  the  whole  Northern 
Continent.  It  was  only  to  be  expected  that  the  great 
powers  would  endeavour  to  obtain  a  foothold,  and  might 
therefore  upon  occasions  have  an  interest  in  fostering  in- 
ternal contentions,  jealousies  and  schisms;  in  instigating 
competitions  with  regard  to  boundaries,  rivalry  in  commerce 
and  disputes  wheresoever  a  plausible  pretext  could  be  dis- 
covered. Groups  and  minor  confederacies  would  then  begin 
to  combine,  and  Europe  would  be  allowed  to  come  into 
American  affairs  as  an  ally  of  one  or  other  of  them.  From 
such  an  opportunity  it  was  of  vital  importance  that  she 
should  be  rigorously  excluded.  To  a  man  viewing  the 
thirteen  states  in  a  broad  vision,  as  one  nation,  such  a  con- 
clusion was  too  obvious  for  any  argument.  To  a  man  regard- 
ing the  matter  from  the  meaner  standpoint  of  the  interest 
of  an  individual  state,  the  conclusion  was  no  less  clear  if  he 
would  but  project  his  mind  a  few  years  into  the  future. 

"Our  whole  system,"  he  continues,  "is  in  disorder;  our 
'  currency  depreciated,  till  in  many  places  it  will  hardly 
'  obtain  a  circulation  at  all ;  public  credit  at  its  lowest  ebb ; 
'  our  army  deficient  in  numbers,  and  unprovided  with  every- 
'  thing." x  And  while  government  was  thus  unable  to  pay, 
clothe,  or  feed  the  troops,  things  were  happening  in  the 
Southern  States  which  should  have  caused  Americans  to 
blush,  Cornwallis  had  won  victory  after  victory,  and  was 
making  steady  progress,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  the  whole 
British  forces  in  the  states  were  little  more  than  fourteen 
thousand  men.  And  yet  the  population  of  those  states  was 
1  Works,  i.  p.  255. 


THE  UNION  OF  THE  STATES  93 

greater  than  at  the  beginning  of  the  war — more  than  two  A.D.  1781 
millions  and  a  quarter  of  white  citizens.  The  quantity  of 
specie  had  also  increased.  The  country  abounded  in  the 
necessaries  of  life  and  in  warlike  materials.  There  was  no 
lack  even  of  foreign  commodities,  and  commerce  in  spite  of 
everything  was  growing.  A  powerful  ally  co-operated  by 
sea  and  land,  and  paid  the  whole  cost  of  supporting  her 
five  thousand  troops  on  American  soil. 

In  these  circumstances  but  one  of  two  things  could  afford 
an  explanation  of  the  disastrous  situation — a  general  dis- 
affection on  the  part  of  the  people,  or  mismanagement  on 
the  part  of  their  rulers.  The  former  alternative  could  not 
be  entertained,  for  the  reason  that  it  was  contrary  to  notori- 
ous facts.  The  prime  necessity  therefore  was  to  strike  at 
the  root  of  the  whole  evil  by  a  reform  of  government  and 
by  augmenting  the  powers  of  the  confederation. 

The  great  defect  of  the  constitution  under  another  aspect, 
was  that  it  had  no  property;  no  revenue,  nor  the  means 
of  obtaining  it.  Funds  are  the  foundation  of  every- 
thing. 'Power  without  revenue,  in  political  society,  is  a 
name.' 

At  this  point  the  series  of  letters  was  interrupted  by 
Washington's  sudden  campaign  in  the  south  against  Corn- 
wallis.  After  the  fall  of  Yorktown  in  the  autumn,  Hamilton 
retired  into  civil  life,  and  in  the  following  April  and  July 
the  argument  was  concluded  in  a  different  strain.  From  the 
necessities  of  government  he  passed  to  the  possibilities  of 
development ;  from  a  criticism  of  the  theory  to  a  discussion 
of  the  practice  of  government. 

"  The  vesting  Congress  with  the  power  of  regulating  trade 
'  ought  to  have  been  a  principal  object  of  the  confederation 
*  for  a  variety  of  reasons.  It  is  as  necessary  for  the  purposes 
'  of  commerce  as  of  revenue.  There  are  some  who  maintain 
c  that  trade  will  regulate  itself,  and  is  not  to  be  benefited  by 


94  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1782  '  the  encouragement  or  restraints  of  government.  Such 
^*°  ^  '  persons  will  imagine  that  there  is  no  need  of  a  common 
'  directing  power.  This  is  one  of  those  wild,  speculative 
'  paradoxes  v/hich  have  grown  into  credit  among  us,  contrary 
*  to  the  uniform  practice  and  sense  of  the  most  enlightened 
"  nations."1  There  are  laws  which  a  government  must  observe 
in  regulating  commerce.  Individuals  may  have  objects  in 
trade  which  it  is  the  duty  of  a  government  to  defeat.  There 
may  be  prospects  of  national  wealth  which,  since  the  capital 
of  private  persons  is  limited,  only  government  help  can 
inaugurate.  The  state  will  aim  at  a  balance  of  the  whole, 
favouring  neither  the  cultivators  of  the  land,  nor  the 
merchants,  nor  the  manufacturers,  nor  the  artisans  and 
labourers.  Under  this  aspect  an  excessive  tariff  would  be 
as  unstates manlike  as  no  tariff  at  all.  That  trade  can  be 
trusted  to  regulate  itself  to  the  greatest  advantage  of  the 
community  is  the  prime  paradox.  All  experience  is  against 
it,  and  proves  that  the  influence  of  government  is  salutary  if 
only  government  be  wise  and  honest.  The  government  of 
Elizabeth  fostered  the  trade  of  England.  Colbert  laid  the 
foundations  of  prosperous  trade  in  France.  In  the  opinion  of 
some,  who  grant  these  premises,  the  separate  states  and  not 
the  federal  power  were  the  proper  regulators  of  commerce ; 
"  but  as  they  are  parts  of  a  whole,  with  a  common  interest  in 
'  trade,  as  in  other  things,  there  ought  to  be  a  common  direc- 
'  tion  in  that  as  in  all  other  matters."2  With  regard  to  any 
plan  devised  by  human  ingenuity,  it  will  always  be  possible 
to  argue  that  it  is  for  the  advantage  of  one  unit,  or  of  one 
state,  rather  than  of  another ;  but  "  unless  we  can  overcome 
'  this  narrow  disposition  and  learn  to  estimate  measures  by 
'  their  general  tendencies,  we  shall  never  be  a  great  or  a 
'  happy  people,  if  we  remain  a  people  at  all." 3 

But  supposing  that  the  central  power  is  prevented  from 
1  Works,  i.  p.  267.  2  Ibid,  i  p.  271.  8  Ibid.  i.  p.  277. 


THE  UNION  OF  THE  STATES  95 

undertaking,  or  should  be  unwilling  to  undertake,  the  A.D.  1782 
control  of  trade,  what  will  happen  ?  There  will  be  a  lack  ^T>  25 
of  revenue.  There  will  be  a  risk  of  independence.  The 
union  will  become  precarious.  The  want  of  a  wholesome 
concert  and  provident  superintendence  to  advance  the 
general  prosperity  will  lead  to  a  depression  of  the  landed 
interest  and  of  labour  for  the  immediate  advantage  of 
the  trading  classes.  Finally,  the  trading  interest  itself  will 
fall  a  victim  to  bad  policy.  It  is  of  the  essence  of  states- 
manship that  burthens  should  be  distributed  and  benefits 
shared.  No  class  should  be  oppressed,  for  the  interests  of 
all  are  interwoven.  "Oppress  trade,  lands  sink  in  value; 
'  make  it  flourish,  their  value  rises.  Encumber  husbandry, 
'  trade  declines ;  encourage  agriculture,  commerce  revives." * 
"There  is  something/'  he  concludes, "  noble  and  magnificent 
'  in  the  perspective  of  a  great  Federal  Republic,  closely  linked 
'  in  the  pursuit  of  a  common  interest,  tranquil  and  prosperous 
'  at  home,  respectable  abroad ;  but  there  is  something  pro- 
'  portionably  diminutive  and  contemptible  in  the  prospect 
'  of  a  number  of  petty  states,  with  the  appearance  only  of 
'  union,  jarring,  jealous,  and  perverse, without  any  determined 
1  direction,  fluctuating  and  unhappy  at  home,  weak  and  in- 
'  significant  by  their  dissensions  in  the  eyes  of  other  nations. 
' .  .  .  Happy  America  if  those  to  whom  thou  hast  intrusted 
'  the  guardianship  of  thy  infancy  know  how  to  provide 
'  for  thy  future  repose,  but  miserable  and  undone  if  their 
'  negligence  or  ignorance  permits  the  spirit  of  discord  to 
'  erect  her  banner  on  the  ruins  of  thy  tranquillity." 2 

1  Works,  i.  p.  281.  a  Ibid.  I  pp.  286.  287 


96  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 


CHAPTER  II 

Congress  and  the  Conduct  of  the  War 

A.D.  THE  legend  which  was  born  out  of  the  soaring  fancy 
!ET  ^9-26  °^  ^e  earty  chroniclers  covers  a  much  wider  field  than  the 
mere  origins  of  the  rebellion.  The  influence  of  the  epic 
can  be  traced  no  less  plainly  in  the  popular  beliefs  regarding 
the  course  of  the  war,  than  in  the  current  estimates  of  the 
virtues  of  individuals  and  of  the  value  of  institutions. 
The  image  of  the  American  Revolution  which  fills  the  mind 
of  the  average  Englishman  is  smooth,  definite  and  highly 
coloured,  but  it  is  a  poor  likeness  of  the  event.  In  this 
picture  the  thirteen  colonies  are  presented  as  one  people, 
firmly  bound  together  from  the  beginning  by  a  confidence 
in  one  another,  and  a  common  sentiment  of  freedom  far 
stronger  than  the  forms  and  articles  of  any  constitution. 
'  The  League  of  Friendship/  as  it  was  named  by  hopeful 
enthusiasts,  is  conceived  to  have  had  no  parallel  save  in  the 
Golden  Age.  The  prevailing  pattern  of  man  during  this 
virtuous  epoch  is  imagined  to  have  been  George  Washington. 
Congress,  no  less  than  the  army,  was  cast  in  that  heroic 
mould.  The  nation  itself  rises  before  a  picturesque  imagina- 
tion like  some  vast  audience  in  the  Albert  Hall,  tier  upon  tier, 
a  multitude  of  individuals,  but  a  single  type.  Everywhere 
there  appears  the  same  austere  patriotism  and  awful  gravity, 
the  same  fortitude  and  the  same  simplicity.  If  any  man  were 
bold  enough  to  suggest  that  comparison  is  possible  between 
the  British  Parliament  and  the  American  Congress  of  that 
time,  or  that  among  the  members  of  these  two  august  assem- 
blies there  was  anything  approaching  an  equality  of  virtue, 
wisdom,  or  courage,  popular  opinion,  nourished  upon  the 


THE  UNION  OF  THE  STATES  97 

myth,  would  put  aside  the  paradox  without  a  smile,  as  a     A.D. 

-17 
19-26 


jest  bordering  too  closely  on  profanity. 


The  Englishman,  who  never  shows  to  best  advantage  in 
the  apologetic  mood,  has  accepted  everything  which  the 
American  epic  required  for  its  completeness.  He  has 
bowed  in  humility  before  the  frequent  scorn  of  its  moral 
judgments,  has  received  without  demur  its  shallow  and 
eloquent  generalisations,  and,  clothed  in  a  white  sheet,  has 
joined,  with  a  taper  in  his  hand,  in  the  discovery  of  scape- 
goats and  the  making  of  heroes.  It  is  no  part  of  our 
purpose  to  enter  upon  a  defence  of  British  policy;  but 
if  we  are  to  entertain  a  true  regard  for  the  fame  of 
Washington  and  Hamilton,  the  difficulties  against  which 
they  had  to  contend  must  be  firmly  grasped.  If  these  be 
covered  over  industriously  with  rose-leaves,  we  may  arrive 
at  a  very  flattering  estimate  of  the  virtues  of  the  American 
colonists ;  but  in  that  case  we  shall  be  forced  to  undervalue 
the  greatness  of  these  two  leaders,  who  both  during  and 
after  the  war  had,  according  to  the  common  history  of 
mankind,  their  hardest  difficulties  to  overcome  from  within 
and  not  from  without. 

Instead  of  this  picture  of  a  perfect  patriotism,  it  is  wiser 
to  accept  the  plain  facts.  The  American  Revolution,  after 
the  war  began,  owed  but  little  to  Congress,  much  certainly 
to  the  patriotic  spirit  of  the  people,  but  most  of  all  to  a 
few  great  men.  The  countrymen  of  Washington,  engaged 
in  a  prolonged  and  painful  struggle,  where  fortune  varied 
and  hearts  grew  sick  with  deferred  hope,  showed  the  same 
high  qualities  and  the  same  ignoble  faults  that  might  have 
been  looked  for  in  men  of  that  race. 

Throughout  the  whole  period  of  the  war,  and  for  more 
than  seven  years  afterwards  (dating  from  the  surrender  at 
Yorktown),  the  states  were  not  a  nation,  but  merely  a  loose 
and  jealous  confederacy.  It  is  indeed  matter  for  amaze- 

G 


98  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.     ment,  not  that  the  war  should  have  run  such  a  long  and 

767l7??  painful  course,  but  that  under  such  conditions  it  was  ever 
T.  19-26  L 

conducted  to  a  successful  conclusion.  We  must  admire  the 
binding  force  of  the  desire  for  independence  by  which  the 
ill-founded  structure  was  kept  together,  and  marvel  at  the 
ineptitude  of  British  diplomacy  that  could  drive  no  wedges 
of  disunion  into  a  fabric  riddled  with  such  dangerous  gaps. 

Until  the  outbreak  of  war  none  of  the  thirteen  colonies 
had  been,  or  had  even  claimed  to  be,  a  sovereign  state. 
Sovereignty,  for  what  it  was  worth,  resided  in  King  George, 
who  exercised  it  upon  the  advice  of  his  cabinet  and  through 
the  agency  of  the  different  governors.  Each  state  was  in- 
dependent of  its  neighbours.  None  was  in  a  position  of 
superiority  to  another.  There  was  no  machinery  of  law  or 
custom  for  joint  action  through  any  central  power.  Franklin, 
indeed,  had  dreamed  of  federation  in  years  gone  by.  The 
representative  Congress  which  assembled  to  concert 
measures  with  regard  to  the  prosecution  of  the  war  with 
France  had  arrived  at  a  plan  of  union  largely  under  his 
influence.  The  royal  governors  were  favourable  to  the 
proposal;  but  it  was  rejected  without  hesitation  by  the  home 
Government,  which  feared  to  call  into  existence  so  powerful 
a  subject,  and  by  the  colonial  legislatures,  whose  jealousy  of 
one  another  seemed  to  be  ineradicable.1 

With  the  assumption  of  independence  sovereignty 
therefore  went  a-begging.  No  federal  power  existed,  only 
a  Congress  of  the  States,  assembled  in  a  great  emer- 
gency to  take  counsel  together  and  to  speak,  if  possible, 
with  one  voice.  In  political  virtue,  courage  and  sagacity, 
this  first  Congress  was  a  body  of  a  remarkable  distinction ; 
but  it  was  not  a  government,  and  it  lacked  both  the 
authority  and  any  precedent  for  creating  one.  The 
prevalent  opinion  was  that  sovereignty,  having  departed 

1  History,  iii.  p.  245. 


THE  UNION  OF  THE  STATES  99 

out  of  King  George  the  Third  and  the  British  Parliament,  A.D 
had  entered  into  the  individual  legislatures  of  the  thirteen 
states.  A  minority,  it  is  true,  held  that  by  some  mystical 
process  sovereignty  had  passed  into  the  hands  of  Congress ; 
but  all  serious  attempts  on  the  part  of  that  assembly  to 
exercise  sovereign  powers  over  the  various  states  incurred 
at  once  the  odium  of  the  selfsame  tyranny  against  which 
the  revolution  was  directed.  Massachusetts,  Pennsylvania 
and  the  rest,  were  determined  that  they  would  no  longer  be 
subjects.  Their  aim  in  taking  up  arms  was  independence, 
and  they  were  no  more  willing  to  part  with  this  precious 
possession  to  their  own  Congress  than  to  King  George. 
At  a  later  date,  when  it  was  proposed  to  create  a  revenue 
for  support  of  the  army  out  of  a  duty  upon  imports,  a  patriotic 
opposition  demanded  a  plain  answer  to  the  question  as  to 
how  this  measure  differed  in  principle  from  the  Stamp  Act 
which  had  set  two  continents  by  the  ears. 

In  spite,  however,  of  this  extreme  jealousy,  the  severe 
pressure  of  circumstances  brought  it  about  that  from  the 
beginning  many  of  the  customary  duties  and  functions  of 
a  sovereign  were  performed  by  Congress.  There  being,  in 
fact,  no  alternative,  it  took  upon  itself  to  create  an  army,  to 
build  a  fleet,  to  issue  paper  money,  to  raise  loans,  make 
alliances  and  assert  the  independence  of  the  United  States. 
But  as  Congress  acted  always  upon  sufferance,  it  lacked  the 
confidence  which  is  given  by  real  authority,  and  as  a  natural 
result  its  procedure  was  feeble,  irresolute  and  ineffectual. 
Shortly  after  the  famous  declaration  of  July  IV 76, '  articles 
of  confederation  and  perpetual  union'  were  submitted  for 
consideration,  but  until  March  1781  they  remained  without 
ratification.  The  delay  was  a  matter  of  but  little  moment, 
seeing  that  this  stately  and  sonorous  document  merely 
defined  in  more  precise  terms  the  impotence  of  govern- 
ment. 


100  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  Put  in  the  shortest  form,  the  evil  lay  in  the  want  of 
power.  'Influence,'  in  the  words  of  Washington,  'is  not 
government/  Congress  had  no  subjects.  It  was  merely 
the  council  of  an  alliance.  It  could  requisition  supplies, 
and  money  and  men;  but  if  a  state  chose  to  fill  its  ears 
with  wax  and  pay  no  heed,  the  central  authority  was 
without  any  remedy  but  patience.  Over  the  individual 
citizens  of  the  states  it  had  no  jurisdiction  whatsoever. 
With  the  various  legislatures  its  relations  were  those  of 
a  diplomatist.  When  it  sought  to  create  an  army  it  needed 
to  ask  leave,  and  to  accomplish  its  end  was  forced  to 
submit  to  terms  not  only  ignominious  but  contrary  to 
reason.  When  a  state  saw  fit  to  furnish  a  regiment,  it 
claimed  and  exercised  the  right  to  appoint  its  officers. 
Military  organisation  under  such  conditions  was  clearly 
impossible.  Efficiency  would  have  been  beyond  hope  had 
the  commander-in-chief  lacked  the  courage  and  personal 
force  necessary  for  exceeding  his  functions. 

Congress  issued  paper  money,  and  its  value  sank  after 
a  few  months  to  two  cents  in  the  dollar.  It  made  alliances 
which  could  and  would  have  been  disowned  by  any  state 
had  it  discerned  a  private  advantage  in  the  disavowal. 
When  Congress  finally  came  to  make  peace,  the  terms 
which  it  had  agreed  to  were  ignored  and  repudiated.  In  the 
harlequinade  of  human  affairs  no  pantaloon  ever  exercised 
less  discipline  and  authority. 

The  consequences  of  this  want  of  power  were  certain.  Men 
of  capacity  who  desired  to  serve  their  country  sought  other 
opportunities,  in  the  state  legislatures,  in  diplomacy,  or  in 
the  army.  The  ranks  of  Congress  were  recruited  by  medio- 
crities, most  of  them  loquacious  and  many  of  them  corrupt. 
It  had  the  mysterious  confidence  of  Chinese  mandarins  in 
the  efficacy  of  ordinances  and  proclamations.  It  ordered 
victories  and  decreed  an  army  of  eighty  thousand  men ;  but, 


THE  UNION  OF  THE  STATES  101 

notwithstanding,  Washington  had  to  make  shift  with  ten     A.D. 
thousand  that  he  and  not  Congress  had  the  labour  and  17I76~!7«3 

.oi<T.  19-26 

credit  of  collecting.  It  meddled  with  appointments  and 
promotions,  and  to  every  foreign  "  adventurer  that  came, 
'  without  even  the  shadow  of  credentials,  gave  the  rank  of 
'  field  officers." l  It  fumed  over  the  question  of  supplies, 
leaving  the  army  to  perish  of  cold  and  hunger  while  it 
debated  interminably  and  bungled  its  diplomacy  with  the 
states  who  were  the  real  paymasters.  Occasionally  it  had 
ideas.  Officers,  Samuel  Adams  argued,  ought  to  be  elected 
annually,  so  as  to  preserve  the  commonwealth  from  military 
despotism 2 — a  view  of  the  matter  which,  had  it  prevailed, 
might  have  ended  the  war  at  a  much  earlier  date.  His 
kinsman,  John  Adams,  Chairman  of  the  Board  of  War, 
discoursed  on  strategy  and  promulgated  maxims.  '  My 
toast  is  a  short  and  violent  war ' ;  for  he  was  utterly  '  sick  of 
Fabian  systems.'  George  the  Third,  if  he  had  happened  to 
hear  of  these  sayings,  must  have  wished  well  to  the  Adams 
family.  These  rhetorical  activities  were  their  own  reward. 
They  found  no  shoes,  blankets  or  victuals  for  the  men  who 
camped  at  Valley  Forge  and  huddled  round  the  fires  at 
night,  afraid  to  sleep  lest  they  should  never  wake.  Mad- 
dened by  the  ingratitude  and  ingenious  persecution  of  con- 
gressmen, Arnold  became  a  traitor ; 3  and  Greene,  who  had  a 
nature  beyond  treachery,  was  driven  to  resignation 4  by  their 
consequential  malice.  In  this  buzz  and  hubbub  of  inferior 
minds  Washington  alone  was  able  to  endure,  wearing  down 
their  folly  and  conceit  by  his  resolute  gravity. 

This  Congress,  to  which  the  great  and  constant  general 
was  obliged  to  defer  and  appeal,  was  clothed  with  a  mock 
dignity  and  that  fickle  and  uncertain  power  which  rests 
entirely  upon  moral  influence.  It  was  meddlesome  and 

1  Hamilton  to  Duer,  History,  i.  p.  431.  2  Cf.  also  History,  i.  p.  420. 

3  History,  ii.  pp.  50-52.  *  Ibid.  ii.  pp.  39-42, 


102  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  inefficient;  was  much  addicted  to  fault-finding,  to  the  giving 
Mr  ^9  26  °^  f00^8-'1  advice,  and  to  intrigue  against  its  own  officers.  It 
stinted  supplies  and  delayed  action.  While  it  endeavoured 
with  certain  ill  results  to  assert  its  own  vain  and  foolish 
authority  in  the  conduct  of  military  affairs,  it  showed  a 
corresponding  backwardness  and  timidity  in  grappling  with 
the  national  credit  and  curbing  the  recalcitrancy  of  the 
states.  Enjoying  the  exercise  of  its  minor  functions  with 
a  peculiar  zest,  it  shrank  from  placing  them  in  jeopardy 
by  any  bold  attempt  to  develop  its  implied  powers  on  the 
plea  of  a  national  emergency.  To  consolidate  its  position 
and  assume  or  usurp  the  high  executive  rights  of  govern- 
ment was  an  ambition  wholly  beyond  its  mean  horizon; 
but  in  the  torment  and  obstruction  of  its  servants  it  was  an 
adept,  jealous  of  its  privileges  and  observant  of  the  letter 
of  its  commission. 

It  is  interesting,  no  doubt,  to  speculate  upon  the  events 
which  might  have  happened  had  the  British  Cabinet  acted 
with  more  vigour,  or  had  Washington  been  governed  by  less 
fortitude ;  but  it  is,  perhaps,  still  more  interesting  to  consider 
what  might  have  happened  had  Hamilton  been  a  member 
of  Congress  instead  of  a  soldier.  When  we  consider  his 
daring  and  masterful  spirit,  and  remember  how  at  a  later 
date,  with  less  assistance  from  the  pressure  of  events,  and 
in  the  teeth  of  interests  which  in  the  meanwhile  had 
become  more  widely  vested,  of  prejudices  which  had 
hardened  into  hatred,  of  traditions  of  independence  which 
had  grown  from  saplings  into  timber,  he  still  succeeded  in 
prevailing  upon  his  fellow-countrymen  to  accept  a  real  union, 
it  is  hard  to  believe  that  in  the  case  we  have  imagined  the 
signature  of  peace  would  have  found  the  whole  work  of 
federation  still  waiting  to  be  done.  It  appears  more  likely 
that  he  would  have  taken  the  metal  at  a  red  heat  in  1777, 
than  that  he  would  have  waited  for  eleven  years  longer  until 


THE  UNION  OF  THE  STATES  103 

it  had  grown  cool.     That  his  attempt  would  have  succeeded     A.D 

t* 

is  not  beyond  possibility,  and  had  it  succeeded  it  is  con- 
ceivable  that  the  constitution  so  created  would  have  been  a 
more  powerful  charter  and  more  in  accordance  with  his  own 
political  convictions  than  that  which  was  subsequently 
approved  at  Philadelphia. 

The  famous  Conway  Cabal  (1777-1778)  aimed  at  getting 
rid  of  Washington  and  replacing  him  by  Gates  '  the  hero  of 
Saratoga/  afterwards  the  hero  of  Camden,  on  which  occa- 
sion he  fled  a  hundred  and  eighty  miles  without  looking 
back.1  Because  all  Americans  at  the  present  time  enter- 
tain an  affectionate  reverence  for  the  memory  of  their  first 
great  leader,  we  are  apt  to  assume  that  there  must  have 
been  an  even  livelier  passion  of  loyalty  in  the  breasts  of 
their  ancestors  who  were  his  contemporaries.  The  reality 
was  somewhat  different.  It  is  well  to  remember  that  for  a 
time  the  opinion  of  a  majority  of  Congress  was  in  favour  of 
driving  Washington  to  resignation. 

In  November  1777  that  body  was  in  the  pride  of  its  youth. 
If  it  was  powerless  to  supply  Washington  with  reinforce- 
ments, it  was  equal  to  the  task  of  complaint  against  his 
failures  and  condemnation  of  his  '  Fabian  tactics ' ;  if  it- 
showed  no  alacrity  in  checking  frauds  in  the  commissariat, 
it  could  still  point  a  moral  and  deduce  conclusions  from  the 
victory  of  Saratoga  and  the  defeats  of  Brandywine  and 
Germantown.  It  was  inclined  to  a  simple-minded  worship  of 
success,  without  analysis  or  consideration  of  circumstances. 

In  the  early  spring  thieves  fell  out,  and  the  Conway 
Cabal  came  to  an  inglorious  end.  It  had  reckoned 
hopefully  upon  Washington's  resignation,  and  had  the 
commander-in-chief  been  merely  the  good  man  and  high- 
spirited  gentleman  he  was,  and  not  something  still  greater 
over  and  above,  the  plan  would  have  had  the  best  chances 

1  Hamilton  to  Duane,  History,  ii.  p.  124. 


104  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  of  success.  But,  fortunately  for  his  country,  he  looked  upon 
his  own  position  in  a  spirit  of  extraordinary  detachment.  He 
regarded  domestic  intrigue,  discontent  and  calumny  as  natural 
incidents  in  the  war ;  as  things  to  be  reckoned  with,  like  floods, 
frosts  and  snowfalls,  impersonally  and  without  malice.  As  he 
had  never  sought  power  and  honour,  but  merely  accepted 
them  when  duty  left  no  escape,  he  had  no  motive  for  resigna- 
tion ;  for  his  duty  was  unchanged  either  by  ingratitude  or 
abuse.  Under  this  attack  his  strength  was  weighted  with 
another  burden  in  that  winter  of  suffering  in  the  hills  at 
Valley  Forge,  but  he  would  have  thought  himself  no  less 
disgraced  in  laying  down  his  commission  before  the  clamours 
of  Congress  than  in  laying  down  his  arms  to  a  summons 
from  Sir  William  Howe. 

To  have  a  clear  understanding,  not  merely  of  the  cam- 
paigns of  Washington,  but  of  what  followed  after,  when  peace 
was  signed,  it  is  necessary  that  the  character  of  the  govern- 
ment, the  nature  and  extent  of  its  authority,  should  be 
firmly  grasped.  The  war  languished  and  dragged  wearily 
along  from  the  want  of  power  in  Congress  and  from  the 
lack  of  virtue  in  congressmen.  In  reality  the  second  was 
merely  a  consequence  of  the  first ;  for  a  position  of  promi- 
nence and  publicity  without  powers  commensurate  to  the 
office  has  no  attractions  for  effective  citizens  who  take 
statecraft  seriously  and  are  content  to  endure  speech  only 
as  a  means  to  action.  But  to  the  consequential  classes, 
prominence,  publicity  and  speech  have  ever  appeared  ends 
admirable  in  themselves.  Such  men  are  easily  content 
with  those  shreds  of  power  which  consist  in  the  giving  of 
advice,  in  the  finding  of  fault,  and  in  setting  their  servants 
by  the  ears.  We  must  therefore  admire  the  constancy 
of  the  patriotic  minority  who  held  to  Congress  through 
good  and  evil  report,  bearing  with  the  din  of  clap-trap  for 
the  chance  of  being  able  now  and  again  to  serve  their 


THE  UNION  OF  THE  STATES  105 

country  by  the  defeat  of  an  intrigue  or  the  destruction  of     A.D. 

J  J  I  HK/v     1  >7QQ 

a  folly.     Men  like  Robert  Morris  have  a  right  to  share  in  ^  19  26 
the  fame  of  Washington.    In  a  sense  they  haye  a  double 
title  to  the  gratitude  of   their   countrymen,  seeing   that 
they  not  only  withstood  the  mischief   but  endured  the 
debate. 

Putting  aside  all  consideration  of  persons,  putting  aside 
also  such  aspects  of  the  conduct  of  government  as  the 
ingenious  bad  faith  which  marked  its  action  after  the 
Saratoga  capitulation,  looking  at  the  matter  in  the  driest 
light,  there  can  be  no  shadow  of  a  doubt  that  the  feeble 
constitution  of  Congress,  with  its  attendant  evils  in  the 
character  of  its  members,  was  the  cause  of  the  long 
continuance  of  the  war.  Had  Washington  been  supported 
with  men  and  supplies,  it  is  neither  incredible  nor  even 
unlikely  that  the  messengers  bringing  news  of  the  surrender 
of  Burgoyne,  in  October  1777,  might  have  met  halfway 
upon  their  journey  riders  from  the  south  with  word  of 
the  surrender  of  Howe  at  Philadelphia.  The  number  of 
Washington's  troops  was  at  no  time  in  proportion  to 
the  manhood  of  the  country,  nor  were  his  supplies  of 
food,  clothing  and  pay  ever  commensurate  with  its  wealth. 
Neither  in  men  nor  money  was  there  a  true  measure  taken 
of  the  spirit  of  its  citizens.  These  difficulties  dogged 
Washington  to  the  end.  In  every  year  after  1775  there 
was  a  possibility  of  ending  the  war  by  a  crowning  victory 
had  he  commanded  an  army  worthy  in  numbers  and  equip- 
ment of  the  resources  of  the  United  States. 

It  has  been  calculated  by  a  thoughtful  American  his- 
torian,1 that  in  the  war  between  North  and  South,  ninety 
years  later,  the  federal  troops  towards  the  end  of  the 
struggle  were  in  the  proportion  of  one  in  every  five  of 
the  men  capable  of  bearing  arms;  more  than  a  million 

1  The  Critical  Period  of  American  History,  by  John  Fiske,  pp.  101-3. 


106  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  soldiers  were  in  the  field  for  the  defence  of  the  union. 
In  the  War  of  Independence  the  numbers  never  reached 
so  high  a  ratio  even  if  the  militia,  who  appeared  and 
disappeared  very  much  at  their  own  pleasure,  is  included 
in  the  sum.  Accordingly  it  has  been  maintained  by 
certain  writers,  that  in  the  war  against  Britain  there  was  a 
weaker  spirit  of  patriotism  than  in  the  War  of  Secession. 
In  both  cases  there  was  a  man  of  immense  character  acting 
disinterestedly  to  attain  success.  Lincoln  and  Washington 
may  be  held  to  cancel  one  another  in  the  equation.  The 
real  difference  is  that  in  the  one  case  there  was  govern- 
ment, and  in  the  other  there  was  not. 

For  if  Congress  could  not  bring  into  the  field  in  such  a 
cause  men  who  were  willing  to  serve,  and  if  it  could  not 
provide  for  its  soldiers,  whom  the  country  was  well  able  to 
support,  it  was  clearly  an  institution  too  contemptible  to  be 
described  as  a  government.  Allowing  to  natural  conditions 
and  the  inertness  of  Britain  their  full  force,  the  success  of 
the  colonists  in  the  fight  for  independence  was  due  to  no 
political  institutions,  but  only  to  the  binding  force  of  a 
common  aim  and  the  unmatched  qualities  of  one  great 
man.  At  the  end  of  the  war  government  was  still  to  seek. 
The  binding  force  of  a  common  aim  was  then  for  the  time 
being  relaxed,  for  it  had  split  into  a  thousand  centrifugal 
forces  of  local  jealousy  and  minor  interests.  But  at  least 
the  one  great  man  remained  as  before,  and  by  good 
fortune  another  great  man  emerged  in  the  nick  of  time  to 
his  assistance. 

Neither  Washington  nor  Hamilton  was  under  any  illusion 
with  regard  to  the  immediate  consequences  of  peace.  They 
foresaw  dangers  ahead  of  them  more  grave  in  character  than 
those  which  had  already  been  surmounted.  They  knew 
that  the  future  of  their  country  hung  upon  a  firm  union, 
and  that  a  firm  union  was  impossible  without  a  strong 


THE  UNION  OF  THE  STATES  107 

government.  The  existing  government  was  a  make-believe.  A.D. 
It  had  been  maintained  in  an  appearance  of  authority  only 
by  the  determination  of  the  people,  and  by  an  excessive  con- 
sideration, a  conscious  and  patriotic  hypocrisy,  on  the  part 
of  their  leaders.  It  had  no  inward  strength,  but  like  a 
sinking  patient  depended  upon  stimulants  and  doses  for  the 
preservation  of  its  feeble  vitality. 

As  Hamilton  had  foretold,  the  ending  of  the  war  let  loose 
at  once  all  the  forces  of  disunion.  Men  ringing  their  joy-bells 
as  King  George's  fleet  of  transports  shook  out  their  white 
sails  in  New  York  harbour  forgot  that  independence,  being 
won,  had  still  to  be  secured ;  or,  if  they  did  not  actually  forget, 
indulged  themselves  in  an  easy  confidence,  longing  for  a  brief 
respite  from  all  high  endeavour.  To  Hamilton  such  indiffer- 
ence seemed  as  dangerous  as  the  lethargy  of  the  traveller 
who  sinks  exhausted  in  a  snowdrift.  He  believed  that  all 
effective  co-operation  had  ceased  when  Washington  dis- 
banded his  army  in  the  autumn  of  1783;  that  the  union 
was  then  dissolved  as  a  reality,  and  preserved  in  Congress 
only  as  a  tradition.  The  states  were  thirteen  independent 
sovereigns,  whose  jealousies  left  open  the  doors  of  the  house 
to  foreign  intrigue.  Unless  the  people  could  be  brought 
to  realise  the  gravity  of  their  predicament,  the  natural 
consequence  of  the  War  of  Independence  would  be  another 
civil  war. 

During  the  spring  of  the  year  1783  much  correspondence 
had  passed  between  Hamilton  and  the  commander-in-chief 
upon  this  matter.  Their  minds  were  clear  both  as  to  the 
malady  and  the  means  to  a  cure.  "  Unless  Congress  have 
'  powers  competent  to  all  general  purposes,"  Washington 
wrote,  "  the  distresses  we  have  encountered,  the  expense  we 
'  have  incurred,  and  the  blood  we  have  spilt,  will  avail  us 
'  nothing." l  "  It  now  only  remains,"  Hamilton  replied,  "  to 
1  Sparks's  Washington,  viii.  p.  391. 


108  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1783  '  make  solid  establishments  within,  to  perpetuate  our  Union, 
M*' 26  '  to  prevent  our  being  a  ball  in  the  hands  of  European 
'  powers,  bandied  against  each  other  at  their  pleasure :  in  fine, 
'  to  make  our  independence  truly  a  blessing.  This,  it  is 
'  to  be  lamented,  will  be  an  arduous  work ;  for  to  borrow  a 
'  figure  from  mechanics,  the  centrifugal  is  much  stronger 
'  than  the  centripetal  force  in  these  states — the  seeds  of 
'  disunion  much  more  numerous  than  those  of  union.  I 
'  will  add  that  your  Excellency's  exertions  are  as  essential 
'  to  accomplish  this  end  as  they  have  been  to  establish 
'  independence."  l 

Washington's  circular  letter  to  the  governors  of  the  states 
at  the  close  of  the  war  breathed  the  same  prayer  for  "four 
'  things  which  I  humbly  conceive  are  essential  to  the  well- 
'  being,  I  may  even  venture  to  say,  to  the  existence  of  the 
'  United  States  as  an  independent  power : — First,  an  indis- 
'  soluble  union  of  the  states  under  one  federal  head ;  second, 
'  a  sacred  regard  to  public  justice;  third,  the  adoption  of  a 
'  proper  peace  establishment ;  and  fourth,  the  prevalence  of 
'  that  pacific  and  friendly  disposition  among  the  people  of  the 
'  United  States  which  will  induce  them  to  forget  their  local 
'  prejudices  and  policies ;  to  make  those  mutual  concessions 
'  which  are  requisite  to  the  general  prosperity ;  and,  in  some 
'  instances,  to  sacrifice  their  individual  advantages  to  the 
1  interest  of  the  community." 2  In  his  farewell  address  to 
his  soldiers  he  entreated  them  to  go  forth  as  missionaries 
among  their  fellow-citizens,  preaching  the  gospel  of  union 
and  a  strong  government.8 

It  is  not  beyond  the  truth  to  say  that  Hamilton  alone 
fully  understood  the  heart  of  Washington  upon  this  issue ; 
that  he  alone  fully  realised  the  grandeur  of  the  policy  of 
union.  For  between  the  aims  of  these  two  men  and  the 

1  Works,  ix.  p.  327.  2  Sparks's  Washington,  viii.  pp.  442-3. 

»  Ibid.  viii.  p.  495. 


THE  UNION  OF  THE  STATES  109 

aims  of  the  rest  of  the  national  party  there  was  something  A.D.  1783 
more  than  a  difference  of  degree.  The  majority  supported  26 
the  constitutional  movement  out  of  fear,  these  two  from 
hope.  Washington's  fame  is  still,  in  some  respects,  far 
below  his  true  deserts.  We  are  apt  to  imagine  him  a 
man  of  cold  courage  and  unimaginative  wisdom.  He  was, 
in  truth,  under  certain  aspects  neither  cold  nor  unimagina- 
tive. His  vision  of  the  future  was  glowing  and  exuberant. 
The  fancy  of  the  veteran  who  had  borne  the  brunt  and 
discouragement  of  a  wasting  war  was  as  fresh  and  san- 
guine as  that  of  a  boy  who  has  never  known  a  check. 
Alive  no  less  to  the  value  of  the  inheritance  than  to  the 
dangers  which  threatened  it,  his  chief  concern  was  not  a 
temporary  triumph,  but  an  ultimate  security.  Like  Hamil- 
ton, he  fixed  his  eyes  upon  a  future  far  beyond  his  own 
span  of  life,  and  the  welding  of  the  thirteen  states  was  to 
make  the  foundations  of  an  Empire. 

From  the  declaration  of  peace  there  is  a  change  in  the 
relations  of  the  two  men.  Their  correspondence  is  still 
grave  and  formal;  sometimes  affectionate,  never  familiar. 
On  the  part  of  the  elder  there  is  an  extraordinary 
generosity,  a  loyalty  which  never  fails;  on  that  of  the 
younger  a  respectful  consideration  which  has  no  tinge  of 
the  histrionic.  In  a  sense,  the  leadership  passes  into  the 
hands  of  Hamilton.  It  is  his  thought  which  ever  presses 
forward,  binding  and  constructing  and  preparing  the  way. 
He  is  the  interpreter  of  the  federal  idea,  and  his  main 
support  is  Washington's  instinct  which  approves,  Washing- 
ton's character  which  upholds  him  at  every  crisis  of  the 
struggle.  Without  diminishing  his  dignity  or  self-respect, 
without  any  abdication  or  surrender  of  his  personal  con- 
victions, Washington  places  the  whole  force  of  his  great 
influence  at  the  disposal  of  Hamilton,  recognising  in  him  a 
genius  for  statecraft,  and  without  a  grudge  or  afterthought 


110  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1783  for  his  own  glory.    Such  alliances  are  rare,  but  out  of  their 
T>        conjunction  great  events  are  apt  to  be  begotten. 

Hamilton  was  justified  in  all  his  predictions.  The  centri- 
fugal forces,  escaping  from  their  cave,  made  such  a  tempest 
of  disorder  as  may  well  have  taken  even  the  prophet  himself 
by  surprise.  Washington,  in  his  wise  optimism,  held  un- 
moved to  the  belief  that '  everything  would  come  right  at  last/ 
and  compared  the  riot  and  extravagance  of  the  states  after 
the  peace  to  that  of '  a  young  heir  come  a  little  prematurely 
to  a  large  inheritance,' l  who  by  and  by,  under  the  pressure 
of  circumstances,  will  return  to  his  natural  good  sense,  and 
successfully  rebuild  his  dilapidated  fortune.  As  things  went 
from  bad  to  worse  he  grew  graver,  but  never  despondent. 
What  perhaps  weighed  upon  him  most  heavily  was  not 
so  much  any  doubt  of  the  result,  as  the  peril  of  his  most 
cherished  desire.  He  wished  to  live  the  rest  of  his  days  as  a 
country  gentleman,  mending  and  enjoying  his  estate.  He 
loved  his  wide  plantations,  green  forests  and  majestic  river. 
The  struggle  with  Nature  for  an  antagonist  delighted  his 
great  heart  by  its  arduous  intensity,  its  compatibility  with 
silence,  its  freedom  from  the  restlessness  of  camps  and 
cities  and  the  affairs  of  men.  But  gradually  it  became  clear 
that  no  union  could  ever  be  attained  without  him;  and 
when  it  was  at  length  attained,  that  no  man  but  he  could 
properly  start  it  on  its  course  ;  and  afterwards,  that  no  man 
but  he  could  continue  it  with  safety.  So  in  the  end  there 
remained  barely  three  years  for  a  reward  to  one  who  cared 
less  than  most  men  for  the  prizes  of  ambition,  and  loved  to 
watch  the  seasons  in  his  country  home  more  than  to  lead 
victorious  armies  or  to  be  a  ruler  over  a  great  nation. 

1  Sparks's  Washington,  ix.  p.  11. 


THE  UNION  OF  THE  STATES  111 


CHAPTER  III 

Centrifugal  Force  and  its  Consequences 

THE  first  trouble  was  the  army,  as  has  already  been  stated  A.D. 
in  a  previous  chapter.1  Unpaid  and  unpensioned,  it  spoke 
openly  of  rebellion.  Washington  was  urged  to  make  himself 
king,  not  only  by  men  who  had  claims  and  grievances,  but 
by  others  who,  while  they  loved  order,  considered  this 
remedy  to  be  the  only  means  of  obtaining  an  honest 
acknowledgment  and  liquidation  of  the  various  liabilities 
which  had  been  contracted  during  the  war.2 

Soldiers  in  peace-time  are  at  a  disadvantage.  They  are 
rarely  masters  of  effective  speech.  Their  words  lack  the 
cunning  of  restraint.  Their  sincerity  and  their  conscious- 
ness of  injustice  render  them  impatient  of  parties.  Occa- 
sionally they  are  useful  to  the  politician,  but  he  discards  the 
alliance  immediately  it  becomes  a  question  of  recompense. 
Moreover,  their  misfortunes  tend  to  bring  them  upon  the 
rates.  Their  grievance  being  that  the  country  has  dealt 
with  them  ungenerously,  the  taxpayers  of  whom  the  country 
is  composed  are  placed  in  what  they  would  themselves  de- 
scribe as  'a  delicate  position' — the  delicacy  consisting  in 
the  fact  that  they  cannot  indulge  their  emotions  without 
putting  their  hands  deeper  into  their  pockets.  Consequently, 
in  a  democracy,  though  the  wrongs  of  an  army  frequently 
call  forth  much  sentiment,  they  rarely  obtain  substantial 
redress.3  A  pension-list  for  political  purposes  is  the  utmost 
that  a  reasonable  mind  will  entertain. 

Congressmen  were  very  slow  to  respond.     They  continued 

1  Book  i.  Chap.  vi.  pp.  65-67.  2  Fiske's  Critical  Period,  pp.  106-8. 

8  Of.  action  of  Massachusetts,  History,  ii.  pp.  494-5. 


112  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  to  draw  their  own  salaries  with  a  most  punctual  fidelity ; 
but  the  claims  of  the  army  were  a  controversial  matter 
which  they  professed  to  have  scruples  against  settling 
offhand.  It  would  be  easier,  they  alleged  with  some 
truth,  and  more  dignified,  to  discuss  the  question  at  leisure 
when  the  army  was  disbanded.1  When  mutinous  murmurs 
reached  their  ears  they  looked  askance  at  Washington, 
and  made  speeches  upon  the  text,  '  No  Cromwells.'  In 
plain  words,  they  had  no  power,  and  what  was  even  more, 
they  had  no  goodwill.  The  debating  caste  was  jealous  of 
the  warrior  caste;  feared  it,  and  affected,  not  altogether 
insincerely,  to  regard  the  calling  of  arms  with  a  kind  of 
moral  reprobation.  Soldiers  were  under  certain  conditions 
a  painful  necessity,  but,  like  a  panther  used  for  hunting, 
should  be  clapped  in  chains  as  speedily  as  possible  after  the 
quarry  had  been  killed.  Hamilton,  writing  to  Washington 
from  Philadelphia  in  the  spring  of  1783,  describes  the 
attitude  of  his  fellow-congressmen  without  flattery :  "  But 
'  while  I  urge  the  army  to  moderation,  I  advise  youi 
'  Excellency  to  take  the  direction  of  their  discontents,  and 
'  endeavour  to  confine  them  within  the  bounds  of  duty.  I 
'  cannot,  as  an  honest  man,  conceal  from  you  that  I  am 
'  afraid  their  distrusts  have  too  much  foundation.  Repub- 
'  lican  jealousy  has  in  it  a  principle  of  hostility  to  an  army, 
'  whatever  be  their  merits,  whatever  be  their  claims  to 
'  the  gratitude  of  the  community.  It  acknowledges  their 
1  services  with  unwillingness,  and  rewards  them  with  reluct- 
'  ance.  I  see  this  temper,  though  smothered  with  great  care, 

*  involuntarily  breaking  out  upon  too  many  occasions.   I  often 
'  feel  a  mortification,  which  it  would  be  impolitic  to  express, 
'  that  sets  my  passions  at  variance  with  my  reason.     Too 

*  many,  I  perceive,  if  they  could  do  it  with  safety  or  colour, 
'  would  be  glad  to  elude  the  just  pretensions  of  the  army." 2 

1  History,  ii.  p.  496.  2  Works,  ix.  p.  330. 


THE  UNION  OF  THE  STATES  113 

The  dangers  of  a  military  rebellion  were  avoided  in  the  A-D. 
manner  which  has  been  already  described.  For  success  the  ^T  25.36 
movement  needed  a  Cromwell;  and  there  was  only  one 
Cromwell  possible,  who  not  only  declined  to  serve,  but  by 
adroit  and  courageous  management  defeated  the  hopes  of 
the  revolutionary  party.  Hot  as  was  Washington's  indigna- 
tion, much  as  he  loved  the  army,  his  patriotism  was  too 
wide  and  well  balanced  to  let  loose  the  havoc  of  civil  war, 
even  though  short  of  this  remedy  there  was  no  hope  of  an 
adequate  provision.  It  was  said  with  truth  that  the  defeated 
Government  of  King  George  dealt  with  the  exiled  and 
fugitive  loyalists  with  a  far  greater  liberality  than  the 
United  States  bestowed  upon  their  victorious  but  im- 
poverished army. 

After  the  taking  of  Yorktown,  Hamilton  returned  to  Albany, 
and  remained  the  guest  of  his  father-in-law  until  the  spring. 
General  Schuyler  offered  pecuniary  assistance,  and  there  was 
some  talk  of  a  public  appointment,  but  both  were  refused. 
Hamilton's  determination  was  fixed  to  go  to  the  bar.  He 
resigned  his  commission  in  the  army  on  the  ground  that  he 
had  obtained  his  command  in  the  autumn  only  with  great 
difficulty  and  after  repeated  applications.  He  was  unwilling, 
now  that  the  issue  admitted  of  no  uncertainty,  to  'obtrude' 
his  claims  upon  the  commander-in-chief.  At  the  same  time 
he  gave  up  his  rights  in  the  matters  of  half-pay  and  com- 
pensation. In  the  May  following  (1782)  he  accepted  for  the 
period  of  a  few  months  the  office  of  receiver  of  the  continental 
taxes  for  New  York  state,  but  resigned  it  in  winter,  when 
he  was  chosen  to  be  a  member  of  Congress. 

In  1782,  after  a  few  months  of  study,  Hamilton  was 
admitted  to  the  bar.  The  age  of  twenty-five,  which  was 
his  age  at  that  date,  is  to-day  the  usual  time  of  life  for 
young  men  to  enter  upon  this  arduous  profession.  There 
is  an  odd  contrast,  however,  between  the  typical  student  of 

H 


114  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

Lincoln's  Inn  or  the  Temple,  and  this  strange,  smiling, 
MH  25-26  boyish  figure,  with  the  fine  lace  ruffles,  who  had  already 
played  the  part  and  borne  the  responsibilities  of  a  man  in 
the  affairs  of  a  great  war,  who  had  dealt  with  statesmen  in 
high  matters  of  politics,  and  conducted  with  tact  and  firm- 
ness the  diplomacy  between  the  commanders  of  America 
and  France. 

When  we  read  of  his  sudden  success  as  an  advocate,  we 
are  inclined  to  look  for  the  reason  in  the  smallness  of  the 
arena  and  the  dearth  of  great  practitioners.  To  a  certain 
extent  both  explanations  are  correct.  The  population  of 
New  York  state  in  1782  numbered  only  about  a  hundred 
and  seventy  thousand  persons,  New  York  city  some  thirty 
thousand.  The  former  leaders  of  the  bar,  for  the  most  part 
loyalists  or  Tories,  had  been  swept  entirely  out  of  the  field. 

But  granting  that  the  arena  was  small,  it  was  not  so  with 
the  issues  which  the  conclusion  of  peace  had  brought  up  for 
consideration.  Few  courts  of  justice  have  ever  been  called 
upon  to  settle  principles  of  higher  moment  to  the  state. 
Hamilton  followed  the  Ciceronian  tradition,  mixing  and  inter- 
weaving law  with  politics.  Through  his  advocacy  in  private 
causes  he  sought  to  affect,  and  to  a  large  degree  succeeded 
in  affecting,  public  opinion  outside  the  court-house. 

The  treaty  of  peace  with  Britain,  like  other  docu- 
ments of  the  kind,  contained  provisions  of  give  and  take. 
After  signature  by  the  commissioners  in  Paris,  it  was  rati- 
fied with  due  consideration  by  the  Continental  Congress. 
The  advantages  which  it  secured  were  not  merely  of  a 
sentimental  nature,  but  material.  It  was  justly  regarded 
by  enlightened  citizens  of  the  States  as  a  triumph  of 
diplomacy.  The  credit  of  Britain  in  the  bargain  was  more 
of  the  heart  than  of  the  head.  She  was  willing  to  concede 
substantial  and  important  benefits  in  order  to  secure  the 


THE  UNION  OF  THE  STATES  115 

lives  and  property  of  those  colonists  who  had  clung  to  the  A.D.  1783 
old  tradition  and  had  sustained  her  arms.  Looking  at  T' 
the  matter  in  a  cool  light,  she  blundered  into  sacrifices 
that  were  altogether  needless  even  with  this  aim  in  view. 
Her  discredit  was  a  lack  of  knowledge,  of  foresight  and 
of  interest.  The  game  was  played,  and  she  had  lost. 
North  America,  in  the  eyes  of  her  statesmen,  was  a 
strip  of  eastern  seaboard ;  the  great  lakes  were  but  dimly 
understood ;  the  continent  beyond  the  Mississippi  was 
ignored.  She  gave  much  more  than  she  needed  to  have 
given,  both  in  east  and  west,  to  attain  her  honourable  end ; 
and  what  was  more  immediately  distressing,  she  received 
little  or  no  value  in  return  for  her  liberal  concessions. 

"  The  uti  possidetis,  each  party  to  hold  what  it  possesses," 
Hamilton  writes  in  the  first  letter  from  Phocion,  "is  the 
'  point  from  which  nations  set  out  in  framing  a  treaty  of 
'  peace.  If  one  side  gives  up  a  part  of  its  acquisitions,  the 
'  other  side  renders  an  equivalent  in  some  other  way.  What 
'  is  the  equivalent  given  to  Great  Britain  for  all  the  important 
'  concessions  she  has  made?  She  has  surrendered  the  capital 
'  of  this  state  (New  York)  and  its  large  dependencies.  She 
'  is  to  surrender  our  immensely  valuable  posts  on  the 
'  frontier,  and  to  yield  to  us  a  vast  tract  of  western  territory, 
'  with  one-half  of  the  lakes,  by  which  we  shall  command 
'  almost  the  whole  fur  trade.  She  renounces  to  us  her  claim 
'  to  the  navigation  of  the  Mississippi,  and  admits  us  to  share 
'  in  the  fisheries  even  on  better  terms  than  we  formerly 

*  enjoyed  it.    As  she  was  in  possession,  by  right  of  war,  of 
'  all  these  objects,  whatever  may  have  been  our  original 
'  pretensions  to  them,  they  are,  by  the  laws  of  nations,  to 

*  be  considered  as  so  much  given  up  on  her  part.  And  what 
c  do  we  give  in  return  ?     We  stipulate — that  there  shall  be 
'  no  future  injury  to  her  adherents  among  us.   How  insigni- 
'  ficant  the  equivalent  in  comparison  with  the  acquisition  I 


116  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1783  '  A  man  of  sense  would  be  ashamed  to  compare  them ;  a 
&i.  26    ,  man  Q£  nonestVj  not  intoxicated  with  passion,  would  blush 
'  to  lisp  a  question  of  the  obligation  to  observe  the  stipulation 
'  on  our  part."  l 

In  return  for  these  advantages  Congress  had  most 
solemnly  undertaken  three  things,  and  the  people,  wearied 
by  the  sufferings  of  an  eight  years'  war,  would  have  gladly 
purchased  the  blessings  of  peace  at  a  much  higher  price. 
The  first  of  these  conditions  was  that  no  obstacle  or  im- 
pediment should  be  put  in  the  way  of  the  recovery  of 
debts  due  to  British  subjects  from  the  citizens  of  the 
Republic ;  the  second,  that  in  the  future  no  fresh  prosecu- 
tions or  confiscations  should  be  directed  against  loyalists; 
the  third,  that  Congress  should  sincerely  recommend  to  the 
legislatures  of  the  various  states  a  repeal  of  the  existing  acts 
of  confiscation  which  affected  the  property  of  these  unfor- 
tunate persons.  On  the  last  no  stress  need  be  laid,  Franklin 
was  candid  as  to  the  difficulties,  and  in  all  likelihood  it 
was  little  more  than  a  pious  hope.  But  the  first  and  the 
second  were  unambiguous,  and  by  every  man,  honest  or 
dishonest,  were  understood  in  the  same  sense  when  peace 
was  joyfully  accepted.  . 

The  forms  of  political  knavery  are  beyond  enumeration, 
but  they  fall  into  classes  with  certain  conspicuous  features, 
according  to  the  development  of  the  community.  There 
is  the  knavery  of  the  pure  savage,  which  differs  from  that  of 
the  feudal  baron ;  and  there  are  knaveries  peculiar  to  a 
bureaucracy,  to  a  despot,  and  to  a  people  without  previous 
experience  in  international  relations.  The  knavery  of  the 
American  states  was  of  the  last-named  order.  They  took 
the  benefits  of  peace  which  the  efforts  of  Congress  had 
secured  to  them;  they  accepted  the  advantages  of  the 
treaty  which  their  representatives  had  signed ;  they  watched 

1   Works,  iv.  p.  239. 


THE  UNION  OF  THE  STATES  117 

and  waited  until  the  troops  of  King  George  were  embarked  A.D.  1783 
in  transports  for  England,  and  then  proceeded  to  deny,  in  a    Ml'  ^ 
variety  of  tones,  all  power  in  the  central  government  to  bind 
them  in  the  matter  of  the  quid  pro  quo.     It  was  not  a  great 
thing  which  Congress  had  undertaken  to  do,  or  one  which 
could  be  of  any  material  advantage  to  their  late  enemy. 
All  their  promise  amounted  to  was  that  they  would  abstain 
from  the  degradation  of  a  petty  and  personal  revenge,  and 
this  promise  they  proceeded  to  break  in  every  particular. 

As  Hamilton  wisely  and  nobly  urged,  the  breach  was  not 
only  a  despicable  perfidy  but  an  impolitic  act,  since  loyalists 
might  become  good  citizens,  and  the  states  needed  nothing 
more  urgently  than  population.  But  no  sooner  was  danger  at 
a  distance,  embarked  on  transports,  than  the  states  assumed 
an  attitude  of  defiance.  New  York  in  particular  proceeded 
to  persecute  the  Tories  by  novel  expedients  and  with  re- 
doubled energy.  The  thirteen  legislatures  vied  with  one 
another  in  the  ingenuity  of  measures  for  defeating  recovery 
of  debts  due  to  British  creditors.  They  derided  the  recom- 
mendation to  repeal  oppressive  acts  and  to  restore  con- 
fiscated property,  and  proceeded  without  regard  either  for 
honour  or  consequences  to  pass  new  acts  of  wider  oppression 
and  to  order  confiscations  on  a  grander  scale.  It  was  the 
same  spirit  which  had  violated  the  terms  of  the  Saratoga 
capitulation :  the  same  which  in  later  days  preached  the 
gospel  of  repudiation  with  its  hand  upon  its  heart. 

The  United  States  at  this  date  were  not  independent  of 
European  assistance,  but  on  the  contrary  stood  urgently  in 
need  of  it.  They  required  capital  and  credit,  and,  beyond 
everything,  treaties  of  commerce;  but  until  1789,  when  the 
constitution  was  in  being,  they  called  their  wants  to  deaf  ears. 
European  bankers  and  ministers  of  state,  mindful  of  these 
events,  evaded — sometimes  with  less  of  courtesy  and  circum- 
locution than  was  agreeable — all  proposals  for  co-operation. 


118  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1783  Even  their  politest  messages  were  unflattering.  They  com- 
Mi.  26  p}ame(j  of  the  duality  of  a  government  that  was  one  and 
indivisible  when  it  desired  to  purchase  a  favour  or  an 
accommodation,  but  turned  into  thirteen  recusants  when 
it  became  a  question  of  paying  the  reckoning.  They 
declined  to  be  captivated  or  tempted  by  the  illusion  of  a 
Congress  that  dissolved  and  faded  under  the  pressure 
of  an  obligation  into  a  welter  of  truculent  and  con- 
ceited legislatures,  who  pleaded  their  municipal  statutes 
against  the  law  of  nations,  and  denied  the  right  of  the 
central  power  to  do  more  than  secure  prepayment  from 
simpletons. 

Against  this  flagrant  and  ruinous  chicanery  the  nobler 
spirits  of  the  Revolution  revolted,  protested  and  fought, 
but  for  a  considerable  period  of  years  in  vain.  They  had 
no  regard  for  popularity,  and  incurred  much  hatred. 
Among  its  opponents  Hamilton  was  foremost  in  writings 
and  action.  Clinton,  Governor  of  New  York,  became  at 
this  time  his  enemy,  and  remained  so  to  the  end.  Among 
people  who  had  no  word  upon  their  lips  so  frequently  as 
freedom,  Clinton  acted  the  part  of  a  predatory  despot  by 
playing  ingeniously  upon  the  greed  and  passions  of  his 
constituents.  It  is  impossible  to  withhold  a  certain  degree 
of  admiration  for  this  narrow,  irascible,  obstinate,  masterful 
precursor  of  Tammany,  who  maintained  his  domination 
against  a  coalition  of  all  the  virtues  and  all  the  talents  over 
a  prolonged  term.  In  shrewdness,  and  not  from  cynicism, 
he  called  his  policy  Democracy.  Phrases  never  clouded  his 
illiterate  and  direct  intelligence;  but  he  was  far  from  despis- 
ing their  utility  in  dealing  with  the  electorate.  Having  given 
his  policy  a  name,  not  with  the  object  of  describing  it,  but 
merely  to  please  the  public  taste,  he  fixed  it  like  a  ring  in  a 
bull's  nose,  and  led  the  passive  creature  whithersoever  it 
pleased  him. 


THE  UNION  OF  THE  STATES  119 

Clinton  loved  his  governorship  with  a  passion  that  was  A.D.  1783 
entirely  royal,  and  he  hated  Congress  because  it  possessed  ^T<  26 
a  semblance  of  superior  power.  When  it  was  possible  to 
do  so  he  thwarted  that  august  impotency  and  treated  it  to 
humiliation  and  contempt.  He  hated  and  feared  the  idea 
of  union,  and  fought  against  it  tooth  and  nail;  for  union, 
beyond  any  doubt,  meant  the  curtailment  of  his  power  and 
importance.  He  hated  the  loyalists  and  Tories  because  they 
had  once  been  his  enemies.  It  is  probable  that  after  a 
fashion  he  loved  his  own  state  of  New  York,  was  jealous  of 
her  glory,  desired  to  see  her  independent,  rich  and  powerful, 
as  sometimes  a  man  has  a  pride  in  his  wife  though  he 
ill-uses  her. 

Such  a  character  holding  the  governorship  of  the  chief 
commercial  state  of  the  Union  was  the  natural  leader  of  the 
revolt  against  treaty  obligations,  and  in  his  action  it  is 
likely  that  his  hatred  of  Congress  was  at  least  an  equal 
motive  with  his  hatred  of  loyalists.  His  first  move  was  a 
comprehensive  measure  for  disfranchising  every  one  who 
had  stayed  of  his  own  free  will  in  places  occupied  by 
British  troops  or  under  their  nominal  control ;  but  the  pro- 
posal was  too  crude  a  usurpation  for  the  stomachs  of  his 
more  timid  supporters.  Then  he  attempted  to  impose  an 
oath  as  a  condition  of  enfranchisement — an  oath  not  of 
loyalty  in  the  present  and  for  the  future,  which  would  have 
been  legitimate,  but  of  immaculate  patriotism  in  the  past.1 
He  promoted  an  edict  of  perpetual  exile  against  all  Tories 
who  had  left  the  state.  He  carried  an  act  enabling  citizens 
whose  property  had  been  occupied  or  entered  upon  by  others 
under  British  authority,  during  the  military  occupation, 
to  bring  suits  for  damages  against  such  persons  as  tres- 
passers. This  measure  struck  at  the  roots  of  the  settlement, 
and  such  was  the  intention  of  the  Clintonian  party.  It 

1  History,  iii.  p.  29. 


120  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1783  also  opened  the  doors  to  every  kind  of  extortion  working 
MT'  26    through  prejudice  against  justice. 

Hamilton  contended  boldly  that  the  act  was  illegal, 
being  contrary  to  the  treaty  of  peace  which  Congress  was 
within  its  legitimate  powers  in  concluding.  Clinton,  with 
much  adroitness,  arranged  for  a  test  case  in  which  a  poor 
widow  sought  damages  from  a  wealthy  merchant.1  Popular 
sympathy  was  on  the  side  of  Clinton's  law,  and  the  circum- 
stances of  this  particular  cause  lent  themselves  to  a  senti- 
mental treatment.  The  state  courts  were  swayed  by  both 
considerations,  and  would  gladly  have  found  a  way  to  enforce 
the  Trespass  Act  and  right  the  widow.  But  Hamilton  left 
them  no  way.  He  fought  the  case  upon  the  great  principles 
of  national  obligation  which  lay  at  the  root  of  the  matter, 
and  wrung  a  verdict  for  his  client  from  the  reluctant 
judges. 

By  this  victory  he  smashed  the  Trespass  Act;  but  the 
whole  policy  of  repudiation  was  abhorrent  to  him,  and  he 
attacked  it  at  large  in  the  first  of  his  letters  from  Phocion. 
One  Ledyard,  over  the  signature  of  Mentor,  attempted  a 
reply  which  drew  from  Hamilton  a  second  letter  upon  the 
same  theme.  These  two  pamphlets  are  among  the  noblest 
and  most  persuasive  of  his  writings.  In  personal  invective 
he  was  not  a  great  master.  He  lacked  the  delicacy  of  wit 
and  melody  of  phrase  which  alone  can  render  anger  and 
contempt  agreeable  to  a  passionless  and  disinterested 
posterity;  but  when  he  writes,  as  in  these,  with  deep 
sincerity,  with  candour  and  good  temper,  he  is  disarming 
and  resistless.  His  simple  object  was  to  persuade  all 
honest  men  that  for  them  the  Clintonian  policy  of  oppres- 
sion was  impossible ;  and  honest  men,  reading  the  pamphlets, 
put  aside  their  prejudices  and  became  slowly  convinced. 
We  find  some  measure  of  his  success  in  the  rage  of 

1  History,  iii.  pp.  11-22. 


THE  UNION  OF  THE  STATES  121 

the  governor's  faction.     Never,  even  later  when  he  spoke  A.  D.  1783 

disrespectfully  of  the  French  Revolution,  was  he  hated  with    JEfSt  26 

so  great  a  frenzy.     A  club  frequented  by  Ledyard  decided 

to  challenge  Hamilton,  each  member  in  turn,  until  some 

one  at  length  should  have  the  good  fortune  to  put  an  end 

to  him.     But  Ledyard,  who  had,  at  least,  the  virtue  of  being 

able  to  take  blows  in  return  for  those  he  gave,  entering 

the  club  and  hearing  of  this  strange  proposal,  broke  out 

in    loud    indignation:   "This,   gentlemen,  can    never    be! 

'  What  ?     You  write  what  you  please,  and  because  you 

'  cannot  refute  what  he  writes  in  reply  you  form  a  com- 

'  bination  to  take  his  life." l    And  so,  reluctantly,  the  scheme 

was  abandoned  by  its  devoted  authors. 

It  was  Hamilton's  most  fatal  weakness  as  a  politician,  and 
one  of  his  chief  virtues  as  a  statesman,  that  he  was  indifferent 
to  popularity.  The  same  passion  for  order  and  justice,  which 
had  driven  him  as  a  boy  to  defend  his  enemies  against  the  vio- 
lence of  an  excited  mob,  armed  him  now  against  the  threats 
and  abuse  of  Clinton's  henchmen.  He  called  himself  a  Whig, 
following  the  practice  of  the  revolutionary  leaders,  and  his 
definition  of  the  name  might  almost  have  converted  Lord 
Thurlow  himself.  "The  spirit  of  Whiggism  is  generous, 
'  humane,  beneficent,  and  just.  These  men  (the  Clintonians) 
'  inculcate  revenge,  cruelty,  persecution  and  perfidy.  The 
'  spirit  of  Whiggism  cherishes  legal  liberty,  holds  the  rights 
'  of  every  individual  sacred,  condemns  or  punishes  no  man 
'  without  regular  trial  and  conviction  of  some  crime  declared 
'  by  antecedent  laws ;  reprobates  equally  the  punishment  of 
'  the  citizen  by  arbitrary  acts  of  legislation,  as  by  the  lawless 
'  combinations  of  unauthorised  individuals,  while  those  men 
'  are  advocates  for  expelling  a  large  number  of  their  fellow- 
'  citizens  unheard,  untried ;  or,  if  they  cannot  effect  this,  are 
'for  disfranchising  them,  in  the  face  of  the  constitution, 

1  History,  iii.  p.  45. 


122  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1783  '  without  the  judgment  of  their  peers  and  contrary  to  the 
^T-26  •  law  of  the  land."  * 

Hamilton's  career  and  merits  as  a  lawyer  have  been  dis- 
cussed at  length  by  men  who  were  themselves  great  jurists. 
In  the  present  essay,  which  is  concerned  with  his  political 
services,  any  elaborate  survey  would  be  out  of  place.  His 
practice  grew  rapidly.  Abilities  that  could  win  a  verdict 
against  the  oppressed  widow  and  the  popular  governor 
could  not  be  safely  overlooked  by  litigants,  no  matter  what 
political  views  they  might  entertain.  He  was  no  mere 
advocate  to  dazzle  twelve  plain  men  in  a  box.  With  courts 
he  was  more  successful  than  with  juries;  and  the  higher  the 
court,  the  greater  was  his  influence  upon  it. 

We  are  apt,  having  rarely  witnessed  the  phenomenon,  to 
ignore  the  chief  advantage  of  his  circumstances.  In  the 
vigour  of  his  youth  and  at  the  very  summit  of  hope,  he 
brought  to  the  study  of  the  divine  precepts  of  law  a  char- 
acter already  trained  and  tested  by  the  realities  of  life, 
formed  by  success,  experienced  in  the  facts  and  disorders 
with  which  law  has  to  deal.  Before  he  began  the  study  of 
the  remedies,  he  had  a  wide  knowledge  of  the  conditions 
of  human  society.  Although  still  a  boy  in  years  and  spirits, 
the  memory  of  playing  fields  and  debating  clubs  was  faint 
and  far  off;  for  he  had  already  contended  and  measured 
himself  against  characters  who  have  left  their  mark  on 
history. 

It  is  characteristic  of  his  quality  that  during  the  year  in 
which  he  studied  for  the  bar  he  wrote  a  text-book  on  law 
for  the  use  of  students.  With  a  succeeding  generation  of 
students  Hamilton's  text-book  remained  in  use,2  not  from 
any  sentimental  reason,  for  the  party  which  he  had  led 
was  extinguished  and  his  own  fame  lay  under  a  cloud  of 
unpopularity,  but  solely  on  its  merits. 

1  Works,  iv.  p.  231.  a  History,  ii.  p.  282. 


THE  UNION  OF  THE  STATES  123 

He  practised  at  the  bar  for  seven  years  before  Washington  A.D.  1783 
summoned  him  to  his  cabinet,  and  for  ten  after  he  had  T* 
resigned  his  office  —  altogether  barely  seventeen  years. 
During  the  whole  of  this  period  he  was  occupied  as  much 
with  public  affairs  as  with  his  profession.  Yet  from  what 
remains  to  us  in  the  meagre  reports,  and  in  his  own  notes, 
abstracts  and  memoranda,  from  the  testimony  of  his  con- 
temporaries and  the  criticism  of  men  who  followed  after, 
there  exists  no  doubt  that  he  must  be  numbered  among 
the  great  lawyers,  one  of  the  smallest  societies  of  mortal 
excellence.  With  him,  as  with  them  (for  it  is  the  badge 
of  their  company),  law  was  not  so  much  a  slow  and 
arduous  acquisition  as  a  sudden  discovery;  not  so  much 
a  painful  effort  of  learning  as  the  intuition  of  an  eternal 
harmony :  a  reality,  quick  and  human,  buxom  and  jolly,  and 
not  a  formula  pinched  and  embalmed,  stiff,  banded  and 
dusty  like  a  royal  mummy  of  Egypt.  Reversing  the  rule 
of  all  academies,  and  following  the  invariable  practice  of 
greatness,  he  learned  from  the  top  downwards,  not  from  the 
base  upwards ;  and  if  he  escaped  drudgery,  which  we  are  too 
often  inclined  to  place  upon  a  separate  pedestal  and  worship 
for  its  own  sake,  it  was  not  at  the  sacrifice  of  thoroughness ; 
for  principles  were  a  part  of  his  being,  and  he  found  his 
details  as  he  needed  them,  like  a  man  seeking  needles  with 
a  lodestone, 


CHAPTER  IV 

Disorder  and  Anarchy 

THE  violations  of  the  terms  of  peace  which  took  place  in 
New  York  were  conspicuous,  not  so  much  by  reason  of  their 
exceptional  flagrancy,  as  from  the  commercial  importance 


124  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.     of  that  state,  from  the  large  number  of  Tories  included  in 
3  26730 


3   7          P°Pulafci°n>  an(^  fr°m  tne  notable  part  taken  by  Hamilton 


in  opposing  a  policy  which  in  his  eyes  was  one  not  merely 
of  breach  of  faith,  but  of  disintegration. 

Up  till  this  time  the  great  difficulty  had  been  to  arrive  at 
anything  approaching  unanimity  among  the  states;  but 
there  was  at  once  a  perfect  unanimity  in  refusing  to  repeal 
the  acts  of  confiscation.  There  was  also  a  practical  unanimity 
in  engaging  in  fresh  persecutions  of  the  loyalists,  not  merely 
by  the  enactment  of  oppressive  civil  laws,  but  even  by  deny- 
ing them  the  protection  afforded  by  a  just  enforcement  of 
the  criminal  laws.  In  many  districts  these  unfortunate 
persons  were  robbed,  tortured,  and  even  put  to  death  with 
impunity,  and  over  a  hundred  thousand  were  driven  into 
exile  in  Canada,  Florida  and  the  Bahamas.  Finally,  there 
was  unanimity  among  all  the  most  important  states  in 
taking  measures  to  defeat  the  recovery  of  private  debts  in 
cases  where  the  creditors  were  Englishmen.1  It  was  the 
same  in  Massachusetts  and  in  South  Carolina,  in  Pennsyl- 
vania, Maryland  and  Virginia,  as  well  as  in  New  York. 
i  The  recovery  of  private  debts  was  indeed  one  of  the 
stipulations  of  the  treaty  of  peace,  but  in  dealing  with  any 
nation  which  had  evolved  a  public  opinion  capable  of  sus- 
taining the  most  rudimentary  code  of  personal  honour  it 
would  have  been  superfluous,  a  thing  which  would  have 
gone  without  saying.  It  is  remarkable,  however,  that  in 
this  period  of  pristine  virtue  public  opinion  was  at  once  so 
childish  and  so  rotten,  that  we  are  at  a  loss  whether  to 
marvel  most  at  its  recklessness  of  credit  or  at  its  unvarnished 
dishonesty.  Public  opinion  was  entirely  favourable  to  the 
idea  of  private  theft,  and  the  interest  of  rogues  was  con- 
sidered with  a  tender  compassion  by  the  grave  and  respect- 
able citizens  who  composed  the  legislatures  of  the  various 

1  Fiske's  Critical  Period  of  American  History,  pp.  129-130. 


THE  UNION  OF  THE  STATES  125 

states.      Measures  were  passed  amid  popular  rejoicing  to     A.D 
obstruct  the  recovery  of  debts  due  to  British  merchants,  and 
to  enable  the  fortunate  Americans  to  revel  unmolested  in 
the  pleasant  flavour  of  stolen  fruit. 

Such  lack  of  morals  in  the  people  being  added  to  the 
lack  of  power  in  Congress,  it  is  not  wonderful  that  the 
federal  government  gradually  faded  into  a  dim  shadow. 
Even  the  instinct  of  self-importance  was  insufficient  to 
keep  it  alive.  Having  become  wholly  a  farce,  it  sank 
into  indifference.  The  legislatures  of  the  thirteen  states 
treated  it  with  frank  contumely;  acted  in  open  defiance 
of  its  authority ;  ignored  its  counsels ;  refused  its  requests, 
and  went  their  various  ways  in  contempt.  Delaware 
and  Georgia,  with  stern  economy,  considered  it  to  be  a 
waste  of  the  public  money  to  furnish  delegates  During 
the  six  years  preceding  1789  the  average  attendance  was 
about  twenty-five,  out  of  a  total  of  ninety-one.  Frequently 
the  meetings  were  adjourned,  which  harmed  no  man,  for 
want  of  a  quorum.  "  Our  prospects,"  wrote  Hamilton  to  Jay, 
"are  not  flattering.  Every  day  proves  the  inefficiency  of 
'  the  present  confederation ;  yet  the  common  danger  being 
'  removed,  we  are  receding  instead  of  advancing  in  a  dis 
'  position  to  amend  its  defects.  The  road  to  popularity  in 
'  each  state  is  to  inspire  jealousies  of  the  power  of  Congress, 
'  though  nothing  can  be  more  apparent  than  that  they  have 
'  no  power ;  and  that  for  the  want  of  it  the  resources  of  the 
1  country  during  the  war  could  not  be  drawn  out,  and  we  at 
'  this  moment  experience  all  the  mischiefs  of  a  bankrupt  and 
'  ruined  credit.  It  is  to  be  hoped  that  when  prejudice  and 
'  folly  have  run  themselves  out  of  breath,  we  may  return  to 
'  reason  and  correct  our  errors." 1 

Hamilton  took  his  seat  in  Congress  during  November 
1782,  and  remained  for  eight  months  a  member  of  that  body. 

1   Works,  ix.  pp.  381,  382. 


126  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.     The  debates  were  not  open  to  the  public,  and  the  only 
'    oV  on  authentic  records  which  remain  are  the  Journals  of  the 

^fiiT.  ZO-oU 

House.  Details  are  therefore  entirely  lacking;  but  it  is 
certain  that  he  took  a  great  part,  if  not  the  most  prominent 
part,  in  its  proceedings.1  From  the  formal  entries,  from  his 
own  letters  and  from  contemporary  notices,  he  stands  out 
clearly  as  the  courageous  advocate  of  union  speaking  to  deaf 
ears.  His  disposition  was  the  reverse  of  reticent.  He  never 
stored  up  ideas  awaiting  the  dramatic  occasion  that  would 
receive  them  with  applause.  If  his  mind  was  full  of  any 
matter,  he  announced  it  regardless  of  the  forces  or  the 
lethargy  that  were  arrayed  against  him.  All  the  chief 
measures  of  his  subsequent  administration  were  brought 
under  discussion  at  this  period  without  consideration  for 
the  hopelessness  of  success.  His  ideas  in  the  matters  of 
foreign  policy,  defence,  national  credit  and  commercial 
affairs  were  all  mooted  in  this  uncongenial  atmosphere.2 
But  in  the  end  even  he  succumbed  to  its  intolerable 
influence.  The  absence  of  any  pressing  external  danger 
removed  all  chance  of  an  effective  effort  proceeding  from 
within.  The  time  had  gone  by  when  a  bold  demand  by 
Congress  for  sufficient  powers  to  govern  with  might  have 
had  some  hope  of  success;  and  although  in  a  sanguine 
moment  Hamilton  had  drafted  a  series  of  resolutions  in 
favour  of  union,  he  met  with  so  little  encouragement  that 
he  did  not  in  the  end  submit  them  to  the  judgment  of  the 
lack-lustre  assembly.3 

Meanwhile  the  policy  of  breach  of  faith  was  producing  its 
natural  crop  of  inconveniences.  Clintonian  methods  were 
not  the  unmixed  advantage  which  his  adherents  had 
supposed  when  they  engaged  upon  them  in  a  spirit  of  light- 
hearted  cunning.  It  was  true  that  Britain  was  in  no  mood 
to  embark  upon  a  fresh  war  for  the  punishment  of  broken 

*  History,  ii.  pp.  335-7.        2  Ibid.  ii.  pp.  568-9.        8  Ibid.  ii.  pp.  571-8. 


THE  UNION  OF  THE  STATES  127 

promises.      She  had  surrendered  the  chief  hostage  when     A.D. 

*"          1 

~  g 


1  *"QQ    1  ^Q"" 

she  evacuated  her  strategical  position  at  New  York  ;  but  she        ~ 


declined  to  hand  over  the  eight  important  frontier  posts 
which  she  held  upon  the  American  side  of  the  line  between 
Lake  Michigan  and  Lake  Champlain.1  These  forts  were 
much  in  themselves,  and  as  a  symbol  of  dominion  to  the 
Indian  tribes.  They  were  much  also  as  a  matter  of  pride  ; 
while  their  retention  carried  with  it  the  whole  of  the  valuable 
fur  trade,  which  consequently,  until  1795,  when  they  were 
at  last  surrendered,  brought  its  considerable  profits  to  British 
merchants. 

Among  British  statesmen  unfriendly  to  the  American 
confederation  there  was  at  this  time  an  opinion,  not  alto- 
gether ill-founded,  that  the  slender  bonds  of  union  might 
be  broken  by  a  war  of  tariffs  and  navigation  acts.2  Britain 
still  remained  the  chief  customer  of  the  states,  as  well 
as  their  chief  market  for  those  needs  which  they  were 
unable  to  produce  within  their  own  borders.  It  was  there- 
fore thought  by  many  people  that  if  the  pressure  of 
commercial  restrictions  were  rigidly  applied,  individual 
members  of  the  confederacy  might,  sooner  or  later,  be 
tempted  to  enter  into  separate  fiscal  agreements  with  the 
British  Government  out  of  consideration  for  their  own 
pecuniary  interests.  By  this  means  it  was  hoped  that  a 
considerable  number  might  be  gradually  and  gently  de- 
tached from  the  Union,  and  in  the  end  led  back  to  their 
old  allegiance. 

During  the  parliamentary  session  of  1783,  after  the  pre- 
liminaries of  peace  had  been  signed,  but  before  the  evacua- 
tion of  New  York  had  taken  place,  Pitt,  in  a  different 
spirit,  introduced  a  bill,  the  object  of  which  was  to  secure 
unconditional  free  trade  between  the  mother  country  and 
the  states.  For  this  he  has  been  warmly  praised  by  the 

1  History,  iii.  pp.  113-14.  2  Ibid.  iii.  p.  109. 


128  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  majority  of  modern  writers,  while  the  House  of  Commons, 
w^c^  refused  to  entertain  his  proposals,  has  been  un- 
sparingly condemned  as  narrow-minded,  short-sighted  and 
churlish. 

In  so  far  as  its  action  was  due  to  temper,  the  result  was 
doubtless  lamentable,  since  it  has  tended  to  obscure  the 
cool  motives  of  policy  which  were  the  real  mainspring. 
It  is  not  clear,  however,  that  temper  had  much  to  do  with 
the  matter.  Historians  have  perhaps  tended  to  assume 
too  readily  that  a  nation  which  had  been  worsted  in  a  long, 
costly,  and  somewhat  ignominious  war,  would  be  in  a  mood 
highly  unfavourable  for  considering  measures  which,  while 
they  might  conceivably  have  conferred  substantial  benefits 
upon  themselves,  would  have  had  the  undoubted  effect  of 
conferring  benefits,  relatively  much  greater,  upon  their  late 
antagonists.  To  a  generation  which  has  grown  accustomed 
to  regard  all  state  regulation  of  international  commerce  as 
nothing  better  than  a  way  of  cutting  off  one's  nose  to  spite 
one's  face,  it  has  seemed  natural  to  conclude  that  the  decision 
of  the  British  legislature  must  have  been  dictated  by  no 
more  respectable  motive  than  ill-feeling.  But  this  assump- 
tion rests  more  upon  its  inherent  probability,  according  to 
modern  ideas,  than  upon  any  contemporary  evidence  of 
repute. 

Pitt's  view,  certainly  the  view  of  the  later  writers  who 
have  praised  his  foresight  and  breadth  of  mind,  was  not 
only  that  the  purposed  arrangement  would  have  been 
commercially  beneficial  to  Britain  by  enriching  an  eager 
and  important  customer,  but  further,  that  it  would  have 
excited  a  strong  sentiment  of  gratitude  in  the  citizens  of 
the  new  Republic,  and  would  have  swiftly  consigned  to 
oblivion  all  the  bitter  memories  of  the  war.1  It  has  been 
assumed  as  an  axiom  that  this  admirable  result  must  have 

1  History,  iii.  p.  57. 


THE  UNION  OF  THE  STATES  129 

ensued;   but  at  the  best  it  was  no  more   than  a  vague     A.D 
possibility,  and  upon  the  whole  it  seems  more  likely  that 
nothing  of  the  kind  would  ever  have  occurred. 

For,  in  point  of  fact,  it  was  in  the  states  and  not  in 
England  that  revenge  was  elevated  into  a  national  object. 
The  wholesale  repudiation  of  the  terms  of  peace  would  never 
have  found  its  necessary  support  in  public  opinion  had  it 
rested  merely  upon  the  interest  of  private  debtors.  To 
pretend  that  the  policy  of  Clinton  was  the  result  of  the 
British  regulations  concerning  trade  and  shipping  is  only 
possible  to  a  profligate  imagination,  or  to  a  memory  un- 
retentive  of  dates.  The  nature  of  these  regulations  was 
unknown,  their  effect  had  not  begun  to  make  itself  felt, 
when  the  carnival  began  like  some  process  of  spontaneous 
combustion.  Nor  even  had  those  things  been  known  and 
felt  would  they  have  afforded  a  plausible  pretext.  For  there 
was  nothing  invidious  in  the  action  of  Britain.  The  policy 
she  chose  to  pursue  was  entirely  in  accordance  with  the 
practice  of  all  nations  at  that  epoch.  Commercial 
warfare  was  their  normal  condition.  France,  the  ally  of 
the  states,  was  no  less  stiff  in  her  enactments,  and  the 
hostility  of  Britain  excited  louder  complaints  only  because 
Britain  was  of  incomparably  greater  importance  to  the 
prosperity  of  the  states  than  any  of  her  rivals. 

Had  Pitt's  measure  been  passed  it  would  have  meant  a 
complete  reversal  of  a  policy  which  had  been  pursued  with 
success  since  the  days  of  Elizabeth.  The  refusal  of  Par- 
liament to  approve  of  so  great  a  revolution  implied  no 
particular  animosity  to  America,  but  merely  an  aversion 
from  the  sudden  jettison  of  an  approved  tradition.  It  is 
credible,  and  even  likely,  that  a  system  of  unconditional  free 
trade  might  have  resulted  in  the  enrichment  of  many 
British  manufacturers  and  merchants,  and  in  an  increase 
of  the  volume  of  trade  between  the  two  countries;  but  it 

i 


130  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  would  have  been  none  the  less  a  startling  violation  of  a 
principle  which  had  obtained  for  many  generations.  This 
principle  laid  it  down  firmly  that  the  proper  object  of 
national  policy  was  to  bind  together  the  mother  country 
and  her  colonies  in  an  empire  which  should  be  as  nearly 
as  possible  self-sufficing  and  independent  of  the  rest  of  the 
world.  According  to  this  view,  it  was  a  mistake  to  cherish 
our  rivals,  and  strengthen  their  sinews,  even  for  the  sake 
of  a  pecuniary  advantage  to  ourselves. 

In  this  case,  moreover,  there  were  particular  reasons  which 
weighed  with  the  majority  both  in  the  Cabinet  and  in 
Parliament  against  any  relaxation  of  the  traditional  policy 
of  Britain.  Then,  as  now,  this  country  was  the  chief 
maritime  power,  and  then,  as  now,  she  was  determined 
at  all  costs  to  maintain  her  supremacy.  The  conditions  of 
this  supremacy  were  sailors  and  ships,  and  for  these  she 
looked  to  the  prosperity  of  her  mercantile  marine  and  of 
her  building-yards.  Gratuitously  to  invite  America  to  take 
a  share  in  the  carrying-trade  seemed  little  short  of  madness. 
The  right  policy  was  to  exclude  her  from  it  to  the  utmost 
extent  that  was  possible,  seeing  that  of  all  others  she  was 
the  rival  who  had  the  greatest  natural  advantages  to  support 
her  competition.  Materials  were  so  plentiful  and  ready 
to  hand  that  in  those  days  ships  could  be  built  in  New 
England  for  less  than  two- thirds  of  the  price  that  was 
required  in  Europe.1  The  development  of  American 
resources  and  an  encouragement  of  her  shipping  must, 
therefore,  have  meant  within  a  few  years  the  closing  of 
British  yards.  These  considerations  lent  an  overwhelming 
force  to  the  opposition  directed  against  the  free  trade 
proposals,  and  it  may  even  be  that  on  second  thoughts  Pitt 
himself  was  converted  by  their  logic.  Certainly  he  never 
again  submitted  his  Utopian  scheme.  British  trade  to  and 

1  Fiske's  Critical  Period  of  American  History,  p.  137. 


THE  UNION  OF  THE  STATES  131 

from  British  colonies  was  accordingly  confined  as  rigidly     A.D. 


178^-17547 

as  before  to  British  bottoms.  ^T.  26-30 

The  result  entailed  much  hardship  and  widespread  ruin 
in  the  states.  In  the  old  colonial  days,  American  shipping 
had  depended  almost  entirely  upon  the  trade  with  Britain 
and  her  West  Indian  possessions.  Under  the  new  settlement, 
however,  the  latter  were  immediately  closed  to  her  vessels. 
The  distress  thus  caused  was  genuine  ;  but  the  complaints 
which  it  called  forth  were  to  a  large  extent  unreasonable  ; 
for  in  fact  the  states,  having  voluntarily  broken  away  from 
the  Empire,  could  hardly  claim  with  any  justice  to  pursue 
the  same  profitable  intercourse  which  would  have  remained 
open  to  them  had  they  chosen  to  remain  within  it. 

British  policy,  however,  did  not  stop  short  at  this  point, 
but  sought  a  further  advantage  which  the  unfortunate  pre- 
dicament of  the  states  enabled  it  to  seize  without  much 
difficulty.  A  bold  attempt  was  made  to  confine  all  trade 
between  Britain  and  America  to  our  own  shipping,  and  so 
long  as  dissension  continued  among  the  thirteen  states  the 
attempt  succeeded,  since  no  measures  of  reprisal,  no  unani- 
mous and  general  counter-strokes,  were  possible.  Duties 
upon  imports  coming  from  England,  and  dues  upon  English 
ships,  could  only  become  an  effective  weapon  if  they  were 
universally  levied  at  all  the  ports  along  the  coast,  and  this 
was  out  of  the  question  until  the  Union  was  something 
more  than  a  mere  name.  Congress,  urged  to  it  by  the  chief 
commercial  states,  asked  for  powers,  but  asked  always  in 
vain.  Each  state  was  jealous  of  its  neighbours.  The 
southern  states,  who  depended  upon  the  export  of  their  raw 
material,  were  distrustful  of  the  northern  states  who  owned 
the  ships,  and  not  without  reason  suspected  a  design  to 
exclude  the  English  carry  ing-  trade  from  American  harbours 
only  in  order  that  Yankees  and  New  Yorkers  might  be 
enriched  by  exacting  more  burdensome  freights  for  de- 


132  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.     livering    the    produce    of    the    plantations    to    European 


2S3  consumer,' 


Things  accordingly  became  even  worse  than  during  the 
war.  The  carry  ing- trade  then  existed,  though  its  risks  were 
high ;  but  now  it  was  wholly  extinguished  by  the  competition 
of  their  former  enemy  in  American  ports.  Shipbuilding, 
though  no  nation  had  more  natural  advantages  of  materials 
and  situation,  was  likewise  extinguished ;  for,  with  the  loss 
of  the  carry  ing- trade,  there  was  no  market  at  home,  and 
abroad  the  hostile  duties  made  sales  impossible.  The  free 
access  to  the  fisheries  which  had  been  secured  under  the 
treaty  was  in  practice  but  a  small  boon,  since  the  profitable 
foreign  market  in  the  British  West  Indian  possessions  was 
closed  to  the  sale  of  the  salted  produce.2  And  in  spite 
of  all  the  grievance  and  ill-feeling,  a  large  demand  arose 
for  British  goods.  For  these  specie  had  to  be  paid  down 
on  the  nail  in  all  cases  where  wares  or  materials  were 
not  taken  in  exchange,  since  no  British  merchant  would 
now  give  one  pennyworth  of  credit,  out  of  respect  to  the 
measures  of  the  various  states  for  the  obstruction  of  the 
payment  of  British  debts.  Even  when  payment  was  taken 
in  kind  the  rate  of  the  exchange  was  ruinous  to  the 
American  producer,  for  many  of  his  commodities  fell  under 
the  ban  of  the  British  tariff,  and  had  to  be  reckoned,  not  at 
their  market  value,  but  at  their  market  value  less  the 
amount  of  the  import  duties  they  would  have  to  bear  when 
landed  in  London  or  Bristol.  It  has  been  computed  that 
in  1784  £1,700,000  of  our  manufactures  were  imported,  and 
but  £700,000  of  native  produce  taken  in  exchange.3  The 
balance  was  paid  in  hard  cash.  Specie  flowed  out  of  the 
country,  so  that,  in  addition  to  the  ruin  of  the  merchants, 
shipowners,  shipbuilders  and  fishermen,  there  was  added  a 

1  History,  iii.  p.  110.  2  Ibid.  iii,  p   108. 

*  Cambridge  Modern  History,  vii.  p.  312. 


THE  UNION  OF  THE  STATES  133 

currency  question  that  ultimately  led  to  civil  war  upon  a     A.I) 
considerable  scale. 

Financial  trouble  had  dogged  the  steps  of  Congress 
throughout  the  war.  As  the  struggle  dragged  on,  this 
problem  increased  in  difficulty;  but  so  long  as  hostilities 
continued,  the  difficulty  was  by  some  means  overcome.  It 
had  been  to  the  interest  of  France  and  Holland,  and  of  the 
other  enemies  of  Britain,  to  keep  the  war  alive.  They  could 
not  afford  to  let  it  perish  of  exhaustion.  And  a  further 
reason  was  found  in  the  argument  that  when  the  severe 
drain  of  war  expenditure  had  ceased,  prompt  payments  of 
interest  and  a  speedy  return  of  the  principal  would  certainly 
be  made.  Creditors  had  therefore  been  sanguine  and  in- 
dulgent. But  in  fact  all  their  calculations  were  upset,  for 
with  the  declaration  of  peace  precisely  the  reverse  of  all 
their  forecasts  came  to  pass. 

The  chief  stimulus  to  contributions  from  the  various 
states  was  gone,  for  the  common  danger  no  longer  existed. 
Far  from  being  in  a  position  to  deal  handsomely  with  its 
creditors,  Congress  could  barely  support  the  small  charges 
of  the  nominal  government.  The  interest  on  foreign  loans 
was  still  unpaid,  and  repayment  of  the  capital  became  a 
remote  and  visionary  possibility.  European  financiers  were 
disinclined,  therefore,  to  throw  good  money  after  bad.  Not 
only  were  American  applications  refused ;  they  were  derided. 
In  the  end  even  the  resourcefulness  of  Robert  Morris  could 
do  nothing.  He  had  in  all  likelihood  achieved  more  than 
any  other  man  could  have  hoped  to  achieve.1  His  dis- 
interestedness no  less  than  his  competency  was  singular  in 
that  company,  for,  like  Washington,  he  contributed  his  private 
fortune  to  the  common  stock.  But  the  limit  of  his  powers 
had  been  reached,  and,  hopeless  of  any  speedy  change  in 
the  constitution,  he  felt  the  position  to  be  impossible.  The 

1  Hamilton  to  Washington,  History,  ii.  p.  503. 


134  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  true  remedy  was  discussed  by  Congress  with  ungrudging 
Prolixitv>  but  never  seriously  attempted,  and  with  a  fine 
sense  of  irony  it  appointed  a  committee  to  succeed  to  his 
functions  when  he  tendered  his  resignation. 

Commercial  treaties  were  no  easier  to  obtain  than  loans, 
so  that  this  means  of  reviving  and  fostering  commerce  was 
also  closed.  No  country  would  conclude  a  bargain  with 
Congress,  for  the  reason  that  the  thirteen  states  could  be 
relied  upon  to  repudiate  all  parts  of  the  arrangement  which 
conferred  an  advantage  upon  the  other  contracting  party.1 
Even  the  little  commerce  overseas  which  was  retained 
lacked  all  security,  and  was  endangered  by  the  want  of 
power  to  protect  it.  American  ships  were  seized,  and 
American  citizens  sold  in  slavery  by  Barbary  pirates,  while 
their  countrymen  at  home  were  engaged  in  arguing  the 
question  of  State  Rights,  and  laying  traps  for  the  con- 
fusion of  the  central  government.  American  diplomacy  and 
American  subjects  were  open  to  insults  and  injuries  from 
the  meanest  antagonists.  The  voice  of  the  Union  had  no 
authority  among  nations,  any  more  than  its  bonds  had 
credit  or  its  promises  were  believed.  It  was  indeed  a 
somewhat  humiliating  pass  to  have  come  to,  within  a  few 
years  after  having  overcome  the  richest,  proudest  and  most 
powerful  people  in  Europe. 

Power,  prosperity  and  consideration,  which  all  men  affected 
to  desire,  were  only  to  be  had  on  terms  which  the  states 
could  not  bring  themselves  to  pay.  The  dignified  entreaties 
of  Washington,  the  unanswerable  reasoning  of  Hamilton, 
failed  to  move  their  light  minds.  The  number  of  the 
plagues  was  still  incomplete.  The  citizens  hardened  their 
hearts ;  preferring,  like  Pharaoh,  to  endure  the  murrain,  the 
locusts,  and  the  darkness,  rather  than  abandon  their  mean 
jealousies,  their  rivalries  at  once  sordid  and  malicious; 

1  History,  iii.  pp.  87,  90,  91. 


THE  UNION  OF  THE  STATES  135 

rather  than  part  with,  or  delegate,  a  single  shred  of  local     A.D. 

1  *7ftQ    1  7ft*7 

sovereignty  to  clothe  the  shivering  and  naked  form  of  ^  20-30 
the  federal  government.  Finally  in  their  madness  they 
fell  one  upon  another;  each  at  the  beginning  looking 
merely  for  advantage  to  itself  in  injury  to  its  neighbours, 
but  as  time  went  on  seeking  injury  to  its  neighbours  even 
as  an  end  desirable  in  itself. 

The  thirteen  states  proceeded  to  indulge  themselves  in 
the  costly  luxury  of  an  internecine  tariff  war.  The  states 
with  seaports  preyed  upon  their  land-locked  brethren,  and 
provoked  a  boycott  in  return.  Pennsylvania  attacked 
Delaware.  Connecticut  was  oppressed  by  Rhode  Island 
and  New  York.  New  Jersey,  lying  between  New  York  on 
the  one  hand,  and  Pennsylvania  on  the  other,  was  com- 
pared to  '  a  cask  tapped  at  both  ends ' ;  North  Carolina, 
between  South  Carolina  and  Virginia,  to  '  a  patient  bleeding 
at  both  stumps.'  It  was  a  dangerous  game,  ruinous  in 
itself,  and,  behind  the  custom-house  officers,  men  were 
beginning  to  furbish  up  the  locks  of  their  muskets. 

Wherever  there  is  a  boundary  there  are  apt  to  be  disputes, 
and  the  political  conditions  being  what  they  were,  it  was 
not  likely  that  this  copious  source  of  ill-feeling  would  run 
dry.  The  barbarities  of  the  Pennsylvanians  under  Patter- 
son, in  the  valley  of  Wyoming,  outdid  even  the  legends  of 
British  atrocities,  and  left  a  rankling  memory  in  Connecti- 
cut. At  one  time  war  between  Vermont,  New  Hampshire, 
and  New  York  seemed  all  but  inevitable. 

Then  there  came  the  greatest  of  all  the  plagues  in  the  not 
unusual  disguise  of  a  panacea.  The  general  commercial 
ruin  and  financial  collapse  had  all  but  extinguished  credit. 
The  drain  of  specie  had  all  but  extinguished  the  currency. 
Credit  without  currency  might  in  theory  work  great  mar- 
vels; but  the  lack  of  both  is  necessarily  fatal.  Barter 
became  a  common  expedient.  Tobacco,  whisky,  and  salt 


136  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  pork  served  in  different  states  as  the  clumsy  medium  of 
excnanoe-  Every  industry  groaned  under  the  calamity. 
But  help  was  at  hand.  Towards  1786  the  genius  of 
democracy  discovered  a  remedy.  The  sound  political  in- 
stinct of  the  people,  which  it  was  the  fashion  of  the 
Clintonian  school  to  uphold  as  equally  fitted  for  a 
general  judgment  after  the  event,  and  for  the  nicest  pro- 
blems of  expert  knowledge,  rose  to  the  occasion  and 
demanded  paper  money.  Printing-presses  in  Georgia  and 
the  Carolinas,  in  Pennsylvania,  New  York  and  Rhode 
Island,  obediently  creaked  out  affluence  in  response  to  the 
resolutions  of  their  various  legislatures.  All  the  states, 
save  only  Connecticut  and  Delaware,  were  more  or  less 
disturbed  by  the  agitation  which  passed  like  a  sudden  wave 
over  the  whole  Union.1 

In  the  matter  of  knots  the  prudent  statesman  will  dis- 
criminate. All  are  not  of  the  Gordian  character,  and,  as  a 
rule,  it  is  safer  to  unravel  than  to  shear  them  through.  The 
panacea  met  with  a  fate  unworthy  of  the  high  hopes  of 
its  inventors.  The  paper  currency  showed  an  immediate 
tendency  to  drop  to  two  cents,  or  thereabouts,  in  the  dollar. 
Mutton  chops  could  sometimes  be  obtained  for  four  dollars 
apiece,  and  a  good,  wearable  hat  for  forty ;  but  more  usually 
a  prudent  shopkeeper  preferred  to  lose  his  customer  than 
handle  such  precarious  stuff. 

Clearly  something  was  wrong,  and  the  people  taking 
thought  discovered  that  it  was  the  shopkeepers  who  needed 
coercion.  Laws  accordingly  were  passed  with  this  object, 
and  when  they  were  defied,  the  matter  came  before  the 
courts.  The  judges,  sitting  amid  the  noisy  demonstration  of 
popular  anger,  decided  nevertheless  that  the  laws  were 
invalid,  and  absolved  the  defendants.2  Up  to  this  point 

1  Fiske's  Critical  Period  of  American  History,  pp.  168-186. 
»  Ibid.  p.  176. 


THE  UNION  OF  THE  STATES  137 

there  had  been,  if  not  unanimity,  at  any  rate  a  huge  A.D 
majority  supporting  the  panacea ;  but  now  there  was  a 
division.  One  party  grumbled,  but  owned  itself  defeated ; 
the  other,  with  a  stern  logic,  discovered  that  to  complete  the 
system  the  judges  must  be  done  away  with  or  intimidated. 
In  Rhode  Island  they  were  accordingly  dismissed,  and  else- 
where there  was  dangerous  rioting.  In  Massachusetts 
there  was  civil  war.  Battles  had  been  fought  at  Spring- 
field and  at  Petersham,  and  upwards  of  eight  thousand  men 
were  bearing  arms,  before  Shays's  rebellion  was  finally  reduced. 
Congress  rising  to  the  emergency  called  out  for  troops ;  but, 
by  a  stratagem  more  prudent  possibly  than  dignified,  pre- 
tended that  they  were  for  use  against  the  Indian  tribes.1 

Paper  money  was  the  worst  of  all  the  plagues;  and  yet 
the  people  still  hardened  their  hearts.  '  The  League  of 
Friendship,'  as  it  was  affectionately  named,  had  reached  a 
sad  dissolution.  A  union  resting  upon  sentiment,  a  govern- 
ment depending  upon  the  goodwill  of  its  members,  are  only 
the  make-believes  of  amiable  enthusiasts  or  the  cheats  and 
counterfeits  of  quacks  and  sophists.  The  only  security  for 
union  must  be  found  in  the  strength  of  the  central  govern- 
ment, and  such  strength  can  only  be  given  by  the  forms  and 
machinery  of  a  constitution.  In  America  during  these  years 
men  thought  otherwise,  and  the  words  of  Washington  and 
Hamilton  therefore  fell  unheeded.  It  was  believed  that  a 
federal  power  could  be  preserved  by  occasional  outbursts  of 
high  emotion.  It  was  forgotten  that  a  government  depend- 
ing upon  emotion  for  its  authority  is  more  likely  in  the  end 
to  be  destroyed  by  that  incalculable  force  than  to  be  saved 
by  it. 

1  History,  iii.  p.  178. 


138  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

CHAPTER  V 

The  Power  of  a  Vision 

A.D.  IN  the  early  spring  of  1785  a  modest  but  memorable 
meetin&  to°k  place  at  Washington's  country  seat  of  Mount 
Vernon,  between  representatives  from  the  states  of  Maryland 
and  Yirginia.  The  occasion  was  a  conference  in  regard  to 
waterways  between  the  eastern  settlements  and  the  western 
unpeopled  land  lying  in  the  valley  of  the  Ohio  and  to  the 
north-west.  The  greater  portion  of  these  vast  territories 
had  been  ceded  to  the  Federal  Government  by  the  various 
states  who  claimed  them  under  their  charters,  or  by  virtue 
of  a  nominal  occupation.  To  the  south  North  Carolina 
stretched  out  in  a  wide  strip  to  the  banks  of  the  Mississippi. 
Her  western  population  being  something  more  than  nominal, 
had  refused  to  be  included  in  the  cession,  and  after  an 
unsuccessful  effort  to  form  themselves  into  a  separate  state 
under  the  name  of  Frankland,1  had  been  compelled  to  return 
to  their  old  allegiance. 

The  development  of  the  western  country  was  one  of  the 
great  dreams  of  Washington's  life.  He  foresaw  the  import- 
ance of  these  possessions  at  a  time  when  few  men  were 
willing  to  give  them  much  thought.  They  were  the  fruits 
of  the  great  policy  of  the  elder  Pitt,  in  which,  as  a  youthful 
soldier,  Washington  had  borne  a  distinguished  part.  What 
the  Treaty  of  Paris  in  1763  had  secured  to  Britain,  another 
Treaty  of  Paris  in  1783  had  divided  between  Britain  and 
the  victorious  colonists.  This  rich  inheritance  it  was  his 
fixed  determination  to  weld  into  the  confederacy.  By  speech 
and  correspondence  he  had  pressed  the  matter  upon  his 
fellow-citizens  even  before  peace  had  actually  been  signed; 

1  History,  iii.  p.  121. 


THE  UNION  OF  THE  STATES  139 

and  throughout  the  whole  of  the  turbulent  period  which     A.D. 
ensued  he  continued  to  urge  the  need  for  development,  and  I?85-1?86 
for  the  firm  attachment  of  this  estate  to  the  rest  of  the 
Union.      When  these  means  proved  inadequate,  being  a 
practical  man,  he  founded  a  joint-stock  company  to  open 
up  communications. 

Even  the  peculiar  advantages  of  this  territory  appeared 
to  Washington  to  contain  some  not  inconsiderable  dangers. 
The  splendid  waterways  of  the  Mississippi  and  its  tributary 
streams  were  not  an  unmixed  advantage,  seeing  that  the 
mouth  and  the  lower  reaches  were  in  the  hands  of  Spain,  who 
also  extended  a  shadowy  claim  to  the  whole  western  bank 
and  to  the  unknown  region  beyond.  The  easiest  course  for 
the  new  settlers  was  to  drift  their  produce  down  the  broad 
current  to  New  Orleans,  and  the  dread  of  Washington  was 
lest  this  tendency  might  induce  'a  habit  of  trade*  with  a 
foreign  power ;  an  intimacy  and  a  mutual  interest  which  in 
the  end  might  lead  to  a  detachment  from  the  Union. 
Consequently,  at  a  time  when  the  chief  matter  of  political 
anxiety  with  regard  to  the  western  lands  was  the  menace 
by  Spain  against  the  free  navigation  of  the  Mississippi,  he 
was  more  concerned  to  develop  the  natural  trade  routes  from 
east  to  west  by  clearing  the  waterways  of  the  James,  the 
Potomac,  and  the  Ohio,  and  by  the  construction  of  a  system 
of  supplementary  canals. 

It  was  for  the  adjustment  of  certain  differences,  and  to 
procure  the  co-operation  of  the  two  states,  whose  sympathies 
had  already  been  enlisted  in  this  enterprise,  that  the  meet- 
ing took  place  at  Mount  Yernon  in  March  1785.  As  the 
delegates  had  come  together  in  a  businesslike  and  peaceful 
spirit,  other  matters  of  mutual  interest  were  brought  tactfully 
under  discussion — the  advantages  of  a  uniform  currency  and 
system  of  duties;  the  need  for  a  general  cohesion  and  mutual 
support  among  the  confederated  states.  Under  the  spell  of 


140  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1786  a  great  character  prejudice  was  for  the  moment  forgotten, 
^T' 29  and  invitations  were  issued  to  Pennsylvania  and  Delaware  to 
join  in  the  discussion.  But  good  feeling  expanded  even 
further — once  started  on  the  course  of  reason  it  was  easy 
to  urge  it  forward — and  it  was  ultimately  decided  to  pro- 
pose to  all  the  thirteen  states  that  in  the  autumn  of  the 
following  year  (1786)  they  should  meet  at  Annapolis  to 
discuss  the  whole  commercial  situation. 

Before  this  date  arrived  the  paper  panacea  had  been 
pricked,  and  Shays's  rebellion  was  in  full  blast.  In  addition, 
the  disputes  with  Spain  about  the  free  navigation  of  the 
Mississippi  had  come  to  a  head.  Threats  of  the  confiscation 
of  American  ships  presuming  to  enter  the  lower  waters  had 
been  followed  up  by  action.  The  southern  states  were  in 
a  flame  of  indignation.  Their  northern  neighbours  were 
apathetic.  The  problems  of  the  Mississippi  did  not  touch 
their  interests  at  any  vital  point.  On  the  contrary,  they 
desired  nothing  so  much  as  a  good  understanding  with 
Spain,  for  they  had  hopes  that  in  this  quarter  their  court- 
ship might  not  be  despised,  and  that  a  commercial  treaty 
might  at  last  be  signed.  All  this  pother  about  free  naviga- 
tion for  the  sake  of  a  few  backwoodsmen  seemed  to  them  to 
indicate  a  lack  of  the  sense  of  proportion.  Jay  at  the 
Foreign  Office  took  this  view  of  the  matter,  and,  as  a  com- 
promise, advised  Congress  to  consent  to  close  the  river  to 
free  navigation  for  a  period  of  twenty-five  years.1  The 
southern  states  were  in  no  mood  for  such  concessions,  and 
threatened  that  if  Jay's  proposal  were  accepted  they  would 
secede  and  return  to  the  British  allegiance.  The  New 
England  states,  with  an  equal  vivacity,  threatened  secession 
unless  the  recommendation  were  confirmed.  The  crisis  was 
averted  only  by  an  indefinite  postponement;  New  Jersey, 
Pennsylvania  and  Rhode  Island  siding  with  the  South. 

1  History,  iii.  pp.  101,  104-5. 


THE  UNION  OF  THE  STATES  141 

The  convention  of  Annapolis,  though  it  met  in  stirring  A.D.  1786 
times,  was  but  a  thin  congregation.  Only  five  of  the  states 
appointed  commissioners  who  attended ;  four  appointed 
commissioners  who  did  not  attend,  and  the  remaining  four 
did  not  appoint  commissioners  at  all.  The  last  class  in- 
cluded Maryland,  which  had  joined  in  issuing  the  invitation; 
but  what  was  more  than  all  the  rest,  New  York  was  repre- 
sented by  Hamilton,  and  Hamilton  ruled  the  convention. 

It  is  something  of  a  shock  to  the  finer  feelings  that  this 
assemblage,  the  beginning  of  the  movement  which  cul- 
minated in  the  constitution,  should  have  been  convoked 
for  the  consideration  of  purely  material  things;  for  the 
discussion  of  inland  navigation,  of  customs  duties  and  the 
currency.  The  folly  of  distracted  effort  was  gradually 
making  itself  apparent.  The  advantages  of  combination 
were  beginning  to  be  dimly  surmised.  The  farce  of  fiscal 
independence  was  played  out.  Even  the  stiff-necked  citizens 
of  New  York  had  come  to  entertain  doubts  whether  their 
private  interests  as  a  trading  state  would  not  be  better 
served  in  the  long  run  by  the  pursuit  of  the  prosperity  of 
the  whole,  than  by  a  narrow  policy  of  individual  gain  at  the 
moment.  It  is  notable  that  the  immediate  cause  of  the 
constitutional  compact  is  to  be  sought,  not  in  the  higher 
spheres  of  political  necessity,  but  in  the  practical  needs  of 
business  men.  Trade  necessities,  and  these  alone,  were 
the  occasion  of  their  meeting  and  the  purpose  of  their 
deliberations.  By  these '  sordid  bonds '  a  loose  confederation 
was  in  due  time  to  be  lashed  together  into  such  a  union  as 
the  world  had  never  seen. 

In  the  short  session  at  Annapolis  it  became  evident 
to  the  delegates,  under  the  searching  analysis  of  Hamilton, 
that  the  only  remedy  for  the  evils  affecting  trade  must  be 
looked  for  in  broad  constitutional  changes  which  their 
limited  commissions  gave  them  no  authority  to  discuss. 


142  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1786  Under  the  influence  of  his  vigorous  spirit  the  convention 

7G1—     OQ 

had  a  remarkable  result;   for  out  of  its  unanimous   con- 
clusion that  it  could  do  nothing  great  things  came  to  pass. 

Hamilton  drafted  an  address  which,  after  much  modifica- 
tion, was  adopted.  It  was  his  policy  and  habit  to  overshoot 
the  mark ;  to  compel  the  weaker  brethren  to  consider  plans 
that  were  too  heroic  for  their  natural  timidity,  confident 
that  the  diminished  fabric  would  still  be  of  an  ampler  pro- 
portion than  if  it  had  arisen  from  mean  foundations.  This 
document  set  out  precisely  the  object  of  the  convention — 
"  To  take  into  consideration  the  trade  and  commerce  of  the 
'  United  States ;  to  consider  how  far  a  uniform  system  in 
'  their  commercial  intercourse  and  regulations  might  be 
'  necessary  to  their  common  interest  and  permanent  har- 
'  mony;  and  to  report  to  the  several  states  such  an  Act 
'  relative  to  this  great  object  as,  when  unanimously  ratified 
'  by  them,  would  enable  the  United  States  in  Congress 
'  assembled  effectually  to  provide  for  the  same." 1  New  Jersey, 
he  pointed  out,  had  given  a  more  liberal  commission  to  her 
delegates,  empowering  them  to  discuss  not  only  these,  but 
'other  important  matters.'  A  complete  agreement  among 
the  thirteen  states,  which  was  the  chief  object  of  the 
meeting,  was  precluded  by  the  mean  attendance.  "Your 

*  commissioners,"    therefore,   "  did    not    conceive   it   advis- 

*  able  to  proceed  to  the  business  of  their  mission " ;    but 
they  place  upon  the  record  "  their  earnest  and  unanimous 
'  wish    that  speedy  measures   may  be  taken    to   effect  a 
'  general  meeting  of  the  states  in  a  future  convention  for  the 
'  same,  and  such  other  purposes  as  the  situation  of  public 
'  affairs  may  be  found  to  require." 2      They  submit  "  that 
'  the  idea  of  extending  the  powers  of  their  deputies  to  other 

*  subjects  than  those  of  commerce  .  .  .  was  an  improvement 
'  on  the  original  plan,  and  will  deserve  to  be  incorporated 

1  Works,  i.  pp.  335-6.  2  Ibid.  I  p.  337. 


THE  UNION  OF  THE  STATES  143 

'  into  that  of  a  future  convention.     They  are  the  more  A.D.  1786 

'  naturally  led  to  this  conclusion  as,  in  the  course  of  their    M<1' 29 

'  reflections  on  the  subject,  they  have  been  induced  to  think 

'  that  the  power  of  regulating  trade  is  of  such  comprehensive 

'  extent,  and  will  enter  so  far  into  the  general  system  of  the 

'  Federal  Government,  that  to  give  it  efficacy,  and  to  obviate 

'  questions  and  doubts  concerning  its  precise  nature  and 

'  limits,  may  require  a  correspondent  adjustment  of  other 

'  parts  of  the  federal  system." 1    The  address  concluded  by 

recommending  that  "  the  states  by  which  they  have  been 

'  respectively  delegated  would  concur  themselves,  and  use 

'  their  endeavours  to  procure  the  concurrence  of  the  other 

'  states  in   the  appointment  of  commissioners  to  meet  at 

'  Philadelphia  on  the  second  Monday  in  May  next,  to  take 

'  into  consideration  the  situation  of  the  United  States,  to 

'  devise  such  further  provisions  as  shall  appear  to  them 

'  necessary  to  render  the  constitution  of  the  Federal  Govern- 

'  ment  adequate  to  the  exigencies  of  the  Union." 2 

Congress  was  fatuously  indignant  at  such  a  usurpation ; 8 
indulged  in  hair-splitting  arguments  upon  legal  rights  and 
the  lack  of  authority  in  any  body  save  themselves  to 
summon  a  representative  council.  But  things  had  come 
into  too  bad  a  pass  for  the  groans  of  Congress  to  produce 
much  impression  upon  the  minds  of  men.  Amidst  riots, 
rebellions  and  threats  of  secession,  on  the  very  brink 
of  a  war  with  Spain,  people  were  in  no  mood  to  pay  much 
heed  to  the  loquacity  of  angry  impotence.  Congress, 
deprived  of  all  hope  of  a  sufficient  revenue  by  the  con- 
tumacious wrangling  of  New  Jersey  and  New  York,4  had 
merely  a  Hobson's  choice — they  might  consent  to  the  con- 
vention or  they  might  forbid  it,  but  whatsoever  course  they 
adopted  the  convention  would  nevertheless  take  place. 

1  Works,  i.  p.  337.  2  Ibid.  i.  p.  339. 

8  History,  iii.  p.  236.  *  Ibid.  pp.  175-8. 


144  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1786  Considerations  of  dignity  seemed  to  point  on  the  whole  to 
acquiescence ;  but  while  the  matter  was  still  under  debate 
Virginia  chose  General  Washington  as  one  of  her  delegates 
to  the  proposed  meeting  at  Philadelphia.  The  tide  was 
running  in  over  the  flats  of  the  firth,  and  a  Congress  with 
any  care  for  its  popularity,  had  to  gallop  before  it  ventre  a 
terre. 

The  convention  of  Annapolis  was  the  turning-point.  The 
reaction  which  had  ensued  when  the  war  was  ended,  and 
independence  for  the  time  being  assured,  had  spent  its  main 
effort. 

The  removal  of  a  common  danger  had  let  loose  at  once,  as 
Hamilton  had  prophesied,  all  the  forces  of  disintegration. 
States  had  clamoured  about  their  particular  sovereignties. 
Individuals,  in  a  needless  panic  lest  union  should  mean 
some  abatement  in  the  pre-eminence  of  mediocrity,  flung 
all  their  influence  into  the  centrifugal  movement.  Mean 
spirits,  hating  the  heroic  and  incredulous  of  magnanimity, 
stirred  up  suspicion  against  those  for  whose  services 
gratitude  was  the  only  recompense  possible  or  welcome. 
Washington  aimed  at  the  title  of  king;  Hamilton  at  the 
reversion  of  the  monarchy.  No  figment  was  too  gross 
for  belief. 

Providence,  which  is  on  the  side  of  the  big  battalions, 
appears  to  be  also  on  the  side  of  the  great  idea.  Visions 
that  were  at  once  noble  in  their  proportions  and  consistent 
within  themselves  have  played  a  notable  part  in  the  history 
of  mankind ;  but  there  is  this  difficulty,  arising  out  of  the 
conditions  of  the  particular  time,  that  a  vision  is  wholly 
without  force  to  move  a  generation  which  is  unprepared  to 
apprehend  its  meaning.  The  virtue  of  the  seer  who  produces 
a  practical  effect  upon  the  fortunes  of  any  nation  is  not  that 
he  sees  some  image  of  surpassing  splendour  which  no  one 
else  has  seen,  but  rather  that  he  sees  clearly  something 


THE  UNION  OF  THE  STATES  145 

which  a  large  number  of  his  fellow-men  have  already  seen  A.D.  1786 
dimly.  His  merit  is  that  he  removes  a  few  of  the  wrappings  T' 
which  conceal  the  pattern  of  life,  and  discloses  a  design 
which  though  half  suspected  had  lain  till  that  time  hidden. 
The  result  is  a  vivid  presentment,  some  startling  re-arrange- 
ment of  familiar  things,  which  contains  the  promise  of  relief 
from  an  intolerable  suffering,  or  adds  a  sudden  value  to  life 
by  giving  a  nobler  purpose  to  human  endeavour.  Michael 
Angelo  has  said  that  he  already  saw  in  the  unhewn  block  a 
statue  which  to  duller  eyes  remained  invisible  until  his 
chisel  had  removed  the  flakes  of  marble  which  concealed  it. 
The  fabric  of  a  vision  which  worketh  great  marvels  is  the 
experience  of  common  men.  Nothing  is  novel  or  surprising 
in  the  material,  but  only  in  the  plan.  When  once  an  idea 
of  this  order  has  taken  possession  of  the  spirit  of  a  nation,  it 
will  not  be  overcome  by  criticism.  The  forensic  method, 
argument  and  rhetoric  undirected  by  a  master  thought,  can 
never  hope  to  hold  it  back.  For  an  idea  can  only  be  fought 
by  an  idea.  It  is  not  sufficient  that  it  should  be  crushed  by 
disproof;  it  must  be  expelled  by  some  more  powerful  vision 
which  usurps  its  place. 

The  inherent  truth  or  falseness  of  such  a  vision  does,  not 
seem  to  afford  any  measure  of  the  effect  it  may  produce 
upon  human  institutions.  What  is  shown  in  an  alluring 
picture  may  be  incapable  of  achievement.  Facts  may  be 
distorted  in  the  crystal  until  they  become  mere  phantoms. 
The  motive  and  the  goal  of  a  great  convulsion  may  be 
nothing  better  than  mirage.  Two  things  only  appear  to  be 
essential  to  its  potency — some  exceptional  gift  of  present- 
ment in  the  seer,  and  an  eager  predisposition  on  the  part  of 
men.  The  same  strange  expectancy,  which  greets  the  Mahdi 
or  Messiah,  met  Rousseau  more  than  halfway,  overwhelming 
him  in  gratitude.  His  gospel  immediately  entered  into  a 
place  in  men's  hearts  that  was  empty.  He  saw  beautiful 

K 


146  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1786  things;  he  saw  them  clearly  and  believed  them  to  be  true; 
^T- 29  and  although  to  a  large  extent  his  vision  was  pure  fantasy,  its 
triumph  was  almost  as  swift  and  facile  as  his  dream.  There 
are  some  rare  occasions  scattered  about  in  history  where,  as 
if  by  a  common  impulse,  humanity  has  paused  at  its  work, 
and,  leaning  upon  its  spade,  has  looked  round  bewildered  by 
a  sudden  hopefulness ;  aware  dimly  that  something  fortunate 
has  happened,  that  a  new  man  has  appeared  in  the  world, 
and  that  he  is  a  friend. 

Of  all  men  who  have  sought  to  benefit  their  fellows  by  a 
change  in  the  old  order,  Hamilton  and  Rousseau  are  probably 
the  most  opposite  in  character  and  aims.  Hamilton  was  a 
man  in  a  world  of  men,  and  the  affairs  of  the  world  he 
lived  in  were  to  him  an  open  book.  The  counters  of  his 
fancy  were  not  shadows,  but  real  people,  real  motives,  and 
real  things.  His  labour  in  accomplishment  was  severe,  and, 
by  comparison,  slow ;  for  a  vision  that  is  free  and  careless 
has  an  advantage  over  one  that  is  burdened  and  hampered 
by  the  whole  fabric  of  society.  Rousseau,  lying  under  a  tree 
beside  the  road  to  Vincennes  on  a  hot  summer's  afternoon, 
'in  an  unspeakable  agitation,'  and  Hamilton,  meditating 
from  day  to  day,  as  he  struggled  cheerfully  and  laboriously 
with  the  correspondence  of  General  Washington,  had  little 
in  common  except  the  divine  gift  of  revelation.  Each  beheld 
an  immeasurable  and  splendid  prospect,  and  what  he  saw  he 
believed  with  an  intensity  and  an  unwavering  faith  that  no 
logic  could  shake.  To  each  his  vision  seemed  to  be  the 
firmest  truth  that  life  contained.  Neither  the  knowledge  of 
new  facts  nor  the  experience  of  changing  conditions  ever 
raised  a  doubt  or  provoked  a  conflict  in  their  minds,  but  like 
well-disciplined  reserves  swung  swiftly  into  line,  as  if  such 
reinforcement  in  the  general  movement  had  been  from  the 
first  foreseen  and  preordained. 


THE  UNION  OF  THE  STATES  147 

CHAPTER  VI 

The  Convention  of  Philadelphia 

THE  Convention  of  Philadelphia  was  summoned  for  the  14th  A.D.  1787 
of  May  1787.  In  spite  of  the  distracted  condition  of  public  ^Tt  30 
affairs,  the  arrival  of  the  delegates  was  marked  by  no  in- 
decent haste.  It  was  not  until  the  25th  that  a  quorum  of 
seven  states  was  assembled.  All  were  ultimately  repre- 
sented, with  the  exception  of  Rhode  Island,  which  held 
aloof  in  ridiculous  isolation.  Of  sixty-five  delegates  who 
were  appointed,  ten  never  attended.  The  final  draft  of  the 
constitution  was  signed  on  the  17th  of  September  by  only 
thirty-nine  delegates,  and  out  of  the  total  number  only 
forty- two  were  then  in  attendance. 

The  sessions  were  held  in  private,  and  General  Washing- 
ton presided.  No  reports  were  issued  of  the  debates,  which, 
from  the  notes  and  correspondence  of  Madison,  Yates  and 
others  who  were  present,  appear  to  have  been  conducted 
with  great  vivacity,  and  to  have  been  influenced,  not  merely 
by  strong  convictions,  but  by  violent  prejudice.  Neverthe- 
less, by  virtue  of  the  secrecy  of  the  proceedings,  speeches 
were  addressed  mainly  to  the  point,  and  but  little  to  the 
gallery.  It  is  impossible  to  overestimate  the  advantages 
of  privacy  in  such  an  undertaking.  When  at  last  the 
constitution  emerged  it  was  a  complete  thing;  to  be 
judged  by  the  nation,  for  whose  salvation  it  was  intended 
to  provide,  as  an  organism,  and  not  as  a  series  of  inde- 
pendent propositions. 

The  use  and  the  misuse  of  popular  judgment  have  been  ' 
subjects  of  much  dispute  among  wise  men  from  the  be- 
ginnings of  society.     Popular  judgment  is  a  sound  but 
rough  instinct,  impatient  of  diplomacy,  unfit  for  adjust- 


148  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1787  ment,  and  incapable  of  compromise.  These  are  the  func- 
"ET'3°  tions  of  individual  men,  meeting  inside  closed  doors,  and 
if  their  work  is  to  be  of  the  best,  it  must  be  left  undis- 
tracted  by  a  running  commentary  of  criticism  and  applause, 
by  incitements  to  combat  and  appeals  for  consideration. 
The  elimination  of  the  partisan  is  of  the  highest  importance, 
for  the  need  in  such  a  case  is  of  negotiators,  and  champions 
of  all  varieties  are  a  curse.  The  wider  the  audience,  the 
harder  for  good  feeling  to  be  maintained  and  for  good  sense 
to  conquer.  Even  in  those  days  of  slower  publicity,  the 
Convention  of  Philadelphia  would  hardly  have  succeeded  in 
accomplishing  its  work  had  it  been  beaten  upon  day  after 
day  by  a  well-informed  public  opinion  and  a  patriotic  press. 

The  first  labour  of  the  Convention  was  to  settle  the 
foundation  upon  which  the  Union  should  be  built  up.  Was 
it  to  be,  as  in  the  past,  a  confederation  or  league  of  states, 
or  was  it  to  be  a  fusion  of  men  into  a  nation  ? 

Its  second  labour  was  to  draft  a  constitution  that 
should  rightly  give  effect  to  the  principle  which  had  been 
agreed  upon. 

In  both  stages  the  part  played  by  Hamilton  was  powerful 
rather  than  conspicuous.  '  He  had  not  great  tact/  it  has 
been  said  of  him,  'but  he  set  his  foot  contemptuously  to 
work  the  treadles  of  slower  minds.'1  The  criticism  is  not 
entirely  just,  for  contemptuous  calculation  is  a  quality  that 
belongs  to  calmer  natures.  Moreover,  in  great  matters  he 
had  something  which  is  closely  akin  to  tact ;  a  knowledge 
of  the  dangers  arising  from  his  own  eager  and  impetuous 
temper;  a  power  of  self-restraint  where  the  .argument  was 
more  safely  left  to  a  more  conciliatory  spokesman.  His 
intervention,  when  he  deemed  the  occasion  favourable,  was 
on  the  heroic  scale;  but  even  in  the  earlier  debates  he 
was  an  infrequent  speaker,  not  only  as  compared  with 

1  Schouler,  History  of  the  United  States  under  the  Gonstitution,  i.  p.  25. 


THE  UNION  OF  THE  STATES  149 

Madison  and  Randolph,  but  also  with  others  of  the  second  A.D.  1787 
rank.  ^T'30 

The  importance  of  Hamilton's  influence  upon  events  at 
this  period  is  missed  if  we  attempt  to  measure  it  either  by 
his  speeches  upon  great  occasions  or  by  his  writings.  His 
pamphlets  had  borne  fruit,  his  orations  resounded  in  the 
ears  of  men ;  but  his  most  effective  weapon  was  the  private 
conference.  The  Convention  did  not  meet  until  near  mid- 
summer, but  early  in  the  spring  the  federal  Congress  came 
together  in  New  York,  and  many  of  its  members  were 
already  nominated  delegates  to  the  assembly  that  was  to 
consider  the  constitution  at  Philadelphia.  Hamilton  spared 
no  pains  to  prepare  the  ground.  He  was  not  one  of  those 
statesmen  who  make  their  rare,  stately  appearances  in  a 
dramatic  arrangement  of  lights  and  slow  music.  His  great- 
ness was  as  confident  and  humane  as  that  of  Rabelais  himself. 
It  did  not  fear  the  familiar  encounter,  or  the  good-natured 
match  of  wits  across  the  bare  mahogany.  He  loved  society, 
and  rejoiced  to  meet  his  enemy  in  any  gate.  His  house  was 
open  to  all  men  without  distinction  of  politics.  His  hospi- 
tality was  splendid  in  its  simplicity  and  kindliness.  Men  were 
put  off  their  guard  by  his  wit  and  gaiety.  They  were  dis- 
armed by  his  enthusiasm.  His  eloquence  took  them  prisoners. 
The  power  of  his  intellect  was  hardly  suspected  under  the 
ambush  of  his  extraordinary  charm.  It  is  even  claimed  for 
him  that  Madison1  was  his  convert;  and  judging  that 
eminent  man  by  his  past  record  and  his  subsequent  career, 
it  is  difficult  to  account  for  the  steadfast  course  of  his 
endeavours  during  the  Convention  upon  any  other  hypo- 
thesis than  that  some  more  powerful  nature  had  for  the 
time  being  cast  a  generous  spell  over  his  timid  and  grudging 
disposition. 

When  the  basis  was  at  length  a  settled  matter,  Hamilton 

1  History,  iii.  pp.  239,  303,  323. 


150  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1787  ceased  from  all  public  speaking,  and  even  upon  two  occa- 
&T.  30  sions  returned  to  New  York  to  attend  to  professional 
matters.1  It  has  been  alleged  by  his  enemies  that  he  was 
mortified  by  the  rejection  of  his  own  plan,  and  by  his 
apologists  that,  as  his  vote  was  nullified  by  the  opposition 
of  his  two  colleagues  from  New  York,  his  close  attendance 
would  have  been  to  no  purpose.  The  real  reason  was  that 
by  this  time  the  power  of  his  ideas  was  secure  enough  in 
the  minds  of  his  party  for  it  to  be  left  without  his  presence 
to  work  out  the  details  of  the  constitution. 

Four  days  after  a  quorum  of  states  had  assembled,  the 
Virginia  Plan  was  introduced  by  Randolph.  Its  main  prin- 
ciple implied  a  revolution.  Government,  to  be  effective, 
must  act  directly  on  its  subjects  as  individual  men.  To  this 
end  it  must  be  fully  clothed  in  powers,  not  merely  by 
the  unambiguous  phrases  of  a  constitution,  but  also  by 
the  opinion  of  a  united  people.  It  was  not  sufficient 
that  its  authority  should  be  defined  beyond  a  doubt;  but 
further,  that  the  men  who  obeyed  its  laws  and  supplied  its 
revenues  should  feel  their  submission  was  rendered,  not  to 
some  remote  tyranny  or  committee  of  oppressive  rivals,  but 
to  a  government  that  was  indeed  their  own.  The  essential 
condition  of  popular  affection  and  awe  could  be  secured  by 
one  means  alone.  The  loyal  support  which  had  hitherto 
been  lacking  would  only  be  possible  if  the  government 
rested  upon  election  by  the  people,  and  if,  between  the  value 
attaching  to  the  votes  of  all  citizens  throughout  the  Union, 
there  was  a  rough  equality.  Election  by  the  separate  states 
must  cease ;  for  clearly  there  could  be  no  approach  to  equality 
if  a  community  of  70,000  free  inhabitants  had  the  same 
power  in  the  Union  as  one  containing  700,000.  Population, 
therefore,  whether  tempered  or  not  by  the  contribution  of 
revenue,  was  the  basis  of  the  Virginia  proposals. 

1  History,  iii.  pp.  317,  322,  329. 


THE  UNION  OF  THE  STATES  151 

The  machinery  of  the  constitution  was  to  consist  of  an  A.D.  1787 
upper  and  a  lower  house,  elected  by  the  people.    The  executive    ^e>  30 
government  was  placed  in  the  hands  of  a  single  man,  to  be 
chosen  by  this  legislature.    This  governor  or  president  was 
to  hold  office  for  a  short  term,  was  to  be  removable  only  by 
impeachment  and  conviction,  and  was  not  to  be  re-eligible. 
The  judges  of  the  supreme  court  were  likewise  to  be  chosen 
by  the  legislature,  which  had  powers  to  create  such  inferior 
federal  courts  as  might  be  required. 

The  ideal  of  the  Virginia  Plan  and  of  the  national  party 
was  a  union  of  the  people  and  not  a  league  of  states.  The 
ideal  of  the  opposite  party  was  precisely  the  reverse.  They 
cared  nothing  for  the  equality  of  the  citizens,  everything  for 
the  equality  of  the  states.  On  June  15,  after  prolonged 
debate  on  Randolph's  resolutions,  the  New  Jersey  Plan  was 
submitted  to  the  Convention  by  Patterson.  His  proposals 
were  put  forward  avowedly  for  the  protection  of  the  smaller 
states  against  their  more  powerful  neighbours.  His  chief 
concern  was  the  pride  and  dignity  of  thirteen  separate 
nations,  which  required  that  no  distinctions  should  be  created 
between  the  power  and  status  of  the  contracting  parties. 
The  logic  of  this  policy  was  anti-democratic,  since  the  unit 
which  it  considered  was  not  a  man ;  nor  even  a  particular 
race  or  breed  of  men;  but  a  mere  boundary,  always  artificial, 
and  in  many  cases  an  accident.  The  Convention  as  a  whole 
was  certainly  conspicuous  by  its  lack  of  any  enthusiasm  for 
democracy ;  but  the  delegates  who  supported  the  doctrine  of 
State  Rights  carried  distrust  of  the  people  to  an  extreme 
which  is  remarkable  not  only  in  the  light  of  modern  de- 
velopments, but  of  what  happened  only  a  few  years  later. 
The  Democratic  party  was  then  compounded  by  the  genius 
of  Jefferson  out  of  a  sheer  contradiction ;  for  the  ideas  most 
diametrically  opposed  in  principle  were  those  of  State 
Rights  and  the  Rights  of  Man. 


152  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1787  The  New  Jersey  proposals  were  respectful  to  Congress. 
•30  They  aimed  at  strengthening  in  some  particulars,  but  in 
principle  maintaining,  the  existing  arrangements.  Their 
object  was  a  binding  alliance  between  sovereign  states. 
They  were  utterly  opposed  to  the  idea  of  a  nation.  They 
contemplated  a  single  house  of  delegates,  voting  by  states. 
The  executive  was  to  consist  of  a  council  chosen  by 
this  legislature,  but  removable  by  the  hostile  vote  of  a 
majority  of  the  state  governments.  The  supreme  court  was 
to  be  appointed  in  a  similar  manner;  but  there  was  no 
power  to  constitute  any  inferior  tribunals. 

A  plan  like  this  could  never  be  accepted,  for  it  provided 
no  cure  for  the  evils  that  had  brought  the  Convention 
together.  Its  fatal  defect  was  the  same  lack  of  power  which 
had  made  the  original  Congress  impotent  during  the  war 
and  contemptible  after  peace  had  been  declared.  For  it  was 
impossible  to  preserve  the  sovereignties  of  the  various  states 
without  denying  to  Congress  any  direct  power  upon  in- 
dividual men.  If  the  central  government  was  restricted 
to  an  indirect  authority  which  could  only  operate  through 
the  state  legislatures,  it  could  only  coerce  at  second-hand. 
In  any  case  of  recalcitrancy  the  procedure  would  be  cum- 
brous and  unworkable.  The  federal  council  would  find  itself 
obliged  in  such  a  case  to  direct  the  local  government  to 
compel  the  individual;  and  if  the  local  government,  for 
any  reason,  or  upon  any  pretext,  should  refuse,  the  remedy 
would  be  the  coercion  of  a  state,  which  is  not  a  constabu- 
lary business,  but  civil  war. 

On  the  other  hand,  it  was  urged  with  great  eloquence  that 
a  reformed  Congress,  acting  through  articles  of  confedera- 
tion, now  most  solemnly  confirmed,  revised,  corrected  and 
enlarged,  would  have  upon  its  side  a  very  powerful  senti- 
ment, and  would  exercise  a  prodigious  influence.  But  Wash- 
ington, who  in  his  quiet  mind  always  saw  the  big  objects 


THE  UNION  OF  THE  STATES  153 

clearly,  had  already  settled  that  argument  for  ever.    'Influ-  A.D.  1787 
ence  is  not  government.'    Sentiment  is  no  adequate  bond 
for  a  nation. 

On  the  18th  of  June,  three  days  after  the  introduction  of 
the  New  Jersey  plan,  Hamilton  submitted  his  own  proposals 
to  the  Convention.  This  famous  statement  occupied  five 
hours  in  delivery,  and  by  all  accounts  was  an  achievement 
far  overtopping  all  other  speeches  made  at  the  Convention  in 
force  of  reasoning,  in  courage  and  in  eloquence.  Unfortu- 
nately we  have  to  estimate  its  quality  at  second-hand,  for  no 
adequate  report  remains  to  us.  His  own  notes  are  methodical, 
but  a  mere  skeleton  or  list  of  points  to  guide  the  speaker  in 
the  order  of  discussion.1  The  argument  is  nowhere  opened 
out,  and  of  the  style  and  force  which  counted  for  so  much 
in  the  effect  upon  those  who  listened,  no  trace  remains 
under  his  own  hand.  The  reports  or  notes  that  were  taken 
by  Madison 2  and  Yates 3  are  not  only  condensed  but  im- 
perfect. They  do  not  cover  more  than  a  small  portion  of  the 
ground.  The  longer  of  them  would  occupy  barely  a  column 
and  a  half  of  the  Times,  while  a  verbatim  report  of  the 
speech  itself  would  probably  have  filled  about  twenty 
columns.  Hamilton  was  an  ample  speaker;  certainly  not 
verbose,  but  exhaustive  of  the  facts  and  copious  in  illustra- 
tion. His  style  does  not  lend  itself  easily  to  abridgment. 

"He  was  obliged  to  declare  himself  unfriendly  to  both 
'  plans.  He  was  particularly  opposed  to  that  from  New 
*  Jersey,  being  fully  convinced  that  no  amendment  of  the 
'  confederation  leaving  the  states  in  possession  of  their 
'  sovereignty  could  possibly  answer  the  purpose." 4  People 
had  questioned  the  powers  of  the  Convention  to  propose 
anything  beyond  a  mere  amendment  of  the  existing  system ; 
but  "we  owed  it  to  our  country  to  do,  in  this  emergency, 

1  Works,  i.  pp.  370-378.  2  Ibid.  pp.  381-393.          8  Ibid.  pp.  393-403. 

4  Madison's  Report,  Works,  i.  p.  381. 


154  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1787  '  whatever  we  should  deem  essential  to  its  happiness.  The 
MT.  30  i  gtateg  Send  us  here  to  provide  for  the  exigencies  of  the 
'  union.  To  rely  on  and  propose  any  plan  not  adequate  to 
*  these  exigencies,  merely  because  it  was  not  clearly  within 
'  our  powers,  would  be  to  sacrifice  the  means  to  the 
'  end." x  Having  swept  aside  this  plea  of  obstruction,  he 
proceeded  to  examine  and  condemn  the  existing  situation 
in  terms  and  upon  principles  with  which  we  are  already 
familiar  after  a  study  of  his  previous  writings.  The  esprit 
de  corps  of  the  various  states  had  proved  hostile  to  any 
superior  government,  and  this  principle  was  ineradicable, 
seeing  that  it  was  founded  on  human  nature.  The  love  of 
power  in  mediocrities,  the  ambitions  of  demagogues,  and  the 
local  attachment  of  the  people  to  their  particular  legisla- 
tures, set  up  a  plain  and  obvious  opposition  which  nothing 
could  remove  save  a  power  in  the  central  government  to 
operate  directly  upon  its  subjects.  If  the  weapons  of 
coercion  of  the  people  were  left  in  the  hands  of  the  states 
by  their  titular  master,  mastery  would  pass  with  the 
weapons,  though  the  title  might  remain  as  an  empty  form. 
For  coercion  of  a  sovereign  state  was  impossible  by  a  mere 
abstraction  calling  itself  the  central  government.  The 
practical  means  were  wholly  wanting — armies  and  supplies. 
And  even  if  these  could  be  brought  into  existence,  the 
remedy  "amounts  to  war  between  the  parties.  Foreign 
'  powers  will  not  be  idle  spectators.  They  will  interpose ; 
'  the  confusion  will  increase,  and  a  dissolution  of  the  union 
'  will  ensue." 2  A  powerful  influence,  also,  not  necessarily 
amounting  to  actual  corruption,  was  on  the  side  of  the 
states  against  the  central  power — the  gift  of  places,  the 
dispensation  of  honours  and  emoluments.  These  forces 
made  a  continuance  of  the  existing  system  an  impossibility, 
and  the  New  Jersey  Plan,  which  aimed  at  conserving  and 

1  Madison's  Report,  Works,  i.  p.  382.  a  Ibid.  i.  p.  384. 


THE  UNION  OF  THE  STATES  155 

perpetuating  the  present  institutions,  should   therefore  be  A.D.  1787 
utterly  discarded. 

The  complete  extinction  of  the  states  would  have 
simplified  the  problem  and  would  have  been  productive  of 
a  great  economy ;  but  such  a  measure,  however  desirable  in 
itself,  was  out  of  the  question.  Hamilton  did  not  propose  a 
revolution  on  so  grand  a  scale,  realising  that  the  sentiments 
of  the  people  made  it  altogether  impracticable.  Subordinate 
authorities  and  jurisdictions  would  still  be  necessary  under 
the  strongest  government,  and  the  state  legislatures  might 
well  be  used  for  this  purpose. 

He  despaired  "  that  a  republican  government  could  be 
'  established  over  so  great  an  extent.  ...  In  my  private 
'  opinion,  I  have  no  scruple  in  declaring,  supported  as  I  am 
'  by  so  many  of  the  wise  and  good,  that  the  British  Govern- 
'  ment  is  the  best  in  the  world ;  and  that  I  doubt  much 
'  whether  anything  short  of  it  will  do  in  America." l  He 
quoted  the  opinion  of  Necker  that  "  it  is  the  only  Govern- 
'  ment  in  the  world  which  unites  public  strength  with 
'  individual  security." 

To  Hamilton  the  term  'republic'  stood  for  something 
different  from  the  meaning  attaching  to  the  word  to-day. 
His  pattern  of  a  republic  was  an  assemblage  in  the  market- 
place— the  direct  and  turbulent  practice  of  Athens  and 
Rome.  In  1787  it  was  this  idea  which  arose  most  readily 
to  the  minds  of  men.  The  credit  of  republican  institutions 
in  the  modern  sense  had  yet  to  be  established;  and  it  is 
necessary  to  bear  in  mind  that  even  at  the  present  day 
the  respectability  of  this  form  of  government  rests  mainly,  if 
not  entirely,  upon  the  success  and  stability  of  the  American 
constitution.  When  Hamilton  announced  his  distrust  of  a 
republic  and  his  preference  for  a  limited  monarchy,  he  was 
using  language  as  it  was  understood  by  his  audience.  He 

1  Madison's  Report,  Works,  i.  pp.  388,  389. 


156  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1787  could  not  foresee  the  history  of  the  next  hundred  years ;  but 
^T<  30  had  he  foreseen  it  he  would  have  claimed  with  perfect  justice 
that  the  success  of  the  United  States  was  based  upon  that 
monarchical  element  which  he  had  spent  such  great  efforts 
in  establishing.  Throughout  the  whole  discussion  the  terms 
are  used  by  both  sides  with  a  certain  degree  of  ambiguity 
— sometimes  as  epithets  of  abuse,  at  others  as  quiet  words 
of  science.  Hamilton  himself  speaks  of  a  monarchy  upon 
occasions  as  if  it  were  synonymous  with  a  despotism,  a 
republic  as  an  equivalent  for  a  democracy  of  the  market- 
place; while  upon  others  the  adjective  monarchical  is  an 
epithet  of  praise,  implying  merely  a  salutary  strength  in 
the  executive,  and  the  word  republic  is  innocently  employed 
as  the  title  of  the  proposed  union. 

It  is  also  worthy  of  attention  that  his  idea  of  the  British 
constitution  which  was  held  up  for  admiration  is  oddly  un- 
like the  system  under  which  we  find  ourselves  at  the  begin- 
ning of  the  twentieth  century.  It  was  not  even  a  correct 
picture  of  the  facts  as  they  stood  in  1787.  What  he  had  in 
his  mind  was  the  British  constitution  as  George  the  Third 
had  tried  hard  to  make  it.1  The  king's  policy  working  to 
increase  the  strength  of  the  executive  power  had,  as  a  minor 
accident  of  his  policy,  provoked  the  War  of  Independence. 
With  the  disastrous  result  of  that  struggle  his  attempt  had 
failed.  To  a  large  extent  his  failure  was  due,  as  Hamilton 
saw,  to  a  lack  of  central  authority  and  to  the  obstacles  that 
were  created  by  an  opposition  not  yet  reduced  to  its  proper 
functions  in  the  state — an  opposition  whose  sympathy  and 
encouragement  from  the  beginning  to  the  end  of  the  war 
had  strengthened  the  hands  of  the  rebellious  colonists 
against  the  British  king.  His  Majesty's  opposition  had  been 
of  great  service  to  the  rebellious  colonists,  but  the  danger  of 
adopting  such  an  institution  was  sufficiently  obvious.  The 

1  Sir  Henry  Maine,  Popular  Government,  pp.  212-13. 


THE  UNION  OF  THE  STATES  157 

aim  of  the  American  statesman  was  to  create  a  system  which  A.D.  1787 
should  be  free  from  the  defects  which  George  the  Third    ^T'30 
had  laboured  vainly  to  remove.     It  is  necessary  to  under- 
stand, not  merely  that  Hamilton  and  many  of  the  wisest 
men  engaged  in  the  Convention  of  Philadelphia,  including 
the  great  Washington  himself,  held  these  views  with  a  deep 
sincerity,  but,  further,  that  their  object  was  attacked  by  the 
bulk  of  the  opposite  party  not  because  of  its  conflict  with 
the  principles  of  a  democracy,  but  because  of  its  antagonism 
to  the  theory  of  State  Rights. 

Hamilton's  ideal  was,  in  fact,  an  elective  monarchy,  and 
his  guiding  political  principle  a  balance  of  authority.    "  Give 

*  all  power  to  the  many,  and  they  will  oppress  the  few.    Give 

*  all  power  to  the  few,  and  they  will  oppress  the  many.    Both, 
'  therefore,  ought  to  have  the  power,  that  each  may  defend 
'  itself  against  the  other.     To  the  want  of  this  check  we  owe 

*  our  paper-money,  instalment  laws,  etc.     To  the  proper  ad- 
'  justment  of  it  the  British  owe  the  excellence  of  their  con- 
'  stitution.     Their  House  of  Lords  is  a  most  noble  institution. 
'  Having  nothing  to  hope  for  by  a  change,  and  a  sufficient 
'  interest,  by  means  of  their  property,  in  being  faithful  to  the 
'  national  interest,  they  form  a  permanent  barrier  against 
'  every  pernicious  innovation,  whether  attempted  on  the  part 
'  of  the  Crown  or  of  the  Commons.    No  temporary  senate  will 
'  have  firmness  enough  to  answer  that  purpose.  ...  As  to 
'  the  executive,  it  seemed  that  no  good  one  could  be  estab- 
'  lished  on  republican  principles.    Was  not  this  giving  up  the 
'  merits  of  the  question,  for  can  there  be  a  good  government 
'  without  a  good  executive  ? " 1 

"  Having  made  these  observations,  I  will  read  to  the  com- 

*  mittee  a  sketch  of  a  plan  which  I  should  prefer  to  either  of 
'  those  under  consideration.    I  am  aware  that  it  goes  beyond 
'  the  ideas  of  most  members.    But  will  such  a  plan  be 

1  Madison's  Report,  Works,  i,  pp.  389,  390. 


158  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A. D.  1787  '  adopted  out  of  doors?  In  return  I  would  ask,  will  the 
Mrs.  so  <  pe0pie  adopt  the  other  plan  ?  At  present  they  will  adopt 
'  neither.  But  I  see  the  union  dissolving,  or  already  dis- 
'  solved.  I  see  evils  operating  in  the  states  which  must  soon 
'  cure  the  people  of  their  fondness  for  democracies.  I  see 
'  that  a  great  progress  has  been  already  made,  and  is  still 
(  going  on,  in  the  public  mind.  I  think,  therefore,  that  the 
'  people  will  in  time  be  unshackled  from  their  prejudices ; 
1  and  whenever  that  happens,  they  will  themselves  not  be 
'  satisfied  at  stopping  where  the  plan  of  Mr.  Randolph  would 
'  place  them,  but  be  ready  to  go  as  far  at  least  as  he  pro- 
'  poses.  I  do  not  mean  to  offer  the  paper  I  have  sketched 
'  as  a  proposition  to  the  committee.  It  is  meant  only  to 
'  give  a  more  correct  view  of  my  ideas,  and  to  suggest  the 
'  amendments  which  I  would  propose  to  the  plan  of  Mr. 
'  Randolph,  in  the  proper  steps  of  its  future  discussion." x 

Hamilton's  plan  may  be  summarised  in  a  few  words.  The 
legislature  was  to  consist  of  two  chambers — an  Assembly 
elected  by  the  people  for  three  years,  and  a  Senate  elected 
by  electors  chosen  for  that  purpose  by  the  people.  The 
Senate  was  to  hold  office  for  life  or  good  behaviour.  The 
supreme  executive  power  was  to  be  placed  in  the  hands  of  a 
Governor,  elected  in  the  same  manner  and  upon  the  same 
terms  as  the  Senate,  who  should  have  the  right  to  negative 
all  laws  passed  by  the  legislature,  and  who  should  hold  the 
office  of  commander-in-chief  of  all  the  forces  of  the  Re- 
public. With  the  advice  and  approbation  of  the  Senate  he 
should  be  empowered  to  make  treaties  and  to  appoint  all 
the  officers  of  the  state,  and  the  appointment  of  the  cabinet 
was  to  be  in  his  hands  without  control.  The  Senate  should 
have  the  sole  power  of  declaring  war.  The  judges  of  the 
supreme  court  were  likewise  to  hold  their  offices  for  life  or 
good  behaviour,  and  power  was  to  be  given  to  the  legislature 

1  Madison's  Report,  Works,  i.  pp.  392,  393. 


THE  UNION  OF  THE  STATES  159 

to  create  inferior  federal  courts  in  every  state.    The  gover-  A.D.  1787 
nor,  the  senators  and  all  officers  of  the  Republic  were  to  be    MT-  30 
liable  to  impeachment  before  the  supreme  court.     Laws 
passed  by  the  state  legislatures,  contrary  to  the  constitu- 
tion or  laws  of  the  United  States,  were  to  be  void,  and  for 
greater  security  the  governors  of  each  state,  who  were  to 
be  appointed  by  the  central  government,  should  have  a 
negative  upon  all  local  legislation.     No  state  was  to  main- 
tain any  warlike  force  on  land  or  sea. 

It  is  abundantly  clear  from  Hamilton's  own  words  that 
he  entertained  no  hope  of  carrying  his  plan ;  but  equally  it 
is  beyond  a  doubt  that  he  sincerely  held  it  to  be  better  than 
either  of  the  others.  To  the  New  Jersey  principles  he  was 
utterly  opposed.  He  accepted  the  main  proposition  of  the 
Virginia  scheme,  but  desired  to  extend  it  further  in  the 
direction  of  strength  and  permanency.  His  own  proposals 
were  brought  forward  in  no  unfriendly  spirit,  but  as  a 
reinforcement  to  the  movement  led  by  Madison  and  Ran- 
dolph, with  whom  he  was  on  terms  of  confidence  and 
alliance.  His  deliberate  purpose,  as  at  Annapolis,  was  to 
overshoot  the  mark;  to  set  up  an  ideal  which  should  to 
some  extent  compel  the  minds  of  men,  even  in  their  rejec- 
tion of  it ;  to  terrify  the  champions  of  a  loose  confederation 
with  the  formidable  aspect  of  an  alternative  which  was 
vastly  more  disconcerting.  At  a  somewhat  later  date  he 
drafted  a  complete  constitution  upon  the  basis  of  his  own 
proposals,  and  handed  it  to  Madison  for  his  guidance  in  the 
subsequent  discussion.1  It  is  worth  while  to  compare  it 

1  Works,  i.  pp.  347-369.  The  point  whether  Hamilton  read  his  final 
scheme  to  the  Convention,  or  read  only  a  skeleton  of  it,  is  not  without 
doubt.  Madison's  report  of  the  proceedings  is  the  main  authority.  He  out- 
lived all  the  members  of  the  Convention,  and  when  he  published  his  report, 
was  beyond  contradiction.  J.  C.  Hamilton  accuses  him  of  suppressing 
certain  things,  and  garbling  others,  in  order  to  justify  the  outrageous 
attacks  made  by  himself  and  his  friends  upon  Hamilton  during  the  first 
administration,  when  their  main  charge  was  his  alleged  disloyalty  to  the 


160  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1787  with  the  actual  constitution  of  the  United  States,  for  there 

Mi.  30    are  £ew  more  conspicuous  examples  in  history  of  the  maxim 

•  that  when  people  are  struggling  towards  a  decision  the  man 

who  will  take  the  pains  to  think  out  and  elaborate  his  own 

plan  in  a  clear  consistency  is  apt  to  reap  a  reward  entirely 

beyond  his  hopes,  in  the  domination  of  his  drilled  ideas  over 

the  undisciplined  aspirations  of  his  enemies. 

The  struggle  was  long  and  bitter  between  the  Virginia  and 
the  New  Jersey  Plans.  At  times  it  seemed  beyond  possibility 
to  avoid  a  deadlock  which  would  have  broken  up  the  Con- 
vention. In  the  end  there  was  a  compromise.  The  legisla- 
ture was  to  consist  of  two  chambers,  of  which  the  Assembly 
was  to  be  chosen  by  the  people  upon  a  basis  of  population, 
the  Senate  by  the  states  upon  the  principle  of  equality 
among  themselves.  In  the  former,  therefore,  the  national 
principle  was  to  prevail,  and  in  the  latter  the  federal.  The 
voting  in  both  branches  of  the  legislature  was  to  be  by  the 
representatives  and  senators  in  their  individual  capacities, 
and  not  according  to  the  method  of  the  old  Congress.  The 
effect  of  the  compromise  was  to  concede  certain  powers  to 
the  central  government;  not,  as  Hamilton  would  have  wished, 
to  give  all  powers,  except  such  as  were  expressly  reserved  to 
the  state  legislatures.  Disappointed  in  this,  his  whole 
influence  was  exerted  to  make  the  intention  of  union  clear, 
while  keeping  the  conferred  authority  vague,  indefinite,  un- 
trammelled and  unlimited.  He  foresaw  that  administration 
could  afterwards  proceed  to  discover  powers  that  were  im- 
plied, though  not  precisely  designated.  Although  the 
frontal  attack  had  failed,  there  was  still  a  way  round. 

Republic.  The  matter  is  not  of  great  importance  except  to  persons  who 
are  interested  in  the  psychology  of  Madison,  for  no  one  believes  those 
charges  to-day,  and  it  is  hard  to  imagine  that  any  one  but  the  blindest 
partisans  believed  them  at  the  time.  Young  Hamilton  also  maintains  that 
Madison  had  no  right  to  take  notes  at  all,  far  less  to  publish  them,  as  such 
actions  were  contrary  to  the  spirit  and  the  letter  of  the  arrangement  for 
complete  secrecy.  Of.  History,  iii.  pp.  284-6,  301-2,  338. 


THE  UNION  OF  THE  STATES  161 

It  was  alleged  against  Hamilton  at  the  time,  and  after-  A.D.  1787 
wards  during  his  administration  of  the  Treasury,  incessantly  ^T>  80 
and  with  excessive  bitterness,  that  he  desired  to  establish 
royalty,  and  that  at  heart  he  was  an  aristocrat.  There  is 
no  colour  for  the  first  charge,  and  there  is  no  doubt  of  the 
second.  Hamilton  made  no  secret  of  his  belief  in  the 
advantages  of  an  aristocratic  power  in  the  commonwealth, 
or  of  his  reasons  for  that  belief.  Apart  altogether  from  the 
need  of  stability  and  of  deliberate  judgment,  he  was  deeply 
conscious  of  the  importance  of  honour  in  the  history  of 
nations ;  and  he  was  wise  enough  to  grasp  the  truth  that  the 
honour  of  nations  ought  to  be  of  a  composite  character, 
deriving  its  virtue  out  of  the  separate  and  peculiar  virtues 
of  every  order.  The  people  at  large  are  ever  eager  to  act  upon 
a  sudden  emotion  of  justice,  resentment,  or  pity ;  ready  to 
accept  the  plausible  coherence  of  an  ex  parte  statement. 
They  are  impatient  of  evidence,  and  wholly  averse  from  the 
consideration  of  what  may  be  urged  upon  the  other  side. 
The  merchant  classes,  basing  themselves  upon  contract,  and 
conscientiously  examining  into  the  extent  and  nature  of 
their  rights  under  a  bond,  judging  everything  by  that 
supreme  test,  assert  confidently  that  there  is  no  place  for 
sentiment  in  business,  and  are  full  of  a  fine  contempt  for 
mere  tradition.  The  lawyers  bring  everything  to  trial  by 
arguments  and  precedents,  interpreting  the  bond,  advocating 
or  questioning  it  with  one  eye  on  the  immediate  issue,  the 
other  upon  some  general  principle  of  society.  The  people 
see  national  justice  as  good  fellowship.  The  merchants  see  it 
as  common-sense.  The  lawyers  see  it  as  law.  There  is  some- 
thing beyond  all  this;  not  hostile  to  it,  but  different.  It 
has  received  a  variety  of  names,  but  none  of  them  -entirely 
suitable.  The  honour  of  a  gentleman  is  perhaps  nearest  the 
mark  ;  the  honour  of  a  man  whose  position  is  secure,  whose 
authority  is  acknowledged,  who  is  neither  concerned  nor 

L 


162  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1787  interested  in  any  struggle  for  pre-eminence.  His  own  per- 
J^T'30  sonal  dignity  is  the  spring  of  his  judgments,  which  are 
instinctive  rather  than  reasoned.  His  opinions,  like  those 
of  the  people,  are  grounded  on  the  feelings,  but  they  are 
deeper  and  more  constant.  They  may  be  contrasted 
with  the  sudden  violence  of  popular  sentiment  as  the 
current  which  flows  underneath  the  waves.  In  addition, 
there  is  a  touch  of  something  conventional  and  fantastic. 
The  parchment  of  the  bond  is  less  honoured  than  the  spirit 
of  it ;  and  while  he  is  jealous,  almost  unreasonably  and  to 
extremes,  of  certain  punctilios,  there  is  often  present  to  his 
mind  a  generous  sympathy  towards  the  motives  of  his 
opponent,  and  a  lofty  consideration  for  his  feelings.  As  an 
element  in  a  republic  the  honour  of  a  gentleman  is  of  at  least 
as  much  importance  as  the  precedents  of  the  lawyer,  the 
honesty  of  the  merchant,  or  the  enthusiasm  of  the  people. 
But  while  in  a  swelling  and  triumphant  democracy  the 
three  last  named  are  always  certain  of  a  great  influence,  it  is 
not  the  same  with  the  first,  which  requires  the  support  of 
some  strong  convention  if  it  is  to  render  effective  service  to 
the  state. 

Hamilton  was  deeply  concerned  to  make  this  element  a 
force  under  the  new  constitution.  His  idea  of  a  senate 
which,  like  the  judges,  should  hold  office  for  life  or  good 
conduct,  was  founded  in  this  sentiment.  Though  not 
hereditary,  and  although  resting  upon  popular  choice,  it  was 
to  be  frankly,  and  in  the  best  sense,  aristocratic.  The  class 
from  which  he  desired  to  exact  political  service  was  not 
likely,  in  his  opinion,  to  be  willing  every  few  years  to 
submit  themselves  to  the  calumny  and  fluster  of  contested 
elections ;  to  canvass  for  votes  and  to  court  popularity.  It  is 
possible  that  his  race  and  temperament  had  much  to  do 
with  his  view  of  this  matter,  but  it  is  probable  that  his  main 
reason  lay  in  his  experience  gained  in  the  conduct  of  the 


THE  UNION  OF  THE  STATES  163 

war,  and  in  the  founding  of  the  constitution.  We  are  con-  A.D.  1787 
scious  of  a  strong  current  working  throughout  the  war  and  Tt 
in  the  early  years  of  the  Republic  always  on  the  side  of 
constancy  and  strong  government — of  the  sustained  and 
instinctive  effort  of  a  class,  capable  of  cohesion  and  inured 
to  responsibility.  Behind  Franklin,  Madison,  Jay,  Jefferson, 
Gouverneur  Morris,  Randolph,  Wilson  and  the  other  notable 
spokesmen  and  writers,  was  a  powerful  order  that  cared 
little  for  notoriety,  but  without  whose  silent  and  devoted 
leadership  the  dominion  of  King  George  the  Third  might 
never  have  been  overthrown  nor  the  Union  of  the  States 
achieved.  From  this  aristocracy  of  squires  and  planters 
Washington  himself  was  sprung;  and  though  circum- 
stances forced  him  to  the  utterance  of  words,  he  was  a 
true  type  both  in  his  natural  silence  and  in  his  calm 
efficiency. 

Hamilton  failed.  The  Constitution  of  Philadelphia  has 
proved  itself  to  be  of  immense  strength,  but  the  principle 
of  aristocracy  has  no  part  or  credit  in  it.  In  the  light  of 
history  we  are  forced  to  admit  that  Hamilton's  lamentations 
appear  exaggerated ;  that  his  prophecies  of  disaster  have  not 
come  true;  that  the  swing  of  democracy  has  so  far  been 
able  to  keep  the  balance  of  the  state  unaided.  But  ad- 
mitting so  much,  and  even  granting  to  American  public 
virtue  most  of  the  excellence  which  its  patriotic  pane- 
gyrists have  so  lavishly  claimed  for  it,  it  is  still  permissible 
to  speculate  whether  it  might  not  have  stood  even  higher 
than  it  does  in  the  opinion  of  the  world  had  it  possessed, 
in  addition  to  its  other  components,  that  element  which 
Hamilton  struggled  so  hard  and  vainly  to  include. 

His  eagerness  to  secure  an  element  of  aristocracy  in  the 
constitution  of  the  United  States  was  due  much  less  to  a 
love  of  aristocrats,  or  to  any  tenderness  for  their  privileges, 
than  to  a  conviction  that  it  would  prove  a  good  bargain  for 


164  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1787  the  nation.  His  aim  was  economic.  Popular  government 
^f1' 30  may  secure  at  a  cheap  price  the  services  of  a  large  number 
of  men  in  easy  circumstances,  of  superior  education,  and 
with  family  traditions  of  loyal  service  to  the  state.  If  it  is 
not  willing  to  pay  the  price,  it  must  rub  along  as  best  it  may 
with  the  professional  politician.  The  new  Republic  chose 
the  latter  alternative,  while  Britain,  by  a  most  fortunate 
obstinacy,  adhered  to  the  former. 

It  is  easy  to  deride  the  House  of  Lords,  the  vanity  of 
titles  and  the  custom  of  primogeniture.  The  philosopher, 
regarding  only  the  value  of  a  man  across  a  dinner- table  or 
in  popular  debate,  easily  justifies  his  derision.  But  there 
is  a  practical  as  well  as  an  academic  side  to  the  matter, 
leading  us  to  inquire  further,  if  Britain  has  not  gained  much 
by  her  illogical  disregard  of  the  principles  of  natural  selec- 
tion, and  if  the  Republic  has  not  lost  much  by  a  too 
reverent  observance  of  the  Rights  of  Man  ? 

As  a  matter  of  logic  the  democratic  argument  is  con- 
clusive ;  as  a  matter  of  history  it  is  nonsense.  The  principle 
of  aristocracy  in  a  popular  government  is  a  very  practical 
device  for  making  use  of  the  upper  classes.  We  use  ours 
while  the  Americans  waste  theirs.  Titles  and  primogeniture 
may  be  absurd,  but  the  fact  remains  that  the  wealthiei 
classes  in  Britain  recognise  a  public  duty  attaching  to  their 
position,  while  in  the  United  States  they  do  not.  The 
tradition  of  the  great  English  families,  and  of  those  whose 
ambition  it  is  to  become  great,  is  service  of  the  state  in 
peace  and  war.  The  tradition  of  the  great  families  in  the 
Republic  is  as  yet,  in  the  nature  of  things,  less  defined ;  but, 
so  far  as  it  may  be  judged  by  a  foreigner,  it  seems  for  the 
most  part  unconcerned  with  the  duties  of  government,  and 
is  tending  more  and  more  towards  the  acquisition  of  com- 
mercial influence  upon  a  scale  such  as  the  world  has  never 
before  seen.  The  public  spirit  of  its  wealthy  citizens  is 


THE  UNION  OF  THE  STATES  165 

measured  by  huge  donatives  rather  than  by  loyal  service.  A.D.  1787 
They  appear  to  entertain  a  cockney  confidence  that  every    ^T-30 
obligation  can  be  discharged  by  the  signing  of  a  cheque. 
The  conspicuous  virtue  in  the  one  case  is  honour;  in  the 
other,  enterprise  and  industry ;  but  if  in  a  purely  practical 
spirit  we  endeavour  to  compute  the  advantage  to  the  state, 
everything  is  on  the  side  of  Britain,  from  the  government 
of  a  parish  to  the  councils  of  the  nation. 


CHAPTER    VII 

The  Federalist 

THE  constitution  had  been  framed   at  Philadelphia  with     ^.D. 
an  admirable  patience ;  but  there  still  remained  the  labour  1787-1788 

TiTi—     e*s\    *)•• 

of  persuading  the  nation  to  accept  it.  The  draft  in  due 
course  was  reported  to  Congress,  and  by  Congress  the 
decision  was  referred  to  separate  conventions  in  the  thirteen 
states.  As  soon  as  nine  had  ratified  the  constitution,  it 
was  to  be  at  once  adopted  by  those  states  themselves  and 
put  in  force.  The  delegates  dispersed  from  Philadelphia  in 
September  1787,  and  the  ninth  state  confirmed  the  Union  in 
June  1788.  Between  these  two  events  lay  a  period  which  is 
remarkable,  not  merely  for  the  success  of  its  achievement, 
but  also  for  the  fact  that  it  threw  up  as  a  by-product  one  of 
the  great  books  of  the  world. 

The  labouring  constancy  of  Washington  and  Hamilton, 
aided  in  their  work  by  the  plagues  arising  from  misrule, 
had  ended  the  first  period  of  the  struggle  for  union  at  the 
Convention  of  Annapolis.  They  had  then  succeeded  in 
awakening  a  powerful  section  of  the  people  to  the  need 
for  a  national  policy.  They  had  inspired  a  hesitating 
world  with  confidence  in  its  own  instincts;  had  guided 


166  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.      events  and  managed  interests  till  the  meaning  of   each 

1787-1788  event  an(}  the  security  of  every  interest  were  made  to 

point  in  one  direction,  and  to  produce  and  sustain  the  idea 

of  an  inexorable  destiny  barring  every  road  save  that  alone 

which  led  to  the  desired  goal. 

The  work  of  the  second  period  was  done  when  the  draft 
of  the  constitution  was  signed  by  the  delegates  at  Phila- 
delphia. Their  business  had  been  to  construct  a  system 
strong  enough  to  fulfil  the  needs  of  the  present,  wide  enough 
to  admit  those  of  the  future. 

The  third  period  was  occupied  in  convincing  the  people  of 
the  various  states  that  the  reality  which  had  been  attained 
in  the  heat  of  debate  and  by  the  practice  of  concession, 
corresponded  with  their  various  and  conflicting  ideals ;  that 
a  document  in  matter-of-fact  phrases,  definite,  precise,  cold 
and  formal  was  indeed  a  true  translation  into  a  practical 
shape  of  the  vague  but  fervent  spirit  of  their  hearts.  They 
had  to  be  persuaded  on  the  morning  after  marriage,  that 
Leah  was  a  bride  no  less  desirable  than  Rachel.  It  was 
during  this  period,  and  while  the  state  conventions  were 
being  held  for  the  purpose  of  ratifying  the  constitution,  that 
the  Federalist l  was  written. 

It  has  been  said,  and  probably  with  truth,  that  in  every 
state  there  was,  at  the  beginning  of  the  agitation,  a  majority 
against  the  new  constitution.  To  the  friends  of  union  its 
weakness  was  a  disappointment.  To  the  defenders  of  State 
Rights  its  usurpations  appeared  an  outrage.  But  the  alter- 

1  The  word  itself  is  a  concession.  Up  till  the  compromise  between  the 
Virginia  and  the  New  Jersey  plans  the  opposition  was  between  the  Nationalists 
(the  party  of  Hamilton  and  Madison)  and  the  Federalists  (the  party  of  State 
Rights).  Satisfied  with  material  victory,  the  former  took  the  name  of  their 
opponents,  but  before  twelve  months  had  passed  they  became  nearly  as 
odious  under  the  new  title  as  they  had  been  under  the  old  one.  The 
upholders  of  State  Rights  thereupon  took  the  names  at  first  of  Republicans, 
afterwards  of  Democrats.  It  is  under  the  latter  title  that  they  are  referred 
to  throughout  this  essay. 


THE  UNION  OF  THE  STATES  167 

native  was  nothing  less  than  anarchy  and  dissolution,  and     A.D. 
against  so  menacing  a  combination  there  was  everywhere  an  ^87oi  jj? 
even  larger  preponderance,  if  the  real  issue  could  but  be 
clearly  stated.     The  object  of  the  opposition  was  to  confuse 
the  actual  choice.    Its  leaders  were  active  and  unscrupulous, 
strong  in  a  ready-made  party  organisation  of  state  legis- 
latures.    The  work  remaining  to  be  done  was   therefore 
harder  than  any  that  had  yet  been  accomplished. 

"  Among  the  most  formidable  of  the  obstacles  which  the 
'  new  constitution  will  have  to  encounter,"  Hamilton  wrote 
in  the  first  number  of  the  Federalist,  "  may  readily  be  dis- 
'  tinguished  the  obvious  interest  of  a  certain  class  of  men 
'  in  every  state,  to  resist  all  changes  which  may  hazard  a 
'  diminution  of  the  power,  emolument,  and  consequence  of 
'  the  offices  they  hold  under  the  state  establishments ;  and 
'  the  perverted  ambition  of  another  class  of  men,  who  will 
'  either  hope  to  aggrandise  themselves  by  the  confusions  of 
'  their  country,  or  will  flatter  themselves  with  fairer  prospects 
'  of  elevation  from  the  sub-division  of  the  empire  into  several 
'  partial  confederacies,  than  from  its  union  under  one  govern- 
'  ment."  To  convert  these  two  classes  was  impossible  ;  but 
'the  honest  errors  of  minds,  led  astray  by  preconceived 
'  jealousies  and  fears,' J  Hamilton  considered  it  to  be  within 
the  limits  of  human  endeavours  to  remove.  The  attempt 
was  made  in  the  Federalist,  one  of  the  most  remarkable  of 
political  documents. 

The  idea  of  the  work  was  Hamilton's.  Something  more, 
indeed,  than  merely  the  idea — the  spirit  of  the  whole  enter- 
prise was  his.  It  was  his  energy  that  carried  the  thing 
through,  as  it  was  his  wisdom  that  had  planned  it;  and 
without  detracting  from  the  deserved  renown  of  his  two 
contributors,  the  lion's  share  of  the  credit  must  rest  with 
the  creator.  Out  of  eighty-five  short  essays,  which  appeared 

1   Works,  xi.  p.  4. 


168  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.      at  intervals  of  a  few  days  during  the  autumn  and  winter  of 
oS  1787-1788,  more  than  fifty  were  written  by  Hamilton  him- 

.  ou-ol 

self.1  Of  the  rest,  the  greater  number  were  by  Madison ;  a 
few  by  Jay.  The  crowning  merit  of  these  papers,  which 
were  produced  under  great  pressure  —  often  while  the 
printer's  boy  was  waiting  in  the  office2 — is  that  they  suc- 
ceeded in  accomplishing  what  they  set  out  to  accomplish. 
They  were  the  greatest  force  that  worked  on  men's  minds 
to  make  them  consent  to  the  adoption  of  the  constitution. 

It  is  difficult  to  bear  in  mind,  as  we  read  the  vigorous 
pages  of  the  Federalist,  distinguished  by  their  hopefulness 
no  less  than  by  their  conviction,  that  Hamilton  was  by  no 
means  satisfied  with  the  constitution.  But  his  mind  was 
of  a  practical  cast.  His  military  experiences  had  intensified 
his  natural  horror  of  schism  and  lukewarm  co-operation; 
and  in  big  things,  at  all  events,  magnanimity  was  a  stronger 
force  than  any  personal  consideration.  From  the  moment 
when  he  attached  his  signature  to  the  Philadelphia  draft  he 
became  its  champion.  He  accepted  it  as  a  whole  and  with- 
out reserves.  If  in  precise  terms  it  did  not  achieve  all  he 
had  hoped,  he  saw,  nevertheless,  that  it  contained  huge 
possibilities.  Courage  and  patience  might  still  contrive  to 
supply  many  of  the  omissions.  As  it  realised  many  of  his 
dearest  aims,  he  received  it  in  a  spirit  of  wide  compromise 
and  wise  opportunism,  thrusting  his  preferences  upon  one 
side,  and  looking  only  to  the  gravest  fact — that  the  chance 
of  union  was  never  likely  to  recur  save  as  the  outcome  of 
a  bloody  war. 

The  most  striking  difference  between  Hamilton  and  the 

constitution-makers  of  France  a  few  years  later  is  the  absence 

I  of  all  illusions  regarding  the  magic  of  a  mere  document.     A 

constitution  was  to  him  but  a  skeleton ;  and  had  it  been  put 

1  History,  iii.  p.  371,  says  sixty -five. 

2  Ibid.  p.  370. 


THE  UNION  OF  THE  STATES  169 

together  by  the  wisest  men,  in  the  coolest  hour,  there  would  A.D. 
still  have  been  no  virtue  in  it  until  it  was  inspired  with  life.  ^^  ~Q  31 
Its  strength  lay  not  in  the  written  words,  but  in  the  tradi- 
tion that  was  still  to  seek.  The  first  administration  would 
have  greater  powers  in  moulding  the  destinies  of  the  nation 
than  the  whole  Convention  of  Philadelphia  voting  unani- 
mously. For  the  title-deeds  of  all  political  authority  are 
elastic.  Courage  will  stretch  them,  and  the  process  will 
appear  inevitable;  but  with  a  timid  possessor  they  will 
shrink  into  a  feeble  formula.  In  the  one  case  the  intention 
will  ever  override  the  words ;  in  the  other  even  the  words 
themselves,  like  teeth  in  old  gums,  will  be  useless  for  the 
lack  of  their  natural  support. 

The  Federalist  is  pure  advocacy,  but  it  is  the  greatest 
and  rarest  advocacy,  for  it  appears  to  the  reader  to  be  a 
reasoned  judgment.  Confident  in  their  cause,  the  authors 
never  shrink  from  a  fair  statement  of  opposite  opinions ;  so 
that,  to  the  modern,  its  wisdom  and  justice  are  apt  to 
obscure  the  amazing  skill  of  the  counsel  who  conducted  the 
case. 

Hamilton  had  two  aims — the  adoption  of  the  constitution, 
and  its  security.  He  sought  to  establish  the  first  by  an 
exhaustive  explanation  of  the  practical  conveniences  and 
advantages  of  the  Philadelphia  plan,  by  a  full  exposition  of 
its  merits,  and  by  showing  in  contrast  the  existing  paralysis, 
unsettlement  and  danger.  But  for  the  security  of  the  new 
institutions  it  was  necessary  to  prove  also  that  they  were 
founded  upon  broad  and  eternal  principles,  harmonious 
with  the  ideals  of  his  countrymen. 

A  self-respecting  nation,  as  it  stands  at  the  cross-roads, 
will  deliberate,  demanding  to  be  satisfied  under  both  heads ; 
requiring  to  be  shown  clearly  that  its  convenience  will  be 
well  and  promptly  served ;  asking,  further,  for  full  assurance 
that  the  remedy  for  present  ills  is  not  contrary  to  nature,  or 


170  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.     likely  to  induce  at  a  future  time  some  morbid  disaster.     It 

7-1788 

.  30-31 


1787  1788  occasionany  happens  that  a  political  party  is  able  to  snatch  a 


hurried  decision  on  the  first  ground  alone,  on  some  temporary 
personal  advantage,  truly  or  falsely  alleged;  but  a  verdict 
given  in  this  fashion  lacks  stability.  Having  no  foundation 
in  the  real  nature  of  things,  it  is  easily  shaken.  No  sanctity 
adheres  to  it.  When  men,  despite  the  promises  made  to 
them,  experience  disappointment,  they  will  pull  it  down 
without  reverence,  for  it  draws  no  aid  from  a  noble  tradition. 

A  democracy  at  its  best  is  not  content  with  a  proof  of 
self-interest,  even  though  it  extends  to  its  grandchildren. 
Mere  practical  considerations  may  be  clearly  shown  to  possess 
a  certain  permanency,  but  are  not,  by  that  reason  alone, 
enough  to  make  a  strong  tradition  upon  which  men  will  act 
as  it  were  by  instinct,  to  which  they  will  defer  as  to  the 
precepts  of  a  revealed  religion.  Public  opinion  is  at  once 
a  man  of  affairs,  dry,  grudging,  sceptical  of  all  sciences  save 
arithmetic,  and  an  idealist  who  will  reject  the  most  fortunate 
balance  of  material  profit,  if  the  attainment  of  it  is  in  conflict 
with  the  national  honour.  There  is  a  need  for  some 
spiritual  element ;  for  some  ideal,  informing  policy.  The 
politician,  ignoring  these  things,  involves  us  in  endless 
debate ;  but  the  statesman,  fully  aware,  is  unsatisfied  with  a 
favourable  vote  which,  given  inconsiderately,  does  not  set 
the  seal  upon  the  upholding  principle.  It  was  not  enough 
for  Hamilton  that  the  constitution  should  be  accepted,  unless 
men  firmly  believed  it  with  their  minds  and  cherished  it  in 
their  hearts. 

The  United  States  have  been  fortunate  in  the  possession 
of  a  great  and  constant  tradition,  compounded  of  an  intense 
belief  in  their  institutions,  in  their  destiny  and  in  them- 
selves. It  has  carried  them  safely  through  much  rough 
weather,  and  it  is  not  idle  curiosity  that  puts  the  question 
how,  being  so  young  a  nation,  they  came  to  gain  it  ?  The 


THE  UNION  OF  THE  STATES  171 

Pangloss  opinion  does  not  hesitate:   that  as  their  institu-     A.D. 

1  7Q^7    1  ^~QQ 

tions  were  good,  their  destiny  favourable,  and  they  them-  ^T  g0  31 
selves  were  born  valiant  and  virtuous,  it  was  impossible 
that  belief  could  be  withheld,  the  conditions  being  so  obvious. 
But  the  inquiry  is  still  unanswered,  for  their  institutions  are 
not  conspicuously  better  than  those  of  other  nations  that 
have  come  and  gone,  except  precisely  in  this,  that  they  are 
more  steadfastly  believed  in.  Their  destiny  likewise  could 
have  worked  no  wonders  until  men  had  faith  in  it,  which  in 
1787  was  far  from  being  the  case.  Few  men  even  surmised 
it,  and  still  fewer  then  held  to  it  firmly — not  even  Madison, 
anxious  and  defensive,  but  only  Washington,  Hamilton  and 
Franklin,  who  found  no  great  number  of  visionaries  to 
understand  their  meaning. 

Without  this  tradition  the  emigrants  who  flocked  into  the 
states  during  the  nineteenth  century,  overwhelming  and  out- 
numbering the  descendants  of  the  old  colonists  who  fought 
against  George  the  Third,  would  never  have  been  compacted 
into  a  great  people.  In  these  exiles  and  outcasts  there 
resided  no  superior  virtue,  but  rather  the  reverse.  It  was 
not  merely  the  pure  spirit  of  adventure,  but  suffering, 
weakness,  despair,  discontent,  turbulence  and  crime  that 
swept  them  together  out  of  the  dusty  corners  of  Europe,  and 
shook  them  out,  Celts  and  Saxons  and  Latins  and  Slavs,  in 
the  seaports  of  the  states.  It  is  impossible  to  conceive  of  any 
immigration  more  lacking  in  unity  and  cohesion,  or  con- 
taining elements  more  dangerous  to  human  society.  Had 
the  same  men  landed  instead  in  the  disunited  states  of  the 
southern  or  central  continent,  they  would  have  swollen  the 
forces  of  disorder.  But  if  they  came  on  shore  at  Boston, 
Philadelphia,  or  New  York,  they  were  met  at  once  by  a 
tradition  so  universally  held  and  so  despotic  that  disagree- 
ment and  resistance  appeared  equally  absurd. 

This  tradition  has  the  defects  of  its  qualities:  extra va- 


172  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  gances,  excesses,  and  upon  occasions  a  preposterous  assurance 
!E  so  31  wkicn  strangers  may  fairly  deride.  But  men  of  our  nation 
can  laugh  with  good  humour  because,  being  governed  by  a 
like  tradition  of  their  own  which  leads  them  at  tunes  into 
similar  absurdities,  they  can  also  admire  without  envy. 
Questioned  as  to  the  origin  of  our  faith,  we  find  it  hard, 
when  taken  unawares,  to  make  any  suitable  reply.  We 
know  vaguely  that  we  have  scrambled  to  it  somehow ;  slowly, 
over  a  long  period,  through  a  series  of  events  which,  viewed 
carelessly,  look  almost  like  accidents.  We  are  inclined  to 
believe  that  its  foundations  must  have  been  deliberately 
laid  by  a  few  great  men  working  in  reasonably  good  material. 
We  have  a  backward  vision  of  Alfreds  and  Henrys  and 
Edwards,  far  off,  'like  misty  warders  dimly  seen.'  But  in 
our  sober  moments  we  do  not  claim  that  the  tradition 
which  governs  us  so  despotically  can  be  fully  explained  and 
accounted  for  by  our  splendid  opportunities,  by  our  noble 
laws,  or  even  by  the  virtue  of  the  mass  of  our  citizens. 
These  things  are  rather  the  results  of  the  tradition  than 
the  causes  which  have  produced  it.  In  periods  of  extreme 
complacency  we  have  perhaps  inclined  to  overlook  the  most 
remarkable  excellence  of  the  British  race,  which  is  its 
fertility  in  leaders ;  and  leadership  is  the  true  cause  of  the 
tradition  no  less  in  the  history  of  a  nation  than  in  the  annals 
of  a  regiment. 

Under  this  aspect  America  is  an  admirable  example  and 
a  useful  reminder.  The  great  interest  which  attaches  to 
her  experiment  is  that  during  the  whole  of  its  develop- 
ment it  has  been  under  a  close  and  rigid  observation ;  for 
the  time  is  short,  and  records  have  been  kept.  If  we  choose 
to  look  we  can  see  the  founders  of  the  tradition  at  work  like 
bees  in  a  glass  hive,  careful,  industrious  and  ungrudging. 
From  Washington  to  Lincoln  there  is  no  obscurity  any- 
where. And  great  as  was  the  practical  achievement  of 


THE  UNION  OF  THE  STATES  173 

the  Federalist  in  procuring  the  adoption  of  the  Union,  its     A.D. 
glory  is  even  greater  in  having  established  it  among  those 
firm  things  which  a  nation  with  loving  reverence  has  deter- 
mined to  place  beyond  all  question. 

For  the  rest  of  the  world  who  are  not  the  subjects  of  the 
Union  the  Federalist  has  the  value  of  a  great  book,  and  this 
not  merely  for  the  style  in  which  it  is  written,  or  even  for 
the  wisdom  it  contains.  Style  is  a  wonderful  pickle  that  is 
able  to  preserve  mediocrity  of  thought  under  favourable 
conditions  for  many  centuries.  Ingenious  and  consistent 
thought  will  frequently  preserve  itself  even  in  the  teeth 
of  obviously  uncomplying  facts.  The  greatness  of  the 
Federalist,  though  it  is  lacking  neither  in  style  nor  con- 
sistency of  thought,  is  something  different,  something 
altogether  unique.  Men  speak  of  it  in  the  same  breath 
with  L' Esprit  des  Lois  and  II  Principe;  and  it  has  at 
least  this  in  common  with  those  works,  that  it  deals  with 
the  problems  of  government,  not  merely  on  the  surface  with 
a  tidy  ingenuity,  but  fundamentally.  Like  them,  it  has  had 
an  immense  influence  both  upon  thinkers  and  upon  men  of 
action.  But  the  contrasts  are  also  valuable.  Montesquieu 
was  a  curious  analyst,  a  man  of  wit  and  eloquence;  but 
he  was  almost  at  the  opposite  pole  from  the  visionaries. 
He  expounds  a  situation,  explains  it,  comments  upon  it,  and 
sums  it  up  with  the  charming  attribute  of  French  writers, 
that  his  conclusions  seem  inevitable  even  on  the  occasions 
when  we  know  his  premises  to  be  inaccurate.  But  he  is 
always  outside  the  actual  controversy ;  keenly  interested,  but 
entirely  detached ;  calm  and  impartial  in  his  demeanour, 
even  if  in  his  heart  he  cherished  certain  preferences.  He 
is  considering  other  people's  affairs  all  the  while;  never 
concerned  in  vindicating  anything  for  which  he  is  personally 
responsible.  The  conspicuous  quality  is  his  fertility  in 
suggestion;  the  book  is  oftener  on  the  knee  than  in  the 


174  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.     hand,  and  the  reader  far  away  on  the  wings  of  his  own 


Machiavelli,  on  the  other  hand,  is  always  the  man  of 
action — the  would-be  man  of  action — or  at  least  the 
counsellor  of  men  of  action.  In  a  sense  he  is  an  idealist, 
and  would  have  built  up  a  state;  but  he  lacks  the  true 
spirit  of  the  revolutionary,  for  he  never  contemplates,  nor 
ever  appears  to  desire,  any  change  in  the  rules  of  the  game. 
He  is  of  opinion  that  he  could  play  it  better  and  more 
intelligently  than  his  contemporaries ;  and  it  is  not  derogat- 
ing from  his  genius  to  say  of  him  that  he  writes  somewhat 
in  the  manner  of  Cavendish  on  Whist.  Assuming  the  con- 
ditions which  exist — the  nature  of  man  and  of  things — to  be 
unchangeable,  he  proceeds  in  a  calm,  unmoral  way,  like  a 
lecturer  on  frogs,  to  show  how  a  valiant  and  sagacious  ruler 
can  best  turn  events  to  his  own  advantage  and  the  security 
of  his  dynasty.  If  we  can  conceive  of  Montesquieu  and 
Machiavelli  set  upon  the  same  problem,  the  construction 
of  an  ideal  state,  the  former  would  have  sought  for  the 
wisest  balance,  the  latter  for  the  strongest  prince. 

The  morals  which  Montesquieu  draws  out  of  his  analysis, 
the  maxims  which  Machiavelli  prepares  from  his  experience, 
are  entirely  different  from  the  method  of  the  Federalist, 
which  advocated  a  plan;  explained  and  justified  it;  pre- 
vailed upon  a  nation  of  practical  men  to  make  a  trial  of  it. 
This  plan  has  now  been  at  work  for  upwards  of  a  hundred 
years,  and  its  strength  appears  to-day  to  be  greater  than 
it  was  at  the  beginning.  A  book  which  has  helped  to 
produce  a  phenomenon  of  this  order  would  possess  an 
interest  for  mankind,  even  if  it  were  not,  as  the  Federalist 
is,  a  classic  at  once  in  style  and  thought. 

The  science  of  political  philosophy  in  recent  times  has 
drawn  in  its  horns,  setting  an  example  of  modesty  which 
its  economic  sister  shows  some  disposition  to  imitate.  Its 


THE  UNION  OF  THE  STATES  175 

pretensions  are  to-day  less  confident  than  in  the  England     A.D. 

-17 
30-31 


of  the  seventeenth  century,  or  the  France  of  the  eighteenth.  1787  1788 


Since  Edmund  Burke  it  has  wisely  chosen  to  waive  its 
early  ambition  of  absolute  power,  accepting  a  position  of 
influential  dignity  rather  than  of  executive  authority.  In 
its  present  mood  it  is  ready  to  agree  with  the  Law  of 
England  that  a  superior  virtue  resides  in  judgments  de- 
livered upon  particular  issues,  and  that  obiter  dicta,  however 
entertaining,  are  not  sound  rules  to  go  by.  The  author 
writing  on  themes  of  government,  as  it  were  at  large,  with- 
out direct  responsibility  for  the  result,  and  chiefly  for  the 
edification  of  the  intelligent  classes  and  the  general  im- 
provement of  the  world,  can  still  enjoy  an  ample  reward 
for  his  fancy  and  his  industry.  But  the  statesman  whose 
effort  is  to  explain,  to  justify  and  to  recommend  a  particular 
policy,  is  on  a  different  plane.  If  his  plan  in  the  end 
succeeds  and  becomes  notable,  the  words  in  which  he  urged 
its  adoption  command  a  deeper  attention.  He  challenges  a 
verdict  not  merely  upon  his  principles,  but  in  their  result ; 
so  that  if  his  work  has  stood,  the  statement  of  his  belief  on 
which  it  was  based  has  a  superior  authority  with  succeeding 
generations. 

The  opponents  of  Union  had  no  artillery  of  sufficient 
weight  to  reply  to  the  Federalist  and  to  withstand  its 
tremendous  attack.  They  trusted  vainly  to  the  machine; 
relying  upon  intrigue  in  the  state  legislatures,  upon  light 
calumny  and  incredible  misstatement.  Confronted  with  a 
real  issue  which  for  the  moment  has  touched  men's  hearts, 
even  the  strong  management  of  a  modern  party  has  found 
itself  discomfited.  An  organisation  is  an  excellent  thing  in 
itself,  but  at  such  times  it  cannot  fight  ideas  with  bogeys. 
People  refused  to  believe  that  Washington  wished  to  be 
a  king.  They  refused  to  believe  that  a  state  would  deprive 


176  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  its  subjects  of  freedom  and  install  a  tyranny  were  it  to  part 
with  a  portion  of  its  sovereignty  to  the  central  government. 
They  were  told,  in  the  hallowed  phrases  which  have  done 
duty  since  the  days  of  Cleon  the  demagogue,  that  the 
Convention  of  Philadelphia  aimed  at  making  the  poor  poorer, 
and  the  rich  richer ;  at  the  domination  of  the  few  and  the 
slavery  of  the  many ; 1  but  men  remained  unconvinced  even 
by  this  familiar  eloquence.  It  was  urged  upon  the  maritime 
states  that  to  part  with  a  shred  of  their  fiscal  independence 
was  to  make  over  a  portion  of  their  natural  wealth  for  the 
benefit  of  their  neighbours;2  but  even  their  faith  in  this 
plausible  appeal  began  to  crumble  before  a  wider  vision  and 
a  nobler  aim.  Finally  they  were  assured  that  the  plan 
was  fantastic  and  unworkable;  that  it  was  but  the  wild 
experiment  of  '  visionary  young  men.'  Every  pamphlet  and 
every  platform  of  the  opposition  echoed  with  this  tremen- 
dous charge,  and  young  men  who  see  visions  may,  if  we 
consider  the  result,  take  comfort  throughout  the  ages. 

On  the  17th  of  June  1788  the  Convention  of  New  York 
state  met  at  Poughkeepsie  to  consider  the  draft  constitu- 
tion. This  event  stands  in  somewhat  the  same  relation  to 
Hamilton's  political  career  as  the  taking  of  the  first  redoubt 
at  Yorktown  to  his  military  service.  It  was  a  brilliant 
episode,  a  gallant  action  upon  which  popular  imagination 
has  fastened,  attracted  by  the  spectacle  of  enemies  meeting 
one  another  in  the  gate.  '  Two-thirds  of  the  Convention/ 
Hamilton  wrote, '  and  four-sevenths  of  the  people  are  against 
us.'3  Governor  Clinton  was  his  opponent,  not  himself  an 
orator,  but  a  character  of  impressive  size.  Even  in  private 
conferences  he  was  hardly  articulate,  but  he  knew  clearlj 
the  direction  in  which  he  had  reasons  for  not  travelling. 

1  History,  iii.  p.  449,  also  pp.  452-4. 

8  Of.  Clinton's  policy  in  New  York,  History,  iii.  p.  174. 

8  Works,  ix.  pp.  432-3, 


THE  UNION  OF  THE  STATES  177 

He  controlled  a  majority  of  forty-six  against  a  minority  of  A.D.  1788 
nineteen.1  But  there  comes  a  time  in  most  struggles  that  MT'  31 
are  prolonged  when  it  is  not  enough  to  direct  the  battle, 
when  the  leader  who  is  willing  to  risk  a  personal  encounter 
prevails  over  his  opponent  who  seeks  to  control  the  move- 
ment from  a  windmill.  Clinton  was  strong,  narrow,  un- 
scrupulous and  very  stubborn,  but  he  had  in  him  nothing 
of  the  stuff  of  a  paladin.  His  military  career  had  been 
inglorious,  and  in  debate  he  pushed  others  forward  to 
do  the  fighting,  lashing  them  into  combat  with  a  surly 
condemnation. 

Since  our  narrative  of  the  events  at  Poughkeepsie  is 
mainly  drawn  from  the  notes  and  journals  of  the  opponents 
of  union,  we  may  believe  that  the  accounts  of  Hamilton's 
prowess  are  not  exaggerated.  He  fought  every  point,  and 
was  at  first  beaten  upon  every  point.  His  eloquence  could 
make  no  impression  upon  the  mechanical  majority.  He  drew 
tears  from  his  audience,  both  sides  alike ;  spoke  for  hours  at 
a  time,  and  all  men  hung  upon  his  words.  But  still,  at  the 
vote,  forty-six  hands  went  up  against  nineteen.  The  system 
on  which  the  discussion  was  conducted  is  very  puzzling. 
The  constitution  was  rejected  by  a  clear  majority,  and  next 
day  Hamilton  returned  undaunted  to  advocate  it  once  more. 
Again  it  was  rejected,  and  again  he  refused  to  accept  the 
decision  as  final,  arguing  for  delay,  hoping  that  the  news  of 
ratification  by  other  states  would  gradually  wear  down  the 
obduracy  of  his  opponents. 

A  friend  finding  him  one  day  alone,  "  took  the  liberty  to 
'  say  to  him,  that  they  would  inquire  of  me  in  New  York 
'  what  was  the  prospect  in  relation  to  the  adoption  of  the 
1  Constitution ;  and  asked  him  what  I  should  say  to  them. 
*  His  manner  immediately  changed,  and  he  answered  :  '  God 
1  only  knows.  Several  votes  have  been  taken,  by  which  it 

1  History,  iii.  p.  483. 
M 


178  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1788  '  appears  that  there  are  two  to  one  against  us.'  Supposing 
Mi.  31  <  ke  ka(j  conclu(je(i  nis  answer,  I  was  about  to  retire,  when  he 
'  added,  in  a  most  emphatic  manner :  '  Tell  them  that  the 
'  Convention  shall  never  rise  until  the  Constitution  is 
'  adopted.' " l  Minorities  are  to  be  measured  by  spirit  as 
well  as  numbers,  and  the  buoyancy  of  the  nineteen  who 
followed  Hamilton  was  disconcerting. 

Suddenly  there  came  a  collapse.  Melancthon  Smith,  the 
able  leader  in  debate  of  the  Clintonian  party,  announced 
his  willingness  to  ratify '  upon  conditions.'  Hamilton  refused 
to  entertain  the  idea  of  a  compromise,  and  wisely  took  the 
admission  as  a  signal  for  a  more  vehement  assault.  The  ob- 
jections that  were  made  to  a  complete  acceptance  "vanished 
'  before  him.  He  remained  an  hour  and  twenty  minutes  on 
'  the  floor.  After  which  Mr.  Smith,  with  great  candour,  got 
'up;  and  after  some  explanations,  confessed  that  Mr. 
'  Hamilton  by  his  reasoning  had  removed  the  objections  he 
'had  made."2 

In  spite  of  this  defection,  Clinton  refused  to  budge,  and 
for  a  time  it  appeared  as  if  his  silent  legion  would  stand  by 
him  in  sufficient  numbers  to  ensure  his  victory.  But  day 
by  day  the  news  of  ratification  by  other  states  came  to 
strengthen  the  weaker  party.  All  eyes  were  turned  upon 
Virginia,  where  the  influence  of  Washington  was  pitted 
against  the  open  opposition  of  Monroe  and  the  puzzling 
advice  of  Jefferson,  who  wrote  from  Paris  that  he  was  in 
favour  both  of  acceptance  and  rejection.  But  when  at 
last,  over  the  dusty  summer  roads,  Hamilton's  triumphant 
gallopers  brought  word  of  the  adherence  of  the  great 
southern  state,  the  battle  was  decided  against  the  strong. 
On  the  25th  July  the  minority  of  twenty-seven  was  changed 
into  a  majority  of  three. 

While    we   may  accept    without   hesitation    Hamilton's 

1  History,  iii.  pp.  522-23.  2  Ibid.  iii.  p.  524. 


THE  UNION  OF  THE  STATES  179 

estimate  that  four-sevenths  of  the  population  of  New  York  A.D.  1788 
state  were  opposed  to  the  Union,  we  must  also  believe  the  "ET<  31 
contemporary  accounts,  which  assure  us  that  on  his  return 
to  the  city  it  seemed  as  if  a  unanimous  people  had  come  out 
to  celebrate  his  victory.  It  was  not  only  the  Convention  of 
Poughkeepsie  which  had  been  conquered  by  his  masterful  and 
persuasive  influence.  The  minds  also  of  the  men  who  wel- 
comed him  with  hymns  and  banners 1  had  been  subdued  and 
fascinated  by  the  dramatic  spectacle  of  a  '  visionary  young 
man '  struggling  against  the  discipline  of  overwhelming 
odds,  day  after  day  for  six  weary  weeks,  and  in  the  end 
overcoming  all  opposition,  by  the  prowess  of  a  great  char- 
acter strung  to  its  highest  pitch  by  the  inspiration  of  a 
great  idea. 

1  History,  iii.  p.  528. 


BOOK    III 

THE   FEDEKALISTS 

AD.  1789-1791 


The  feudal  system  may  have  worn  out,  but  its  main  principle,  that  the 
tenure  of  property  should  be  the  fulfilment  of  duty,  is  the  essence  of  good 
government.  The  divine  right  of  kings  may  have  been  a  plea  for  feeble 
tyrants,  but  the  divine  right  of  government  is  the  keystone  of  human 
progress,  and  without  it  governments  sink  into  police,  and  a  nation  is 
degraded  into  a  mob. — DISRAELI. 


BOOK   III 
THE  FEDERALISTS 

CHAPTER  I 

President  Washington 

CONGRESS  met  at  New  York  in  April  1789.     Upon  a  canvass  A.D.  1789 
of  the  returns  from  the  electoral  colleges,  it  was  found  that    ^Ti  32 
General  Washington    had    been    chosen    President    by  a 
unanimous  vote. 

"  As  he  approached  the  Hall  of  Congress,  he  was  seen  to 
'  retain  the  firm,  elastic  step  of  a  yet  vigorous  soldier's  frame. 
'  His  thin  hair  of  hazel  brown,  covered  with  powder,  was 
'  clubbed  behind,  in  the  fashion  of  the  day.  His  dress  was  of 
'  black  velvet.  On  his  side  hung  a  dress  sword,  and  around 
1  his  neck  a  ribbon  to  which  was  attached,  concealed,  a  minia- 
*  ture  of  his  wife,  worn,  it  is  stated,  from  his  nuptials  until  his 
'  death.  '  Time,'  wrote  Fisher  Ames, '  had  made  havoc  upon 
'  his  face.  He  addressed  the  two  Houses  in  the  Senate 
{  Chamber ;  it  was  a  very  touching  scene,  and  quite  of  the 
'  solemn  kind.  His  aspect  grave,  almost  to  sadness ;  his 
1  modesty,  actually  shaking ;  his  voice  deep,  a  little  tremulous, 
'  and  so  low  as  to  call  for  close  attention — added  to  the  series 
'  of  objects  presented  to  the  mind,  and  overwhelming  it,  pro- 
'  duced  emotions  of  the  most  affecting  kind  upon  the  members. 
'  I  sat  entranced.' " l 

1  Fisher  Ames,  3rd  May  1789,  History,  iv.  p.  8. 

183 


184  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1789  The  first  President  had  the  gift  of  seeing  into  the  heart  of 
^ET'  32  a  situation  better  than  most  men,  and  he  therefore  doubtless 
understood  that  his  unanimous  election  was  not  the  begin- 
ning of  the  Millennium.  He  had  a  just  pride  in  his  fame  in 
the  world,  an  honourable  concern  for  the  good  opinion  of  his 
fellow-countrymen,  and  it  needed  no  prophetic  instinct  to 
perceive  that  in  this  new  adventure  both  were  to  be  placed 
in  jeopardy.  Even  in  his  own  trade  of  soldier  it  was  hardly 
possible  that  he  could  have  added  to  his  laurels  by  fresh 
enterprises,  and  in  the  unknown  trade  of  politician  it  was 
not  unlikely  he  might  suffer  total  eclipse.  Nor  could  he 
hope  in  this  hazardous  undertaking  to  retain  the  all  but 
universal  affection  which  had  rewarded  his  conduct  of  the 
war.  Popular  government  in  its  working  was  predestined  to 
result  in  a  cleavage,  and  he  who  had  been  the  leader  of  the 
whole  people  would  find  himself  before  long  only  the  leader 
of  a  party.  Beyond  these  considerations  was  a  fervent  desire 
for  rest  after  an  arduous  life.  '  The  business  of  America's 
happiness,'  in  Hamilton's  phrase, '  was  yet  to  be  done.' l  It 
was  a  true  statement  of  the  case,  and  to  the  younger  man, 
whose  aim  was  not  peace  but  achievement,  the  prospect 
appeared  radiant  and  delectable.  With  Washington,  how- 
ever, it  was  entirely  different.  No  action  of  his  life  shows  a 
finer  patriotism  than  his  acceptance  of  office ;  for  he  foresaw 
both  the  danger  and  the  labour,  and  judged  notwithstanding 
that  duty  left  him  no  escape. 

The  constitution  which  had  been  framed  at  Philadelphia, 
and  afterwards  accepted  by  the  people,  was  as  yet  a  lifeless 
thing.  At  the  most  it  was  only  a  licence  to  begin  governing, 
granted  to  a  few  energetic  characters  who  had  faith  in  their 
own  capacity  to  make  the  experiment  succeed.  Nothing 
appeared  more  likely  than  that  this  licence  would  be 
promptly  withdrawn  if  the  early  years  were  marked  with 

1  History,  iv.  p.  2. 


THE  FEDERALISTS  185 

failure,  or  even  if  delay  occurred  in  achieving  some  con-  A.  D.  1789 
spicuous  success.  The  life  of  the  Union  being  bound  up  in  ^T* 32 
the  strength  of  its  government,  the  first  thing  to  be  done  was 
to  establish  that  strength  upon  sure  foundations  by  the  bold 
use  of  the  powers  which  had  been  bestowed.  In  the  weak 
hands  of  men  afraid  to  act  upon  their  warrant,  afraid  to 
construe  it  widely  and  even  to  exceed  its  strict  and  literal 
intention,  the  constitution  compacted  with  so  much  care 
and  accepted  with  so  much  misgiving  must  infallibly  have 
gone  to  pieces.  In  twelve  months  the  states,  which  were  as 
yet  united  only  upon  paper,  would  have  split  again  into 
disunion.  There  was  no  magic  in  the  charter  itself  that 
could  have  drawn  order  out  of  the  existing  chaos.  The 
document  signed  at  Philadelphia  was  little  more  than  an 
opinion  and  a  hope.  It  was  by  the  vigour  and  courage 
of  Washington's  administration,  and  by  the  interpretation 
placed  upon  the  constitution  by  his  boldest  minister,  that 
the  United  States  ultimately  became  a  nation. 

The  enemies  of  Union  both  within  and  without  were 
hopeful  that  a  weak  government  would  undo  the  work  of 
the  Convention.  France,  who  conceived  her  interest  to  lie 
in  a  distracted  league,  was  unfriendly  to  the  idea  of  an 
American  nation,  and  incredulous  of  the  accomplishment  of 
such  a  miracle.1  The  '  French  '  party  in  the  states  bestirred 
themselves  in  bringing  forward  the  name  of  Benjamin 
Franklin,  whose  advanced  age  alone  was  a  sufficient  obstacle 
to  his  efficiency.  The  minority,  who  had  vainly  opposed  the 
act  of  union,  were  equally  averse  from  the  appointment  of 
a  strong  president,  and  endeavoured  in  a  timid  and  subter- 
ranean fashion  to  promote  this  impossible  candidature. 
The  adherents  of  Gates,  whose  personality  appears  at  all 
times  to  have  exercised  a  fatal  fascination  upon  impotent 
intriguers,  were  favourable  to  any  nomination  which  would 

1  Instructions  to  De  Moustier,  History,  iii.  p.  559. 


186  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1789  have  excluded  Washington  from  power.  But  in  fact  the 
^ET<32  only  question  worth  an  answer  was  whether  Washington 
himself  would  consent  to  serve.  In  this  case  the  issue  was  a 
foregone  conclusion.  The  real  obstacle  was  neither  France 
nor  Gates,  but  Washington's  own  reluctance,  his  '  great  and 
sole  desire  to  live  and  die  in  peace  and  retirement  on  my 
own  farm.'1  In  the  letters  which  passed  between  Wash- 
ington and  Hamilton  during  the  summer  and  autumn  of 
the  previous  year 2  there  is  proof  of  the  genuine  aversion  of 
the  former  from  the  cares  of  office,  and  of  the  determination 
of  the  latter  that  he  must  be  compelled  to  make  a  sacrifice 
of  his  inclination. 

It  is  clear  that  Hamilton  grasped  the  importance  of 
immediate  effort.  The  enemies  of  the  constitution,  though 
temporarily  discouraged,  were  numerous  and  powerful. 
They  would  gladly  have  obstructed  the  creation  of  any 
government,  but  as  that  had  not  been  possible,  they  were 
prepared,  as  soon  as  occasion  offered,  to  pervert  its  inten- 
tion. Hamilton  thoroughly  understood  the  value  attaching 
to  the  early  acts  of  an  administration  charged  with  the 
perilous  inauguration  of  a  brand-new  system.  While  he 
was  well  aware  of  the  fatal  consequences  of  any  serious 
mistake,  he  was  also  aware  that  any  delay  on  the  part  of 
the  executive  in  exerting  its  authority  would  be  construed 
as  hesitation,  and  would  restore  the  strength  and  spirit  of 
the  opposition.  He  sought,  therefore,  to  impose  his  own 
policy  at  once,  and  to  entrench  it  in  such  a  fortress  of  pre- 
cedents that  only  a  revolution  would  be  able  to  dislodge 
it.  While  men  of  slower  natures  were  looking  about  them 
stunned  by  defeat,  or  bewildered  by  success,  unsettled  and 
disorganised — like  an  establishment  of  servants  brought  up 
to  town  and  deposited  in  a  new  and  unfamiliar  mansion 
— he  alone,  and  at  once,  grasped  the  opportunity  afforded 

1  Hi*toryt  iii.  p.  553.  a  1788.     History,  iii.  pp.  550-58. 


THE  FEDERALISTS  187 

by  these  circumstances   to  a  self-possessed  and  energetic  A.D.  1789 
character  with  a  clear  knowledge  of  his  own  mind.    While    ^Efr-  32 
public  affairs  were  in  this  plastic  condition,  purposes  could 
be  achieved  with  but  little  difficulty  that  at  a  later  date 
would  have  required  stupendous  efforts  for  their  accomplish- 
ment.   At  such  a  time  things  might  also  be  done  which 
could  never  be  undone. 

National  unity  was  in  a  sense  already  attained;  the 
principle  had  been  accepted  in  the  most  solemn  fashion; 
but  the  constitution,  where  it  was  vague,  imperfect,  or 
inadequate,  had  still  to  be  defined,  developed  and  extended. 
The  financial  position  was  rotten.  It  was  of  paramount 
importance  to  place  it  at  once  on  a  sound  and  honest  basis. 
The  natural  resources  of  the  empire  were  enormous,  but 
they  needed  the  care  of  a  strong  and  watchful  sovereign  to 
bring  them  into  early  prosperity.  A  continent  upon  the 
eastern  side  of  the  Atlantic,  distracted  by  jealous  rivalries, 
invited  the  American  people  to  flattering  but  deadly  alliances, 
in  which  Hamilton  dreaded  to  see  the  new  Republic  en- 
tangled either  by  reckless  sentiment  or  by  a  spirit  of 
inveterate  revenge. 

With  these  objects  he  set  himself  at  once  to  extend 
the  power  and  prestige  of  the  federal  government,  and 
to  curb  and  diminish  the  importance  of  the  states;  to 
provide  for  or  discharge  all  debts  according  to  the  strict 
letter  of  the  bond ;  to  pursue  the  deliberate  advantage  of 
his  own  country  among  nations,  equally  unmoved  by  affection 
for  France  and  by  hatred  of  England,  and  equally  indifferent 
to  the  enthusiasm  of  most  men,  and  to  the  indignation  of  a 
few,  as  the  Revolution  in  Paris  pursued  its  startling  career. 
And  in  all  circumstances,  at  every  turn  of  events  and  clash 
of  interests,  he  kept  before  his  eyes  the  subordination  of 
classes,  industries,  and  states,  to  the  national  purpose  and 
the  advantage  of  the  commonwealth. 


188  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1789  The  complete  sovereignty  of  the  central  government  over 
JEfIm 32  all  citizens  and  states  of  the  Union  had  been  the  chief  sub- 
ject of  controversy  from  the  beginning.  This  principle,  not 
altogether  unintentionally,  had  been  to  some  extent  put  out 
of  sight  during  the  discussions  at  Philadelphia.  It  was  not 
fully  admitted  even  by  the  clauses  of  the  constitution. 
Still  less  had  it  been  accepted  by  the  people  with  all  its 
unforeseen  consequences  when  they  ratified  the  action  of  the 
majority  of  their  delegates.  It  was  the  chief  object  of 
Hamilton's  policy  to  establish  this  principle  so  firmly  that 
it  could  not  be  overthrown  or  even  questioned.  The  chief 
object  of  his  opponents  was  precisely  the  reverse.  They 
aimed  at  limiting  the  central  sovereignty,  while  he  sought 
to  extend  it.  Where  the  terms  of  the  compact  admitted  of 
a  doubt,  they  endeavoured  to  construe  them  in  a  sense 
favourable  to  the  state  legislatures,  unfavourable  to  the 
federal  government.  Both  parties  admitted  the  need  for  a 
balance  of  power  as  a  check  upon  rash  administration,  but 
while  Hamilton  was  determined  to  produce  this  balance  out 
of  the  forces  which  existed  within  a  single  nation,  the 
opposite  party  held  no  less  fervently  by  the  old  idea  that 
the  end  in  view  could  only  be  successfully  accomplished  by 
the  competing  interests  of  many  nations  within  a  league. 

This  difference  in  political  faith  was  fundamental.  Long 
after  Washington  and  Hamilton  had  passed  away,  cheerful, 
well-meaning  men  and  despondent,  wise  men  endeavoured 
vainly  to  adjust  by  compromise  what  could  only  be  settled 
by  victory.  Any  solution  of  the  antagonism  between  the 
Federalist  ideal  and  the  pretensions  of  the  State  Rights 
party  was  wholly  beyond  the  reach  of  concession  or  accom- 
modation. For  the  policies  were  in  direct  opposition,  like 
two  men  whose  sole  but  essential  quarrel  is  simply  for 
the  upper  hand.  Bland  mediation,  soothing  make-believe, 
patched-up  temporary  arrangements,  were  hopeless  nego- 


THE  FEDERALISTS  189 

tiators,  for  there  was  in  such  a  case  no  choice  of  alter-  A.D.  1789 
natives.    In  the  end  one  man  must  prevail,  the  other  must 
submit. 

It  is  conceivable  that  had  the  times  been  more  pro- 
pitious, had  Hamilton  been  as  admirable  a  party  leader 
as  he  was  a  statesman,  had  he  lived,  or  had  the  Federalist 
party  at  the  beginning  of  the  nineteenth  century  dis- 
covered some  other  chief  capable  of  sustaining  their 
spirit  and  guiding  their  counsels,  the  difference  might  have 
been  settled  by  a  political  victory.  But  each  year  of  delay 
added  to  the  danger  by  complicating  the  issue  with  fresh 
interests.  The  growth  of  population,  the  development  of 
territory,  the  increase  of  wealth,  added  strength  and  con- 
fidence to  the  opposing  parties,  so  that  by  the  time  Lincoln 
came  to  undertake  the  government  of  the  country l  there 
remained  only  one  possible  solution — the  stricken  field. 
'In  campaign,  battle,  hospital,  and  prison/  it  has  been 
computed  that  a  million  of  human  lives  were  sacrificed,2  in 
order  '  that  this  nation,  under  God,  shall  have  a  new  birth 
of  freedom.'3  Certainly  it  was  not  a  cheap  victory.  The 
thing  which  commands  our  admiration  is  that  three-quarters 
of  a  century  later  a  man  should  have  arisen,  the  equal  of 
Washington  in  character,  of  Hamilton  in  perspicacity, 
who  had  the  courage  to  maintain  the  Union  even  at  this 
staggering  price. 

A  great  nation  does  not  for  any  mean  or  trivial  difference 
split  into  two  camps  of  eager  volunteers  and  engage  in 
civil  war  until  one  of  the  sections  yields  through  mere 
exhaustion.  Long  before  four  campaigns  had  ended,  the 
virus  of  personal  hatred  would  have  spent  itself,  the  pre- 
tensions of  a  mere  phrase  would  have  been  detected.  The 
War  of  Secession  would  never  have  been  fought  by  men, 

1  March  1861.  2  Cambridge  Modem  History,  vii.  p.  453. 

8  Lincoln's  Address  at  Gettysburg. 


190  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1789  bewitched  by  rival  logicians  in  dispute  regarding  the 
abstract  propositions  of  constitutional  law.  The  spirit  which 
combated  against  union  in  the  Philadelphia  Convention,  in 
the  early  Congresses  and  in  the  cabinets  of  Washington, 
was  the  same  spirit,  and  engaged  in  the  same  struggle,  in 
the  cabinet  of  Buchanan  and  on  the  field  of  Gettysburg, 
seventy  years  later.  It  is  a  spirit  that  compels  respect 
from  its  most  determined  opponents — a  spirit  of  an  im- 
practicable ideal,  but  still  an  ideal.  But  between  the 
fanatics  for  State  Rights  whom  we  condemn,  and  the 
upholders  of  the  dignity  and  utility  of  local  authorities 
whom  we  have  been  taught  to  admire,  there  is  in  fact  only 
a  difference  of  degree.  A  commonwealth  in  which  this 
spirit  had  ceased  to  exist  might  be  safely  marked  as  a 
dying  race;  but  in  the  view  of  the  statesman  it  can  never 
be  allowed  the  upper  hand.  Like  the  steam  in  a  boiler, 
it  serves  its  purpose  by  its  efforts  to  escape  from  imprison- 
ment and  control ;  but  if  these  efforts  are  successful,  there 
is  an  end  of  the  utility. 

The  struggle  between  Federalism  and  State  Rights  soon 
made  a  wide  cleavage  in  the  first  cabinet.  Washington's 
own  convictions  and  sympathies  were  on  the  Federal  side ; 
but  he  considered  that  his  supreme  duty  as  a  Federalist,  no 
less  than  as  a  patriot,  was  to  compel  the  new  constitution 
to  prove  itself  capable  of  being  worked.  The  country  had 
to  be  governed,  a  political  system  had  to  be  inaugurated 
at  all  costs.  With  this  end  in  view  he  set  to  work 
reluctantly  and  wearily,  composing  differences  and  enduring 
obloquy,  with  the  same  calm  judgment  and  undramatic 
courage  that  had  directed  his  conduct  of  the  war.  The 
weight  of  this  immense  and  unfamiliar  character  was  not 
to  be  resisted.  While  Hamilton  laboured  at  the  founda- 
tions, Washington  helped  him  to  keep  the  enemy  at  bay, 
and  approved  the  work,  step  by  step,  as  it  was  accomplished. 


THE  FEDERALISTS  191 


It  may  well  be  doubted  whether  without  this  fortunate  A.r>.  1789 
co-operation  the  constitut 
as  a  historical  document. 


co-operation  the  constitution  would  ever  have  existed  except          3 


CHAPTER  II 

The  Threefold  Policy 

THE  governing  principle  of  Hamilton's  policy,  of  Washington 
who  supported  Hamilton,  and  of  the  whole  Federalist  party 
who  followed  him,  was  to  establish  a  supreme  sovereignty. 
The  first  step  towards  the  accomplishment  of  this  object 
was  dull  but  arduous.  Out  of  nothing  the  whole  machinery 
of  government  had  to  be  called  suddenly  into  existence. 
Controversy  was  silenced  for  the  moment  by  an  over- 
whelming necessity.  At  this  stage  the  difficulties  were 
mainly  those  inherent  in  the  nature  of  the  task,  and  were 
not  to  any  important  extent  the  result  of  the  spirit  of 
faction.  But  so  soon  as  the  machinery  was  contrived, 
departments  organised  and  provision  made  for  the  pressing 
needs  of  the  Union,  the  governing  principle  became  visible, 
and  according  to  the  dispositions  of  men  it  appeared  ad- 
mirable in  the  eyes  of  some  and  hateful  in  the  eyes  of 
others. 

Hamilton  sought  his  prime  object  by  a  threefold  means. 
The  idea  of  his  financial  policy  was  the  welding  of  the 
Union,  of  his  commercial  policy  the  development  of  the 
estate,  of  his  foreign  policy  to  confirm  independence.  Each 
of  these  undertakings  was  planned  upon  the  heroic  scale  in 
accordance  with  the  nature  of  its  author ;  but  all  were 
subordinate  to  his  main  end,  and  never,  even  in  the  dust 
and  heat  of  political  controversy,  were  they  permitted  to 
escape  from  their  true  proportions. 


192  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1789  The  period  during  which  Hamilton's  ideas  have  directed 
^T' 32  the  course  of  American  history  has  not  yet  ended,  and  is  not 
likely  to  end  in  our  day;  but  the  time  during  which  his 
personal  influence  controlled  the  policy  of  government  is 
reckoned  only  at  twelve  years,  while  his  official  career  lasted 
for  but  little  more  than  five.1  The  administration  of  Wash- 
ington began  in  April  1789  and  ended  in  March  1797.  Upon 
his  retirement  from  political  life,  John  Adams,  also  a  member 
of  the  Federalist  party,  was  chosen  to  succeed  him.  Adams 
was  no  friend  to  Hamilton,  but  his  cabinet  did  not  allow  him 
to  break  the  spell  during  the  term  of  his  administration. 

In  March  1801  Thomas  Jefferson,  the  founder  and  leader 
of  the  Democratic  party,  having  defeated  the  Federalists, 
became  President  of  the  United  States.  For  four- and- twenty 
years  from  that  date  the  highest  office  in  the  Union  was 
occupied  in  turn  by  three  men2  who  not  only  held  the  whole 
trend  of  Hamilton's  policy  in  abhorrence,  but  were  among 
the  bitterest  of  his  personal  enemies.  The  Federalist  party, 
seriously  crippled  even  before  the  death  of  its  leader,3 
gradually  crumbled  into  discredit  when  deprived  of  his 
support.  In  these  circumstances  it  was  only  natural  that 
the  ideals  of  Hamilton  earned  but  a  scanty  respect.  Much 
was  said  about  the  need  for  undoing  his  work,  and  some- 
thing was  attempted  towards  that  end ;  but,  fortunately  in 
one  respect,  his  fame  was  so  completely  obscured  for  the 
time  being  by  the  superior  radiance  of  his  successors  that  it 
was  judged  unnecessary  to  signalise  the  triumph  of  the 
Democrats  and  the  ruin  of  the  Federalists  by  the  incon- 
venient process  of  destroying  institutions  which  were  already 
perceived  to  be  indispensable  to  the  prosperous  management 
of  affairs. 

1  Federalist  Administrations  (Washington  and  Adams),  April  1789-March 
1801 ;  Hamilton  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  September  1789-January  1795. 

2  Jefferson,  Madison  and  Monroe.        8  Hamilton's  death,  llth  July  1804. 


THE  FEDEKALISTS  193 

The  ultimate  object  of  the  threefold  policy  was  to  establish  A.D.  1789 
a  set  of  principles,  by  weaving  them  into  the  fabric  of  the  ^T' 32 
national  tradition,  before  the  opponents  of  strong  govern- 
ment should  have  the  opportunity  of  office.  Hamilton 
sought  to  accomplish  his  ends  by  a  series  of  legislative 
measures  and  by  a  course  of  steadfast  conduct  on  the  part 
of  the  executive.  If  these  measures  and  this  course  of 
conduct  were  to  fulfil  his  ultimate  object,  it  was  necessary,  in 
his  opinion,  that  each  separate  act  should  succeed  in  a  con- 
spicuous manner  in  achieving  its  own  particular  and 
immediate  object.  Good  results  must  be  shown  forthwith. 
The  great  mass  of  the  citizens  must  be  affected  by  a  sudden 
and  fortunate  contrast,  with  a  sense  of  a  great  benefit  due 
unmistakably  to  the  federal  arrangement.  And  yet  it  was 
equally  necessary  that  the  policy  should  be  wise  and  well 
grounded.  For  although  a  rapid  improvement  was  for 
every  reason  desirable,  it  was  above  everything  desirable 
that  the  measures  of  the  first  administration  should  possess 
the  quality  of  permanence.  It  was  essential  that  their  purpose 
should  not  be  impaired  at  a  later  date  by  the  need  for 
frequent  alterations  and  adjustments  which  in  careless  or 
hostile  hands  might  have  endangered  the  existence  of  the 
essential  principles.  If  Hamilton's  threefold  policy  succeeded 
in  detail,  the  result,  in  his  opinion,  would  be  to  produce 
throughout  the  country  a  feeling  of  gratitude  and  even  of 
reverence,  not  to  himself  personally  or  to  his  party,  but 
towards  those  new  institutions  which  were  standing  upon 
their  trial.  In  addition  to  this  general  aim,  there  was  also 
a  particular  intention  in  many  of  his  acts,  notably  in  those 
which  dealt  with  the  funding  of  the  debts  and  other  problems 
of  finance,  to  enlist  powerful  interests  and  classes  upon  the 
side  of  the  federal  government  by  assuming  obligations  and 
responsibilities  towards  them  which  had  previously  been 
distributed  among  the  separate  states. 

R 


194  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1789  It  may  also  be  said  of  Hamilton's  policy,  viewing  it  from 
MT.  32  a  difjerent  standpoint,  that  its  object  was  the  same  as  that 
of  the  war  itself.  The  struggle  with  Britain  had  been  for 
the  sake  of  independence,  and  for  that  alone.  After  immense 
sacrifices  the  states  had  succeeded  in  getting  rid  of  every 
vestige  of  direct  external  control.  Hamilton's  aim  was  to 
secure  the  measure  of  independence  which  had  been  thus 
attained,  and  to  extend  the  work  a  stage  further  by  getting 
rid  of  all  influence  from  without,  not  only  direct  but  indirect, 
not  only  political  in  the  strict  sense,  but  general. 

The  aim  of  his  financial  measures  (in  which  he  succeeded) 
was  to  make  the  nation  independent  of  external  creditors, 
of  European  usurers,  bankers  and  governments  who  had 
supplied  the  funds  necessary  for  carrying  on  the  war  either 
at  onerous  rates,  or,  as  in  the  case  of  France,  in  order  to 
gain  an  influence  which  would  enable  them  to  promote 
their  own  political  ends. 

The  aim  of  his  foreign  policy  was  independence  of  European 
intrigue,  and  the  exclusion  of  its  diplomacy,  not  merely  from 
all  direct  appeals  to  the  individual  states,  but  from  a  position 
in  which  it  could  exercise  pressure  upon  the  federal  power. 
And  in  his  practical  and  foreseeing  mind  he  clearly  understood 
from  the  beginning  that  if  the  Old  World  was  to  be  kept 
from  interference  in  the  affairs  of  the  New,  it  could  only  be 
by  a  stiff  and  unyielding  refusal  upon  the  part  of  the 
Union  to  be  drawn  upon  any  pretext  into  the  quarrels  of 
the  European  continent.  In  this  aim  also  he  succeeded; 
for  if  he  did  not  actually  secure  the  formula  which  is  now 
known  as  the  Monroe  Doctrine  in  the  definite  phrases  of  a 
state  document,  he  none  the  less  by  irrevocable  acts 
laid  the  foundations  and  raised  high  the  edifice  of  that 
foreign  policy  which  his  country  has  pursued  from  that  day 
to  this. 

Independence  was  likewise  the  aim  of  his  commercial 


THE  FEDERALISTS  195 

policy,  which  was  framed  with  the  deliberate  intention  of  A.D.  1789 
creating  a  self-sufficing  nation.  American  industry  was  to  ^T<  32 
be  made  as  free  from  the  hazards  of  European  markets  as 
American  politics  from  the  influence  of  European  govern- 
ments. His  method  was  to  arrive  at  a  balance  between 
the  production  of  food  and  raw  materials  on  the  one  hand, 
and  manufactures,  shipping  and  other  forms  of  commerce 
upon  the  other.  It  was  possible,  in  his  opinion,  with  the 
prudent  assistance  of  legislation,  to  come  speedily  to  a 
point  at  which  all  the  necessities  of  life  and  instruments 
of  labour,  and  even  the  greater  part  of  the  luxuries  that 
were  in  common  demand,  should  be  supplied  from  the 
fields  and  farms,  the  mines,  mills  and  workshops  of  the 
new  republic.  A  nation  which  was  content  to  drift  along 
the  path  of  least  resistance  must  suffer  the  inconveniences 
and  dangers  of  a  lop-sided  development.  A  nation  in 
which  the  manufacturing  or  the  agricultural  interest  was 
in  an  overwhelming  predominance  would  never  be  proof 
against  foreign  hostility  or  catastrophe,  as  a  nation  might 
hope  to  be  which  maintained  the  principle  of  a  strong 
internal  market  for  commodities  of  every  kind. 

Hamilton's  desire  to  establish  his  commercial  policy  did 
not  succeed.  It  is  true  that  he  has  set  forth  his  ideas  in 
one  of  the  most  memorable  reports  ever  made  to  Congress. 
It  is  true  also  that  his  proposals  were  welcomed  by  the 
great  majority  of  his  own  party  as  well  as  by  many  of  his 
opponents.  But  although  in  certain  isolated  cases  he  was 
able  to  introduce  his  system  of  national  development,  it  was 
so  little  advanced  when  his  power  ended  that  the  propor- 
tions of  the  fabric  did  not  affect  the  imaginations  of  men  so 
as  to  impel  them,  willing  or  unwilling,  to  complete  the  work. 
Unlike  his  foreign  and  financial  policies,  his  commercial 
policy  did  not  crystallise  into  a  tradition  or  an  institution. 
The  foundations  were  not  even  laid,  but  only  staked  out ; 


196  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1789  and  although  the  elevation  and  the  working  plans  existed 
ready  to  the  hand  of  the  builder,  they  were  laid  aside  and 
soon  forgotten.  All  that  can  be  claimed  is  that  the  idea 
was  perfect  in  his  own  mind.  But  only  after  many  years 
had  elapsed  did  it  begin  to  assert  an  authority  among  men 
who,  under  the  pressure  of  circumstances  and  not  by  means 
of  their  own  clear  foresight,  had  begun  to  travel  slowly  in 
the  same  direction. 

The  fate  of  Hamilton's  threefold  policy  after  his  death 
is  worth  noting  at  this  stage.  That  part  of  it  which  dealt 
with  finance  was  accomplished  during  the  term  of  his  office. 
Although  his  opponents  had  blustered  heroically  about  their 
intentions,  it  was  never  undone,  because  it  was  too  strong  to  be 
pulled  down  by  peaceful  means.  The  principles  of  his  foreign 
policy  were  fully  accepted  in  practice  before  the  retirement 
of  Washington.  Their  sound  patriotism  was  too  obvious  to  be 
disregarded  by  his  successors,  who,  when  their  passions  were 
cooled  and  the  malice  of  rivalry  had  died  away,  completed 
the  structure  and  confirmed  the  tradition.  But  of  his  com- 
mercial policy  the  plan  only  was  bequeathed  to  future 
generations.  His  policy,  therefore,  succeeded  in  accomplish- 
ing the  greater  number  of  the  particular  objects  it  set  out 
to  accomplish.  In  no  instance  was  it  defeated.  It  was  only 
delayed.  Even  when  some  counter  idea  for  the  moment 
overcame  it,  the  victory  was  never  followed  up  by  effective 
occupation.  It  is  true  that  his  commercial  policy  did  not 
prevail,  but  the  doctrine  of  Free  Trade  did  not  usurp  the 
vacant  place.  Free  Trade  was  never  even  set  up  with 
success  as  an  alternative  to  his  commercial  policy.  The 
obstacle  was  merely  a  kind  of  lethargy  which  descended 
upon  men  in  what  has  been  termed  '  the  era  of  good  feeling/ 
an  indisposition  to  decide  upon  any  new  and  definite  policy. 
The  spirit  of  the  times  was  an  easy  contentment  with  exist- 
ing institutions,  even  though  these  were  obviously  incom- 


THE  FEDERALISTS  197 

plete     Men  preferred  to  live  in  an  unfinished  palace,  despite  A.D,  1789 
the  dangers  and  inconveniences  attaching   to  their  lazy         • 32 
occupation,  rather  than  to  engage  in  any  strenuous  efforts 
to  complete  the  structure. 

When  we  come  to  consider  further  what  was  to  Hamilton 
the  main  and  ultimate  object  of  his  threefold  policy — the 
firm  establishment  of  a  supreme  and  sovereign  government 
— we  find  that  here  also  he  has  been  successful — successful 
even  beyond  his  own  hopes,  but  still  not  wholly  successful. 
The  Union  still  exists.  The  forces  of  disintegration  have 
been  kept  at  bay.  This  result,  however,  has  not  been 
attained  by  the  peaceful  means  which  Hamilton  had  planned, 
but  only  as  the  outcome  of  civil  war  waged  upon  a  tremen- 
dous scale.  In  placing  these  limits  upon  the  renown  of  his 
achievements,  we  must  in  fairness  take  into  account  the 
prodigious  nature  of  his  ambition.  We  are  bound  to 
remember  also  this  fact,  that  if  the  Union,  for  which  he 
sacrificed  his  own  life,  was  not  preserved  without  the  further 
sacrifice  of  a  million  lives,  it  was,  beyond  any  doubt,  from 
the  love  of  the  institutions  he  had  raised,  and  by  the 
force  of  the  tradition  made  by  his  great  spirit,  that  men 
were  found  willing  to  pour  out  their  blood  like  water  to 
secure  all  that  he  had  won  for  them,  and  nearly  all  that  he 
had  dreamed  of  winning. 

When  we  consider  the  course  of  events  during  the  first 
quarter  of  the  nineteenth  century,  it  is  impossible  not  to  be 
struck  by  the  prevalence  of  lethargy  in  the  counsels  of 
Hamilton's  successors,  and  even  in  the  people  themselves. 
There  is  a  tendency  among  the  statesmen  who  followed  him 
to  leave  his  work  for  the  greater  part  where  he  had  left  it ; 
if  complete,  complete;  if  half-done,  half-done;  if  only 
planned  but  not  begun,  to  lay  the  plan  aside.  Hamilton 
was  as  great  a  builder  as  he  was  an  architect,  as  necessary 
in  the  one  capacity  as  in  the  other ;  and  for  more  than  half  a 


198  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1789  century  after  his  death  no  man  was  found  equal  to  the  task 

7IV1  QQ  * 

of  finishing  the  work.  When  a  further  advance  was  re- 
quired by  circumstances,  his  successors,  like  the  architects 
and  builders  of  an  inferior  age,  were  apt  to  carry  out  the 
original  intention  in  a  feeble,  grotesque,  or  disproportioned 
style.  In  the  case  of  the  commercial  policy  this  tendency 
is  everywhere  conspicuous.  The  plan  lay  ready  to  hand, 
but  when  Hamilton's  successors  came  to  put  it  in  execution 
they  showed  at  first  a  futile  hesitation,  and  in  the  end  a 
riotous  extravagance,  owing  to  their  inability  to  see  the 
problem  as  a  whole.  The  fine  symmetry  and  the  noble 
purpose  which  existed  in  the  mind  of  Hamilton  were 
entirely  missed.  Under  the  shelter  of  his  name,  what  he 
dreaded  most  has  come  to  pass,  and  the  advantage  of 
interests  and  of  classes  has  been  preferred  to  the  wellbeing 
of  the  nation.  His  system  of  foreign  policy  had  less  to 
fear  from  mutilation,  for  it  was  not  only  planned,  but  for  the 
most  part  already  built.  Yet  even  here  it  is  impossible  not 
to  detect  the  absence  of  the  master's  hand.  Although  his 
ends  have  been  achieved,  his  wise  maxims  have  been  ignored 
even  upon  grave  occasions.  "  There  appears  to  me  too  much 
'  tartness  in  various  parts  of  the  reply,"  Hamilton  wrote  at 
the  crisis  of  the  negotiations  with  Britain.  "  Energy  without 
'  asperity  seems  best  to  comport  with  the  dignity  of  national 
*  language.  The  force  ought  to  be  more  in  the  idea  than  in 
'  the  expression  or  manner." l  And  again,  '  real  firmness 
is  good  for  anything;  strut  is  good  for  nothing.'  The 
note  of  his  system  was  a  quiet  adherence  to  essential  things 
and  a  contemptuous  aversion  from  exasperating  methods. 
His  preference  was  for  the  aristocratic  spirit  and  ritual.  A 
courteous  and  dignified  demeanour  was  to  his  thinking  a 
better  weapon  than  the  self-conscious,  highflown  aggressive- 
ness which  delighted  the  hearts  of  the  Democrats.  The 

1  History,  vi.  p.  5. 


THE  FEDERALISTS  199 

Monroe  Doctrine  and  the  modern  tariff  policy  of  the  United  A.D  1789 
States  are  both  in  a  certain  sense  direct  inheritances  from    ^T* 32 
Hamilton.    But,  viewed  under  another  aspect,  both  contain 
an  element  of  caricature,  not  only  in  their  style,  but  even 
in  their  methods  and  ultimate  aims.     We  miss  the  grand 
manner  which  despised  provocation.      A  certain  bustling 
assurance,  with  all  its  loud  talk  of  business  principles, 
does  not  reach  the  high  level  of   his    energy,  while  it 
misses  many  things  which  were  firmly  held  in  his  luminous 
and  well-proportioned  view. 


CHAPTER  III 

Hamilton's  Difficulties 

AN  attempt  has  been  made  to  explain  the  Federalist 
principle  and  to  draw  a  rough  outline  of  the  policy  by 
which  Hamilton  purposed  to  establish  it  as  a  precedent  for 
future  governments  and  as  a  part  of  the  national  tradition. 
Even  this  inadequate  account  will  have  been  enough  to 
indicate  the  splendour  and  audacity  of  his  enterprise ;  but 
for  a  true  understanding  of  his  character  it  is  necessary  that 
we  should  bear  in  mind  the  difficulties  which  surrounded 
him  on  every  side. 

The  first  of  these  is  the  shortness  of  the  period  in  which 
the  work  was  done.  Five  years  and  a  few  months  was  the 
brief  term  of  Hamilton's  official  career.  Within  seven 
years  after  his  retirement  from  Washington's  government 
his  enemies  came  into  power. 

Nor  was  shortness  of  time  the  greatest  of  Hamilton's 
difficulties.  We  must  realise  also  that,  except  for  the  few 
months  between  his  appointment  as  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury  in  September  1789  and  the  meeting  of  the  second 


200  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1790  session  of  Congress  early  in  the  following  January,  there 
^T'33  was  hardly  a  day  during  the  whole  of  his  administration 
when  he  was  not  challenged  and  obstructed  at  every  turn 
by  a  powerful  opposition. 

While  it  is  true  that  throughout  the  remaining  term  of 
the  first  Congress1  parties  were  not  yet  organised  upon  a 
strict  system,  and  that  the  cleavage  was  uncertain  and  not 
wholly  partisan  ;  yet  this  fact  had  its  disadvantages  as  well 
as  its  benefits,  for  the  members,  lacking  discipline,  were 
often  and  easily  persuaded  to  sacrifice  a  principle  to  a 
passing  sentiment.  Accordingly,  although  upon  the  whole 
the  Federalists  who  followed  Hamilton  were  in  a  con- 
siderable majority,  it  happened  on  more  than  one  occasion 
that  Hamilton's  measures  were  defeated,  and  it  was  the 
exception  when  any  important  Act  was  carried  without 
some  mischievous  alteration  or  illogical  curtailment. 

In  the  second  Congress2  the  opposition  was  organised, 
fanatical  and  unscrupulous.  Not  only  Hamilton's  policy, 
but  his  personal  integrity,  was  constantly  and  bitterly 
assailed,  and  although  these  attacks  were  on  every  occasion 
rolled  back  with  disaster  upon  their  instigators,  the  perti- 
nacity of  these  enemies  was  untiring.  Apart  from  the 
distraction  and  annoyance,  the  mere  time  occupied  in  the 
defeat  of  the  eager  malice  of  the  Democrats  was  a  serious 
impediment  to  his  labours. 

In  the  third  Congress 3  there  was,  if  possible,  a  still  more 
savage  and  relentless  temper.  The  difficulties  of  adminis- 
tration were  enhanced  by  the  fact  that  the  Federalists  now 
no  longer  held  a  majority  in  the  House  of  Representatives, 


1  The  first  session  of  the  first  Congress  lasted  from  the  beginning  of  April 
to  the  end  of  September  1789 ;  the  second  session  from  January  to  August 
1790  ;  the  third  session  from  December  1790  to  March  1791. 

2  October  1791  to  March  1793. 

8  December  1793  to  March  1795. 


THE  FEDERALISTS  201 

but  were  outvoted  on  every  party  division  by  the  Demo-  A.D.  1790 
crats.     Moreover,  during  this  period  Hamilton  was  occupied    ^T- 33 
for  several  months  with   the  suppression  of  the  Whisky 
Rebellion,1  which  had  been  excited  by  the  blundering  in- 
trigues of  the  opposition.     A  military  expedition,  headed  by 
Washington,  was  required  to  restore  order,  and  although 
Hamilton  accompanied  the  Federal  forces  without  a  military 
command,  the  direction  was  mainly  in  his  hands. 

The  rapidity  with  which  parties  came  into  existence  is 
hardly  a  matter  for  surprise.  The  ordinary  man  is  apt  to 
cry  out  lustily  whenever  he  is  hurt  or  inconvenienced,  and, 
unless  he  be  perpetually  reminded  that  his  complaints  are 
unreasonable,  there  is  always  a  danger  that  he  will  settle 
down  into  a  regular  opposition. 

The  process  of  union  or  confederation  must  always  be  to 
some  extent  a  painful  business.  As  in  the  case  of  badly 
set  limbs,  bones  have  to  be  broken  by  the  surgeon  and 
reset  before  the  patient  can  regain  his  proper  shape  and 
the  full  use  of  his  members.  It  was  not  only  bad  citizens 
and  dishonest  rascals,  not  only  men  who  sought  a  profit  in 
disunion  or  in  the  repudiation  of  debts,  who  composed  the 
Democratic  party.  There  were  also  included  in  it  all  those 
who  still  clung,  many  of  them  unconsciously,  to  the  doctrine 
of  State  Rights,  and  dreaded  as  if  by  instinct  the  rule  of  a 
central  government  which  in  their  panic  they  identified  with 
tyranny.  And  to  these  were  added,  in  a  remarkable  alliance, 
the  adherents  of  the  new-fangled  and  fashionable  doctrines 
of  the  Rights  of  Man. 

Gradually  but  swiftly,  therefore,  a  party,  compounded  of 
malcontents  of  every  variety  and  enthusiasts  belonging  to  at 
least  two  incompatible  faiths,  grew  up  and  consolidated  in 
antagonism  to  the  policy  of  the  administration.  To  say  that 
this  party  was  hostile  to  the  Union  would  be  too  sweeping 

1  1794. 


202  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A,D.  1790  a  charge ;  but  it  is  none  the  less  true  that  it  was  hostile 
^T- 33  to  the  conditions  upon  which  the  very  existence  of  the 
Union  depended,  and  in  time  it  became  even  more  hostile 
to  the  personal  forces  that  were  engaged  in  maintaining 
the  Union.  In  many  minds  the  necessity  for  strong  govern- 
ment was  only  admitted  at  particular  moments  under  the 
lash  of  adversity.  People  who  had  called  out  for  a  true 
sovereign  during  the  crisis  of  the  war  became  careless 
as  soon  as  peace  was  declared,  and  many  likewise  who 
had  been  clamorous  for  Union  in  the  intolerable  dis- 
orders of  1787  grew  lukewarm  in  the  comparative  tran- 
quillity of  1790.  The  constant  tendency  among  this 
class  of  citizens  was  to  be  content  with  an  instalment  of 
comfort.  They  grudged  paying  the  full  price  which  would 
have  ensured  them  a  permanent  possession  of  the  whole 
benefit. 

Parliamentary  opposition  was  neither  the  last  nor  the 
worst  of  Hamilton's  difficulties.  Before  many  months  had 
passed  the  cabinet  was  divided  no  less  sharply  than  Con- 
gress, till  in  the  end  the  majority  of  its  decisions  were 
arrived  at  by  the  casting  vote  of  the  President.  In  such 
circumstances  a  perfect  loyalty  among  its  members  would 
have  been  a  difficult  achievement  had  they  been  men  of 
the  nicest  honour.  But  even  an  outward  show  of  co- 
operation proved  to  be  quite  unattainable.  Confidence  was 
entirely  destroyed.  The  opposition  out  of  doors  was 
directed,  encouraged  and  comforted  from  within.  The 
measures  of  government  were  damned  in  advance  by  a 
zealous  Democratic  press  well  supplied  with  information  by 
its  supporters  in  the  Cabinet. 

It  must  be  admitted,  after  the  event,  that  Washington's 
original  conception  of  cabinet  government  was  founded  on 
a  capital  error,  and  even  that  his  management  of  his 
administration  was  marred  by  very  grave  mistakes.  There 


THE  FEDERALISTS  203 

is  little  cause  for  wonder  and  none  for  reproach  in  such  a  A.D.  1790 
verdict ;  for  though  Washington  was  by  nature  a  statesman    MT'  33 
as  well  as  a  soldier,  neither  by  nature  nor  by  training  was 
he  a  politician.    His  instinct  did  not  foresee  the  pitfalls  that 
were  hidden  in  parliamentary  institutions  of  an  entirely 
novel  and  unprecedented  type. 

His  idea  of  a  strong  cabinet  was  a  representative  cabinet. 
Not  only  was  it  his  desire  that  it  should  be  representative 
of  geographical  divisions,  of  north  and  south,  of  Virginia, 
New  England,  and  New  York, — in  itself  both  a  sound  and 
a  politic  aim, — but  he  wished  also  to  make  it  representative 
of  the  various  currents  of  political  thought,  and  this  was 
necessarily  disastrous.  It  may  be  urged  that  at  the  time 
when  he  chose  the  members  of  his  cabinet  there  was  no 
sharp  division  of  opinion ;  that  to  all  appearance  differences 
had  been  successfully  ended  by  the  compromise  of  Phila- 
delphia ;  that  the  whole  country  was  in  an  optimistic  mood, 
and  proceeded  upon  the  assumption  that  every  good  man 
had  rallied  once  and  for  all  to  the  support  of  a  government 
charged  with  the  task  of  establishing  the  Union.  It  is 
difficult  to  withstand  an  enthusiasm  of  this  character,  but 
in  Washington,  who  had  a  wide  knowledge  of  mankind  in 
general  and  of  his  own  countrymen  in  particular,  we  must 
suspect  a  certain  measure  of  incredulity.  For  he  had  seen 
the  two  opposing  principles  at  work  from  Lexington  to  the 
Convention  of  Philadelphia,  and  was  well  aware  of  their 
force  and  essential  hostility. 

The  confidence  of  any  people  in  its  government  is  grounded 
in  the  opinion  that  the  government  knows  its  own  mind.  A 
cabinet  which  is  representative  of  conflicting  ideas  can  only 
hope  to  tide  over  some  sudden  crisis.  Its  existence  supposes 
a  common  enemy.  When  the  crisis  is  past  it  can  only 
maintain  itself  by  the  most  rigorous  inaction.  For  with- 
standing some  temporary  danger  it  may  have  considerable 


204  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.r>.  1790  virtues,  but  for  carrying  through  a  policy  it  is  a  miserable 
^T<33  instrument. 

The  result  of  this  attempt  to  reconcile  irreconcilable 
ideals  was  a  bitter  disagreement  which  ended  in  an  open 
and  public  scandal.  Had  the  opposing  forces  been  equal, 
the  functions  of  government  must  have  been  suspended  by 
hopeless  paralysis.  Only  the  overwhelming  character  of 
Hamilton  rescued  the  administration  from  disastrous 
failure.  Washington,  whose  influence  in  a  united  cabinet 
would  have  been  a  tower  of  strength,  was  put  out  of  action 
at  the  height  of  the  battle.  His  convictions  were  on  the 
side  of  the  Federalists,  but  his  sense  of  duty  forced  him  to 
play  the  arbiter.  At  moments  when  a  bold  pronounce- 
ment was  the  thing  most  needful,  he  was  engaged  in  a  con- 
scientious examination  of  arguments.  In  political  matters 
his  mind  worked  slowly.  Having  provided  himself  with  a 
ministry  of  conflicting  principles,  he  felt  bound  to  consider 
their  conflicting  advice.  By  his  delay  in  coming  to  a 
decision  he  frequently  lost  the  advantage  of  prompt  action, 
and  raised  suspicions  that  there  was  room  for  doubt  upon 
the  merits  of  the  case. 

But,  further,  he  was  guilty  of  a  tactical  error  in  retaining 
colleagues  with  whom  he  was  in  utter  disagreement,  whose 
characters  he  had  come  to  distrust.  He  seems  to  have 
cherished  the  illusion  that  by  adopting  this  course  he  would 
disarm  their  hostility,  and  would  pin  them  down  to  an 
approval  of  his  measures.  The  result  was  altogether  dis- 
appointing. The  reluctance  of  Jefferson,  the  Secretary  of 
State,  and  of  Randolph,  the  Attorney-General,  was  published 
upon  the  housetops.  The  scrupulous  deliberation  of  Wash- 
ington bound  them  to  nothing,  but  merely  tolerated  the 
presence  of  informers  in  his  own  camp. 

The  well-meaning  plan  of  a  representative  cabinet  was 
therefore  in  the  working  of  it  a  complete  failure.  The  broad 


THE  FEDERALISTS  205 

basis  proved  to  be  a  mere  will-o'-the-wisp.    The  great  matter  A.D.  1790 
was  that  the  federal  idea  should  get  clear  away,  and  to  this       Tt 
end  the  necessity  was  a  cabinet  of  perfect  sympathy,  even 
though  it  was  chosen  upon  a  narrower  principle  of  selection. 
The  mistake  of  Washington   lay  in  imagining  that   the 
strength  of  a  government  was  determined  by  the  number 
of  its  friends  at  the  beginning.     Disillusionment  came  too 
late,  when  he  found  the  opposition  to  his  administration 
was  led  by  his  own  ministers. 

In  addition  to  these  difficulties  arising  out  of  the  gigantic 
nature  of  the  task,  the  shortness  of  the  time,  the  growth  of 
parties,  the  hostility  of  Congress,  and  the  dissensions  in  the 
cabinet,  Hamilton  was  further  impeded  by  the  rules  adopted 
by  the  two  Houses  for  the  transaction  of  their  business.  If 
ever  it  may  be  said  with  safety  of  any  man  that,  given  the 
opportunity,  he  would  have  been  a  great  parliamentarian,  it 
may  confidently  be  said  of  him.  He  had  the  true  genius 
for  debate  in  addition  to  his  other  and  nobler  qualities.  His 
management  of  the  Convention  of  New  York  l  is  in  itself  a 
sufficient  proof  of  his  capacities  in  this  direction.  A  man 
who  could  carry  his  party  to  victory  against  a  majority  of 
two-thirds  of  the  convention  and  four-sevenths  of  the  people 
would  hardly  have  failed  in  persuading  the  triumphant 
Federalists  in  the  first  and  second  Congresses  to  pass  in 
their  integrity  the  measures  necessary  for  the  conservation 
of  the  republic.  When,  therefore,  it  was  determined  by  the 
legislative  bodies  that  not  only  were  ministers  to  be  ex- 
cluded from  debate,  but  even  their  reports  and  recommenda- 
tions were  to  be  made  in  writing,  it  was  as  if  on  the  eve  of 
battle  a  general  were  to  be  forbidden  to  make  use  of  his 
artillery.  Under  this  regulation  the  business  of  a  minister 
was  merely  to  prepare  his  measures  for  the  consideration  of 
Congress.  The  defence  and  explanation  of  the  policy  was 

1  At  Poughkeepsie,  1788,  ante  pp.  176-179. 


206  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1789  taken  altogether  out  of  the  hands  of  its  author  and  left  to 
Mi.  32  frjen(js  who,  however  devoted  and  intelligent,  could  hardly 
be  expected  to  understand  its  bearings  in  all  their  width 
and  depth.  Objections  that  should  have  been  dealt  with  at 
the  moment  were  left  to  wander  at  large.  Opponents  who 
should  have  been  smitten  hip  and  thigh  upon  their  first 
hostile  movement  were  often  allowed  to  hold  the  field  for 
want  of  a  proper  challenger.  Principles  were  obscured  by 
irrelevant  issues,  and  by  sudden  appeals  to  sentiment  or  the 
authority  of  phrases.  But  the  chief  evil  was  the  exclusion 
of  that  personal  force  which  transcends  all  argument  and 
tactics,  which  causes  its  will  to  prevail  in  popular  assemblies 
not  so  much  by  an  appeal  to  the  emotions  or  even  to  the 
reason  of  men,  as  by  the  direct  impact  of  character,  asserting 
its  mastery  like  the  lion-tamer  by  some  inexplicable  quality 
inherent  in  the  eyes,  the  voice  and  the  demeanour. 


CHAPTER  IV 

Secretary  of  the  Treasury 

THE  bill  to  establish  the  Treasury  department  passed  into 
law  on  the  2nd  of  September  1789,  and  Hamilton  was 
appointed  to  the  Secretaryship  on  the  llth  of  the  same 
month.  In  view  of  the  condition  of  the  public  finances,  it 
was  the  hardest  post  under  government.  Having  regard  to 
the  disposition  of  mankind  when  called  upon  to  pay  taxes, 
it  was  the  most  perilous.  And  under  every  aspect  it  was  the 
most  important.  Friends  endeavoured  in  vain  to  dissuade 
him  from  accepting  a  position  which,  while  it  involved  the 
sacrifice  of  a  lucrative  practice  for  a  stipend  inadequate  to 
cover  the  expenses  of  his  household,  might  also  destroy 
a  career  of  brilliant  promise  by  engaging  him  in  an  under- 
taking foredoomed,  in  their  judgment,  to  failure. 


THE  FEDERALISTS  207 

The  story  goes  that  Washington  consulted  Robert  Morris,  A.D.  1789 
the  late  Superintendent  of  Finance,  upon  the  dismal  pro-    ^T' 32 
spects  of  his  department.   '  What  are  we  to  do  with  this  heavy 
debt  ? '    '  There  is  but  one  man  in  the  United  States  who 
can  tell  you/  Morris  replied ;  '  that  is  Alexander  Hamilton. 
I  am  glad  you  have  given  me  this  opportunity  to  declare  to 
you  the  extent  of  the  obligations  I  am  under  to  him.' 1 

Hamilton  was  appointed  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  at  the 
age  of  thirty-two,  and  found  himself  a  great  minister  of 
state,  with  a  salary  of  £700  a  year.  He  gave  up  his  pro- 
fession before  he  had  been  able  to  effect  any  substantial 
savings,  in  order  to  undertake  the  office  of  Chancellor  of 
the  Exchequer  to  an  embarrassed  and  almost  bankrupt 
nation,  impoverished  by  a  long  and  costly  war.  There  was 
neither  treasury  nor  treasure,  revenue  nor  staff  of  experts, 
system  of  accounts  nor  practice  of  audit — only  a  crowd  of 
solicitous  and  noisy  creditors,  and  a  government  without  the 
means  of  paying  even  the  modest  expenses  that  had  to  be 
incurred  from  day  to  day.  The  currency  was  in  disorder. 
Commercial  credit,  the  fundamental  condition  of  progress 
and  prosperity,  had  ceased  to  exist.  The  minds  of  all  men 
were  filled  with  uncertainty,  and  the  life  of  every  industry 
was  threatened  by  the  national  insolvency. 

One  great  advantage  Hamilton  certainly  possessed,  for 
there  was  nothing  to  undo,  no  creaking  system  and  stiff 
traditions  to  be  destroyed ;  but  against  this  may  be  set  the 
disconcerting  fact  that  he  was  without  even  the  skeleton  of 
a  service  or  the  remnant  of  an  organisation.  Not  only  had 
he  to  devise  a  method,  create  a  machinery,  find  and  train 
his  servants ;  but  he  was  peremptorily  required  to  furnish  an 
immediate  revenue,  and,  while  providing  it  under  so  great 
pressure,  to  think  out  and  establish  a  permanent  financial 
policy  with  which  these  hasty  expedients  should  not  be  at 

1  History,  iv.  p.  30. 


208  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1789  discord.  Beyond  all  this  he  was  determined  so  to  fashion 
^T* 32  the  measures  of  his  department  that  they  should  contribute, 
directly  as  well  as  indirectly,  to  the  strength  of  the  con- 
stitution which  was  on  its  trial.  He  found  himself,  there- 
fore, confronted  with  a  labour  of  drudgery  and  detail.  At 
the  same  time  he  was  clearly  aware  that  in  his  hands  lay 
the  power  of  affecting  the  destiny  of  his  country  far  beyond 
the  scope  of  his  particular  department.  The  distracted 
Congress  turned  to  him  as  a  saviour,  and  within  ten  days  after 
his  appointment  demanded  a  report  on  ways  and  means.1 

The  confidence  with  which  all  men  regarded  him  in  these 
days  of  confusion  is  a  strange  phenomenon.  Hamilton  enjoyed 
even  at  this  date  a  great  financial  reputation ;  but  when  we 
come  to  investigate  the  basis  on  which  it  rested,  and  the 
means  by  which  it  was  acquired,  it  is  impossible  to  suppress 
a  smile.  His  sole  practical  training  for  administering  the 
finances  of  the  republic  had  been  those  few  years  spent  in  a 
storekeeper's  office  in  a  West  Indian  sugar  island,  between 
the  ages  of  eleven  and  fifteen.  He  was  favourably  known 
to  many  as  a  charming  and  handsome  young  soldier,  who 
had  written  General  Washington's  despatches  in  a  most 
admirable  style ;  who  had  very  gallantly  taken  a  redoubt 
at  the  crisis  of  the  war ;  who  had  been  called  to  the  bar,  and 
had  at  once  sprung  into  a  great  practice;  who,  ever  since 
he  was  a  college  student,  had  written  political  pamphlets, 
memoranda  and  letters ;  who  had  had  a  large  share  in 
framing  the  constitution,  and  an  even  larger  share  in  pro- 
curing its  adoption  by  his  countrymen.  But  these  charac- 
teristics, qualities  and  accomplishments,  however  admirable 
in  themselves,  hardly  seemed  to  warrant  the  confidence 
with  which  men  saw  him  undertake  the  hardest  office  in 
the  first  administration. 

But  beyond  this  what  was  there  to  show  ?     Only,  so  far 

1  History,  iv.  pp.  32,  45. 


THE  FEDERALISTS  209 

as  can  be  gleaned  from  history,  the  fact  that  while  he  was  A.D.  1789 
Washington's  secretary,  harassed  by  the  want  of  supplies    ^T-32 
and  the  ill  conduct  of  affairs,  he  had  written  and  talked 
about  finance  and  figures,  revenue  and  credit,  with  an  ease 
and  decision  that  made  people  gape  with  astonishment.    He 
had  no  credentials  save  his  conversation  and  his  letters. 
He  was  wholly  without  training,  and  had  never  borne  an 
ounce  of  financial  responsibility  in  the  whole  course  of  his 
public  career. 

Of  all  political  reputations  the  reputation  for  financial 
ability  is  the  easiest  to  acquire  and  to  lose.  A  man  of 
any  notoriety  can  almost  have  it  for  the  asking.  If  he 
has  but  a  small  eminence  from  which  to  show  himself 
to  his  fellow-countrymen,  and  a  persuasive  tongue,  or  even 
a  sufficiently  solemn  aspect  of  silent  wisdom,  he  need  not 
fear  that  his  fitness  will  be  too  severely  scanned  at  the 
beginning.  It  is  almost  enough  to  have  been  a  banker 
in  order  to  be  believed  a  financier.  To  have  become 
suddenly  wealthy  by  speculation,  by  manufactures,  or  by 
keeping  shops,  places  his  intellectual  fitness  beyond  ques- 
tion, and  people  then  only  demand  to  be  satisfied  of  his 
integrity.  For  the  world  hates  boredom,  and  to  be  forced 
to  do  arithmetic  is  for  nine-tenths  of  humanity  the  gloomiest 
and  the  most  irritating  of  all  forms  of  boredom.  And  the 
world  also  hates,  except  in  rare  moments  of  spiritual  exalta- 
tion, to  look  its  indebtedness  in  the  face,  fair  and  square. 
The  suspicion  of  insolvency  lurking  in  the  heap  of  bills 
intensifies  its  natural  disgust  with  the  subject.  If  a  per- 
suasive man  suddenly  appears,  talking  fluently  of  sinking- 
funds  and  conversions,  saying,  "  Gentlemen,  leave  it  all  to 
'  me.  I  see  my  way.  I  promise  you  everything  will 
'  come  right,"  or  if  a  silent  person,  who  is  known  for 
his  private  success,  be  pushed  forward  by  his  admiring 
friends,  the  world  is  usually  willing,  especially  when  times 

o 


210  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1789  are  bad,  to  let  the  dismal  burden  be  strapped  upon  his 
^T'32  shoulders. 

But  if  confidence  be  easy  to  win  in  this  department  of 
human  affairs,  it  is  even  easier  to  lose.  Bankruptcy  has  a 
penetrating  quality  which  disconcerts  the  efforts  of  the 
bravest  charlatan  who  seeks  to  banish  it  with  incantations. 
Two  months  before  Hamilton  entered  Washington's  cabinet 
the  Bastille  had  fallen,  and  the  ancient  monarchy  of  Franco 
was  rocking  upon  its  foundations.  For  that  great  disturbance 
of  society  it  may  be  fairly  claimed  that  persuasive  financiers 
had  as  large  a  share  of  the  credit  as  incompetent  monarchs 
or  extortionate  nobles  or  any  other  class  of  mankind. 

In  what  precisely  the  quality  of  state  financier  consists  it 
is  difficult  to  say.  Only  one  thing  is  certain  about  him,  that 
he  must  be  persuasive  in  an  altogether  remarkable  degree. 
This  is  not  to  lay  down  the  rule  that  he  must  be  smiling  and 
bland  and  full  of  amiable  prognostications  of  fair  weather ; 
but  he  must  be  able  to  inspire  confidence,  not  only  in  the  tax- 
payers whose  affairs  are  in  his  charge,  but  also  in  the  moneyed 
classes  with  whom  the  duties  of  his  office  place  him  in 
relations.  To  speak  in  terms  of  his  department,  his  credit 
is  of  even  more  importance  than  his  cash.  Under  a  certain 
aspect  it  almost  seems  as  if,  given  persuasiveness,  a  scrupu- 
lous adherence  to  copy-book  precepts  will  do  the  rest.  A 
moderately  clear  head,  infinite  pains  and  a  stiff  back  will 
carry  him  a  long  way.  In  a  nation  already  enjoying  pro- 
sperity these  qualifications  have  often  proved  quite  adequate 
to  the  purpose ;  but  in  other  and  more  difficult  circumstances 
we  are  conscious  of  something  beyond,  which,  as  it  is  too 
volatile  for  definition,  we  allude  to  vaguely  as  genius.  Two 
or  three  men  whose  names  are  recorded  in  history  have 
possessed  it,  and  Hamilton  is  one  of  these. 

The  results  in  such  cases  are  the  only  proof;  but  when, 
impelled  by  curiosity,  we  attempt  discovery  of  the  methods  by 


THE  FEDERALISTS  211 

which  this  peculiar  success  has  been  achieved,  they  continue  A.D.  1789 
to  elude  us.  In  Hamilton's  fluent  reports  everything  appears  ' 
so  simple,  so  obvious,  so  entirely  in  accordance  with  common- 
sense  ;  everything  is  so  orderly  and  neat  and  inevitable,  so 
exactly  what  we  should  ourselves  have  recommended  un- 
hesitatingly in  similar  circumstances,  that  the  intelligent 
reader,  almost  from  a  kind  of  modesty,  and  being  accustomed 
to  associate  genius  with  a  mist  or  an  obscurity,  becomes 
sceptical  of  its  existence  where  nothing  of  the  magician 
is  allowed  to  appear.  The  cloak,  and  the  hat,  and  the 
wand,  and  the  air  of  mystery  are  all  absent,  and  there  is 
nothing  at  all  remarkable  except  a  certain  lucidity. 

Hamilton  set  himself  to  work,  and  the  principles  of 
finance,  like  the  principles  of  law,  immediately  surrendered 
to  him.  His  instinct  grasped  the  few  essentials  of  his  task 
firmly  and  clearly.  When  these  were  once  established, 
industry  and  firmness  did  the  rest.  Swiftly  and  unhesitat- 
ingly he  proceeded  to  grapple  with  the  multitude  of  im- 
portant details,  inevitable  trifles,  and  pure  irrelevancies ;  not 
in  a  spirit  of  sightless  drudgery,  but  like  some  traveller  on 
a  frosty  autumn  morning  who  sees  before  him  on  the  sunlit 
plain  the  spires  and  steeples  that  are  his  goal,  and  steps  out, 
brisk  and  cheery,  in  the  full  swing  of  his  stride,  whistling 
and  singing  on  his  way. 

With  insight,  and  with  what  in  a  sanguine  financier  is 
even  rarer  and  more  wonderful — with  sufficient  foresight, 
yet  not  too  much — he  devised  his  method  and  constructed 
his  machine.  He  collected  his  staff  as  best  he  could, 
and  imbued  them  with  his  own  orderly  and  indefatigable 
spirit;  arranged  a  system  of  audit,  checks,  records  and 
divisions,  good  enough  for  his  immediate  purpose,  and,  as 
the  event  has  proved,  good  enough  for  the  United  States 
until  the  present  day. 

Regarded  merely  as  an  official  Hamilton  is  a  great  man, 


212  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1789  for  he  constructed  his  department  upon  principles  that 
Mr'  32  have  never  needed  to  be  altered  because  they  have  never 
hampered  the  national  development.  Nothing  of  this  work 
has  ever  been  undone  by  succeeding  generations  of  public 
servants,  but  has  merely  expanded  and  unfolded  under 
the  pressure  of  circumstances.  When  we  consider  the 
rapidity  with  which  the  United  States  have  grown  in 
population,  wealth  and  intricacy  since  1790,  far  exceeding 
the  progress  of  any  people  recorded  in  history,  and  even 
far  beyond  the  hopes  that  Hamilton  himself  entertained,  we 
are  amazed  at  the  qualities  of  practical  wisdom  that  en- 
abled him  to  create  the  Treasury.  For  his  contrivance  was 
like  no  human-made  garment  that  is  soon  worn  threadbare 
and  outgrown,  but  rather  like  the  bark  of  a  tree,  that  from 
the  very  nature  of  its  being  is  never  inadequate,  since  it  is 
a  part  of  the  living  organism  which  it  covers. 

Our  admiration  increases  when  we  remember  that  he  was 
not  left  in  peace  like  a  mathematician  in  his  study  to  con- 
struct a  system,  and  to  emerge  by  and  by  at  his  leisure 
and  apply  it  deliberately  to  the  phenomena  of  life.  He  was 
rather  in  the  position  of  a  camp  cook  who,  under  a  sniping 
fire,  is  required  to  build  his  oven  and  to  supply  baked  bread. 
Congress  was  impatient  for  advice  upon  a  multitude  of 
questions  and  for  practical  suggestions  in  a  great  variety 
of  perplexities.  And  not  only  the  urgency  of  Congress,  but 
the  pressure  of  hard  facts  rendered  delay  impossible. 

At  the  time  Hamilton  accepted  office  the  cabinet  was 
still  incomplete.  Knox,  the  Minister  for  War,  and  Ran- 
dolph, the  Attorney-General,  were  both  subordinate  figures. 
The  most  important  office  in  the  first  administration,  after 
the  Presidency  and  the  Secretaryship  of  the  Treasury,  was 
the  Secretaryship  of  State.1  The  most  important  character 

1  i.e.  for  Foreign  Affairs.  It  is  not  intended  to  suggest  that  constitution- 
ally the  Secretaryship  of  the  Treasury  is  the  superior  office,  but  only  that 
in  the  peculiar  circumstances  of  the  time  it  was  the  more  important. 


THE  FEDERALISTS  213 

in  the  first  administration,  after  Washington  and  Hamilton,  A.D.  1789 
was  Thomas  Jefferson,  author  of  the  Declaration  of  In-  T<  * 
dependence,  a  prominent  legislator  of  Virginia  and  Minister 
of  the  United  States  at  the  court  of  France,  who  accepted 
the  post  of  Secretary  of  State  shortly  before  Christmas  1789. 
The  nomination  of  Jefferson,  who  was  widely  respected,  had 
been  pressed  by  Madison  and  welcomed  by  Washington. 
The  new  minister  was,  however,  unable  to  enter  upon  the 
duties  of  his  office  until  the  following  March,  when,  upon 
his  arrival  at  the  seat  of  government  in  New  York,  he 
found  Congress  plunged  in  an  eager  discussion  of  Hamil- 
ton's comprehensive  plans  for  dealing  with  the  public 
credit. 

It  was  said  of  Hamilton  by  his  enemies  at  a  later  time, 
that  he  took  an  unconstitutional  and  arrogant  view  of  his 
own  position,  and  that  he  regarded  himself  not  merely  as  the 
head  of  a  department  responsible  solely  to  the  President, 
but  as  something  in  the  nature  of  a  prime  minister  respon- 
sible on  the  one  hand  to  the  President,  as  to  a  monarch, 
and  on  the  other  hand  to  Congress.  Although  this  state- 
ment is  an  ill-natured  exaggeration,  it  is  none  the  less  true, 
not  only  that  he  threw  the  net  of  his  department  as  widely 
as  possible  over  the  waters,  but  that  his  activity  extended 
and  his  influence  predominated  far  outside  the  limits  of 
his  own  office.  Every  important  proposal  brought  forward 
by  his  colleagues  was  minuted  and  reviewed  by  Hamilton, 
and  it  may  be  added  that  a  large  number,  if  not  the 
majority,  of  these  proposals  were  offered  at  his  instiga- 
tion, and  were  drawn  upon  lines  which  he  had  already 
sketched  out.  From  the  beginning  to  the  end  of  his  official 
career  the  cabinet  was  literally  overwhelmed  by  his  wide 
interest  and  untiring  industry;  and  although  in  a  short 
time  his  insistence  provoked  a  violent  resentment  in  certain 
quarters,  in  the  main  issues  his  policy  prevailed,  and  the 


214  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1789  government  submitted  to  the  force  of  his  will,  whether  the 
various  ministers  liked  it  or  not. 

The  power  of  getting  work  done  was  one  of  his  most 
remarkable  qualities,  and  excites  our  astonishment  alto- 
gether apart  from  his  force  of  character.  The  diversity  of 
his  occupations  during  the  first  ten  months  of  office,  between 
the  date  of  his  appointment  and  the  end  of  the  next  session 
in  Congress,  is  little  short  of  appalling.  He  organised  the 
Treasury  Department  and  the  revenue  system.  He  sifted 
and  analysed  the  various  debts,  reported  on  the  public 
credit,  and  recommended  a  policy  with  regard  to  it.  He 
provided  supplementary  reports  at  every  stage  of  the  Fund- 
ing and  the  Appropriation  Bills ;  further  reports  on  the 
much-needed  amendment  of  the  Revenue  Act,  and  on  the 
voluminous  and  intricate  claims  of  individuals  against  the 
Treasury.  He  issued  circulars  to  the  collectors  of  customs, 
and  framed  an  Act  to  provide  more  effectually  for  the  duties 
on  imports  and  tonnage.  These  were  matters  which  came 
naturally  within  the  scope  of  his  department,  and  we  marvel 
only  at  the  amount  of  the  work  accomplished.  When  we 
remember,  however,  that  no  permanent  service  of  experi- 
enced officers  stood  at  his  elbow  to  provide  him  with  the 
necessary  assistance,  we  marvel  even  more. 

But  this  activity  was  not  the  sum  of  his  labours.  During 
the  same  space  of  time  he  made  a  digest  of  the  navigation 
laws ;  reported  on  the  depreciation  of  the  currency,  on  the 
purchase  of  West  Point  for  military  purposes,  and  on  the 
Post  Office  department,  with  regard  to  which  he  drafted  a 
bill.  He  drafted  bills  as  to  official  foreign  intercourse, 
remission  of  fines  and  forfeitures,  and  for  the  establishment 
of  lighthouses.  He  also  made  a  summary  of  the  acts  for 
registering  and  clearing  vessels,  and  drew  up  a  plan  for  the 
sale  of  public  lands.  Nor  must  it  be  thought  that  the  first 
ten  months  was  a  period  of  exceptional  industry.  He  con- 


THE  FEDERALISTS  215 

tinned  the  same  course  until  he  resigned  his  office,  and  A.D.  1790 
during  the  later  years,  when  foreign  affairs  and  domestic    <SSfs'  33 
disorders  became  the  chief  cares  of  government,  when  the 
attacks  of  his  opponents  were  levelled,  not  only  against  his 
measures,  but  against  his  personal  honour,  the  burden  of 
work  was  far  heavier  than  in  this  earlier  period  of  compara- 
tive calm. 


CHAPTER  V 

The  Public  Credit 

WHEN  Congress  met  at  the  beginning  of  the  new  year,1  it 
was  obvious  that  the  chief  subject  of  its  deliberations  must 
be  the  disordered  finances  of  the  Republic.  During  the  war 
with  Britain  both  the  Federal  Congress  and  the  governments 
of  the  various  states  had  contracted  a  variety  of  onerous 
debts  for  the  advantage  of  the  common  cause.  The  total 
sum  that  had  been  borrowed  in  this  way  amounted  to  some 
sixteen  millions  sterling.  When  it  is  a  case  of  raising  the 
wind  at  a  time  of  national  difficulty,  it  is  beyond  reason  to 
look  for  a  clear  and  uniform  system.  Financiers,  both  state 
and  federal,  had  to  get  money  how  and  when  they  could,  and 
the  result  was  a  bewildering  confusion  of  accounts,  creditors, 
securities,  rates  of  interest  and  principles  of  repayment.  In 
many  cases  payment  of  interest  was  heavily  in  arrear,  while 
any  repayment  of  the  capital  was  almost  too  remote  a  con- 
tingency for  con  templation.  '  We  are  in  a  wilderness,'  wrote 
Madison  sadly,  'without  a  single  footstep  to  guide  us';2 
and  Ames  puts  the  same  thought  in  more  grandiloquent 
language:  'We  perceive  a  great,  unavoidable  confusion 
'  throughout  the  whole  scene,  presenting  a  deep,  dark  and 
'  dreary  chaos,  impossible  to  be  reduced  to  order  without 

1  7th  January  1790.  2  History,  iv.  p.  47, 


216  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1790  '  the  mind  of  the  architect  is  clear  and  capacious,  and  his 
MT.  33  <  power  commensurate  with  the  occasion." J 

Fortunately, '  the  mind  of  the  architect '  was  well  suited 
to  the  needs  of  the  problem.  Fortunately,  also,  there  was  a 
promptitude  in  his  action  which,  in  the  particular  situation 
of  affairs,  was  invaluable.  On  the  day  after  Congress  assem- 
bled Hamilton  announced  that  he  was  ready  to  submit  a 
full  report  on  the  public  credit,  and  desired  to  be  instructed 
whether  he  should  discharge  this  duty  by  speech  or  in 
writing.  According  to  some  commentators  Congress  feared 
lest  they  might  come  too  much  under  the  spell  of  his 
eloquence,  and  it  was  for  this  reason  that  they  signified  their 
wish  to  consider  a  written  statement  of  the  national  finances. 
The  report  was  immediately  placed  upon  the  table,  and  the 
House  of  Representatives  proceeded  to  consider  its  contents 
a  week  after  they  had  met.2 

The  principle  of  Hamilton's  first  series  of  financial 
measures  was  a  copy-book  heading;  the  most  universal, 
indeed,  of  all  that  family  of  aphorisms — Honesty  is  the  best 
Policy.  He  held  that  nations  should  pay  their  debts 
punctiliously,  both  as  a  matter  of  honour,  and  because  it 
was  wise. 

The  federal  debt  was  due  partly  to  foreign,  partly  to 
domestic  creditors;  and  there  were  besides  the  various 
debts  due  by  the  several  states.  Hamilton's  simple  and 
comprehensive  plan  was  that  the  central  government  should 
recognise  all  these  liabilities  at  their  face  value,  should 
undertake  full  responsibility  towards  the  various  creditors, 
and  should  see  to  the  discharge  of  all  arrears  of  interest  in 
accordance  with  the  bonds.  With  these  objects  he  proposed 
to  consolidate  the  whole  in  a  National  Debt,  with  a  proper 
provision  for  redemption  by  means  of  a  sinking-fund.  As 
the  new  constitution  now  gave  a  much  greater  security  to 

1  History,  iv.  p.  47.  a  14th  January  1790. 


THE  FEDERALISTS  217 

the  lenders  for  the  principal  as  well  as  for  the  punctual  A.D.  1790 
payment  of  interest,  he  considered  himself  entitled  to  pro-    ^T* 3S 
pose,  as  an  equivalent  for  the  assumption  of  these  responsi- 
bilities by  the  federal  government,  a  reduction  of  the  vary- 
ing and  exceedingly  onerous  terms  of  the  original  bargains 
to  a  uniform  and  more  moderate  rate. 

About  Hamilton's  proposals  for  dealing  with  the  foreign 
debt  there  was  little  disagreement ; l  but  a  fierce  contest  arose 
with  regard  to  the  domestic  debt,  and  one  still  more  fierce 
on  his  scheme  for  the  assumption  of  the  state  debts  by  the 
central  government. 

In  the  case  of  the  federal  domestic  debt  it  was  contended 
with  some  truth  that  there  had  been  speculation.  Many  of 
the  original  holders  had  parted  with  their  securities  much 
below  the  face  value  under  the  pressure  of  necessity  or 
through  hopelessness  of  redemption.  The  deserving  patriots 
who  had  lent  money,  or  parted  with  money's  worth  in  goods 
or  services  on  behalf  of  the  national  cause,  would  not  receive 
the  chief  benefit  under  the  proposed  arrangement.  A  tribe 
of  gamblers,  usurers  and  speculators  who  had  bought  up  the 
paper  at  a  huge  discount  would  derive  an  unholy  profit. 
The  evil  was  grossly  exaggerated.  Hamilton  maintained 
firmly  that  whether  honest  men  or  rascals  held  the  bill,  a 
promise  to  pay  remained  a  promise  to  pay.  A  self-respecting 
nation,  like  a  self-respecting  merchant,  must  honour  its 
signature  and  meet  its  engagements  as  to  interest  and 
principal  alike.  With  this  solid  argument  he  answered 
every  opponent — the  loose-tongued,  loud-voiced  demagogue 
who  loved  repudiation  for  its  own  charms ;  and  the  fantastic 
sentimentalist  who  believed,  in  all  sincerity  no  doubt,  that 
hardship  might  be  set  right  by  injustice. 

It  was  Hamilton's  fate  to  encounter  the  doctrine  of 
repudiation  at  many  points  in  his  public  career,  and  when- 

1  History,  iv.  p.  50. 


218  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1790  ever  he  met  with  it  he  gave  no  quarter.  It  was  abhorrent  to 
T' 33  him  as  a  gentleman.  As  a  statesman  he  judged  rightly  that 
if  successful  it  would  prove  ruinous  to  his  country  by  the 
destruction  of  credit,  and  by  corrupting  the  character  of  its 
citizens.  This  doctrine  of  repudiation  has  had  a  singular 
vitality  in  American  politics,  and  has  appeared  on  a  variety 
of  occasions  in  suitable  disguises.  Sometimes,  as  in  the 
present  instance,  it  was  a  moralist,  eloquent  upon  the  un- 
worthiness  of  the  creditor;  at  others  it  was  a  strategist 
arguing  in  favour  of  dishonesty  as  a  form  of  warfare,1 
threatening  nations  who  had  incurred  the  displeasure  of  the 
United  States  with  the  cancellation  of  all  public  bonds  and 
private  debts  due  to  their  subjects. 

Madison,  Hamilton's  old  colleague  of  the  Federalist,  came 
forward  with  an  amiable  and  well-meaning  plan  for  a 
division  between  the  original  and  the  present  holders  of 
domestic  federal  debt.2  By  this  means  he  pretended  that 
the  sufferings  of  the  army  might  be  equitably  recognised. 
He  argued  warmly  that  soldiers  who  had  disposed  of  their 
warrants  for  arrears  of  pay  at  large  discounts  were  justly 
entitled  to  receive  a  further  benefit  when  at  last  a  stable 
government  was  in  a  position  to  redeem  the  pledges  of  its 
predecessor.  This  view  of  the  matter  was  pressed  upon 
Washington  not  only  by  Madison,  but  by  the  Secretary  of 
State.3  Fortunately  the  plausible  but  unsound  plea  ended 
in  failure.  The  '  poor  soldier '  argument,  like  the  '  poor 
widow'  argument,  was  destroyed  by  Hamilton's  vigorous 
common-sense.  The  case  was  well  put  by  one  of  his 
supporters :  '  The  original  holder  has  no  claim  upon  the 
justice  of  the  government.  His  claim  is  on  its  humanity.'  * 
But  unfortunately  'humanity'  implied  further  taxation, 
and  this  attempt  upon  the  part  of  Madison  to  shift  the 

1  e.g.  History,  v.  pp.  523-24.  2  History,  iv.  p.  76. 

*  History,  iv.  pp.  129-30.  *  Lawrence,  History,  iv.  p.  79. 


THE  FEDERALISTS  219 

burden  of  recompensing  the  army  from  the  shoulders  of  A.D.  1790 
the  citizens  to  the  shoulders  of  the  creditors  of  the  Union  3S 
was  only  repudiation  in  a  more  ingenious  form.  The 
niggardly  individual,  anxious  merely  to  withhold  as  much 
as  possible  from  the  tax-gatherer,  does  not  easily  find  a  plea 
that  lends  itself  to  noble-mouthed  rhetoric.  A  society  for 
the  avoidance  of  personal  obligations  would  not  be  felt 
to  rest  upon  a  strong  moral  basis;  but  if  it  can  be  pre- 
tended that  not  a  private  but  a  patriotic  motive  is  involved, 
a  better  stand  may  be  made.  According  to  the  practice  of 
demagogy,  the  doctrine  of  repudiation  was  in  this  way  raised 
to  a  higher  moral  plane.  In  the  twilight  of  words  and 
phrases  the  seductive  idea,  like  a  lady  of  doubtful  virtue 
and  waning  beauty,  was  arranged  in  a  charitable  and  be- 
coming shadow,  and  honesty  was  insulted  by  her  lovers. 

Madison  has  been  bitterly  assailed,  and  not  without 
excuse,  by  the  admirers  of  Hamilton.  Much  has  been  made 
of  apparent  contradictions  in  his  course  of  conduct,  and  of 
changes  in  his  attitude,  towards  men  and  ideas.  His  stead- 
fast advocacy  of  the  Union  at  the  Convention  of  Philadelphia 
has  been  contrasted  with  his  refusal  during  the  first  period 
of  federal  government  to  support  the  measures  by  which 
alone  the  Union  could  be  turned  into  a  reality.  And  from 
this  it  has  been  argued  that  a  sour  jealousy,  and  not  any 
earnest  conviction,  directed  his  actions  during  Washing- 
ton's administration.  But  viewing  the  contest  from  a 
remoter  standpoint,  these  contradictions  and  changes  be- 
come of  less  importance.  The  accusation  of  a  flagrant  and 
interested  inconsistency  fails  to  convince  the  modern  reader 
of  its  justice. 

Madison  was  an  upright,  unimpassioned  man,  but  he  was 
an  idealist  only  under  compulsion.  Diffidence  was  his  most 
remarkable  characteristic.  The  impression  he  makes  upon 
the  mind  is  of  something  unusually  formal  and  precise.  It 


220  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1790  appears  altogether  incredible  that  he  was  upon  any  occasion 
untidy  in  his  dress ;  that  he  ever  mislaid  a  penknife  or  a 
memorandum ;  that  he  ever  shook  with  laughter  or  shouted 
with  joy.  He  is  the  type  of  the  elderly  young  man  who  has 
pleasure  only  in  sedate  company.  His  intellect  was  power- 
ful but  full  of  cobwebs.  We  contrast  it  with  the  intellect 
of  Hamilton,  which  excites  a  certain  measure  of  distrust 
because  of  its  preternatural  and  appalling  perspicacity. 
Men  of  slow  wits  have  admired  Madison  for  his  defects, 
have  judged  him  wise  because  he  shared  their  own  in- 
firmities, and  prudent  because  he  ran  away  from  the  con- 
sequences of  his  opinions.  He  loved  discussion,  though  he 
was  averse  from  wrangling.  In  spite  of  his  temperament 
he  never  shrank,  as  Jefferson  always  did,  from  meeting  his 
enemy  in  the  gate.  He  was  no  less  conspicuous  for  his 
personal  courage  than  for  his  timidity  as  a  statesman.  "  I 
'  think  him  a  little  too  much  of  a  book  politician,  and  too 
'  timid  in  his  politics,"  wrote  Fisher  Ames.  ".  .  .  He  seems 
'  evidently  to  want  manly  firmness  and  energy  of  character."1 
The  reproach,  upon  analysis,  seems  to  resolve  itself  into  this 
— that  he  was  wanting  not  so  much  in  the  courage  of  his 
ideas,  as  in  ideas.  It  was  an  epoch  of  construction,  and  he 
was  deficient  both  in  boldness  and  in  imagination.  As  a  critic 
he  never  lacked  confidence,  but  criticism  was  not  the  supreme 
need  of  the  moment. 

Madison  was  also  peculiarly  subject  to  personal  influence. 
It  has  been  considered  amazing  that,  having  supported  a 
national  policy  at  Philadelphia,  he  should  have  run  counter 
to  it  almost  from  the  beginning  of  the  federal  government. 
But  it  is  really  more  amazing  that  he  took  the  line  he  did 
during  the  convention.  For  his  course  before  that  event  was 
entirely  consistent  with  his  subsequent  action.  It  almost 

1  Fisher  Ames,  History,  iv.  p.  75. 


THE  FEDERALISTS  221 

seems  as  if  at  Philadelphia  he  was  under  some  kind  of  A.D.  1790 
enchantment,  and  advocated  a  policy  which  was  discordant  ^T* 33 
to  some  extent  with  the  natural  mood  of  his  mind.  It  is  no 
surprise,  therefore,  that  he  fell  speedily  under  the  influence 
of  Jefferson,  whose  procedure  was  far  more  sympathetic  to 
his  disposition.  We  have  a  feeling  that  even  at  Philadelphia 
Hamilton  frightened  him.  Hamilton's  methods  were  too 
swift,  his  manner  too  peremptory ;  his  very  confidence  was 
provocative  of  doubt  and  hesitation.  Madison  was  by  nature 
suspicious  of  the  constructive  statesman,  and  inclined  to  the 
belief  that  inaction  was  usually  wisdom  and  action  folly. 
Consequently  he  was  attracted  by  the  Jeffersonian  policy  of 
drifting  into  danger,  preferring  it  to  strenuous  efforts,  even 
though  these  had  for  their  object  to  escape  from  the  fatal 
current. 

It  may  be  true,  but  if  true  it  is  unimportant,  that  he  was 
jealous  of  Hamilton;  for  he  was  in  essentials  too  honest 
a  man  to  be  guided  by  such  considerations.  If  his  tempera- 
ment had  been  sympathetic  to  the  policy  of  Hamilton,  we 
may  believe  he  would  have  supported  that  policy  even 
though  he  had  hated  its  projector.  Even  after  reading  the 
seven  volumes  of  Hamilton  the  younger  we  decline  to  be 
convinced  that  Madison  was  anything  but  a  good  man.  He 
was  a  good  man  in  the  most  intolerable  sense.  His  excessive 
virtue  deprived  him  of  charity.  He  appropriated  all  virtue 
to  himself  and  his  followers.  His  sincerity  upon  this  point 
would  be  detestable  if  it  were  not  so  ludicrous.  He  believed 
fanatically  that  his  opponents  were  utterly  corrupt.  He 
made  and  permitted  to  be  made,  under  the  shelter  of  his 
name,  the  grossest  charges  against  their  personal  honour, 
charges  which  his  common-sense  must  have  told  him  clearly 
were  nothing  better  than  rubbish  had  he  not  been  wholly 
possessed  by  this  illusion  as  to  his  sole  property  in  virtue. 

From  the  date  of  his  opposition  to  Hamilton's  proposals 


222  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1790  for  dealing  with  the  debt  his  course  of  action  towards  his 
1  former  friend  is  wanting  not  merely  in  generosity  but  in 
candour.  At  every  point  his  constitutional  antipathy  to 
constructive  statesmanship  appears;  but  there  is  also  a 
more  bitter  and  personal  accent  of  hostility  which  can  be 
traced  to  the  resentment  of  one  who,  having  been  temporarily 
led  out  of  his  natural  course  by  the  influence  of  a  superior 
character,  has  returned  to  his  ancient  habits  and  looks  back 
upon  his  aberration  with  horror.  His  manner  towards 
Hamilton  from  this  time  forward  is  always  grudging.  His 
favourite  weapon  is  that  of  the  common  politician — the 
suggestion  of  motives  so  mean  that  they  are  wholly  in- 
credible. The  triviality  of  his  attacks  is  painful.  The  dis- 
interested reader  turns  the  pages  quickly,  anxious  not  to 
dwell  too  long  upon  the  humiliation  of  a  worthy  gentleman, 
whose  friends,  had  they  been  true  ones,  would  often  have 
drowned  his  eloquence  in  a  discreet  tumult  or  would  have 
led  him  away  to  recover  his  sense  and  his  dignity. 

In  the  end  Hamilton  carried  his  point  as  to  the  federal 
debts,  and  vindicated  the  sanctity  of  contract  all  along  the 
line.  He  routed  with  equal  success  the  people  who  wished 
to  escape  taxes,  though  they  had  profited  by  the  loans,  and 
those  others  who  professed  themselves  willing  to  pay,  pro- 
vided that  a  portion  of  the  funds  were  taken  away  from  the 
legal  holders  and  given  in  charity.  The  federal  debts,  both 
foreign  and  domestic,  were  in  the  end  recognised  and  con- 
solidated, and  provision  made  for  full  payment  of  all  the 
arrears  of  interest. 

The  assumption  of  the  state  debts  was  a  harder  matter. 
States  which  had  incurred  small  debts,  or  none,  upon 
account  of  the  war,  were  persuaded  without  much  difficulty 
to  regard  it  as  monstrously  unfair  that  the  large  debts  of 
their  neighbours  should  be  saddled  upon  the  Union.  The 
mere  difference  in  the  amounts  stank  of  injustice  to  the 


THE  FEDERALISTS  223 

simpler  class  of  citizens,  while  for  the  more  refined  there  A.D.  1790 
was  the  argument  that  the  heavily  indebted  states  must    ^T-33 
have  been  negligently  administered.      Opponents   of   the 
government  policy  clamoured  for  a  hostile  and  searching 
scrutiny  of  reasons,  expenditure  and  accounts. 

By  such  means  it  was  made  to  appear  that  a  certain 
corporate  dignity  was  outraged  by  Hamilton's  high-handed 
procedure.  Finally  Congress,1  by  a  majority  of  two,  refused 
Hamilton's  proposal  to  take  over  the  war  debts  which  the 
states  individually  had  incurred  for  the  common  good. 

Hamilton  determined  to  have  this  decision  reversed,  and 
he  accomplished  his  end  in  a  characteristic  fashion  by  giving 
a  civility  in  exchange  for  a  loaf  of  bread.  It  so  happened 
that  the  states  of  little  debts,  and  therefore  disposed 
against  assumption,  were  for  the  most  part  southern  states, 
while  those  of  big  debts  were  mainly  northern.  Each 
of  these  parties  desired,  for  sentimental  reasons,  that  the 
capital  of  the  Federal  Republic  should  be  fixed  within  its 
own  boundaries.  Hamilton  spoke  with  Jefferson,  who  was 
of  the  southern  party,  and  Jefferson  gave  a  dinner-party. 
Being,  according  to  his  own  account,  but  a  child  in  such 
matters,  he  remained  silent,  and  allowed  his  guests  to  talk. 
As  the  result  a  compact  was  arrived  at  whereby  the 
majority  adverse  to  assumption  of  the  state  debts  was 
converted  into  a  minority,2  and  the  south  in  return  was 
allowed  to  possess  the  honour  of  the  capital  city  of  tho 
Union.3 

In  his  treatment  of  the  debt  Hamilton  was  not  concerned 
merely  with  the  honour  of  his  country,  nor  did  he  regard 
the  matter  only  with  the  merchant's  eye  to  the  advantages 
of  good  credit  in  case  of  further  troubles.  His  measures 
were  something  more  than  financial.  They  had  a  deliberate 
political  intention.  The  constitution,  as  has  been  stated 

1  12th  April  1790.         *  July  1790.          »  Ford's  Je/erson,  i.  pp.  161-62. 


224  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.     already,  did  not  entirely  satisfy  him.     He  felt  that  the  plain 
90-1791 
2Er.  33-34 


1791  meaning  of  its  terms  did  not  convey  sufficient  power  to  the 


administration,  nor  secure  beyond  question  solidarity  in 
the  Union.  His  efforts  accordingly  were  directed  towards 
supplementing  its  deficiencies. 

The  political  object  of  his  financial  policy  was  to  bind  the 
moneyed  classes  firmly  to,  the  central  government ;  to  induce 
them  to  look  to  that  quarter  for  the  security  of  their  capital 
and  the  punctuality  of  their  dividends ;  to  fix  their  interests 
in  it  rather  than  in  the  state  governments.  The  interests 
of  this  powerful  class  being  thus  made  dependent  upon  the 
existence  of  the  Union,  it  was  natural  to  suppose  that  they 
would  cherish  it  and  contribute  to  its  strength,  as  the  family 
of  a  man  whose  wealth  is  in  annuities  zealously  and  tenderly 
endeavours  to  prolong  his  days  in  peace.  It  was  a  legitimate 
aim,  but  it  could  hardly  hope  to  escape  opposition  when 
once  its  purpose  was  fully  detected. 

Hamilton  claimed  for  his  measures  that  they  would 
'  cement  more  closely  the  union  of  the  states '  and  '  establish 
public  order  on  the  basis  of  an  upright  and  liberal  policy.' 1 
He  was  fully  aware  that,  if  successful,  they  would  strengthen 
the  central  government  in  comparison  with  the  state 
governments — to  a  large  extent,  indeed  to  the  detriment  of 
the  latter — by  assuming  a  great  portion  of  their  respon- 
sibilities, and  by  identifying  and  allying  the  safety  and  self- 
interest  of  the  creditors  with  the  power  and  permanency 
of  the  federal  authority.  It  was  a  deliberate  aim,  and  it 
succeeded.  The  champions  of  State  Rights  who  had 
opposed  the  constitution  naturally  strove  against  these 
extensions  of  its  hated  principles  with  the  energy  of  despair. 
This  zealous  panic  swept  many  of  the  timid  and  hesitating 
off  their  feet,  Madison  among  the  number.  It  gathered  up 
also  in  its  course  all  the  disappointed,  all  the  feeble,  critical 

1   Works,  ii.  p.  232. 


THE  FEDERALISTS  225 

and  disaffected  folk  whose  ardour  and  constancy  were  not     A.D. 

1790-17 
Ms.  33-34 


sufficiently  tempered  to  carry  them  beyond  the  threshold  of  179° 


Union  on  into  its  consequences. 

The  establishment  of  the  National  Bank  during  the  next 
session  of  Congress  (1791)  carried  this  policy  of  allying 
property  with  order  a  step  further.  Its  practical  advantages 
were  obvious,  the  necessity  for  it  overwhelming.  Commerce 
was  in  a  diseased  condition,  suffering  from  a  kind  of 
paralysis.  Natural  wealth  and  human  industry  existed  in 
abundance;  but  any  means  of  making  capital  sufficiently 
mobile  for  the  uses  of  mankind  was  altogether  absent. 
Credit  and  confidence  were  lacking.  The  want  of  the 
facilities  of  exchange  and  of  a  reliable  medium  of  circula- 
tion had  reduced  portions  of  society  to  the  primitive  and 
laborious  methods  of  barter.  Hamilton's  policy  was  boldly 
opposed  to  the  doctrine  of  laisser  faire.  In  his  opinion  it 
was  the  duty  of  the  state,  in  these  circumstances,  not 
merely  to  preserve  security  and  order,  but  actually  to  create 
credit.  He  laid  this  down  as  a  legitimate  function  of 
government ;  and,  in  spite  of  the  opposition  which  deplored 
a  further  increase  in  the  stability  and  influence  of  the 
central  government,  the  practical  urgency  of  the  remedy 
secured  its  adoption  by  Congress. 

But  a  more  serious  obstacle  then  remained  to  be  sur- 
mounted. The  question  of  legality  was  raised,  and  the 
President  was  known  to  entertain  doubts.  Banking  was 
alleged  to  be  outside  the  four  corners  of  the  constitution ;  a 
thing  which  could  not  be  undertaken  lawfully  by  the  central 
government.  Jefferson,  Madison  and  others  laboured  this 
argument  in  minutes  and  memoranda  which  Washington 
carefully  considered.  Hamilton,  in  reply,  set  up  the 
doctrine  of  implied  powers.1  If  nothing  could  be  done 
that  was  not  expressly  named  in  the  articles  of  union, 

1   Works,  iv.  pp.  445-93. 
P 


226  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1791  these  articles  could  never  fit  the  uses  of  a  great  and  de- 
^T<34  veloping  state.  The  constitution  under  so  strict  an  inter- 
pretation would  be  but  a  lifeless  legal  document  and 
nothing  more ;  a  bone  for  dogs  to  quarrel  over  and  not  a 
rod  to  govern  with.  This  constitution,  Hamilton  contended, 
was,  and  was  meant  to  be,  merely  an  outline.  It  was  neces- 
sary to  look  at  its  great  intention,  and  to  judge  it  to  be  the 
possessor  of  all  the  powers  implied  in  that  intention.  The 
Secretary  of  the  Treasury  prevailed  and  the  President 
signed,1  and  the  greatest  jurist  of  the  early  days  of  the 
Republic2  decided  that  Hamilton  was  right  and  his 
opponents  wrong. 

The  passing  of  the  Bank  Bill  was  an  important  landmark. 
The  main  principles  of  Hamilton's  financial  system  were 
then  established.  The  framework  was  complete.  Speaking 
broadly,  he  had  succeeded  at  every  important  point.  His 
measures,  it  is  true,  had  suffered  certain  changes  during 
their  progress  through  the  two  houses  of  Congress.  It  had 
been  necessary  to  make  concessions  in  detail  in  order  to 
save  the  spirit  of  his  policy.  Nor  do  these  concessions 
appear  in  any  case  to  have  been  improvements  upon  the 
original  plan.  Where  there  had  been  a  direct  simplicity 
they  introduced  a  certain  confusion.  They  shrank  from  a 
full  acceptance  of  the  highest  standard  of  financial  integrity, 
and  aimed  rather  at  doing  substantial  justice  than  at  boldly 
affixing  the  seal  to  any  great  principle  of  finance.8  Con- 
sequently they  failed  to  secure  the  absolute  safety  of  the 
policy,  which  in  subsequent  sessions  had  to  suffer  many 
attacks  and  did  not  come  off  entirely  scatheless.  But  on 
the  whole,  when  we  consider  all  the  difficulties  of  the  case, 
and  make  due  allowance  for  the  effect  of  Hamilton's  exclu- 

1  25th  Feb.  1791.  2  John  Marshall,  History,  iv.  p.  489. 

8  Cf.  History,  iv.  pp.  145-50,  where  the  measures  as  passed  are  compared 
with  the  measures  as  originally  drafted. 


THE  FEDERALISTS  227 

sion  from  the  discussion,  his  triumph  was  one  of  the  most  A.D.  1791 
remarkable  order. 

For  another  reason  also  the  passing  of  the  Bank  Bill  was 
an  important  landmark.  The  cleavage  in  the  cabinet  dates 
from  this  event.  Jefferson  was  hostile  to  the  measure  upon 
every  ground.  He  regarded  it  as  an  invasion  of  State 
Rights  and  an  infringement  of  the  constitution.  In  his 
opinion  it  had  no  practical  merits,  and  violated  every 
sound  principle  of  law  directed  against  mortmain,  alienage, 
descent,  distribution  and  monopoly.  After  the  cabinet 
discussions  upon  this  question,  the  correspondence  of  Jeffer- 
son with  Hamilton,  which  only  a  month  earlier  had  been 
'  yours  respectfully  and  affectionately/ 1  passes  into  the 
third  person.  Henceforward  there  was  no  friendship 
between  the  two  men,  and  very  soon  their  enmity  became 
a  public  scandal. 

From  the  summer  of  1790,  when  the  assumption  and 
funding  of  the  debt  were  finally  settled,  there  was  a  rapid 
and  steady  increase  of  prosperity  throughout  the  country.2 
Hamilton's  immediate  aim  was  realised  even  beyond  his 
hopes.  A  conspicuous  benefit  to  the  nation  had  attended 
his  earliest  measures.  Within  eighteen  months  Britain  was 
so  much  impressed  that  she  accredited  an  agent  to  the 
government  of  the  United  States.3  At  the  beginning  of 
1791  a  loan  of  two  and  a  half  millions  of  florins  was 
opened  in  Holland,  and  filled  in  two  hours  upon  better 
terms  than  could  be  obtained  by  any  European  power  save 
Britain.4  The  subscriptions  to  the  National  Bank  were 
completed  in  a  single  day.6  Carried  away  by  the  sudden 
change  from  bankruptcy  to  credit,  men  lost  their  heads, 
and  in  spite  of  Hamilton's  earnest  protests6  engaged  in 
the  wildest  speculation.  As  a  matter  of  course  the  panic 

1  History,  iv.  p.  280.          2  Ibid.  iv.  pp.  281-82.  3  Ibid.  iv.  p.  286. 

4  Ibid.  6  Ibid.  «  Ibid.  iv.  p.  287-88. 


228  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1791  which  ensued  caused  much  distress  while  it  lasted,  but 
^ET'34  was  speedily  overcome.  The  chief  evil  was  rather  the 
handle  it  gave  to  the  prophets  of  evil  among  the  opposition 
than  any  permanent  damage  to  the  community.  It  was 
attributable  in  no  sense  to  Hamilton's  measures,  but  only 
to  the  folly  and  cupidity  of  a  section  of  the  people. 

The  first  Congress  ended  its  existence  a  week  after  the 
Bank  Bill  had  passed  into  law. 

CHAPTER  VI 

Commerce  and  the  Union 

AT  the  beginning  of  December  1791,  a  few  days  after  the 
opening  of  the  first  session  of  the  second  Congress,  Hamilton 
submitted  to  the  House  of  Representatives  a  report  on 
Manufactures.1  The  policy  advocated  in  this  document 
was  something  much  more  than  an  outline  or  a  skeleton. 
Its  survey  of  existing  facts  and  conditions  was  comprehen- 
sive; its  aims  definite;  the  action  which  it  recommended 
was  in  full  accord  with  the  spirit  of  his  previous  measures. 
Self-contained  and  independent,  it  was  none  the  less  an 
essential  part  of  the  great  federal  plan. 

Of  the  important  proposals  introduced  and  urged  by 
Hamilton  this  alone  was  not  accepted  by  the  nation  during 
his  lifetime.  It  has  even  been  alleged  that  he  did  not 
expect  it  to  be  accepted  by  his  contemporaries ;  but  it  seems 
incredible  that  he  should  have  intended  it  merely  as  a  legacy. 
For  not  only  is  it  entirety  contrary  to  our  conception  of  the 
remarkably  practical  character  of  Hamilton's  statesmanship 
that  he  should  engage  in  anything  which  he  did  not  believe  to 
be  ripe  for  accomplishment,  but  the  internal  evidence  of  the 
Report  itself  is  conclusive.  It  enters  into  the  most  business- 
like details.  It  is  filled  with  concrete  arguments  drawn  from 

1  Works,  iv.  pp.  70-202. 


THE  FEDERALISTS  229 

the  hard  facts  of  the  year  seventeen  hundred  and  ninety-one  A.D.  1791 
when  it  was  written.  It  is  restrained  and  reasonable,  per-  Tg  34 
suasive  and  disarming.  Its  eagerness  and  hope  stamp  it  as 
having  had  an  immediate  object  and  not  a  remote  one.  A 
man  does  not  write  like  this  to  give  advice  to  posterity,  but 
only  to  wring  the  necessary  consent  from  to-day.  Haste  is 
visible  in  every  page,  but  nowhere  impatience.  The  docu- 
ment has  the  appearance  of  a  letter  that  has  been  written 
at  unnecessary  length,  because  the  occasion  was  pressing 
and  the  writer  lacked  the  leisure  to  prune  it  to  a  more 
sententious  form.  It  recalls  the  correspondence  of  Bismarck 
with  its  rough,  careless  logic  and  vigorous  redundancy.  It 
is  wanting  in  compactness  but  never  for  a  moment  in 
lucidity.  He  repeats  the  same  argument  in  slightly  different 
forms,  but  there  is  never  the  slightest  doubt  either  as  to 
what  he  wishes  to  do  or  as  to  why  he  wishes  to  do  it.  As  a 
state  document  it  stands  in  the  first  rank,  not  only  by  virtue 
of  its  quality  of  thought,  but  by  reason  of  its  ultimate 
authority.  The  report  on  Manufactures  is  filled  with  the 
personal  charm  of  the  author  and  with  the  hopefulness  and 
sincerity  of  youth,  but  at  the  same  time  it  is  as  clear  and 
shrewd  as  the  letters  of  a  banker  to  his  agent  or  a  merchant's 
valuation  of  his  stock.  It  is  a  strange  but  distinguished 
figure  among  state  documents  in  all  their  great  variety; 
but  perhaps  still  stranger  and  more  distinguished  when  it  is 
remembered  that  the  theme  on  which  it  is  written  has  been 
named  '  the  dismal  science.' 

Adam  Smith's  Wealth  of  Nations  had  appeared  in  1776 — 
the  first  year  of  the  American  Revolution.  Hamilton  had 
studied  the  book  with  care,  and  had  written  a  commentary 
upon  it,  which  unfortunately  has  been  lost.1  The  contact  of 

1  Mr.  Sumner  doubts  this,  but  his  argument  does  not  seem  conclusive 
against  J.  C.  Hamilton's  statements,  History,  ii.  p.  514,  on  the  authority  of 
P.  S.  Duponceau  (1783).  The  commentary  was  written  while  Hamilton  was 
still  a  member  of  Congress  (Sumner's  Hamilton,  p.  108). 


230  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1791  two  brains  so  fresh  and  original,  and  so  free  from  cant,  was 
'ET'  34  too  valuable  to  have  gone  into  the  dust-heap.  Adam  Smith, 
the  absent-minded  student  and  philosopher,  educated  at  a 
Scots  university,  matured  by  seven  years'  study  at  Oxford, 
had  been  appointed  in  due  time  to  lecture  upon  Logic 
and  Moral  Philosophy  to  the  undergraduates  of  Glasgow. 
Friendly,  interested  and  clear-eyed,  he  mixed  in  the  society 
of  the  merchants  and  manufacturers  of  that  thriving  city, 
drank  their  claret  and  joined  in  their  discussions;  and  while 
he  continued  to  lecture  on  logic  and  ethics,  on  rhetoric  and 
the  belles  lettres,  in  accordance  with  the  terms  of  his  founda- 
tion, his  mind  began  to  revolve  the  problems  of  the  wealth 
of  nations  as  a  subordinate  part  of  "  an  immense  design  of 
'  showing  the  origin  and  development  of  cultivation  and 
'  law ;  or,  as  we  may  perhaps  put  it,  not  inappropriately,  of 
'  saying  how,  from  being  a  savage,  man  rose  to  be  a  Scots- 
'  man." 1  Whatever  may  have  been  the  case  with  the  rest 
of  his  speculations,  those  affecting  commerce  were  founded 
upon  the  study  of  the  facts  at  first  hand. 

Adam  Smith  published  a  book  on  the  Moral  Sentiments, 
and  on  the  strength  of  the  reputation  it  produced,  was 
appointed  bear-leader  of  the  young  Duke  of  Buccleuch, 
whom  it  was  decided  to  send  upon  the  grand  tour.  In  this 
capacity  he  travelled  for  three  years  in  Europe,  spending 
most  of  his  time  in  France,  and  studying  the  conditions  of 
humanity  everywhere  with  an  eager  eye.  When  he  returned, 
he  lived  for  ten  years  quietly  with  his  mother  in  the  village 
of  Kirkcaldy  in  the  ancient  kingdom  of  Fife,  meditating 
upon  the  plan  of  his  life's  work  without  excessive  impa- 
tience. When  sixty-three  years  of  age  he  published  the 
Wealth  of  Nations,  the  first  instalment  of  this  great  plan 
and  also  the  last;  for  the  fame  of  it  procured  him  the 
appointment  of  Commissioner  of  Customs,  and  during  the 

1  Bagehot,  Biographical  Studies,  p.  255. 


THE  FEDERALISTS  231 

remaining  fourteen  years  of  his  life  he  lived  very  comfort-  A.D.  1791 
ably  in  Edinburgh  society,  performing  a  task  for  which  he    ^Tt  34 
was  entirely  unfitted. 

Adam  Smith  cannot  have  been  conscious  of  the  immense 
influence  his  famous  work  would  afterwards  exercise  upon 
the  fortunes  of  his  country.  He  was  an  elderly  philosopher 
contemplating  the  conditions  of  an  old  world,  that  had  not 
yet  begun  to  renew  its  youth,  in  a  spirit  of  gentle  curiosity. 
Hamilton  was  a  young  statesman  considering  the  future  of 
a  great  continent  which  he  had  the  ambition  to  mould,  not 
only  by  the  force  of  his  thoughts,  but  by  the  vigour  of  his 
acts.  In  Adam  Smith  he  found  a  lucid  analysis  of  causes 
he  had  been  revolving,  a  discussion  of  systems  he  had  been 
constructing  in  his  own  mind  with  a  determination  to  bring 
them  into  operation  as  soon  as  opportunity  should  make  it 
possible.  In  their  conclusions  there  was  doubtless  some  dis- 
agreement, but  they  were  at  one  at  least  in  their  method ; 
in  their  preference  for  observation  of  the  facts  at  first  hand 
over  all  the  other  and  easier  ways  of  arriving  at  conclusions 
in  political  science. 

Hamilton's  report  urges  the  importance  of  the  immediate 
establishment  of  manufactures  upon  two  fundamental 
reasons  —  military  security  and  national  development. 
"Not  only  the  wealth  but  the  independence  and  security 
'  of  a  country  appear  to  be  materially  connected  with  the 
'  prosperity  of  manufactures.  Every  nation,  with  a  view  to 
'  those  great  objects,  ought  to  endeavour  to  possess  within 
1  itself  all  the  essentials  of  national  supply.  These  comprise 
*  the  means  of  subsistence,  habitation,  clothing,  and  defence. 

'  The  possession  of  these  is  necessary  to  the  perfection  of 
'  the  body  politic  ;  to  the  safety  as  well  as  to  the  welfare  of 
1  the  society.  The  want  of  either  is  the  want  of  an  important 
'  organ  of  political  life  and  motion ;  and  in  the  various  crises 
'  which  await  a  state  it  must  severely  feel  the  effects  of 


232  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1791  '  any  such  deficiency.  The  extreme  embarrassments  of  the 
JEfS' 34  '  United  States  during  the  late  war,  from  an  incapacity  of 
'  supplying  themselves,  are  still  matter  of  keen  recollection ; 
1  a  future  war  might  be  expected  again  to  exemplify  the 
'  mischiefs  and  dangers  of  a  situation  to  which  that  incapacity 
'  is  still,  in  too  great  a  degree,  applicable,  unless  changed  by 
'  timely  and  vigorous  exertion.  To  effect  this  change,  as 
'  fast  as  shall  be  prudent,  merits  all  the  attention  and  all  the 
'  zeal  of  our  public  councils  :  it  is  the  next  great  work  to  be 
'  accomplished." 1 

But  national  development  requires,  no  less  than  military 
security,  manufacturers  and  traders  in  addition  to  farmers 
and  planters.  It  is  a  question  of  good  husbandry.  The 
human  and  material  resources  o,f  the  imperial  estate  must 
both  engage  the  attention  of  government.  If  military  security 
calls  for  a  self-contained  and  self-sufficing  confederation, 
commercial  security  and  national  wellbeing  demand  a  de- 
velopment which  shall  be  symmetrical  and  not  lopsided, 
a  society  of  varied  enterprise  and  multitudinous  employ- 
ments. A  nation  of  specialists,  whether  farmers  or  bankers, 
manufacturers  or  traders,  lacks  the  essential  condition  of 
permanency,  for  its  various  parts  do  not  afford  an  adequate 
support  one  to  another.  Its  wealth  depends  upon  its  inter- 
course with  foreign  nations.  If  circumstances  should  arise 
when  this  intercourse  is  violently  interrupted,  if  its  supplies 
are  cut  off,  or  its  surplus  goods  refused,  it  will  experience 
a  shock,  ruinous  to  a  greater  or  less  extent.  The  wars, 
disasters  and  policies  of  strangers  are  a  constant  menace 
to  its  prosperity.  It  is  at  the  mercy,  not  only  of  the  malice 
of  its  rivals,  but  of  the  misfortunes  of  its  friends. 

But  there  is  an  argument  beyond  mere  commercial  safety. 
The  development  of  a  nation  will  be  much  more  rapid  if  it 
encourages  a  town  population  to  support  its  country  people ; 
1  Works,  iv.  pp.  135,  136. 


THE  FEDERALISTS  233 

artisans  to  consume  the  produce  of  the  fields,  farmers  to  A.D.  1791 
employ  the  output  of  the  mills.     The  establishment  of  work-       T' 
shops  will  therefore  prove  a  benefit  to  the  United  States 
by  '  creating  in  some  instances  a  new,  and  securing,  in  all, 
a  more  certain  and  steady  demand  for  the  produce  of  the 
soil.'  i 

Moreover,  in  a  fully  developed  community  the  natural 
genius,  aptitude  and  inclination  of  every  man  desiring  to 
earn  his  living  will  readily  find  work  suitable  to  his  character. 
It  clearly  makes  for  the  wealth  of  any  country  if  it  can 
'furnish  greater  scope  for  the  diversity  of  talents  and  dis- 
positions which  discriminate  men  from  each  other.'2  In 
such  a  state  also  employment  will  be  found  for  classes  of 
the  community  not  hitherto  engaged  in  business:  for  the 
wives  and  daughters  of  husbandmen  who  would  otherwise 
be  idle,  or  insufficiently  or  less  remuneratively  employed. 

The  immigration  of  good  citizens  will  be  stimulated.  Manu- 
facturers and  workmen  of  the  Old  World,  impatient  of  its 
'burthens  and  restraints,'  attracted  by  their  "greater  personal 
'  independence  and  consequence  under  the  operation  of  a 
'  more  equal  government,"  tempted  also  by  the  boon  of  "  a 
'  perfect  equality  of  religious  privileges  .  .  .  more  precious 
'  than  mere  religious  toleration,"  will  flock  into  such  a  state 
if  only  they  can  be  inspired  with  the  hope  of  being  able 
to  pursue  their  own  trades  and  industries  there  'with  an 
assurance  of  encouragement  and  employment.' 3  But  these 
men,  the  best  and  the  most  intelligent  of  the  middle  and 
working  classes  of  Europe,  will  not  transplant  themselves 
without  excessive  provocation,  if  by  emigrating  they  have  no 
alternative  to  engaging  in  agriculture,  an  avocation  to  which 
they  have  served  no  training,  and  the  pursuit  of  which 
would  entail  the  sacrifice  of  all  their  technical  skill  and 
inherited  experience. 

1  Works,  iv.  p.  87.  2  Ibid.  3  Ibid.  p.  92. 


234  ALEXANDEE  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1791  To  this  composite  and  self-contained  state  will  also  accrue 
T  the  advantages  of  a  scientific  division  of  labour,  whereby 
the  national  prosperity  is  increased  through  men  becoming 
experts  in  particular  departments.  And  as  the  minds  and 
characters  of  the  people  are  like  a  natural  field  of  various 
soils  that  may  be  cultivated,  well  or  ill,  suitably  or  unsuit- 
ably, just  as  much  as  swamps  of  rice,  or  acres  of  corn,  or 
plantations  of  tobacco,  the  state  which  develops  at  the 
same  time  in  a  multitude  of  directions  will  reap  a  benefit 
in  a  political  as  well  as  in  a  commercial  sense — both  directly 
in  its  wealth  and  indirectly  in  the  character  of  its  citizens. 
Its  varied  opportunities  will  "cherish  and  stimulate  the 
'  activity  of  the  human  mind  by  multiplying  the  objects 
'  of  enterprise."1  The  imaginations  of  the  restless  and 
ambitious  spirits  will  be  touched  with  a  magic  wand. 
"Every  new  scene  which  is  opened  to  the  busy  nature  of 
'  man  to  rouse  and  excite  itself,  is  the  addition  of  a  new 
'  energy  to  the  general  stock  of  effort.  The  spirit  of  enter- 
'  prise,  useful  and  prolific  as  it  is,  must  necessarily  be 
'  contracted  or  expanded,  in  proportion  to  the  simplicity  or 

*  variety  of  the  occupations  and  productions  which  are  to  be 
'  found  in  a  society.     It  must  be  less  in  a  nation  of  mere 
'  cultivators  than  in  a  nation  of  cultivators  and  merchants ; 

*  less  in  a  nation  of  cultivators  and  merchants  than  in  a 
'  nation  of  cultivators,  artificers,  and  merchants." 2 

With  the  utmost  care  and  tenderness,  avoiding  the  con- 
tentious phrase  and  all  words  of  provocation,  Hamilton 
examines  in  turn  a  variety  of  arguments  and  opinions  that 
had  been  urged  and  held  at  different  times  against  the 
establishment  of  manufactures  in  general,  and  in  the  peculiar 
circumstances  of  the  states.  The  old  doctrine  of  Quesnay 
and  the  ficonomistes,  that  agriculture  is  more  profitable  than 
the  labour  of  the  mill  and  workshop,  because  in  the  fields 

1  Works,  iv.  p.  94.  a  Ibid.  iv.  pp.  94,  95. 


THE  FEDERALISTS  235 

man  works  with  Nature  as  a  partner,  but  in  the  other  case  A.D.  1791 
man  works  alone,  is  examined  at  a  length  and  with  such    ^ET<34 
respect  as  somewhat  amazes  us  at  the  present  time.    Hamil- 
ton meets  the  contention  that  labour  would  be  diverted 
from  the  land,  and   that  the  narrow  capital  of  the  new 
empire  would  be  insufficient  for  engaging  in  a  competition 
with  Europe,  and  other  arguments  of  the  same  character 
with  a  respectful  eagerness  and  a  good  nature  that  are  full 
of  persuasiveness. 

Having  established  the  necessity  of  manufactures  on  the 
grounds  of  military  security  and  national  development, 
having  proved  the  advantages,  direct  and  indirect,  to  wealth 
and  character,  to  stability  and  progress,  of  a  composite  and 
well-balanced  industrial  society,  he  comes  to  the  practical 
consideration — how  is  such  a  condition  of  things  to  be. 
created  ? 

It  had  never  been  allowed  to  exist  in  the  colonies,  but  it 
showed  hardly  greater  signs  of  life  in  the  free  republic.  It 
might  never  exist.  It  certainly  would  not  come  to  pass 
speedily  if  left  to  the  action  of  individuals.  To  consummate 
the  federalist  policy  a  rapid  prosperity  was  of  the  highest 
importance,  and  this  would  only  be  attained  under  the  care 
and  direction  of  government.  It  was  the  function  of  the 
state,  according  to  Hamilton's  argument,  to  provide  induce- 
ments that  would  make  men  engage  readily  in  manufacture ; 
to  sustain  the  young  industries  against  the  ruthless  and 
deliberate  assaults  of  more  powerful  communities;  to  meet 
the  commercial  regulations  of  foreigners  with  a  vigorous  and 
consistent  policy  of  national  defence. 

He  viewed  his  country  ever  as  a  whole.  States  and  divi- 
sions meant  nothing  to  him.  Local  sentiment  affected  him 
with  so  little  sympathy  that  he  failed,  except  on  one  occasion,1 
even  to  use  it  as  a  weapon.  In  his  imagination  there  was  a 

1  Ante,  p.  223. 


236  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1791  great  continent  united  by  a  miraculous  good  fortune  into  one 
JErs'  34  state,  of  unknown  extent,  of  undefined  limits,  unexplored  and 
uninhabited  save  for  a  fringe  along  the  Atlantic  seaboard, 
but  surmised  to  be  habitable  and  fertile  throughout  the 
length  and  breadth  of  its  territories.  The  rapid  development 
of  this  great  inheritance  meant  much  more  to  Hamilton's 
mind  than  the  mere  addition  of  so  many  families  and  so 
much  wealth  to  the  national  stock.  It  meant  the  oblitera- 
tion of  state  rivalry  and  the  sweeping  out,  as  by  a  flood,  of 
the  litter  and  decay  of  ancient  jealousies.  Its  ultimate  inten- 
tion, like  all  the  rest  of  his  policy,  was  union.  His  vision 
was  of  one  great  nation,  capable  of  producing  within  its  own 
wide  borders  everything  that  its  citizens  would  require  for 
life,  for  comfort,  and  even  for  luxury.  Independent  of  its 
neighbours,  it  might  hope  to  escape  from  embroilment  in 
their  quarrels ;  dependent  on  the  co-operation  of  its  members, 
it  would  be  secured  in  the  possession  of  internal  peace.  But 
a  lopsided  expansion,  an  absorption  of  nine-tenths  of  the 
inhabitants  in  pastoral  and  agricultural  pursuits,  was  in  his 
opinion  neither  a  swift  nor  a  sure  means  to  this  end.  Such 
a  development  was  more  likely  to  occur,  was  in  a  sense 
easier  and  more  natural  than  the  other ;  but  as  a  gardener 
will  take  pains  to  secure  an  even  and  symmetrical  growth 
in  his  plantation,  by  pruning,  by  the  removal  of  obstacles 
at  the  roots,  by  the  admission  of  light,  by  the  destruction 
of  oppressive  neighbours,  by  defence  against  the  winds  and 
storms ;  so,  he  argued,  should  the  state  regard  it  as  one  of 
its  most  important  duties  to  promote  a  healthy  industrial 
society  of  varied  employments  which  gave  mutual  support. 

The  reply  of  the  economist  that  all  this  would  come  to 
pass  in  good  time  if  it  were  really  desirable,  failed  to  satisfy 
him.  There  is  no  such  great  hurry,  argued  his  opponents. 
The  intelligent  self-interest  of  the  individual  will  produce 
manufactures  in  their  proper  season.  His  opponents  spun 


THE  FEDERALISTS  237 

amiable  theories  on  the  nature  of  the  economic  man — and  A.D.  1791 
hazarded  sanguine  prophecies  of  his   glorious  destiny,  if       T< 
left  to  his  own  devices,  without  help  or  hindrance  from 
government. 

Hamilton  believed  in  the  possibility  of  a  commercial 
policy.  The  doctrine  of  laisser  faire  did  not  appeal  to 
him  any  more  than  it  would  have  appealed  to  a  tobacco- 
planter  in  reference  to  the  cultivation  of  his  estate.  The 
effort,  it  is  true,  can  only  come  from  the  individual,  as 
the  sap  can  only  come  from  the  soil ;  but  the  direction  of 
effort,  if  it  is  not  to  run  to  waste,  must  come  from  elsewhere. 
There  are  things  desirable  in  commerce  too  big,  and  by  their 
nature  impossible,  for  private  citizens  to  achieve  even  in 
combination.  In  the  frankest  terms  he  disputed  the 
pessimist  creed  of  leaving  things  alone  and  letting  men 
blindly  wander  round  in  hopeless  circles  of  wasted  effort. 
He  contended  that  a  commercial  policy  in  a  positive  and  not 
in  a  negative  sense  was  necessary  in  the  circumstances  of 
the  case. 

Hamilton  had  definitely  committed  himself  to  this  solution 
of  the  problem  when  he  founded  the  National  Bank  with 
the  avowed  object  of  creating  commercial  credit.  It  would 
be  incorrect  to  say  that  the  report  on  Manufactures  carries 
this  policy  one  step  further ;  for  in  reality  it  travels  to  the 
very  end  of  the  journey.  It  contains  both  the  science  and 
the  art  of  modern  commercial  development.  The  policy  that 
has  slowly  and  awkwardly  struggled  into  existence  during 
the  last  quarter  of  the  nineteenth  century,  which  is  pursued 
every  year  with  greater  confidence  and  perspicacity  by  all 
the  great  industrial  nations,  with  the  exception  of  the 
United  Kingdoms,  is  Hamilton's  policy.  He  thought  it  out 
for  himself,  keenly  contemplating  the  commercial  facts  of 
New  York  and  the  New  World,  by  much  the  same  method  as 
Adam  Smith,  the  basis  of  whose  speculations  was  the  trade 


238  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1791  of  Glasgow  and  the  Old  World.  The  reality  and  force  of 
^T' 34  the  writings  of  both  men  are  derived  from  their  intimate 
thoroughness.  The  foundations  of  their  practical  experience 
were  narrow,  but  they  were  firm.  Their  theories  grew  out 
of  the  facts  themselves  and  not  out  of  the  theories  of  other 
men. 

The  state,  in  Hamilton's  view  of  the  matter,  may  create 
the  industrial  conditions  it  desires,  precisely  as  a  landowner 
goes  about  his  forestry.  The  effort  truly  comes  from  the 
nature  of  man  in  the  one  case  and  of  trees  in  the  other ;  but 
if,  possessing  a  waste  of  good  land,  you  would  provide  a  high 
arching  forest  of  oak  for  your  great-grandson  to  cut,  where 
now  there  is  but  a  thin  straggle  of  stunted  trees,  you  will  not 
leave  the  achievement  of  your  design  to  random  gales  sowing 
acorns  fortuitously  from  the  sparse,  indigenous  trees ;  but  you 
will  trench  and  drain,  and  plant,  and  provide  artful  shelter, 
and  clear  the  choking  undergrowth.  You  will  not  create 
the  great  woods,  it  is  true,  for  that  is  the  work  of  nature's 
unintelligent  force;  but  your  direction  is  none  the  less  a 
condition  of  its  creation,  without  which  it  might  never  have 
been,  or  at  the  best  would  have  taken  as  many  centuries  for 
its  growth  as  under  your  plan  it  will  require  decades.  Un- 
combined  human  effort  is  nearly  as  blind  and  unintelligent 
a  force  as  the  nature  of  trees ;  and  the  functions  of  the  state 
and  of  statesmen  were  in  Hamilton's  opinion  the  same  as 
those  of  the  squire  and  his  foresters. 

Having  established  his  principles,  that  it  is  the  interest  of 
the  state  to  possess  the  most  varied  industrial  society,  and 
also  its  duty  to  attempt  the  creation  of  such  conditions,  he 
plunged  into  a  detailed  discussion  of  the  ways  and  means  to 
this  end  in  which  it  is  unnecessary  to  follow  him.  Duties 
and  bounties  and  premiums  have  their  various  uses  for 
different  objects.  Landways  and  waterways  are  to  be 
improved  and  extended  at  the  charge  of  government. 


THE  FEDERALISTS  239 

Inspectors  of  produce  are  to  be  appointed  to  guard  'the  A.D.  1791 
good  name'  by  seeing  that  quality  is  maintained.     Inven-    j3ET-34 
tions  are   to    be  carefully  secured    to    the    inventors.    A 
board  with  ample  funds  at  its  disposal  is  to  devote  itself 
to  the  encouragement  of  arts,  agriculture,  manufactures 
and  commerce. 

Hamilton  was  out  of  sympathy  with  the  orthodox  French 
economists  of  the  eighteenth  century.  He  found  but  little 
virtue  in  their  uncreative  logic.  He  disbelieved  in  the 
Economic  Man — a  being  without  bowels,  with  an  ulterior 
like  a  clock,  accurately  ticking  the  progress  of  the  human 
race  under  the  impulse  of  the  magic  spring  of  enlightened 
self-interest,  and  never  needing  to  be  either  wound  or  regu- 
lated. The  besetting  vice  of  the  economists  was  their  pre- 
ference for  argument  over  observation.  They  based  their 
reasoning  upon  axioms  when  they  should  have  gone  to  the 
facts.  They  conceived  that  they  could  treat  the  wealth  of 
nations  by  a  series  of  propositions  like  those  of  Euclid. 
At  each  stage  they  became  more  and  more  the  victims 
of  words  that  did  not  correspond  with  realities,  of  syllogisms 
that  under  analysis  were  little  more  than  mere  arrangements 
of  phrases.  To  a  large  extent  their  ideas  were  completely 
dead  things,  like  the  conclusions,  paradoxes  and  truisms  of 
the  ingenious  schoolmen  of  the  middle  ages;  as  painfully 
industrious,  as  technically  exquisite,  as  those  samplers 
which  were  sewed  by  our  great-grandmothers,  and  of  nearly 
as  much  use  and  benefit  to  the  world. 

Hamilton,  on  the  other  hand,  saw  the  facts  themselves 
in  a  magic  crystal.  His  clear  view  held  the  closer  objects 
in  an  easy  and  true  proportion;  but  also,  in  the  full 
meaning  of  the  splendid  common  phrase,  it  went  '  far  and 
wide.'  It  was  a  vision  of  bold  extent  and  distant  range. 
He  beheld  a  unity,  where  all  objects  fell  into  place  as  in 
a  picture.  What  his  mind  grasped  and  concerned  itself 


240  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1791  with  was  not  the  advantage  of  a  single  trade  or  group 
^T-34  of  trades,  of  a  single  state  or  group  of  states,  but  the 
advantage  of  the  whole  inheritance.  His  idea  of  good 
statesmanship  was  good  stewardship;  an  active  direction 
and  continuous  effort  towards  an  unmistakable  goal.  It 
was  not  enough,  in  his  opinion,  to  remove  obstructions. 
You  do  not  necessarily  render  a  river  navigable  for  all 
time  merely  by  tearing  out  the  snags  and  other  foreign  im- 
pediments that  lie  there  blocking  the  water-way.  For  there 
are  sandbanks  to  be  dug  away,  channels  to  be  dredged, 
banks  to  be  protected  with  piles,  buttresses  and  groins. 
There  are  precautions  against  flood  and  drought.  There 
are  shiftings  of  the  course,  natural  but  unforeseen;  con- 
ditions that  change  on  a  sudden,  and  a  constant  wear  and 
tear.  To  give  the  greatest  freedom  to  the  force  of  the  river 
may  have  the  undesired  effect  of  creating,  as  the  final  result, 
a  wide  impracticable  shallow  through  which  no  barge  of 
commerce  can  ever  hope  to  penetrate. 


CHAPTER  YII 

Stewardship  of  the  Estate 

THE  wisest  commercial  policy  that  ever  came  out  of  the 
human  brain  could  never  hope,  it  was  contended  by  Hamil- 
ton's opponents,  for  a  richer  fruitfulness  in  its  effect  than  to 
benefit  certain  classes  at  the  expense  of  the  community, 
certain  trades  to  the  detriment  of  commercial  society, 
certain  towns,  districts,  states,  or  groups  of  states  against 
the  best  interests  of  the  nation.  This  proposition  being  laid 
down  with  greater  or  less  plausibility  by  many  speakers  and 
writers  as  one  of  the  laws  of  nature,  unalterable  by  any 
contrivance  of  man,  their  argument  proceeded  in  perfect 


THE  FEDERALISTS  241 

order  to  the  inference  that  Hamilton's  real  but  unavowed  A.D.  1791 
intention  must  therefore  be  the  advantage  of  private  indi-    ^T<  34 
viduals  and  particular  sections. 

Hamilton  met  his  opponents  upon  both  grounds.  With 
much  detail  he  proceeded  to  show  how  a  commercial  policy 
was  capable  in  intelligent  hands  of  benefiting  the  nation  as  a 
whole.  As  for  the  personal  accusation,  his  career  from  first 
to  last  had  been  such  as  to  render  it  incredible  to  any  sane 
man,  but  more  especially  to  his  present  critics,  who,  in 
former  contests,  had  incessantly  taunted  him  with  his 
indifference  to  local  privileges.  Much  more  vehemently 
than  his  opponents,  Hamilton  held  that  the  duty  of  the 
state  in  every  circumstance  was  to  look  beyond  the  interest 
of  the  individual  and  the  section  to  the  general  advantage. 
For  the  state  to  benefit  one  of  these  units,  be  it  merely  a 
man  or  half  the  empire,  is  an  evil  if  that  benefit  is  the  sole 
intended  result  of  its  action;  but,  on  the  other  hand,  the 
state  should  never  shrink  from  conferring  such  an  advantage 
upon  particular  trades  or  classes,  if  it  clearly  foresees  that 
this  course  will  ultimately  conduce  to  the  swifter  develop- 
ment, the  greater  prosperity  and  the  firmer  security  of  the 
nation. 

An  advantage  given  to  one  man  does  not  necessarily  mean, 
when  it  is  fairly  examined,  a  corresponding  burden  imposed 
upon  another.  You  cannot  argue  safely  from  physics  to 
politics.  But  even  if  such  were  the  case,  the  burden  of  this 
year  may  nevertheless  become  a  benefit  in  that  which 
follows.  The  burden  of  one  generation  may  build  up  a  fine 
estate  for  its  successor.  What  a  man  to-day  is  compelled 
to  forgo  may  be  recovered  by  his  children  and  grandchildren 
with  heavy  accumulations  at  compound  interest. 

There  was,  Hamilton  maintained,  a  habit  of  exaggeration 
in  the  argument  of  his  opponents  that  the  immediate 
increase  of  price  which  his  proposals  might  entail  would 

Q 


242  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1791  prove  oppressive  to  the  consumer.  There  was  a  tendency 
^T' 34  also  to  ignore  the  advantage  which  all  alike  would  derive 
]  when  the  general  object  of  his  policy  was  attained.  The 
doctrine  that  in  helping  one  person  you  are  necessarily  in- 
juring another  has  in  it  a  pinch  of  truth,  but  a  pinch  only. 
It  is  subject  to  many  qualifications.  It  is  alleviated  from  the 
beginning  by  countervailing  benefits.  But  supposing  that 
it  were  true  in  that  wide  and  absolute  sense  which  is  claimed 
for  it  by  its  professors,  what  is  the  alternative?  If  the 
state  is  to  fulfil  the  purpose  for  which  it  was  called  into 
being,  it  must  act ;  and  by  its  every  action  it  must  cause 
more  or  less  of  injury  to  some  of  its  citizens,  more  or  less 
of  benefit  to  others.  A  complete  paralysis  is  the  only 
alternative.  It  is  not  only  in  matters  affecting  trade  that 
this  argument  holds  good,  but  in  every  department  of 
government,  and  perhaps  more  in  that  of  public  defence 
than  in  any  other.  The  question  that  awaits  an  answer 
upon  the  introduction  of  any  measure  is  always  the  same : 
Will  the  proposed  reform  promote  the  health  and  vigour  of 
the  nation  ? 

The  action  of  the  state  ought  therefore  to  be  guided 
calmly  to  one  end — the  advantage  of  the  whole  in  the 
present  and  in  the  future.  All  men  are  agreed  that  appeals 
from  any  class  for  favour  should  be  coldly  regarded.  What 
has  not  been  so  generally  perceived,  is  that  the  comple- 
mentary duty  is  of  equal  force;  that  prayers  for  govern- 
ment to  stand  still,  to  hold  its  hand,  and  to  abstain  from 
interference  with  existing  conditions,  lest  a  benefit  should 
thereby  accrue  to  some  interest  or  industry,  must  be  ruled 
by  the  same  tests  and  as  resolutely  set  aside  upon  the  same 
grounds. 

But  if  division  of  labour  among  men  is  the  cause  of  a 
rapider  increase  of  wealth  than  under  conditions  where  each 
has  to  perform  for  himself  a  hundred  tasks  for  which  he  has 


THE  FEDEEALISTS  243 

no  inclination  and  but  small  capacity,  surely,  urged  the  A.D.1791 
opposition,  the  same  argument  applies  to  nations  ?    Let  each    MT'  34 
people  therefore  attend  to  those  labours  in  which  they  are 
most  proficient,  in  which  nature  and  their  own  inclinations 
will  render  the  most  admirable  assistance.     Hamilton  con- 
ceded the  justice  of  this  argument,  but  upon  one  condition 
— 'if  the  system  of  perfect  liberty  to  industry  and  com- 
merce were  the  prevailing  system  of  nations.' 

"  In  such  a  state  of  things  each  country  would  have  the 
'  full  benefit  of  its  peculiar  advantages  to  compensate  for  its 
'  deficiencies  and  disadvantages  ...  a  free  exchange  mutually 
'  beneficial,  of  the  commodities  which  each  was  able  to  supply, 
'  on  the  best  terms,  might  be  carried  on  between  them, 
'  supporting,  in  full  vigour,  the  industry  of  each.  .  .  .  And 
1  though  the  circumstances  which  have  been  mentioned,  and 
'  others  which  will  be  unfolded  hereafter,  render  it  probable 
'  that  nations,  merely  agricultural,  would  not  enjoy  the  same 
'  degree  of  opulence,  in  proportion  to  their  numbers,  as  those 
'  which  united  manufactures  with  agriculture,  yet  the  pro- 
'  gressive  improvement  of  the  lands  of  the  former  might,  in 
'  the  end,  atone  for  an  inferior  degree  of  opulence  in  the 
'  meantime ;  and  in  a  case  in  which  opposite  considerations 
'  are  pretty  equally  balanced,  the  option  ought,  perhaps, 
'  always  to  be  in  favour  of  leaving  industry  to  its  own 

*  direction. 

'  But  the  system  which  has  been  mentioned  is  far  from  char- 
'  acterising  the  general  policy  of  nations.  The  prevalent  one 

*  has  been  regulated  by  an  opposite  spirit.     The  consequence 
'  of  it  is,  that  the  United  States  are,  to  a  certain  extent,  in 
'  the  situation  of  a  country  precluded  from  foreign  commerce. 
'  They  can,  indeed,  without  difficulty,  obtain  from  abroad 

*  the  manufactured  supplies  of  which  they  are  in  want; 
1  but  they  experience  numerous  and  very  injurious  impedi- 
'  ments  to  the  emission  and  vent  of  their  own  commodities. 


244  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1791  '  Nor  is  this  the  case  in  reference  to  a  single  foreign  nation 

MT'  34    '  only.      The  regulations  of  several  countries,  with  which 

'  we  have  the  most  extensive  intercourse,   throw  serious 

'  obstructions  in  the  way  of  the  principal  staples  of  the 

*  United  States. 

'  In  such  a  position  of  things,  the  United  States  cannot 
'  exchange  with  Europe  on  equal  terms ;  and  the  want  of 
'  reciprocity  would  render  them  the  victim  of  a  system 
'  which  should  induce  them  to  confine  their  views  to  agri- 
1  culture,  and  refrain  from  manufactures.  A  constant  and 
'  increasing  necessity,  on  their  part,  for  the  commodities  of 

*  Europe,  and   only  a  partial  and   occasional   demand  for 
'  their  own,  in  return,  could  not  but  expose  them  to  a 
'  state  of  impoverishment,  compared  with  the  opulence  to 
'  which  their    political  and  natural  advantages  authorise 
'  them  to  aspire. 

'  Remarks  of  this  kind  are  not  made  in  the  spirit  of  com- 

*  plaint.     It  is  for  the  nations  whose  regulations  are  alluded 
'  to,  to  judge  for  themselves,  whether,  by  aiming  at  too  much, 
1  they  do  not  lose  more  than  they  gain.     It  is  for  the  United 

*  States  to  consider  by  what  means  they  can  render  them- 
'  selves  least  dependent  on  the  combinations,  right  or  wrong, 

*  of  foreign  policy.  ...  If  Europe  will  not  take  from  us  the 

*  products  of  our  soil,  upon  terms  consistent  with  our  interest, 
1  the  natural  remedy  is  to  contract,  as  fast  as  possible,  our 
'  wants  of  her." l 

One  may  be  permitted  to  doubt  whether  Hamilton  would 
have  made  even  this  concession  had  he  been  confronted  with 
a  situation  of  perfect  liberty  in  commerce  between  the  nations. 
For  it  conflicts,  to  some  extent,  with  his  master  principle  of 
a  varied  society  and  multitudinous  employments  as  the  con- 
dition of  healthy  and  rapid  development.  Even  had  every 

1  Works,  iv.  pp.  100-102.  See  also  draft  of  Smith's  speech  (January  1794) 
by  Hamilton^  Works,  ir.  pp.  205-24. 


THE  FEDERALISTS  245 

gateway  been  open  throughout  the  world,  it  is  probable  A.D.  1791 
that  on  this  ground  he  would  still  have  judged  it  wise,  in  ^T- 34 
the  special  circumstances  of  the  United  States,  with  their 
vast  natural  wealth,  their  undeveloped  resources  and  un- 
inhabited fertile  tracts,  to  pursue  a  strictly  national  rather 
than  a  cosmopolitan  policy  in  matters  of  commerce.  But 
this  condition  of  perfect  freedom  did  not  exist,  was  not 
likely  to  exist,  and  has  in  fact  never  existed.  On  the 
contrary,  the  strictly  national  policy  has  imposed  itself 
gradually,  piecemeal,  but  in  the  end  completely,  upon  all 
the  nations  of  the  world  save  only  upon  Britain.  Opinion 
has  often  halted.  Motives  have  rarely  been  without  con- 
fusion. The  waves  have  slipped  back  upon  the  sand;  but 
the  tide  has  ever  continued  to  advance.  The  concession  of 
the  principle,  guarded  by  an  impossible  '  if/  was  wise  argu- 
ment; for  granting  the  foundations  of  his  opponents' 
contention,  accepting  their  theory  under  ideal  conditions,  he 
was  able  with  still  greater  force  to  establish  the  validity  of 
his  own  counsel. 

Another  argument  with  which  modern  ears  are  not 
unfamiliar,  is  "  the  proposition  that  industry,  if  left  to  itself, 
'  will  naturally  find  its  way  to  the  most  useful  and  profitable 
1  employment.  Whence  it  is  inferred  that  manufactures, 
'  without  the  aid  of  government,  will  grow  up  as  soon  and  as 
'  fast  as  the  natural  state  of  things  and  the  interest  of  the 
'  community  may  require. 

'  Against  the  solidity  of  this  hypothesis,  in  the  full  latitude 
'  of  the  terms,  very  cogent  reasons  may  be  offered.  These 
*  have  relation  to  the  strong  influence  of  habit  and  the  spirit 
'  of  imitation ;  the  fear  of  want  of  success  in  untried  enter- 
'  prises ;  the  intrinsic  difficulties  incident  to  first  essays 
'  towards  a  competition  with  those  who  have  previously 
'  attained  to  perfection  in  the  business  to  be  attempted ;  the 
'  bounties,  premiums,  and  other  artificial  encouragements  with 


246  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1791  '  which  foreign  nations  second  the  exertions  of  their  own 
Mr.  34    <  citizens,  in  the  branches  in  which  they  are  to  be  rivalled. 

'  Experience  teaches,  that  men  are  often  so  much  governed 
'  by  what  they  are  accustomed  to  see  and  practise,  that  the 
'  simplest  and  most  obvious  improvements,  in  the  most 
'  ordinary  occupations,  are  adopted  with  hesitation,  reluctance, 
'  and  by  slow  gradations.  The  spontaneous  transition  to  new 
'  pursuits,  in  a  community  long  habituated  to  different  ones, 
*  may  be  expected  to  be  attended  with  proportionably  greater 
'  difficulty.  When  former  occupations  ceased  to  yield  a  profit 
1  adequate  to  the  subsistence  of  their  followers,  or  when  there 
'  was  an  absolute  deficiency  of  employment  in  them,  owing  to 
'  the  superabundance  of  hands,  changes  would  ensue;  but 
1  these  changes  would  be  likely  to  be  more  tardy  than  might 
'  consist  with  the  interest  either  of  individuals  or  of  the 
'  society.  In  many  cases  they  would  not  happen,  while  a  bare 
'  support  could  be  insured  by  an  adherence  to  ancient  courses, 
1  though  a  resort  to  a  more  profitable  employment  might  be 
'  practicable.  To  produce  the  desirable  changes  as  early  as 
'  may  be  expedient  may  therefore  require  the  incitement  and 
'  patronage  of  government." 1 

An  endeavour  has  been  made  to  describe  the  main  purpose 
of  Hamilton's  report,  but  the  effort  is  quite  inadequate  to 
the  occasion.  In  a  condensed  form  his  eager  advocacy  is 
stripped  of  all  its  charm  and  much  of  its  persuasiveness. 
The  leading  quality — its  practical  intensity — is  dimmed  by 
the  omission  of  a  multitude  of  instances  drawn  from  the  pre- 
dicament of  commerce  at  the  time  when  he  wrote.  It  would 
be  altogether  impossible  to  follow  his  methodical  analysis  and 
defeat  of  minor  objections ;  his  examination  in  detail  of  the 
industries  which,  in  his  opinion,  it  was  possible  advantageously 
and  at  once  to  establish  in  the  United  States;  his  review 

1  Works,  iv.  p.  104. 


THE  FEDERALISTS  247 

and  consideration  of  the  various  means  and  resources  of  A.D.  1791 
which  government  might  make  use  for  planting  and  foster-    "ET>  34 
ing  manufactures;  his  enumeration  and  criticism  of  taxes 
conducive  and  inimical  to  commercial  prosperity— for  to 
attempt  such  an  undertaking  would  result  in  reprinting  at 
length  the  whole  of  this  voluminous  document. 

In  none  of  his  measures  does  Hamilton  show  more 
remarkably  the  great  force  of  his  instinct  for  reality,  his 
piercing  insight  into  the  true  conditions  of  things,  his  grasp 
upon  the  facts  of  the  case.  Like  Adam  Smith,  he  will  look 
at  matters  with  his  own  eyes  in  the  first  instance;  and 
having  made  his  survey,  then  and  only  then,  he  goes  for 
counsel  and  a  second  opinion  to  the  works  of  others  who 
have  considered  the  same  problems  in  a  similar  spirit. 

For  the  skilful  craftsman,  quick  of  eye  and  ready  with  his 
hands,  tired  out  and  hungry  after  his  day's  work,  it  is  an 
irksome  effort  to  study  out  of  books  the  science  of  his 
avocation.  He  is  aware,  or  at  any  rate  he  is  frequently 
reminded,  that  by  so  doing  he  would  sharpen  his  intelli- 
gence, improve  his  output,  and  derive  much  collateral  profit. 
But  under  the  influences  of  fatigue  and  repletion  he  is 
disinclined.  Sleep  steals  upon  his  eyelids.  In  point  of  fact 
he  is  lazy,  but  he  justifies  himself  by  affecting  to  view  all 
book-learning  with  contempt.  For  the  man  who  works  not 
with  his  muscles  but  with  his  mind,  be  he  statesman  or 
philosopher,  laziness  sits  in  the  other  scale.  Books  and 
words  and  syllogisms  are  as  easy  to  him  as  the  brace-and-bit 
and  the  plane  to  a  carpenter.  He  is  under  an  everlasting 
temptation  to  substitute  the  lazy  methods  of  logic  for  the 
hard  and  uncongenial  processes  of  observation.  In  his 
library  he  is  happy;  but  you  derange  his  whole  life,  and 
render  him  miserable,  if  you  condemn  him  to  a  week's  work 
in  a  merchant's  office. 

In  economic  science  mere  syllogisms  have  never  been 


248  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.  D.  1791  enough.  Political  insight  requires  some  more  substantial 
MT.  34  £OQ(j  t|ian  tke  i^g]^  Of  other  men.  The  philosopher  is 
required  to  sacrifice  his  leisure,  to  observe  the  facts  of  the 
world  he  lives  in  as  well  as  to  reason  about  them,  if  the 
results  of  his  labour  are  to  serve  the  nation  and  to  endure. 
Hamilton  accepted  this  necessity  like  a  cheerful,  winter- 
morning  bather,  plunging  daily  into  the  actual  confusion 
of  things.  His  opponents  drew  the  bedclothes  up  to  their 
noses,  turned  lazily  upon  the  other  side,  and  dreamed 
dreams  of  an  Arcadia  while  a  very  different  world  was 
astir. 


BOOK    IV 

THE    DEMOCRATS 
A.D.  1791-1794 


*  BY-ENDS. —  Why  they,  after  their  headstrong  manner,  conclude  that  it 
is  their  duty  to  rush  on  their  journey  all  weathers ;  and  I  am  waiting 
for  wind  and  tide.  They  are  for  hazarding  all  for  God  at  a  clap ; 
and  I  am  for  taJcing  all  advantages  to  secure  my  life  and  estate.  They 
are  for  holding  their  notions,  though  all  other  men  be  against  them  ;  but 
I  am  for  religion  in  what,  and  so  far  as,  the  times  and  my  safety  will 
bear  it.  They  are  for  Religion  when  in  rags  and  contempt ;  but  I  am  for 
him  when  he  walks  in  his  silver  slippers  in  the  sunshine,  and  with 
applause.'— THE  PILGRIM'S  PROGRESS. 


BOOK    IV 
THE  DEMOCRATS 

CHAPTER  I 

Thomas  Jefferson 

THOMAS  JEFFERSON  is  one  of  the  most  remarkable  figures 
in  history.  Of  Welsh  descent,  he  was  born  in  Virginia  in 
the  year  1743.  At  his  father's  death  he  inherited  a  small 
estate,  and  to  this  he  added  by  shrewd  purchases,  so  that  at 
the  date  of  his  marriage,  in  his  thirtieth  year,  he  was  the 
owner  of  some  five  thousand  acres  and  fifty  slaves.  He  was 
bred  to  the  law,  and  enjoyed  a  lucrative  chamber  practice 
which  was  the  chief  source  of  his  income ;  but  at  the  same 
time  he  cultivated  his  own  land,  and,  like  Washington, 
had  more  happiness  in  this  pursuit  than  in  any  other.  In 
Virginian  society  he  was  not  eminent  either  by  reason  of 
his  birth  or  wealth.  He  was  merely  a  substantial  country 
gentleman.  His  circumstances  were  easy  from  the  begin* 
ning;  and  shortly  after  his  marriage  the  death  of  his 
father-in-law  was  the  means  of  adding  largely  to  his 
resources.  Hardship,  therefore,  of  the  pecuniary  sort,  had 
no  share  in  his  education.  Until  near  the  end  of  his  days 
he  was  undisturbed  by  anxieties  arising  from  any  lack  of 
funds. 
Jefferson  was  a  patriotic  citizen  who  served  his  country 

251 


252  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

with  ungrudging  labour  for  close  on  half  a  century.  He 
was  a  member  of  the  House  of  Burgesses  in  his  own  state, 
and  of  the  Continental  Congress  both  before  the  war  began 
and  after  its  conclusion.  For  two  troubled  years x  he  was 
the  Governor  of  Virginia ;  for  five 2  he  was  minister  at  the 
Court  of  France;  for  four3  he  was  Secretary  of  State  in 
Washington's  cabinet.  He  was  Vice- President  of  the  United 
States  from  1797  until  his  election  to  the  Presidency  in 
1801,  and  only  retired  from  official  life  at  the  end  of  his 
second  term  in  1809.  He  died  in  his  eighty-fourth  year 
By  a  dramatic  coincidence  his  death  occurred  upon  the 
fortieth  anniversary4  of  the  famous  Declaration  of  Inde- 
pendence, of  which  he  was  the  author. 

He  is  described  by  his  biographer 6  as  '  thin  and  raw-boned,' 
with  '  red  hair,  and  freckled  face  and  pointed  features.'  His 
height  was  well  over  six  feet.  He  was  large  in  frame  and 
loose-limbed.  We  are  told  that  he  was  studiously  unkempt, 
and  even  slovenly  in  his  dress  and  person ;  '  made  up ' 
elaborately,  as  his  enemies  suggest,  for  the  part  of  a  sterling 
democrat.  His  uncouth  disorder  upon  high  occasions,  his 
disregard  of  the  ordinary  conventions  and  ceremonies  of 
state,  slippers  down  at  the  heel,  corduroy  breeches  very  much 
the  worse  for  wear,  neck-cloth  awry  and  not  overclean,  do 
not  impress  the  modern  reader  as  they  appear  to  have  im- 
pressed the  admiring  citizens  of  his  own  day.  We  are  not 
struck  by  the  sincerity  of  a  great  nature  contemptuous  of 
trifles,  but  rather  by  the  ingenuity  of  a  great  actor  who  had 
carefully  weighed  the  value  of  the  meanest  accessories. 

The  portraits  of  Jefferson  are  of  a  considerable  variety, 
and  difficult  to  reconcile  one  with  another.  There  is 
dignity  in  all  of  them,  and  kindliness  in  most.  But  there  is 
also  an  expression  of  anxious  vigilance.  The  face  suggests 

1  1779-80.  2  1784-89.  8  1790-93. 

4  4th  July  1826.  B  Tucker. 


THE  DEMOCRATS  253 

a  sensitive  and  shrinking  nature  which,  by  the  sport  of 
circumstances,  or  by  a  perverse  ambition,  has  been  led  to 
play  the  wholly  unintended  part  of  a  man  of  action.  Jeffer- 
son was  a  bold  horseman,  but  in  every  other  sphere  where 
courage  and  swift  decision  are  usually  looked  for,  he  was 
dilatory,  timorous  and  unready.  He  was  an  affectionate 
friend,  adored  by  his  familiars,  and  brilliant  under  the  glow 
of  their  sympathy.  But  as  an  enemy  he  was  less  admir- 
able :  untiring,  but  unchivalrous ;  never  fighting  in  the  open 
where  he  could  avoid  it,  and  never  taking  blows  without  a 
whine.  He  hated  to  hear  any  man  applauded  who  was  not 
under  his  immediate  patronage;  and,  what  is  perhaps  his 
strangest  quality,  seeing  that  he  was  a  scholar  and  had 
much  experience  of  the  world,  he  detested  whole  classes 
of  his  fellow- creatures  for  no  better  reason  than  because 
they  were  invested  by  tradition  with  some  kind  of  respect. 

When  Jefferson  first  came  into  prominence  certain  ideas 
were  in  the  air,  and  these  ideas  were  believed  by  their 
lovers  to  be  capable  of  forming  the  solid  foundations  of 
states.  By  their  enemies,  on  the  other  hand,  they  were 
denounced  as  pernicious  nonsense,  impossible  to  be  trans- 
lated into  political  action  save  at  the  cost  of  anarchy  and 
disorder.  The  poetry,  religion  and  philosophy  of  the 
revolutionary  epoch  had  a  great  vogue  for  nearly  three 
generations,  and  when  Jefferson,  as  a  member  of  Congress, 
drafted  his  famous  Declaration  of  Independence,  they  had 
been  in  men's  minds  for  a  quarter  of  a  century.  The 
dominant  note  at  this  time  was  the  love  of  mankind,  no  less 
intense  because  of  its  vagueness,  and  a  bitter  indignation 
against  officers  and  institutions  that  were  deemed  to  be  the 
cause  of  human  suffering. 

When  Jefferson  for  a  second  time  appeared  in  distin- 
guished pre-eminence  as  Secretary  of  State  these  ideas  were 
in  their  second  period,  of  which  the  note  was  a  blind  and 


254  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

bloodthirsty  rage  that  had  its  origin  in  failure.  Despite 
the  prophets  the  millennium  had  not  yet  arrived.  The 
contrivances  of  despots,  the  zeal  of  their  minions,  the 
cowardice  of  doubters,  were  assumed  to  be  the  causes  of 
the  delay.  Ultimate  defeat  was  held  to  be  impossible,  for 
the  stubbornness  of  the  facts  themselves  had  not  then 
begun  to  be  suspected. 

To  this  age  of  impatience  there  succeeded  an  age  of  com- 
parative peace.  The  violence  of  emotion  had  produced 
a  natural  exhaustion.  A  dim  perception  of  the  things  that 
must  be  rendered  unto  Caesar  had  somewhat  abated  the 
confidence  of  poets  and  the  dogmatism  of  philanthropists. 
The  manners  and  hearts  of  men  became  the  objective  of 
such  revolutionaries  as  still  maintained  their  faith.  The 
institutions  of  the  state  would  be  moulded  in  the  end 
through  the  awakened  conscience  of  mankind,  when  the 
spots  of  the  leopard  were  changed  and  the  Ethiopian  had 
become  white. 

Roughly  the  revolutionary  epoch  lasted  for  three-quarters 
of  a  century.1  Its  first  period  was  one  of  brotherhood,  the 
second  of  rage,  the  third  of  a  mild  and  patient  aspiration. 
Jefferson  was  prominent  in  each  of  these  phases.  His 
sympathy  never  wavered,  his  hope  never  failed.  In  his 
own  country  certainly,  and  in  other  countries  possibly,  the 
majority  of  good  men  was  with  him  from  the  beginning  to 
the  end  of  his  career — the  majority  of  the  idealists,  the 
unselfish,  the  thoughtful,  the  articulate  and  the  unwise. 
They  were  not  practical  men,  but  they  were  sincere,  and 
Jefferson  was  their  champion  and  exponent.  Fidelity  to 
ideas  rather  than  success  in  action  was  their  concern.  They 
judged  their  leader  more  by  the  eloquent  orthodoxy  of  his 
messages  and  manifestoes  than  by  any  test  of  efficiency  in 
office. 

1  1750  to  1825. 


THE  DEMOCRATS  255 

This  is  the  first,  and  the  greatest,  and  the  most  worthy 
of  the  causes  that  made  Jefferson  a  famous  character.  He 
was  a  kind  of  Don  Quixote ;  with  this  difference,  that  half 
the  world  shared  his  illusions. 

A  further  cause  was  the  political  exhaustion  that  followed 
upon  strenuous  effort.  Jefferson  came  as  chief  magistrate  to 
a  people  longing  for  peace  after  war,  rest  after  revolution.1 
Independence  was  secured,  union  accomplished,  a  consti- 
tution created  and  set  in  movement.  The  natural  temper 
of  men  in  such  conditions  is  towards  the  enjoyment  of  what 
has  been  won  by  so  great  sacrifices.  They  desired  to  go 
about  their  business,  to  cultivate  material  prosperity,  to  have 
leisure  and  to  breathe  freely. 

This  condition  in  the  United  States  coincided  with 
the  third  phase  of  the  revolutionary  spirit  throughout 
the  Western  world.  Public  opinion,  while  deprecating 
violent  action,  conversion  by  fire  and  sword,  and  all 
attempts  upon  the  grand  scale  to  translate  its  aspirations 
into  statutes,  was  grateful  to  one  who  kept  its  faith 
alight  by  obiter  dicta,  and  persuaded  mankind  by  his 
glowing  deliverances  that  the  triumph  of  these  principles, 
though  postponed,  was  inevitable.  Martyrdom  during  the 
first  quarter  of  the  nineteenth  century  was  not  prized  among 
friends  nor  inflicted  upon  enemies.  The  period  was  one  of 
easy  faith.  Men  searched  for  welcome  signs  of  conformity 
in  their  neighbours  rather  than  for  spots  of  heresy.  The 
little  outward  forms  of  democracy  in  which  Jefferson  took 
an  uncouth  delight  were  in  fact  better  tribute-money  than 
a  stern  and  rigid  adherence  to  the  formulas  of  equality  and 
fraternity.  The  literal  observance  of  the  Rights  of  Man  had, 
to  tell  the  truth,  become  inconvenient  and  embarrassing. 
The  virtuous  citizen,  while  cherishing  the  ultimate  hope, 
abstained  from  the  pedantic  practice  of  perfect  brotherhood. 

1  1801. 


256  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

Finally,  there  is  the  sound  practical  reason  for  Jefferson's 
pre-eminence  that,  very  fortunately  for  his  reputation,  he 
had  fallen  upon  an  age  of  dwarfs,  which  had  succeeded  to 
an  age  of  giants.  After  the  defeat  of  Adams,  the  deaths  of 
Washington  and  Hamilton,  the  ostracism  of  Burr,  there 
were  no  possible  rivals.  We  look  in  vain  for  any  sign  of 
lusty  nature  among  his  conspicuous  lieutenants  and  suc- 
cessors. Madison  and  Monroe  belong  to  a  different  breed  of 
men.  Jefferson  was  the  last  of  the  giants ;  and  consequently, 
while  he  continued  in  life,  he  was  secure  of  his  reputation, 
through  the  absence  of  all  competition.  A  kind  of  sanctity 
encircled  his  head.  He  was  the  grand  keeper  of  the  Touch- 
stone of  Democracy.  Men  voyaged  from  long  distances,  and 
put  him  to  exorbitant  expenses  in  grateful  entertainment 
of  them,  merely  to  look  upon  his  features  and  boast  of  it 
to  their  grandchildren ;  and  in  the  end  he  died,  as  he  had 
lived,  in  the  odour  of  phrases. 

It  is  better  to  concede  all  Jefferson's  faults,  and  having 
done  so  to  make  a  single  bold  claim  that  few  will  be  found 
to  dispute,  though  to  some  it  will  appear  as  an  explanation 
of  his  success  rather  than  as  a  proof  of  his  virtue.  There 
was  a  quality  in  him  which  Hamilton  and  other  great 
statesmen  of  the  constructive  school  have  usually  lacked. 
It  is  the  old  battle  of  the  moralists  against  the  evangelists, 
of  salvation  by  works  or  by  grace.  Jefferson  believed  in 
humanity  without  any  reservations,  and  the  causes  of  his 
great  influence  must  therefore  be  sought  for  in  his  faith 
and  not  in  his  acts.  Hamilton  disbelieved  in  humanity, 
unless  it  had  the  support  of  strong  laws  and  the  leadership 
of  great  men.  To  the  people,  craving  for  an  affectionate 
confidence,  these  limitations  implied  distrust.  The  world 
which  needed  his  works  and  profited  by  them  forgot  him 
for  the  time  in  favour  of  a  rival  who  was  not  merely  barren 
of  achievements,  but  who  also  lacked  the  gaiety,  courageous 


THE  DEMOCRATS  257 

bearing  and  charm  of  manner  which  are  in  the  usual  way 
strong  aids  to  popularity. 

Hamilton  was  a  master;  but  Jefferson  men  felt  to  be  a 
friend.  He  lived  in  their  hearts.  It  was  useless  to  point 
to  the  ledger  account  of  benefits  conferred.  The  mass  of 
citizens  was  not  ungrateful  to  Hamilton,  nor  wilfully  dis- 
respectful to  his  memory ;  but  towards  Jefferson  there  was  a 
homage  of  a  wholly  different  order.  His  love  for  them  was 
sincere,  his  faith  in  them  was  constant.  Freedom  and 
fraternity  were  ever  on  his  lips,  so  that  not  only  his  followers 
in  the  North,  but  possibly  even  he  himself,  came  to  forget 
that  he  was  a  Virginian  slave- owner  to  the  last. 

That  the  manner  of  his  climbing  into  power,  and  his  way 
of  dealing  with  his  enemies,  do  not  conform  with  his  own 
ideals  of  virtue,  cannot  fairly  be  brought  as  evidence  that  he 
was  insincere.  In  the  case  of  every  public  character  wide 
allowance  must  be  made  for  divergence  between  his  public 
professions  and  his  private  practice.  He  has  a  right  to 
plead  an  imperfect  world  for  much  apparent  inconsistency. 
And  for  Jefferson  it  is  necessary  to  make  a  further  excuse. 
In  his  own  timid  disposition  he  had  more  to  fight  against 
than  most  men.  It  led  him  constantly  into  situations  from 
which  he  chose  to  escape  by  some  mean  device,  or  on  some 
disingenuous  plea,  or  even  by  plain  untruth.  But  if  it  be 
some  excuse  for  him  as  a  man  that  he  was  found  continu- 
ally acting  under  the  influence  of  his  fears,  it  is  also  his 
severest  condemnation  as  a  servant  of  the  state. 

According  to  one  of  his  bitterest  critics,  "Jefferson  was 
'  a  practical  theorist.  His  theory  was  the  general  credulity 
'  of  mankind.  Upon  this  credulity  his  life  was  the  success- 
'  ful  practice." l  This  judgment  is  true  up  to  a  certain 
point,  but  misses,  as  prejudice  usually  does,  the  real  interest 
of  his  character.  It  is  true  that  he  practised  successfully 

1  J.  C.  Hamilton,  History,  iv.  p.  463. 
R 


258  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

upon  the  credulity  of  mankind,  but  his  art  was  to  a  large 
extent  unconscious.  For  no  man  was  ever  yet  born  so 
clever  that  he  could  live  upon  popularity  merely  by  his 
wits.  To  succeed  at  the  game  it  is  necessary  that  he  should 
be  himself  a  dupe.  The  appeals  of  Jefferson  were  in  many 
cases  so  absurd  that  they  could  never  have  earned  even  a 
temporary  assent,  had  he  not  himself  believed  in  them  with 
the  utmost  sincerity.  For  all  his  shrewdness,  his  character 
was  one  of  an  extraordinary  simplicity.  The  things  in 
which  he  believed  are  possibly  astounding,  but  the  fact  of 
his  belief  in  them  is  beyond  all  question. 

In  observation  no  statesman  has  excelled,  and  very  few 
in  the  whole  history  of  the  world  have  equalled,  Jefferson. 
The  whole  of  the  uppermost,  emotional  nature  of  individual 
men  was  an  open  book  to  him.  Their  vanities,  their  en- 
thusiasms, their  ambitions,  needed  little  study  and  no 
reasoning.  He  felt  them  by  a  kind  of  sympathy.  His 
instinct  within  these  limits  was  unerring.  The  profound  er 
depths  he  did  not  understand.  He  saw  only  what  was 
reflected  in  the  mirrors  of  his  own  feelings.  The  sterner 
qualities  of  mankind  were  hidden  from  him.  Steadfastness 
under  discouragement  and  amidst  the  doubt  of  friends, 
renunciation  that  was  silent  and  undramatic,  volcanic 
passions  and  cold  equity  he  could  not  see,  for  his  own 
nature  held  no  glass  to  reflect  them.  He  did  not  fully 
understand  Hamilton.  He  was  baffled  by  his  frankness  and 
miscalculated,  convinced  it  must  be  a  cloak  to  conceal  some 
interested  motive.  He  never  understood  Washington  beyond 
the  fringe  of  his  character.  He  was  incapable  by  his  nature 
of  understanding  the  personal  dignity  of  a  Scots  shep- 
herd, or  of  a  Jew  pedlar,  or  the  unbreakable  loyalty  of  a 
blackguard.  But  he  looked  into  most  men,  if  he  did  not 
look  entirely  through  them.  He  was  as  superior  to  Walpole, 
who  traded  mainly  upon  their  meanness,  as  he  was  inferior 


THE  DEMOCRATS  259 

to  Chatham,  who  knew  how  to  use  their  virtues.  In  prac- 
tising upon  the  emotions  no  man  was  ever  more  adroit  and 
at  the  same  time  less  self-conscious,  and  no  man  ever  reaped 
a  greater  profit  on  his  genius. 

Jefferson's  greatest  skill  was  in  dealing  with  men  as  in- 
dividuals; but  he  was  also  a  capable  analyst  of  mankind 
in  the  mass.  To  his  credit  it  must  be  set  down  that 
he  made  no  attempt  at  bribery.  He  did  not  offer  doles 
and  never  hinted  at  spoliation.  There  was  no  grossness  in 
his  method.  The  harmonics  that  he  fiddled  were  entirely 
upon  the  strings  of  sentimentality.  He  had  a  flair  for 
what  was  or  might  be  made  popular.  He  understood  and 
interpreted  what  was  felt  at  the  moment,  and  he  had  the 
gift  to  foresee  what  would  be  felt  at  the  next  moment.  It 
was  less  art  with  him  than  a  kind  of  instinct,  which  is 
shared  by  the  theatrical  manager  and  all  great  showmen. 
He  knew  what  the  public  wanted,  and  he  knew  also  what 
it  was  easy  and  possible  to  educate  it  to  want ;  and  what  it 
wanted  or  might  want  he  was  always  ready  to  provide. 

The  charge  against  him  in  this  respect  is  not  dishonesty, 
for  if  any  of  his  beliefs  were  sincere  his  belief  in  the  Vox 
populi,  vox  Dei  theory  is  entitled  to  respect.  If  the  popular 
voice  was  truth,  the  part  of  a  wise  and  virtuous  statesman 
must  be  to  listen  and  obey,  to  anticipate  and  prepare.  It 
may  appear  to  us  amazing  that  any  man  should  have  held 
such  views;  but  granting  that  he  did,  it  is  impossible  to 
impeach  him  upon  the  accusation  that  he  pandered  to  popu- 
larity. The  real  difficulty  is  at  a  later  stage.  The  popular 
voice  uttered  such  discordant  judgments  that  obedience  to 
them  all  would  have  seemed  to  most  men  to  force  the 
abandonment  of  the  divine  mansion  of  reason.  But  in 
Jefferson's  case  there  was  apparently  no  struggle.  He  ex- 
ploited an  emotion  until  it  showed  signs  of  flagging,  and 
then  passed  on  to  another  which  he  had  helped  to  kindle. 


260  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

Disaster  was  forgotten  not  only  by  himself,  but  by  his  con- 
stituents, in  the  hope  and  excitement  of  a  new  venture. 
So  quick  was  he  to  seize  and  interpret  the  mood  of  the 
moment,  that  a  grateful  people  easily  overlooked  the  fact 
of  his  having  championed  with  equal  fervour  some  prior 
emotion  of  which  they  had  come  to  repent. 

But  just  as  Jefferson  failed  to  penetrate  the  profound  and 
noble  qualities  in  his  personal  friends  and  enemies,  so  he 
missed  the  essential  things  in  national  affairs.  The  desires, 
indignations  and  enthusiasms  of  the  majority  of  citizens 
in  any  country  at  a  given  moment  are  not  necessarily 
synonymous  with  the  material  or  spiritual  needs  of  the 
people.  In  the  former  he  was  a  sharer,  and  as  he  lived  in 
a  period  of  peace  and  not  of  stress  (when  unreality  must 
have  found  him  out),  he  had  an  immense  reward  for  his 
sympathy.  But  looking  beyond  this  sympathy  what  is 
there  to  show  ?  What  institutions  owe  their  origin  to 
his  efforts?  What  problems  did  he  solve?  The  record 
of  his  actual  achievements  is  almost  negligible.  The 
opportunities  which  he  missed  entirely  dwarf  his  meagre 
accomplishment. 

The  irony  of  events  forced  or  permitted  Jefferson  to 
assume  the  role  of  a  leader  of  men.  Whatever  the  virtue 
of  his  qualities,  it  was  not  an  executive  virtue.  Yet  he  put 
himself  to  slavery  for  many  long  years,  endured  endless 
mortifications,  and,  according  to  the  computation  of  one  of 
his  editors,  wrote  upwards  of  forty-five  thousand  letters, 
most  of  them  long  ones,  to  achieve  a  triumph  which, 
viewed  as  statesmanship,  was  nearly,  or  wholly,  barren. 
Reading  his  correspondence,  we  doubt  whether  he  even 
enjoyed  the  pleasures  of  the  pursuit,  for  he  was  not  a  com- 
bative man  or  a  sportsman.  It  seems  rather  that  he  was 
haunted  by  a  sense  of  duty  impelling  him  to  snatch  power 
out  of  the  hands  of  certain  dangerous  characters  who  had 


THE  DEMOCRATS  261 

proved  their  iniquity  by  deriding  a  set  of  phrases  which 
were  more  to  hirn  than  all  religion.  His  success  was  con- 
spicuous but  tragic.  In  the  end  he  ousted  his  enemies  and 
cast  down  the  revilers;  but  his  phrases  played  him  false. 
No  power  could  translate  them  into  policy  or  law,  because 
they  did  not  correspond  with  any  translatable  human  facts. 
For  the  greater  part  they  were  only  words,  and  for  the  rest 
they  were  the  fancies  of  a  poet. 

Although  Jefferson  outlived  Hamilton  by  more  than 
twenty  years  he  was  his  senior  by  fourteen,  and  this  fact 
accounts  for  much  of  the  bitterness  which  marked  their 
relations.  When  Jefferson  arrived  at  New  York  in  March 
1790  to  take  up  his  duties  of  Secretary  of  State,  Hamilton 
had  been  already  at  work  for  six  months.  His  fame  was  in 
the  mouths  of  all  men.  He  was  the  hero  of  the  particular 
crisis.  Jefferson  was  not  used  to  subsist  upon  the  crumbs  of 
applause.  That  he  genuinely  hated  Hamilton's  political 
ideals  there  can  be  no  question;  nor  that  he  hated  his 
methods  and  his  pre-eminence  even  more  than  his  ideals. 
Hamilton's  swift,  practical  way  of  setting  to  work  and  accom- 
plishing his  ends  without  allowing  his  opponents  the  luxury 
of  phrasemaking  and  prolonged  debate  was  wormwood  to 
him.  The  temperaments  of  the  two  men  were  as  far  asunder 
as  the  poles ;  not  different  in  the  sense  that  they  were  com- 
plementary, which  might,  under  favourable  circumstances, 
have  made  them  fast  friends,  but  in  that  they  were  intensely 
antipathetic  in  every  particular,  from  the  philosophy  of  life 
to  the  cut  and  fashion  of  their  clothes.  And  beyond  all  this 
there  was  the  same  personal  rivalry  which  disturbed  the 
peace  of  the  archangels.  Jefferson,  the  writer  of  the  Declara- 
tion of  Independence,  which  it  had  been  the  custom  to  con- 
sider the  noblest  and  most  famous  document  hi  the  whole 
history  of  the  world;  Jefferson,  the  minister  at  the  court 
of  the  most  Christian  king,  the  friend  of  philosophers, 


262  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

the  philosopher  of  fine  ladies,  the  counsellor  of  the  most 
eminent  statesmen  of  Europe — for  such  a  man  in  the  prime 
of  his  life  to  be  dragged  at  the  chariot  wheels  of  an  energetic 
young  upstart  was  altogether  intolerable,  and  Jefferson  must 
have  been  something  more  than  human  had  he  accepted  the 
position  with  magnanimity. 

It  has  been  suggested  that  Hamilton  regarded  himself  in 
the  light  of  a  prime  minister.  It  is  certain  that  he  insisted 
upon  making  his  policy  operate  in  every  department  of 
the  state.  His  clearness  of  thought,  swiftness  of  decision, 
cogency  in  argument,  whether  spoken  or  written,  gave  him 
an  enormous  advantage,  both  with  the  cabinet  and  Congress. 
His  faculty  for  getting  his  own  way  was  little  short  of 
miraculous.  Washington  was  his  staunch  supporter.  General 
Knox,  the  Minister  for  War,  always  followed  his  lead.  Even 
Randolph,  the  Attorney-General,  with  the  bravest  intentions, 
was  constantly  detached  from  his  allegiance  to  Jefferson  by 
the  magnetism  of  his  rival.1 

If  it  were  possible  to  consider  Thomas  Jefferson  and 
Alexander  Hamilton  quietly,  as  types  of  human  tempera- 
ment and  modes  of  thought,  stripped  of  all  personal  rivalry, 
the  whole  pageantry  of  the  times  swept  aside,  and  all  the 
husk  of  fashion,  prejudice  and  affectation  torn  from  each 
character,  there  would  still  remain  a  violent  and  eternal 
opposition.  The  small  accidents  of -their  official  relations 
merely  provided  a  dramatic  setting  to  an  enmity  which  was 
as  fundamental  as  that  of  fire  and  water. 

The  ideal  of  Hamilton  was  the  hive,  the  ideal  of  Jefferson 
was  the  bee.  To  the  former  the  state  was  everything; 
to  the  latter,  the  divine  nature  of  man.  To  Jefferson 
an  individual  was  much  more  important  than  a  state,  a 
state  much  more  important  than  the  Union.  In  proportion 
as  human  life  took  on  a  corporate  character  and  strength, 

1  Jefferson  to  Madison,  History,  v.  p.  344. 


THE  DEMOCRATS  263 

he  became  less  interested  in  its  fortunes  and  more  apt  to 
regard  it  with  jealousy  and  suspicion.  In  his  honest  and 
sincere  belief,  a  man  as  an  amiable,  prosperous  individual, 
not  the  state  as  an  aggregate  of  self-sacrificing  men,  was  the 
true  goal  of  politics. 

Never  in  the  history  of  the  world  has  there  been  a  full 
realisation  of  Hamilton's  dream.  The  nearest  approach  to 
it  is  the  popular  conception  of  the  Empire  of  Japan — a  mass 
of  intelligent  humanity,  reckless  of  their  lives,  yet  filled  with 
the  joy  of  life,  eager  for  distinction,  hungry  for  success, 
alert,  practical  and  merry;  but  at  the  same  time  subordinate, 
humbly  and  piously  subordinate,  to  a  pure  abstraction. 
With  a  people  inspired  to  so  high  a  pitch,  the  triumph  and 
security  of  the  race  would  dominate  every  individual  aim, 
interest  and  affection.  The  maxim  of  such  a  polity  is 
combination  ;  but  the  inevitable  corollary  is  caste. 

If,  as  Hamilton's  enemies  contended,  his  passion  for  order 
and  strong  government  would  certainly,  in  the  event  of 
its  full  success,  have  bound  the  United  States  of  America 
into  a  conservative  Venetian  republic  within  the  space  of  a 
few  generations,  Jefferson's  counter  policy,  with  the  same 
fortune,  would  assuredly  have  plunged  them  into  anarchy 
and  bloodshed  within  a  decade.  The  passion  of  Jefferson 
was  individual  freedom.  Often  it  amounted  to  a  formula — 
sometimes  to  a  quite  extravagant  formula;  but  there  was 
a  reality  underlying  it.  He  had  a  genuine  belief  in  the 
goodness  of  humanity  viewed  as  individuals.  He  hated  the 
idea  of  the  hive.  He  could  never  understand  the  fascination 
of  its  abstract  glory,  or  realise  that  it  possessed  any  practical 
utility.  Sacrifices  to  such  an  end  were  not  even  a  puzzle 
to  him,  but  merely  a  foolish  paradox.  His  nature  was  im- 
pervious to  any  national  anthem.  What  was  important  to 
him,  and  holy,  was  the  free  growth  of  men,  restricted  no 
more  than  was  absolutely  necessary  by  laws  or  conventions. 


264  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

He  desired  to  see  them  grow  up  in  their  natural  shapes,  and 
believed  that  these  shapes  would  be  more  'natural'  on  a 
bleak,  wind-swept  moorland,  or  in  a  crowded  forest,  than  in 
any  cared-for  park  or  sheltered  garden.  He  was  an  enthu- 
siast, who  hoped  for  good  with  so  fervent  and  extreme  a 
faith,  that  he  openly  avowed  a  preference  for  government  by 
newspapers  and  disparaged  the  virtues  of  a  settled  constitu- 
tion. It  is  hardly  exaggeration  to  say  that  he  would  have 
rejoiced  to  see  the  state  a  dismasted  hulk,  so  confident  was 
he  that  by  the  action  of  beneficent  and  eternal  currents,  she 
would  drift  for  ever  upon  a  smiling  sea,  within  bow- shot  of 
the  delectable  islands,  without  the  aid  of  sails  or  rudder. 
Hamilton  lacked  the  same  enthusiasm,  was  entirely  wanting 
in  such  confidence.  His  passion  was  good  seamanship,  trim 
tackle  and  a  hearty  crew.  To  drift  was  for  him  ever  the 
greatest  of  all  evils;  and  the  advocate  of  such  policy  was 
in  his  opinion  a  madman,  an  incompetent,  or  a  coward. 

Under  the  British  system  of  government  Hamilton  must 
necessarily  have  been  a  head  and  shoulders  above  all 
other  statesmen  of  his  time  and  country.  Jefferson,  on 
the  other  hand,  would  not  have  taken  any  rank  whatever 
among  statesmen,  but  would  have  arrived  at  eminence 
in  some  different  sphere.  Our  parliamentary  plan  has 
many  faults,  but  certain  compensations.  It  hinders  the 
work  of  a  minister  and  wastes  his  time,  but  at  least  it 
enables  him  to  defend  his  own  measures.  And  there  is 
this  safety  in  it,  that  our  party  leaders  must  always  be  men 
of  courage.  Sometimes  in  our  haste  we  may  permit  our- 
selves to  speak  disparagingly  of  debate,  and  if  the  result 
of  debate  were  merely  the  prevalence  of  eloquence  over 
silence,  of  good  arguments  over  bad  ones,  it  might  justly  be 
contemned  as  a  means  of  selecting  men  to  govern  the 
country.  But  debate  is  something  a  great  deal  more  re- 
spectable. The  glory  of  the  British  parliament  is  that  men 


THE  DEMOCRATS  265 

subdue  it  by  their  characters  to  a  far  greater  extent  than  by 
their  arguments.  It  is  required  of  a  leader  that  he  must 
be  prepared  at  any  moment  to  stand  up  to  his  enemies,  to 
give  blows  and  to  take  them.  This  test  can  never  be 
escaped.  Occasional  brilliant  appearances  will  never  put 
any  man  in  power,  or  keep  him  in  power  if  he  has  happened 
to  arrive  there  by  some  accident.  Private  influence  or 
intrigue,  literary  gifts  of  the  highest  order,  are  all  in  vain. 
The  system  is  sound,  although  of  necessity  it  excludes  many 
aspirants  of  shining  talents.  The  rule  is  absolute  that, 
before  a  man  may  be  permitted  to  govern  the  nation,  he 
must  have  proved  himself  capable  of  prevailing  over  his 
rivals  in  single  combat  and  face  to  face. 

Jefferson  did  not  shine  in  controversy.  He  hated  it — it 
is  not  unjust  to  say  that  he  feared  it.  His  abstinence  from 
debate  has  been  explained  by  a  huskiness  of  the  voice,  but 
in  reality  it  was  much  more  a  matter  of  temperament.  He 
avoided  personal  strife  whenever  it  was  possible  to  do  so, 
and  upon  the  whole  his  foresight  to  that  end  was  amazingly 
successful.  But  when  occasionally  the  unexpected  happened 
and  he  found  himself  confronted  with  a  determined  adversary, 
he  never  hesitated  to  escape,  nor  gave  much  thought  to  the 
dignity  of  his  demeanour. 

Many  instances  are  alleged  against  him,1  and  of  these  the 
most  conspicuous  is  his  failure  as  governor  of  Virginia 
during  the  war.  It  is  not  credible,  as  his  enemies  have 
insinuated,  that  Jefferson  feared  for  his  life,  or  would  have 
hesitated  in  the  extreme  necessity  to  give  it  for  his  country. 
But  in  any  crisis  he  was  unprepared,  and  emergency  always 

1  "  He  deserted  from  Congress  instantly  on  hearing  of  the  battle  of  Long 
Island.  He  abandoned  the  chief  magistracy  of  Virginia  while  the  enemy 
were  in  possession  of  that  state,  and  when  an  impeachment  was  hanging 
over  his  head ;  and  he  retired  from  the  Department  of  State  (January  1794) 
when  everything  indicated  imminent  peril  to  his  country.  "—History,  v. 
pp.  438-39 ;  also  v.  pp.  339-55  ;  iii.  p.  65. 


266  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

found  him  in  a  fluster.  He  was  a  quiet,  studious,  patriotic 
and  unwarlike  citizen,  but  as  a  governor,  called  upon 
suddenly  to  repel  a  bold  invader  supported  by  a  mere 
handful  of  men,  he  was  a  lamentable  failure.  He  could 
inspire  no  confidence  in  his  legislators,  because  he  was 
utterly  unable  to  collect  his  own  wits.  He  lacked  the  clear 
and  practical  sense  of  an  objective,  the  swiftness  of  decision, 
the  cheerful  and  cool  resourcefulness  that  the  occasion 
demanded.  The  policy  of  his  life  was  to  toss  phrases  into 
the  ears  of  mankind,  like  honey-cakes  to  Cerberus.  But  it 
was  impossible  to  deal  with  men  who  carried  muskets  by 
this  easy  prescription.  Jefferson  proved  himself  incom- 
petent as  governor  of  Virginia  to  repel  the  British  troops 
under  Arnold,  and  by  reason  of  the  same  defects  in  his 
character  he  would  have  been  no  less  incompetent  to  deal 
with  the  funding  of  the  national  debt,  for  creditors  are  an 
equally  obdurate  class  of  antagonists. 

The  contrast  between  Hamilton  and  Jefferson  is  forced 
upon  us  at  every  turn,  in  acts  as  well  as  in  theories,  in 
trifling  fashions  and  in  serious  beliefs.  Nowhere  is  it  more 
remarkable  than  in  the  style  of  their  writings.  Jefferson  is 
flowing,  desultory  and  familiar.  He  has  an  entertaining 
spice  of  peevish  humour  and  captious  satire;  an  aptness 
in  outflanking  his  opponent  by  some  ingenious  digression. 
Hamilton,  on  the  other  hand,  is  ever  grave  and  eager; 
formal  if  not  actually  distant ;  terse,  vigorous  and  direct  in 
attack,  preferring  the  frontal  to  all  other  methods.  He 
never  deals  in  trivial  annoyance.  If  he  wounds  it  is  not 
because  he  desires  to  hurt,  but  because  his  intention  is 
to  destroy. 

The  contrast  is  as  obvious  in  their  opinions  as  in  their 
style.  Hamilton  made  his  party  round  his  convictions. 
The  men  who  thought  as  he  did,  the  men  who  were  won 
over  by  his  appeal,  came  to  him  and  attached  themselves. 


THE  DEMOCRATS  267 

Jefferson's  opinions,  on  the  other  hand,  cannot  escape  a 
suspicion  of  having  in  many  cases  been  chosen  deliberately 
in  order  to  attract  a  party  to  follow  him.  There  is  no  single 
instance  where  he  stood  out  boldly  against  a  popular  cry. 
Hamilton,  on  the  contrary,  was  more  often  found  fighting 
against  the  sentiment  of  the  moment  than  in  agreement 
with  it.  He  never  hesitated  to  risk  his  favour  with  the 
people  if  his  ideas  of  justice  were  opposed  to  their  passions. 
He  was  always  a  leader.  Jefferson  at  his  best  was  never 
more  than  a  patron,  and  usually  he  was  only  a  purveyor. 
His  unique  faculty  for  self-persuasion  alone  saved  him  from 
actual  dishonesty. 

It  has  been  the  custom  to  excuse  Jefferson,  and  even  to 
praise  him,  on  the  grounds  that  his  feelings  were  stronger 
than  those  of  ordinary  men.  But  the  difference  was  really 
less  in  the  strength  of  his  feelings  than  in  the  weakness  of  his 
control.  He  had  the  shrewdness  to  make  a  merit  of  a  vice, 
and  he  succeeded  so  well  that  he  has  not  only  been  forgiven 
for  his  lack  of  self-command,  but  has  built  upon  it  the  proof 
of  his  sincerity.  Like  many  persons  who  profess  the  widest 
philanthropy  and  are  beset  by  loose  emotions,  he  was  vindic- 
tive and  at  times  ferocious.  He  exulted  over  the  suffering 
and  degradation  of  individuals  and  classes  against  whom  he 
had  merely  a  theoretic  grudge.  His  apologies  for  all  that 
was  worst  in  the  French  Revolution  are  painful  reading. 
We  miss  not  only  an  intelligent  estimate  of  these  events, 
but  any  semblance  of  magnanimity.  His  most  solemn 
judgments  are  tainted  by  a  morbid  spirit  of  literary  revenge ; 
they  never  arrive  at  that  pitch  of  authority  which  overawes, 
and  although  he  is  often  cruel,  he  is  never  stern. 

To  search  for  the  explanation  of  a  great  renown,  and  to 
find  so  little  that  corresponds  to  our  ideas  of  a  hero,  is 
disappointing.  We  are  wearied  by  apologists  who  concede 
nothing  to  Jefferson's  dispraise  except  his  inconsistencies, 


268  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

and  attribute  even  these  to  an  excessive  honesty ;  who  keep 
harping  upon  his  half-virtues,  and  would  persuade  us  that 
after  all  tact  is  a  kind  of  leadership,  and  perseverance  a 
sort  of  courage;  that  eagerness  for  popularity  is  but  a 
healthy  love  of  approbation,  and  that  untruthfulness  which 
springs  from  timidity  or  the  imagination  is  less  heinous 
than  if  its  origins  were  in  some  sinister  ambition.  It  is 
hard,  listening  to  such  instructors,  not  to  go  the  whole  way 
with  the  Federalists  and  to  rate  him  as  a  mere  mountebank 
whose  title  to  fame  consists  not  in  the  value  of  his  work, 
but  in  the  skill  with  which  he  imposed  upon  his  own  day 
and  generation.  The  ambition  of  a  man  like  Hamilton  is  to 
get  certain  things  which  he  believes  in  done,  of  a  man  like 
Jefferson  to  keep  himself  poised  upon  the  top  of  a  wave. 
In  spite  of  his  eloquent  morality  he  held  no  opinion  so 
firmly  that  he  would  risk  his  popularity  to  achieve  it.  In 
spite  of  his  belief  that  the  greatest  work  of  God  is  a  man 
and  not  a  polity,  he  hated  minorities,  and  hated  even  more 
to  be  in  a  minority.  In  spite  of  his  admiration  for  rational 
as  opposed  to  traditional  government,  he  not  only  distrusted 
reason  as  many  wise  men  have  done — he  detested  it.  An 
argument  drawn  from  experience  was  almost  as  offensive  to 
him  as  a  hard  fact.  He  was  satisfied  that  he  had  penetrated 
to  the  heart  of  any  matter  when  he  had  ranged  it  under  one 
or  other  of  his  ready-made  formulas. 

It  is  easy  to  understand  why  Jefferson  should  have  hated 
Hamilton.  Two  so  different  dispositions  were  bound  to  dis- 
agree, and  to  disagree  with  bitterness.  What  is  difficult  to 
understand,  unless  on  the  ground  of  a  peculiar  temperament, 
is  the  inveteracy  of  Jefferson's  malice.  He  outlived  Hamil- 
ton for  more  than  twenty  years,  and  during  the  whole  of 
that  period  his  popularity  had  been  prodigious  and  uninter- 
rupted. Towards  the  end  of  his  life  he  became  the  object  of 


THE  DEMOCRATS  269 

a  hero-worship  almost  religious  in  its  character.  Men  came 
from  all  parts  to  gaze  upon  his  countenance,  and  the  name 
of  Hamilton  was  for  the  time  being  forgotten. 

In  this  serene  and  blissful  atmosphere  Jefferson  set  to 
work  upon  the  revision  of  his  correspondence  and  memoirs. 
It  was  with  him  no  perfunctory  task  of  notes  and  dockets, 
ordering  of  dates  and  filling  in  of  initials ;  but  a  very  serious 
and  painstaking  effort  to  leave  the  golden  memory  of  the 
author  without  a  single  smut  or  stain.  Passages  were  re- 
written. Incidents  where  some  tarnish  had  fastened  were 
industriously  scrubbed.  His  share  in  ancient  controversies 
was  explained  in  a  new  light.  His  case  was  fortified  by 
evidence  that  flowed  easily  from  the  cells  of  his  resourceful 
memory.  In  the  end  it  may  be  believed  he  was  well  satisfied 
with  his  work,  and  felt  entirely  confident  that  he  had  painted 
such  a  portrait  of  a  virtuous  citizen  as  the  world  must  ever 
afterwards  accept  as  the  highest  type. 

The  intended  portrait  of  the  virtuous  citizen  is  a  dull 
and  lifeless  presentment  in  thin  and  fading  tints.  On  the 
canvas  behind  it,  glowing  through  the  transparency,  is  the 
true  Jefferson  in  strong  lines  and  gorgeous  colours — Jeffer- 
son the  skilful  politician,  the  ingenious  sophist,  the  intriguer 
against  his  enemies,  the  distorter  of  evidence  and  of  facts ; 
above  all,  perhaps,  Jefferson  the  unforgiving.  The  Anas  and 
the  Autobiography  give  us  a  masterly,  but  too  savage  like- 
ness, and  it  is  no  wonder  that  his  friends  and  admirers  have 
never  ceased  to  lament  their  publication.  The  Confessions 
of  Rousseau  are  less  convincing,  because  at  times  we  cannot 
keep  back  the  suspicion  that  a  dramatic  instinct  of  self- 
abasement  has  inspired  his  candour.  The  value  of  Jefferson 
is  not  his  candour,  for  there  is  none,  but  his  inadvertence, 
which  is  without  a  parallel.  In  his  efforts  to  enhance  his 
own  glory  he  considered  it  essential  to  blacken  the  reputa- 


270  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1791  tions  of  his  enemies,  and  as  a  consequence  he  has  given  us  a 
"ETt34    description  of  his  own  character  to  which  his  bitterest 
enemy  would  not  wish  to  add  a  line. 


CHAPTER  II 

The  Origin  and  Growth  of  Parties 

THE  Democratic  party  which  came  into  existence  during  the 
year  1791  (although  it  did  not  acknowledge  its  existence 
until  considerably  later)  was  lineally  descended  from  the 
Conway  Cabal.1  It  had  its  origin  in  the  intrigues  of  which 
Horatio  Gates  was  the  hero,  and  "  an  intimate  connection  with 
'  the  project  of  forcing  General  Washington  from  the  com- 
'  mand  of  the  army."  2  The  conduct  of  the  war  required  an 
efficient  direction  of  the  united  energies  of  the  states.  "  The 
'  friends  of  Washington  were,  therefore,  the  friends  of  ener- 
'  getic  counsels.  His  opponents  resorted  to  the  usual  instru- 
'  ment  of  disaffection,  an  appeal  to  jealousy  of  power."3  In 
the  period  which  preceded  the  convention  of  Philadelphia 
the  dividing  line  was  still  the  same.  It  was  the  same  during 
the  sessions  of  the  convention ;  the  same  when  a  national 
government  undertook  to  work  out  the  salvation  of  the 
union. 

"From  the  very  birth  of  the  colonies,  jealousy  of  power 

*  had  been  the  dominant  thought  of  the  American  mind. . . . 
'  This  feeling  produced  the  Revolution.     This  feeling  pro- 

*  longed  its  struggles.     This  feeling  postponed  the  com- 
'  pletion  of  the  Confederation.     This  feeling  prevented  its 
'  invigoration.     This  feeling  produced  the  compromises  of 
'  the  Constitution.     This  feeling  delayed  and  almost  pre- 

1  Ante,  p.  103.  a  History,  iv.  p.  417.  3  Ibid.  iv.  p.  418. 


THE  DEMOCRATS  271 

vented  its  establishment.     The  majority  of  the  American  A.D.  1791 
people  were  against  it.     Its  founders  were  in  a  minority.    ^T-34 
1  Its  supporters  were  a  conservative  party  dealing  with  the 
'  masses.     Of  this  party,  while  Washington  was  the  head, 
'  avowing  himself  a  Federalist,  Hamilton  was  the  exponent, 
'  both  of  its  theory  and  of  its  practice." 1 

The  division  was  between  the  upholders  of  State  Rights 
on  the  one  hand,  and  the  friends  of  a  strong  government  on 
the  other.  During  the  Conway  Cabal,  throughout  the 
'  League  of  Friendship,'  and  in  the  Congress  which  met  in 
the  autumn  of  1791,  the  chief  issues  were  ever  the  same. 
The  same  fustian  was  talked  about  liberty.  The  same 
catchwords  were  invoked  '  to  call  fools  into  a  circle ' ;  and 
to  a  large  extent  the  same  men  were  engaged  in  the  contest, 
and  the  same  methods  were  set  to  work. 

Jefferson  accordingly  found  a  State  Rights  party  ready- 
made  when,  outraged  by  the  rivalry  of  Hamilton  and  offended 
by  the  rejection  of  his  own  advice  in  the  matter  of  the 
National  Bank,  he  determined  to  undertake  the  organisation 
of  an  opposition  to  the  government  of  which  he  was  a 
member.  His  genius  in  the  manipulation  of  political  forces 
thereupon  effected  a  strange  alliance  between  the  party  of 
State  Rights  and  the  party  of  the  Rights  of  Man.  He  suc- 
ceeded, by  his  consummate  tact,  in  inducing  those  citizens 
who  hated  and  feared  the  tyranny  of  the  Union  to  co-operate 
with  those  others  whose  guiding  principle  was  a  hot  affection 
for  the  French  Revolution.  It  was  a  work  which  earns  the 
praise  of  an  incomparable  dexterity,  for  at  the  beginning  the 
mistrusters  of  strong  government  were  far  further  removed 
than  their  opponents,  the  Federalists,  from  any  admiration 
for  democracy;2  while  the  Democrats  would  have  found 
little  to  object  to  in  Washington's  administration  had  it  been 
willing  to  support  the  arms  of  France  and  do  homage  to  the 

1  History,  iv.  p.  463.  *  Ibid.  pp.  436-38  and  444. 


272  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1791  principles  of  the  Rights  of  Man.     The  cause  of  the  cohesion 

jfilyP  f\        A 

of  this  oddly  compacted  party  was  to  a  large  extent  the 
endurance  for  twelve  years  of  a  government  which  both 
sections  detested  with  an  equal  cordiality,  though  originally 
for  widely  different  reasons.  Before  the  end  of  this  period 
the  supporters  of  State  Rights  had  for  the  most  part  become 
hearty  Democrats,  while  the  Democrats  had  succeeded  in 
persuading  themselves  that  a  system  of  contumacious  states 
would  prove  more  favourable  than  a  powerful  Union  to  their 
ideals  of  liberty,  equality  and  fraternity. 

All  the  sections  who  composed  the  Democratic  party  had 
a  common  ground  in  their  hatred  of  Monarchy.  It  mattered 
little  that  even  upon  this  point  their  agreement  was  more  a 
matter  of  a  word  than  of  things.  It  is  true  that  monarchy 
to  the  lovers  of  democracy  meant  the  personal  rule  of  a  king, 
and  to  the  upholders  of  State  Rights  a  strong  rule  of  any 
kind,  even  one  which  rested  on  manhood  suffrage.  But  as 
party  leaders  are  well  aware,  an  ambiguous  word  is  often 
good  enough  for  the  purposes  of  an  opposition.  It  is  only 
when  the  '  outs '  exchange  places  with  the  '  ins '  that  the 
double  meaning  is  apt  to  become  the  cause  of  embarrass- 
ment. Every  act  done  or  supposed  to  have  been  inspired  by 
Hamilton,  was  branded  as  a  covert  design  to  overturn  the 
Republic  and  establish  a  Monarchy.  The  confusion  of  mind 
which  associated  the  quality  of  strength  in  government  with 
the  idea  of  a  despot  was  sedulously  encouraged  by  the 
leaders  of  the  opposite  party.  It  is  not  credible  that  either 
Jefferson  or  Madison  believed  that  Hamilton  aimed  at  set- 
ting up  a  king,  but  for  political  purposes  they  fostered  the 
suspicion  in  simpler  minds,1  till  finally  the  charge  of  treason 
against  the  Republic  became  the  burden  of  every  Democratic 
speech  and  pamphlet.  The  objects  of  the  invective  were  at 
first  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  and  his  corrupt  adherents, 

1  History,  iv.  pp.  459-60. 


THE  DEMOCRATS  273 

but  in  the  end  the  President  himself  was  openly  and  fiercely  A.D.  1791 
attacked  for  his  '  mimickry  of  kings.'  ^T<  34 

In  the  same  month  which  saw  the  end  of  the  first  Congress, 
Jefferson  and  Madison  started  upon  a  northern  tour.  They 
visited  New  York,  and  held  interviews  with  Livingston,  who 
had  been  disappointed  of  office,  with  Clinton,  who  detested 
the  whole  policy  of  union,  and  with  Aaron  Burr,  whose  pre- 
dominant passion  was  intrigue,  and  whose  constant  expe- 
rience was  defeat.  From  New  York  the  two  emissaries 
passed  on  to  Yermont  and  Connecticut.  The  object  of  their 
journey  was  to  create  an  opposition  to  Hamilton's  policy 
and  the  results  became  obvious  as  soon  as  the  second 
Congress  assembled  in  the  autumn. 

In  June  1788,  when  ratification  of  the  constitution  was 
on  hand,  Madison  had  written  to  Hamilton  a  remarkable 
letter,1  in  which  he  warned  him  of  the  dangers  to  be  appre- 
hended by  all  true  lovers  of  the  Union  as  soon  as  the  first 
administration  should  begin  its  labours.  "  Notwithstanding 
'  the  fair  professions  made  by  some,  I  am  so  uncharitable  as 
'  to  suspect  that  the  ill-will  to  the  constitution  will  produce 
'  every  peaceable  effort  to  disgrace  and  destroy  it.  ...  My 
'  conjecture  is,  that  exertions  will  be  made  to  engage  two- 
1  thirds  of  the  legislature  in  the  task  of  regularly  under- 
'mining  the  government."  This  letter,  which  is  signed 
'yours  affectionately,'  is  a  startling  forecast  of  the  course 
which  was  to  be  pursued  less  than  three  years  later  by  its 
author. 

The  anti-federal  party  soon  rallied.  Its  defeat  at  Phila- 
delphia had  never  become  a  rout.  The  spirit  of  State 
Rights  was  still  a  powerful  force.  To  Jefferson,  who  had 
aided  Hamilton,  timidly  and  doubtfully,  it  is  true,  during 
the  session  of  1790,  to  carry  his  financial  measures,  it  soon 
became  apparent,  not  only  that  a  rival  had  thereby  been 

1  History,  iii.  p.  480. 
S 


274  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1791  strengthened,  but  that  the  policy  of  this  rival  was  directed 
^T- 34  against  a  set  of  maxims  which  represented  Jefferson's  most 
cherished  ideals.  Jefferson  was  by  nature  all  in  favour  of 
loose  ties  and  a  vague  optimism.  He  despised  institutions. 
Preferring  as  he  did  the  guidance  of  newspapers  to  the  rule 
of  cabinets,  he  considered  that  mankind  could  only  be 
governed  fortunately  by  rhetorical  appeals  founded  upon 
the  Rights  of  Man.  His  natural  dislike  to  precision  in 
thought,  definiteness  in  policy  and  force  in  execution,  was 
excited  by  a  competition  and  strengthened  by  an  oppor- 
tunity. 

Jefferson  was  a  man  of  singular  astuteness,  and  it  was  not 
long  before  he  realised  that  although  for  the  moment  power, 
and  even  an  appearance  of  popularity,  were  on  the  side  of  his 
rival,  there  was  a  strong  and  very  bitter  party  hostile  to  the 
Secretary  of  the  Treasury  on  personal  grounds  and  opposed 
with  an  equal  detestation  to  the  general  trend  of  his  policy. 
These  persons  felt  that  they  had  been  outmanoeuvred  at  the 
Convention  of  Philadelphia  and  overwhelmed  in  the  popular 
agitation  which  followed  it.  They  considered  that  their 
ruin  was  in  process  of  being  completed  by  the  audacity  and 
vigour  of  Washington's  minister  of  finance.  These  mal- 
contents were  disorganised  and  leaderless.  Madison,  their 
most  respectable  figure,  had  contributed  to  the  disaster  by 
assisting  Hamilton  to  mould  the  constitution  and  to  write 
the  Federalist.  Although  a  statesman  of  undoubted  ability, 
Madison  lacked  the  qualities  needed  for  inspiring  con- 
fidence in  common  men,  for  party  intrigue  and  for  bold 
attack. 

Jefferson  therefore  set  himself  actively  to  work  in  opposi- 
tion to  Hamilton.  In  spite  of  his  want  of  personal  courage, 
he  was  a  dangerous  antagonist.  Conversations  with  'old 
friends/  private  letters  well  seasoned  with  political  counsel, 
the  mildest  but  the  most  indefatigable  pulling  of  wires, 


THE  DEMOCRATS  275 

advice  that  was  never  too  much  forced  or  obtruded,  gradu-  A.D.  1791 
ally  compacted  a  party  in  opposition  to  the  government  of  ^T- 34 
which  he  was  himself  a  minister.  Everything  was  so 
gentle,  it  hardly  earned  the  title  of  an  impulse.  He  appeared 
to  act  sadly,  and  from  a  sense  of  duty.  Only  a  depraved 
spirit  could  suspect  him  of  ambition.  His  sole  desire  was 
to  do  good  stealthily.  He  wished  for  nothing  so  little  as 
the  fame  of  a  notorious  attack;  but  merely  induced  the 
younger  generation  to  come  forward  and  to  speak  their 
minds,  glad  if  the  advice  and  encouragement  of  the  '  wave- 
worn  mariner'  could  be  of  some  small  service  to  them. 
Accessible  and  genial  in  a  private  circle,  Jefferson  acquired 
an  influence  by  the  strangest  method  that  has  ever  been 
practised  in  public  life.  In  the  peculiar  circumstances 
which  now  began  to  develop,  he  was  an  unmatched  party 
leader.  Timid,  but  untiring;  ingenious,  subterranean  and 
resourceful,  he  played  his  game,  unaffected  by  the  hatred, 
suspicion  and  contempt  of  his  immediate  associates;  and 
in  the  end  he  won  it  by  a  strange  mixture  of  virtues  and 
vices,  of  tenacity  and  cunning,  by  a  wonderful  knowledge 
of  the  less  admirable  emotions  of  men,  and  by  an  unwaver- 
ing confidence  in  their  importance  under  any  system  of 
popular  government. 

The  Democratic  party,  which  from  the  beginning  of  the 
second  Congress  offered  a  vigorous  opposition  to  all  the 
measures  of  the  administration,  was  planned,  concentrated, 
organised,  named  and  inspired  by  Thomas  Jefferson,  the 
Secretary  of  State.  It  was  an  anomalous  arrangement,  but 
for  the  attainment  of  its  object,  which  was  the  destruction 
of  the  government,  it  had  very  obvious  advantages. 

The  reasons  of  Jefferson's  bitter  opposition  to  Hamilton 
were  both  public  and  personal,  and  there  is  no  great  difficulty 
in  understanding  either.  As  a  statesman  Hamilton  stood  for 
Federal  Government  against  State  Rights ;  for  a  strong  execu- 


276  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A. D.  1791  tive  against  the  Rights  of  Man;  for  the  actual  inequality 
^T' 34  against  the  philosophic  equality  of  human  creatures ;  for 
business  against  nonsense.  The  literary  brain  of  Jefferson 
employed  its  leisure  with  the  invention  of  names l  to  convey 
his  iniquity.  An  intention  to  subvert  republican  institu- 
tions was  constantly  alleged.  The  idea  of  a  king  was  sus- 
pended as  a  constant  menace;  but  it  was  always  difficult 
to  give  substance  to  the  threatened  dynasty.  Hamilton's 
frankly  expressed  admiration  for  certain  British  institu- 
tions enabled  Jefferson  to  foster  the  suspicion  that  he 
desired  to  bring  about  a  union  with  that  country,  and 
to  replace  the  necks  of  free  Americans  under  an  odious 
yoke. 

Like  many  other  great  men,  Hamilton  had  a  polar  quality 
which  attracted  love  and  hatred  with  a  force  that  meaner 
natures  are  exempt  from.  His  capacity  for  uniting  his 
enemies  was  inferior  only  to  his  gift  for  inspiring  devotion  in 
his  friends.  He  was  great  in  the  simple  manner;  not  at 
all  astute,  but  merely  overwhelming  and  irresistible.  He 
was  one  of  the  greatest  strategists,  but  only,  very  rarely, 
even  a  respectable  tactician.  Every  man,  enemy  or  friend, 
saw  how  his  course  was  laid.  He  never  divided  his 
enemies  by  conjuring  up  a  timely  mist  upon  the  waters. 
He  was  combative ;  loved  the  giving  of  blows  and  cared 
little  about  receiving  them.  In  the  matter  of  smiting  he 
had  a  heavy  hand.  On  great  occasions  he  was  capable  of 
a  great  restraint,  but  his  natural  character  was  eager  and 
vehement,  intolerant  of  fools  and  impatient  of  prudential 
management.  His  youth  made  it  unforgivable  that  he  should 
be  so  outspoken.  Many  envied  his  success ;  some  certainly 
hated  his  ideals ;  and  there  were  others,  grave  men,  important 
among  their  neighbours,  who  had  felt  over  their  shoulders 
the  lash  of  his  contempt. 

1  'Monocrata,   '  Auglomen,' etc.  etc. 


THE  DEMOCRATS  277 

A  few  months  later,1  the  results  of  Jefferson's  northern  A.D.  1791 
tour  and  his  collaboration  with  Madison  became  manifest.  ^T* 34 
A  journal  was  started  to  assail  the  government.  Its  editor 
was  one  Freneau,  a  gentleman  of  a  light  and  caustic  vein, 
with  a  turn  for  metrical  satire.  The  Secretary  of  State 
appointed  him  to  a  subordinate  post  in  his  office.  The 
pay  was  small;  so  small  that  the  appointment  has  the 
appearance  of  a  blunder.  The  patronage  was  of  such  a 
trifling  sort,  as  far  as  money  went,  that  the  moral  support 
assumed  the  chief  part.  Freneau's  paper  with  great  vivacity 
proceeded  to  assail  all  the  acts  of  the  administration  except 
those  which  could  be  attributed  to  the  impulse  of  his  patron. 
Hamilton's  financial  policy  was  fiercely  attacked.  The  charge 
of  corruption  figured  constantly  in  the  largest  type ;  though 
the  nature  of  the  bribe,  and  the  persons  who  had  been 
bought,  were  involved  in  mystery.  The  briber  alone  stood 
out  clearly  for  execration. 

Under  Jefferson's  able  inspiration  Freneau  played  the 
game  of  indefinite  slander  with  great  vigour.  From  cor- 
ruption he  passed  on  to  treason.  Hamilton  and  the 
Federalists  were  scheming  to  subvert  the  Republic  and 
impose  a  monarchy.  The  temper  of  the  times  was  jealous, 
and  the  plain  man  accordingly  did  not  always  dismiss  the 
charge  as  incredible ;  but  hearing  it  often  repeated  came  at 
last  to  think  there  must  be  something  in  it. 

During  Hamilton's  remaining  years  of  office  his  chief 
work  in  connection  with  the  Treasury  department  was  the 
defence  and  completion  of  his  financial  policy.  But  in 
addition  he  was  forced  to  undertake  a  more  irksome  labour. 
His  character  was  persistently  assailed,  at  first  upon  the 
vague  charge  that,  out  of  the  public  funds,  he  had  corrupted 
others,  and  when  that  had  failed,  upon  the  cruder  accusa- 
tion that  he  had  manipulated  loans,  and  made  away  with 

1  October  31,  1791,  Works,  vii.  p.  239. 


278  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1791  millions  for  his  private  benefit.  There  was  never  even  a 
Mj  34  prima  facie  case  under  either  head.  The  accounts  were  so 
perspicuous,  the  records  so  complete,  that  no  honest  purpose, 
however  blundering,  was  capable  of  misunderstanding  their 
import.  Jefferson  and  Madison,  who  instigated  these  attacks 
and  drew  a  profit  from  them,  can  never  have  been  unaware 
that  they  were  false ;  but  they  argued  wisely  that  for  their 
immediate  purpose  truth  or  falsehood  was  not  a  matter 
of  any  great  importance.  What  was  of  paramount  import- 
ance was  that  Hamilton  should  be  hindered  in  his  work, 
and  if  possible  should  be  driven  out  of  public  life. 

Even  had  there  been  no  dangers  to  the  state  arising  out  of 
the  progress  of  the  French  Revolution,  these  departmental 
and  personal  concerns  would  have  left  Hamilton  but  little 
time  for  the  prosecution  of  his  commercial  policy  upon  a 
grand  scale.  When  the  occasion  presented  itself,  as  in  the 
case  of  the  fisheries x  and  the  system  of  import  duties,2  he 
did  not  hesitate  to  advance  a  few  steps  towards  his  end,  but 
it  was  entirely  out  of  the  question  to  attempt  the  realisation  of 
his  dream  of  "  erecting  one  great  American  system,  superior 
1  to  the  control  of  transatlantic  force  or  influence,  and  able  to 
'  dictate  the  connection  between  the  Old  and  the  New  World."8 
The  report  upon  Manufactures,  presented  to  the  second  Con- 
gress, within  a  few  weeks  after  its  assembly,  was  therefore 
left  by  him,  reluctantly,  without  any  serious  effort  to  carry  it 
into  accomplishment. 

Jefferson's  attitude  towards  this  commercial  policy  was 
hostile  at  every  point.  He  hated  it  for  two  very  good 
reasons :  it  was  obnoxious  upon  different  grounds  both  to 
the  party  of  State  Rights  and  to  the  enthusiasts  for  the 
Rights  of  Man.  The  former  saw  in  it  a  new  attempt  to 
aggrandise  the  Federal  power,  the  latter  were  up  in  arms 

1  History,  iv.  pp.  361-62.  2  Ibid,  pp,  392-95. 

8  Ibid.  iv.  p.  314. 


THE  DEMOCRATS  279 

because  it  offered  an  affront  to  the  phrases  of  liberty.    The  A.D.  1791 
first  objection  was  grounded  in  the  facts,  the  second  was       T- 
based  upon  a  purely  verbal  misconstruction;  but  for  the 
purpose  of  an  opposition  the  one  was  as  good  a  weapon  as 
the  other. 

Jefferson  was  a  free-trader,  as  one  would  have  expected 
him  to  be,  but  it  is  more  than  doubtful  if  he  knew  what  the 
phrase  meant.  It  was  enough  that  a  doctrine  paid  a  kind 
of  lip-service  to  the  idea  of  freedom  for  him  to  subscribe 
to  it  without  a  second  thought.  For  those  who  will  not 
observe  the  conditions  of  their  own  time,  the  formula  is 
ever  the  proper  weapon.  Jefferson  was  a  reader  of  books,  a 
weaver  of  fanciful  philosophies,  an  accepter  of  general  prin- 
ciples, a  worshipper  of  words,  a  hater  of  the  confusion 
of  things.  He  loved  everything  that  was  'free/  or  that 
called  itself '  free,'  with  the  passionate  unreasonableness  of  a 
collector  of  Stuart  relics.  His  fundamental  belief  (if  we  may 
use  these  words  to  describe  opinions  which  never  at  any  point 
touched  a  firm  bottom,  but  merely  swam  like  a  kind  of 
*  sud '  upon  the  stream  of  expediency)  was  a  set  of  formulas 
which  he  had  learned  by  rote  during  his  official  career  in 
France.  It  was  bad  enough,  according  to  the  precepts  of 
this  philosophy,  that  free  citizens  should  be  required  to  pay 
taxes  of  any  kind  whatsoever.  It  was  intolerable  that  imposts 
should  be  levied  except  to  supply  the  barest  necessities  of 
the  simplest  form  of  government  that  would  fit  the  needs 
of  the  time.  He  would  have  derided  the  idea  that  any 
country  could  be  taxed  into  prosperity,  or  that  under  any 
circumstances  a  system  of  duties  could  become  an  aid  to 
national  development.  A  scheme  which  had  for  its  object 
to  place  the  industry  and  commerce  of  the  states  under  the 
care  of  the  federal  government  was  either  visionary  and 
absurd,  or  else  was  the  cloak  to  some  ulterior  end.  Had  it 
been  possible  to  prove  to  him  that  such  a  scheme  was  in  fact 


280  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1791  attainable  and  would  produce  great  benefits  to  the  com- 
34  is  opposition  would  still  have  remained  the  same. 


It  was  more  important,  in  his  opinion,  that  private  men 
should  be  left  free  to  manage  their  own  affairs,  than  that  the 
affairs  of  men  in  the  aggregate  should  be  well  managed. 

The  system  of  Jefferson  prided  itself  upon  a  consistency 
that  scorned  compromise.  All  men  were  equal,  and,  with 
the  exception  of  black  men  in  certain  favoured  latitudes, 
they  were  born  free.  All  countries  were  the  same.  If  it 
were  not  for  the  injurious  artifices  of  government,  friend- 
liness would  be  the  rule  among  mankind.  Truth  was  a  flat 
and  easy  projection  like  Mercator's,  not  a  rough  crystal  with 
a  thousand  planes.  In  the  navigation  of  his  fancies  Jefferson 
allowed  neither  for  wind  nor  current,  neither  for  deviation 
of  the  compass  nor  for  the  tide  that  is  in  the  affairs  of  men. 
He  could  not  love  a  man  who  would  dissect  a  beautiful 
theory  ;  Hamilton,  on  the  other  hand,  would  not  away  with 
arguments  unless  they  were  based  upon  a  knowledge  of  the 
conditions.  To  Jefferson,  liberty,  equality  and  fraternity 
were  the  pillars  of  the  temple,  and  free  trade  seemed  for  the 
moment  to  be  a  necessary  consequence  of  the  plan.  A  few 
years  later,  it  is  true,  fashions  in  thought  and  rhetoric  under- 
went a  change.  The  doctrine  of  free  trade  ceased  to  be  an 
article  of  the  Democratic  faith.  Its  place  was  taken,  under 
Jefferson  and  his  successors,  by  a  crude  and  spasmodic  pro- 
tection which  was  hardly  less  opposed  to  the  national  prin- 
ciple of  Hamilton  than  to  the  original  highflown  professions 
of  his  rival.  Those  erratic  efforts  formed  no  part  of  a 
permanent  and  noble  purpose,  but  were  merely  the  hand-to- 
mouth  expedients  of  compliant  demagogues. 

Jefferson's  attitude  towards  the  financial  policy  of  Hamil- 
ton was  at  the  beginning  by  no  means  unfavourable.  It  was 
only  when  he  came  to  realise  the  strength  and  permanence 
of  the  feelings  aroused  against  it  that  his  opposition  was 


THE  DEMOCRATS  281 

declared  in  unmistakable  terms.  Even  as  late  as  the  spring  A.D.  1791 
of  1791,  after  his  quarrel  with  Hamilton  over  the  National  ^T-34 
Bank,  we  find  clear  expressions  of  approval,  and  a  sound  per- 
ception of  the  benefits  which  the  country  had  derived  from 
the  measures  of  the  previous  sessions.1  It  is  necessary  to 
discriminate  very  carefully  between  the  feelings  which 
Jefferson  gave  utterance  to  at  the  time  when  these  measures 
passed  into  law,  and  those  other  feelings  which  he  was  led 
to  entertain  a  short  time  afterwards,  when  the  exigencies  of 
creating  a  political  party  became  his  chief  concern.  And  it 
is  necessary  also  to  discriminate  between  what  Jefferson 
really  felt  in  1790  and  1791,  and  what  in  later  years  he  had 
the  audacity  to  maintain  that  he  had  felt  during  that  period. 
It  is  not  too  harsh  a  judgment  to  condemn  the  account  con- 
tained in  the  Anas  as  unworthy  of  belief.  The  misrepre- 
sentation of  the  chief  incidents  of  the  time  and  of  Hamilton's 
measures,  motives  and  methods  is  not  less  remarkable  than 
his  undeserved  depreciation  of  his  own  astuteness. 

It  is  true,  however,  that  Jefferson  was  entirely  ignorant  of 
finance.  He  not  only  confessed  the  defect  in  his  intelligence, 
but  made  a  merit  of  it.  To  understand  finance  was  a  thing 
only  possible  for  rogues.  We  are  not  unfamiliar  with  the  argu- 
ment at  the  present  day.  The  rhetorical  censor,  baffled  and 
brought  to  book,  invariably  rushes  to  this  classical  asylum. 
"  You  are  too  clever  for  me.  You  can  prove  anything.  But 
'  all  the  same,  the  plain  man  knows  very  well  that  my 
'  charges  are  true,  and  that  you  are  a  knave."  This  method 
argues  a  great  reliance  upon  the  opacity  and  indolence  of 
a  democracy,  but  there  is  no  gainsaying  the  fact  that  it 
occasionally  attains  its  purpose. 

Jefferson  alleges  in  his  letters  and  Anas 2  that  Hamilton's 
measures  were  grounded  in  corruption  and  dishonesty ;  but 
his  own  moral  sense  was  never  a  very  trustworthy  guide, 

1  History,  iv.  pp.  486-87.  2   Ford's  Je/erson,  i.  p.  160. 


282  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1791  and  upon  any  question  concerned  with  finance,  his  intelligence 
T<  34  was  as  inadequate  as  his  conscience.  There  was  not  merely 
a  looseness  in  his  judgment  on  this  subject,  but  that  real 
mental  impediment  which  prevents  most  women  and  many 
men  from  being  able  to  understand  the  simplest  balance- 
sheet.  When  he  disliked  anything  or  anybody,  he  picked 
the  handiest  word  from  his  vocabulary,  and  corruption 
was  the  most  apposite  term  of  abuse  to  employ  in  a  case 
where  money  was  in  question.  His  own  views  upon  national 
finance  are  of  a  charming  crudity.  In  magniloquent  and 
persuasive  language  he  strove  to  persuade  his  followers  to 
contest  the  whole  matter  of  the  debt,  basing  their  argu- 
ments upon  the  proposition  of  Thomas  Paine, '  that  no  gene- 
ration has  the  right  to  bind  posterity.'  With  an  amusing 
precision  he  calculated  a  generation  to  exist  for  a  period  of 
nineteen  years,  and  he  earnestly  recommended  that  any  debt 
which  had  remained  undischarged  for  such  a  time  should 
be  cancelled.1  Posterity  was  to  be  allowed  to  enjoy  private 
freedom  and  political  safety ;  but  the  present  age  must  either 
discharge  the  bill  in  full,  or  the  bill  itself  must  be  wiped  off 
the  slate.  He  protested  that  although  he  aided  Hamilton  to 
carry  '  assumption '  in  the  manner  that  has  been  already  ex- 
plained,2 he  almost  immediately  came  to  regret  it.  He  would 
persuade  us  that,  at  the  time,  he  entertained  no  very  decided 
convictions,  and  that  his  childlike  simplicity  was  practised 
upon  by  his  unscrupulous  colleague.  He  explained  in  vivid 
but  unconvincing  detail  the  manner  in  which  he  was '  duped ' 
by  Hamilton.3  Jefferson,  indeed,  is  unique  in  his  mis- 
fortunes, inasmuch  as,  at  the  time,  he  endured  considerable 
unpopularity  (to  his  mind  ever  the  worst  of  all  possible 
human  calamities)  through  his  supposed  complicity  in  finan- 
cial integrity,4  and  after  his  death  discarded  the  reward  of 

1  Ford's  Jefferson,  ix.  p.  389.  a  Ante,  p.  223. 

8  Ford's  Jefferson,  i.  pp.  161-62.  4  History,  iv.  p.  449. 


THE  DEMOCRATS  283 

his  martyrdom  by  allowing  it  to  transpire  that  his  sympathies  A.D.  1791 
were  wholly  upon  the  side  of  repudiation.     For  posterity,    ^T* 34 
looking  back  upon  the  deeds  of  its  great-grandparents,  is 
always  a  stern  moralist,  and  in  this  matter  of  the  debt  un- 
hesitatingly approves  Hamilton's  action  and  condemns  the 
opposition  he  was  forced  to  endure. 

The  first  session  of  the  second  Congress  did  not  meet  under 
the  most  promising  conditions.  It  is  true  that  the  country 
was  enjoying  a  prosperity  which  had  passed  the  dreams  of 
the  optimists.-  It  is  true  also  that,  upon  the  whole,  there  was 
a  disposition  to  support  the  Union,  and  to  acknowledge  the 
benefits  which  the  administration  of  Washington  had  already 
conferred  upon  the  nation.  The  composition  of  Congress 
reflected  this  general  feeling,  and  the  Federalists  were  in  a 
considerable  majority,  though  by  no  means  firmly  bound 
together  upon  party  lines.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  there 
was  an  ominous  lawlessness  in  Pennsylvania,  where  Gallatin 
had  begun  his  evil  work  of  agitation  against  the  excise ;  while 
Virginia,  the  proudest  of  all  the  states,  was  deeply  offended 
by  the  superior  strength  and  dignity  of  the  central  govern- 
ment. 

It  was  evident  from  the  beginning  that  there  was  an 
organised  party,  far  superior  in  discipline  to  the  supporters 
of  the  government,  determined  to  offer  opposition  to  the 
Federalist  principle  at  every  point.  The  character  and  policy 
of  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  were  the  main  objects  of 
attack.  He  brought  forward  proposals  to  give  effect  to  the 
decisions  arrived  a.t  during  the  previous  sessions;  but  no 
matter  how  obvious  or  how  formal  were  his  recommenda- 
tions, they  were  mnde  the  occasions  of  factious  opposition. 
Reason  and  consistency  had  no  concern  in  the  matter.  It  was 
sufficient  that  Hamilton  was  favourable  to  any  measure  for 
it  to  be  obstructed  by  all  the  forms  of  Congress,  and  by  all 
the  invective  of  the  opposition.  Whether  he  proposed  to 


284  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1791  increase  the  debt  by  a  small  sum  in  order  to  render  the  pro- 
Mr' 34  cess  of  '  assumption '  complete  and  equitable,  or  to  decrease 
the  debt  by  providing  for  its  rapid  discharge  by  means  of  a 
sinking  fund,  the  settled  hostility  never  varied.  His  pro- 
posals for  the  discharge  of  obligations  due  to  foreign  officers 
who  had  served  during  the  War  of  Independence  were 
assailed  with  objections  as  fierce  and  as  captious  as  his  pro- 
posals to  provide  a  revenue  adequate  to  the  exigencies  of  the 
Union  by  means  of  an  excise.  An  attempt  was  even  made 
by  Madison,  in  the  full  hope  of  success,  to  prevent  the  House 
from  asking  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  to  report  upon 
Ways  and  Means.  The  insolence  of  the  suggestion  was 
deliberately  designed  to  force  Hamilton  to  resignation. 
Jefferson  in  private  conferences  endeavoured  to  detach  a 
sufficient  number  of  the  Federalists,  while  Madison  in 
Congress  coloured  the  argument  with  a  show  of  reason. 
The  manoeuvre  was  in  the  nature  of  a  surprise,  but  in  the  end 
it  was  defeated  by  a  small  majority.1 

From  its  inauguration  in  January  the  National  Gazette 
pointed  out  the  way  and  cheered  on  the  antagonists  of  the 
administration.  Jefferson,  in  addition  to  his  quiet  labours 
among  the  weaker  Federalists  in  Congress,2  turned  his  per- 
suasiveness to  the  task  of  instilling  a  suspicion  of  Hamilton's 
integrity  in  the  mind  of  the  President.3  The  swashbucklers 
of  the  party  were  incited  to  make  attacks  in  Congress,  and 
Madison  reinforced  their  ingenuous  philippics  with  a  more 
solemn  malice  and  a  more  lingering  innuendo.  The  charge 
of  treason  gradually  gained  strength.  The  charge  of  cor- 
ruption passed  into  a  new  phase.  At  first  it  had  been 
alleged  upon  the  grounds  that  unworthy  men  who  had 
bought  up  the  obligations  of  the  states  and  the  confedera- 
tion at  a  discount  were,  by  Hamilton's  system,  to  be  paid  off 

1  History,  iv.  p.  389.  2  Ibid.  iv.  pp.  388-90. 

«  Ibid.  v.  pp.  34-35  and  38-40. 


THE  DEMOCKATS  285 

at  par.  That  was  felt  to  be  a  straining  of  the  meaning  of  A.D.  1791 
words,  and  accordingly,  as  the  charge  was  one  too  profitable  ^Tf  34 
to  be  withdrawn,  Madison  invented  an  accusation  which  he 
rightly  considered  would  not  be  unworthy  of  the  epithets 
his  followers  had  employed.  Clearly,  though  in  an  indirect 
form,  he  accused  Hamilton  of  having  bribed  the  members 
of  Congress  who  were  fundholders,  and  the  moneyed  classes 
generally,  by  creating  an  artificial  price.  Stock  had  been 
bought,  it  was  alleged,  on  behalf  of  government  for  the  pur- 
poses of  the  sinking  fund  at  a  price  higher  than  the  true 
market  price.1  It  would  be  unfair  to  Madison's  intelligence 
to  suggest  that  he  believed  in  the  truth  of  his  accusation, 
and  equally  unfair  to  his  cool  nature  to  put  forward  the 
excuse  that  he  was  carried  away  by  a  perfervid  tempera- 
ment. It  is  only  fair  to  judge  Madison  to  some  extent  from 
his  own  standpoint.  There  was  no  confusion  in  his  thoughts, 
or  heat  in  his  action.  He  was  merely  an  intolerably  good 
man  whose  object  it  was  to  rid  himself  and  his  country  of  a 
bad  man.  He  was  willing  to  pay  a  price  for  this  benefit 
which  would  have  staggered  meaner  natures,  and  to  his  own 
conscience  it  is  conceivable  that  he  excused  the  means  he 
employed  on  the  grounds  that  the  game  of  politics,  like  the 
game  of  war,  leaves  veracity  out  of  its  rules. 


CHAPTER    III 

Charges  of  Corruption 

THE  Democratic  party  was  planned  and  organised  during 
the  spring  and  summer  of  1791,  and  its  efficiency  was  well 
proved  in  the  session  which  followed;  but  until  after  the 
scandals  of  August  1792  the  opposition  made  no  parade  of 
their  strength,  acknowledged  no  leader  either  in  Congress  or 

1  History,  iv.  p.  528. 


286  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1792  in  the  Cabinet,  and  would  not  even  have  admitted  that  they 
^T' 35    had  any  formal  existence.     Everything  was  wrapped  up  in 
secrecy,  and  it  was  intended  that  an  excellent  discipline 
should  wear  the  appearance  of  a  perfect  spontaneity. 

During  the  earlier  part  of  the  previous  session l  the  loose 
ranks  of  the  Federalists  had  been  unprepared  for  any  con- 
certed attack.  They  had  continued  as  before  to  indulge 
their  private  fancies,  acting  upon  the  assumption  that  in 
every  division  members  would  vote  according  to  their  senti- 
ments and  not  by  order.  As  a  result,  government  measures 
had  suffered  defeat  and  alteration  upon  more  than  one  occa- 
sion, and  critical  issues  had  often  been  determined  by 
dangerously  narrow  majorities.  Gradually  it  had  become 
clear  that  some  secret  caucus  was  pursuing  a  consistent 
course  with  the  firm  intention  of  forcing  Hamilton  to  resign. 
This  attempt,  having  ended  in  failure,  had  been  succeeded 
by  a  second  attempt,  the  object  of  which  was  to  tarnish  his 
honour.  The  friends  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  stirred 
with  indignation,  had  demanded  a  frank  exposure  of  the 
hidden  enemy;  but  in  this  they  had  been  discouraged  by 
their  leader,  who  held  that  in  the  interests  of  the  Union  it 
was  necessary  for  the  moment,  at  all  costs,  to  conceal  the 
divided  counsels  of  the  Cabinet  and  the  antagonism  of  the 
joint  authors  of  the  Federalist.  Perhaps  it  would  have  been 
better  had  Hamilton  continued  of  this  mind  for  a  twelve- 
month longer ;  but  patience  under  attack  was  not  with  him 
a  natural  quality,  and  the  ingenious  malice  of  his  enemies 
was  a  remarkable  thing  even  in  the  history  of  politics.2 

Hamilton's  view  of  the  situation  after  the  session  had 
ended  is  set  forth  with  his  customary  frankness  in  a  private 
letter  to  Colonel  Carrington.3  He  was  then  fully  aware  that 

1  24th  October  1791  to  8th  May  1792. 

•  e.g.  the  St.  Glair  incident,  History,  iv.  p.  416  and  v.  pp.  122-27. 

3  26th  May  1792,  Works,  ix.  p.  513. 


THE  DEMOCRATS  287 

the  obstruction  of  his  measures  and  the  attacks  upon  him-  A.D.  1792 
self  had  not  been  mere  casual  explosions,  but  part  of  a  pre-  ^T* 35 
concerted  scheme.  He  had  taken  office  against  the  advice 
of  his  friends,  confident  that  he  would  have  the  hearty 
support  of  Madison,  whom  he  knew,  from  Madison's  own 
assurances,  to  be  in  agreement  with  him  upon  all  essential 
points.  Madison  had  been  in  favour  of  a  funded  debt,  and 
of  the  assumption  of  the  state  obligations.  He  had  been 
opposed  on  principle  to  discrimination  and  to  repudiation  in 
that  or  in  any  other  form.  He  had  advised  strongly  that  an 
excise  was  a  proper  means  of  raising  revenue.  But  from  the 
very  beginning  of  the  administration  he  seemed  to  have 
gone  back  upon  all  his  former  opinions.  Hamilton  was  sur- 
prised and  chagrined,  but  nevertheless  had  received  with 
incredulity  the  tales  of  gossips  who  alleged  a  personal 
animosity,  and  had  refused  to  believe  that  so  sincere  a  lover 
of  the  Union  could  have  been  turned  from  his  principles  by  a 
crabbed  jealousy.  But  after  the  work  of  last  session  it  was 
impossible  to  doubt  any  longer  that  Madison  had  exchanged 
friendship  for  enmity,  had  thrown  consistency  overboard, 
and  had  cast  in  his  lot  with  the  party  which  would  have 
gladly  seen  the  Federalist  burned  by  the  common  hangman. 
It  was  clear  also  that  Madison  was  co-operating  day  by 
day  with  Jefferson.  The  similarity  of  the  views  put  forward 
by  the  Secretary  of  State  at  cabinet  councils,  with  those  put 
forward  simultaneously  by  the  actual  but  unacknowledged 
leader  of  the  opposition  in  Congress,  was  too  marked  to  be 
the  result  of  a  mere  accident.  Jefferson's  enmity  was  alto- 
gether unveiled.  He  held  conversations  with  all  and  sundry 
upon  the  iniquities  of  the  Treasury  policy.  His  particular 
friends  were  the  most  active  assailants  of  Hamilton's  integrity 
in  public  discussions  and  private  talk.  The  virulence  of 
Freneau's  paper  was  unceasing,  and  it  was  notorious  that 
Jefferson  and  Madison  had  been  the  promoters  and  were 


288  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1792  still  the  patrons  of  this  enterprise.  In  the  whole  of  Madi- 
^Tt  35  son's  conduct  there  had  been  a  more  uniform  and  persevering 
opposition  than  Hamilton  had  been  able  to  resolve  into  a 
sincere  difference  of  opinion.1  But  even  Madison's  speeches 
in  Congress  afforded  no  adequate  measure  of  his  hostility. 
During  the  coarser  and  more  violent  attacks,  as  a  rule,  he 
had  lain  'perdu'  and  had  put  up  others  endowed  with  a 
more  reckless  effrontery  to  do  the  dirtier  portion  of  the 
work.  On  one  occasion,  however,  he  had  departed  from  this 
prudent  principle,2  and  had  made  a  direct  imputation  of 
dishonesty  against  the  Treasury. 

Hamilton's  letter  goes  on  to  enumerate  his  various  dis- 
agreements with  Jefferson  and  Madison  since  the  inception 
of  Washington's  government.  In  all  these  disagreements 
the  object  of  his  adversaries  had  been  to  narrow  the  inter- 
pretation of  the  constitution  and  to  abridge  and  curtail  the 
federal  power.  In  no  case  had  they  been  able  to  achieve 
their  ends,  and  Hamilton  surmised  that  this  constant  current 
of  success  on  the  one  side,  and  of  defeat  on  the  other,  had 
made  the  opposition  furious,  and  had  produced  a  disposition 
to  subvert  their  competitors,  even  at  the  expense  of  govern- 
ment.3 

In  conclusion,  Hamilton  pointed  out  the  hollowness  and 
insincerity  of  the  clamours  which  had  been  raised  against 
the  tyranny  of  the  central  power.  The  real  danger  lay  not 
in  the  possible  suppression  or  extinction  of  the  states,  which 
were  things  beyond  the  wildest  terrors,  but  in  the  preserva- 
tion of  the  federal  government  which  was  engaged  in  a 
struggle  for  its  very  life.  At  every  moment  fresh  attempts 
were  being  made  with  an  untiring  audacity  to  pare  down  the 
powers  and  whittle  away  the  sovereignty  of  the  Union.  The 
constant  attempts  at  encroachment  on  the  part  of  the  larger 
states  were  now  becoming  more  and  more  difficult  to  with- 

1  Works,  ix.  p.  520.  2  See  ante  p.  285.  3  Works,  ix.  p.  530. 


THE  DEMOCRATS  289 

stand,  owing  to  the  authority  which  attached  to  the  names  A.D.  1793 
of  the  men  who  led  and  stimulated  these  attacks.  If  success  ^T'  25 
should  attend  their  efforts,  the  result  must  be  fatal.  There 
would  be  an  end  not  only  of  the  Republic,  but  of  republican- 
ism as  a  principle.  Hamilton  had  feared  from  the  beginning 
that  a  pure,  unmitigated  republic  would  prove  too  weak  a 
form  of  government  to  preserve  the  Union  against  the  tur- 
bulence of  the  states.  It  had  been  his  constant  effort 
throughout  the  administration  to  make  the  experiment  of  a 
republic  succeed.  The  accusations  which  were  brought 
against  him  of  treasonable  designs,  of  a  preference  for  mon- 
archy, of  a  desire  for  reunion  with  Britain,  were  entirely 
false ;  but  what  lent  them  colour  was  his  determination  to 
establish  republicanism  above  the  reach  of  disorder  and 
intrigue  by  clothing  it  with  powers  adequate  to  its  functions. 
Strength  in  government  was  the  only  principle  capable  of 
maintaining  the  Republic  against  the  attacks  of  its  numerous 
ill-wishers. 

A  few  weeks  later l  Washington  forwarded  to  Hamilton  a 
long  list  of  objections  to  the  Federalist  policy,  and  asked 
that  he  might  be  supplied  with  the  proper  answers.  The 
authorship  of  these  objections  was  wrapped  up  in  no  mystery. 
They  were  formidable  only  because  they  were  so  numerous, 
so  wearisome,  so  trite,  so  hollow  and  so  obscure.  Jefferson 
had  the  gift  to  make  even  his  own  confusion  a  weapon 
against  his  enemies.  As  Hamilton  complained  with  some 
pathos,  the  chief  difficulty  of  making  an  answer  was  the 
difficulty  of  attaching  any  clear  meaning  to  the  accusations. 
The  rhetorical  attacks  of  an  intelligent  man  who  has  the 
force  of  character  to  play  the  part  of  a  stupid  one  are  the 
severest  trial  to  the  temper  of  him  who  has  to  provide  a 
reply.  But  as  Washington  was  most  diligently  assailed  by 
Jefferson,  in  season  and  out  of  season,  with  the  object  of 

1  29th  July  1792. 
T 


290  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1792  sowing  in  his  mind  a  distrust  of  Hamilton  and  all  his  works, 
^ET*  35  it  was  essential  that  the  vague  indictment  should  be  answered 
at  length.  The  objections  were  therefore  dealt  with  down 
to  number  '  twenty-one '  with  a  painstaking  and,  upon  the 
whole,  good-natured  solemnity.  The  analysis  of  the  mean- 
ing of  the  various  charges  appears  in  most  cases  conclusive 
without  the  need  of  any  reply  to  them.  The  labour  entailed 
may  well  have  been  grudged  by  the  head  of  a  great  depart- 
ment working  long  after  hours  in  the  ordinary  routine  of 
his  office. 

This  unjustifiable  attack  was  the  last  straw.  Early  in 
August,  Hamilton  broke  loose  from  his  wise  and  self- 
imposed  restraint.  In  a  series  of  letters  (anonymous  only 
because  the  fashion  of  the  times  preferred  such  signatures 
as  An  American,  Amicus,  Catullus,  Metellus,  A  Plain 
Honest  Man,1  and  so  forth,  to  any  private  name)  Hamilton 
proceeded  to  deal  out  justice  to  his  colleague  the  Secretary 
of  State.  Freneau  escaped  with  a  few  light  touches  of  the 
lash;  the  weight  of  the  thong  fell  upon  the  shoulders  of 
Jefferson.  The  gist  of  the  accusation  was  that  Jefferson 
had  started  a  paper  to  vilify  the  government  of  which  he 
was  himself  a  member;  that  he  had  from  the  beginning 
been  unfriendly  to  the  constitution;  that  he  had  been 
opposed  almost  without  exception  to  all  the  measures  of 
the  administration,  but  notwithstanding  had  clung  to 
office ;  and  that  the  value  of  his  opinion  upon  any  matter 
connected  with  financial  probity  was  nought,  seeing  that 
during  his  ministry  in  France  he  had  seriously  recom- 
mended a  fraud  upon  the  creditors  of  the  United  States 
so  gross  and  palpable  that  the  old  Congress  had  con- 
temptuously rejected  it.2  All  these  charges  were  proved 
up  to  the  hilt.  Disloyalty,  fatuity,  ignorance  and  hypocrisy 
were  established  against  the  poor  man  so  relentlessly  that 

1  Works,  vii.  pp.  230-303.  2  Ibid.  vii.  p.  235. 


THE  DEMOCRATS  291 

the  mere  fact  of  his  survival  compels  a  certain  degree  of  A.D.  179 
admiration.  Hamilton's  popularity  rose  with  the  vehe-  ^T-35 
mence  of  the  counterstroke.  The  Federalists  were  elated. 
Washington,  who  vainly  desired  peace,  was  perturbed  to  the 
point  of  remonstrating  with  both  parties.  The  letters  of 
his  two  ministers  in  reply  are  worthy  of  consideration. 
Hamilton  is  frank  and  fierce,  but  says  he  will  endeavour 
to  comply — when  he  has  finished  with  the  business:  like 
some  panting,  victorious  dog  that  is  chidden  by  its  master 
for  a  street  brawl.  Jefferson  answers  at  great  length  and 
with  a  stammering  affectation  of  serenity;  as  if  he  had 
been  in  no  wise  ruffled, — a  whine,  a  snarl  and  a  great 
flow  of  eloquence  about  his  wrongs  and  his  virtue.  It 
has  been  doubted  whether  the  controversy  on  Hamilton's 
part  was  altogether  dignified.  For  the  time  it  served  its 
purpose.  It  was  rough  cudgel  play ;  but  it  must  be  remem- 
bered that  an  outraged  minister  has  no  such  safety-valve 
in  the  United  States  as  is  provided  by  the  British  House  of 
Commons.  He  is  debarred  from  speechmaking,  and  has  no 
opportunity  of  defending  himself  in  debate.  Under  these 
restrictions,  to  trounce  a  not  too  scrupulous  adversary  in 
the  newspapers  is  certainly  excusable,  and,  according  to 
circumstances,  it  may  even  be  good  policy. 

The  history  of  the  two  sessions  of  Congress1  which 
followed  upon  these  events  is  not  a  pleasing  retrospect 
either  to  the  patriotic  American  or  to  the  sanguine  lover 
of  popular  government.  Hitherto  the  assault  had  been  of 
a  somewhat  general  character.  The  demerits  of  Hamilton's 
policy  had  been  under  review.  Corruption  had  been  freely 
alleged,  but  the  argument  had  depicted  the  Secretary  of 
the  Treasury  as  the  disdainful  tempter,  offering  rosy- 

1  The  second  session  of  the  second  Congress  (5th  November  1792  to  3rd 
March  1793),  and  the  first  session  of  the  third  Congress  (2nd  December  1793 
to  9th  June  1794). 


292  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  cheeked  apples  to  the  lips  of  greedy  followers.  The  new 
method  was  an  accusation  of  personal  dishonesty,  veiled 
but  unambiguous.  A  great  concern  was  displayed  for  the 
fullest  information  with  regard  to  the  disbursements  of 
the  exchequer.  A  full  explanation  was  required  of  this 
matter,  a  precise  account  of  that  one.  The  reports  that 
were  demanded  covered  the  whole  field  of  expenditure 
and  finance  since  the  Federal  Government  had  come  into 
existence.  These  demands  were  in  themselves  innuendos, 
and  the  multitude  of  the  demands  was  designed  to  over- 
power the  efforts  of  the  responsible  minister  to  reply  to 
them,  and  to  obfuscate  the  judgment  of  public  opinion. 

There  is  a  dreary  monotony  in  the  records  of  Congress. 
Resolutions  were  moved  and  defeated.  Reports  were  de- 
manded and  supplied.  Committees  inquired  and  reported. 
But  the  result  was  invariable.  There  was  always  an  answer 
which  left  no  possibility  of  doubt  in  the  minds  of  those 
who  were  at  the  pains  to  consider  it.  Like  a  gambler  who 
doubles  his  stake  after  each  reverse  of  fortune,  the  opposi- 
tion increased  in  violence  as  often  as  their  charges  were 
proved  clearly  to  be  calumny.  Every  fresh  exposure  made 
them  more  desperate.  They  never  learned  caution,  and  it 
must  be  admitted  to  their  credit  they  never  lost  heart. 
Persistency  in  anything,  even  in  calumny,  has  some  hope 
of  success  if  it  is  prepared,  no  matter  how  the  luck  runs,  to 
double  after  every  loss.  The  insensibility  which  refuses  to 
be  routed  upon  the  proof  of  falsehood  may  commend  itself 
in  the  long  run  merely  as  a  good  fighter;  for  a  popular 
audience  is  apt  upon  occasions  to  be  more  interested  in 
good  fighting  than  in  the  pursuit  of  truth. 

The  hero  of  this  period  was  Giles  of  Virginia,  a  pre- 
posterous, pugilistic  character,  to  whom  notoriety  was  much, 
and  failure  in  calumny  merely  failure  and  not  disgrace. 
Behind  him  we  have  a  vision  always  of  Madison  with  a 


THE  DEMOCRATS  293 

sponge,  a  basin  and  a  towel.     Madison  does  not  cut  a  very     A.D. 

1792-17 
Mi.  35-36 


dignified  figure,  but  we  excuse  his  solemn  anxiety,  for  he  1792  1793 


had  heavy  wagers  on  the  event.  It  was  natural  that  he 
should  nurse  his  '  fancy '  with  the  most  sedulous  attention. 
He  was  not  much  of  an  ally,  had  little  share  in  the  glory 
of  the  encounter,  but  was  reserved  for  the  humiliation  of 
defeat,  in  which  the  heroic  Giles  was  unable  fully  to 
participate  by  reason  of  the  grossness  of  his  nature. 
Jefferson,  in  the  meanwhile,  hating  controversy,  shook  his 
head;  muttered  suspicions  to  the  President;  averted  his 
gaze  from  the  eyes  of  men,  and  studied  his  square  toes, 
while  the  mischief  proceeded  which  he  had  so  ingeniously 
set  to  work. 

In  spite  of  his  violence,  his  reckless  disregard  of  truth, 
his  unconcern  for  the  feelings  of  his  enemies,  Giles  does  not 
offend  the  moral  sense  to  the  same  degree  as  his  employers 
offend  it.  It  is  difficult  to  think  of  him  without  a  smile, 
and  the  smile  is  not  altogether  unfriendly.  He  was  a 
squat,  untidy,  blackavised  little  man,  with  a  prodigious 
vitality,  a  quick  eye  and  a  shrewd  instinct  in  a  melee ;  a 
stout  fellow  with  loud  lungs.  In  a  combat  he  was  entirely 
without  scruples,  and,  allowing  for  certain  pasteboard  con- 
ventions of  rhetoric,  equally  devoid  of  highflown  professions. 
Politics  to  him  was  a  mere  game,  and  the  pleasure  he 
derived  from  it  was  not  the  sordid  results  of  success,  but 
mainly  the  joyful  exercise  of  his  talents.  He  went  into 
Congress  as  a  man  enters  the  ring,  and  finding  himself  there 
he  hit  out  just  as  hard  as  he  could.  The  more  eyes  he 
blacked,  the  more  noses  he  caused  to  bleed,  the  more 
complacent  he  became.  He  did  not  rate  himself  highly, 
except  upon  his  particular  gift  in  the  matter  of  the  '  knock- 
out.' His  attitude  towards  Jefferson  and  Madison  was 
a  mixture  of  good-humoured  condescension  and  absurd 
respect — the  attitude  of  the  prize-fighter  to  the  '  toffs '  who 


294  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.     have  put  their  money  on  him.     His  attacks  were  in  the 
,92^1J2!5  brutal  manner,  his  violence  was  outrageous,  but  he  does 

iT.  35-oD  .  .  ° 

not  produce  the  impression  of  malice.  He  was  vain,  and 
Jefferson,  for  the  time  being,  flattered  his  egotism.  He  was 
fluent,  and  Madison  guided  the  torrent  of  his  eloquence. 
Quick  in  mean  manoeuvres,  shrewd  in  small  issues,  un- 
scrupulous, reckless,  persistent  and  'game,'  he  combined 
the  sharpness  of  the  old-fashioned  country  attorney  with 
the  hardness  of  the  old  fashioned  fox-hunting  squire.  No 
fence  was  too  high,  no  hedge  too  thick,  no  joke  too  broad, 
no  blow  too  heavy,  no  plea  too  desperate.  He  had  none  of 
the  finer  feelings,  and,  to  do  him  justice,  he  believed  that  all 
mankind  were  made  in  his  own  image.  He  was  a  gamester 
in  politics,  but  it  is  not  to  be  denied  that  he  was  passionately 
attached  to  his  own  state  of  Virginia,  and  that  he  sincerely 
detested  the  constitution  with  the  whole  force  of  his  nature. 
During  the  session  which  began  in  the  autumn  of  1792 
and  ended  in  the  spring  of  1793,  the  energies  of  Giles  were 
kept  fully  employed.  Speaking  generally,  all  measures 
which  emanated  from  the  Treasury,  even  the  most  formal 
and  necessary  provisions,  were  opposed  and  obstructed. 
Shortly  after  Congress  assembled  Hamilton  introduced 
proposals  of  a  far-reaching  character  for  the  reduction  of 
the  debt.  Finding  upon  every  side  the  evidences  of  a 
remarkable  prosperity,  he  considered  himself  well  justified 
in  calling  upon  the  country  to  bear  a  somewhat  heavier 
taxation  to  diminish  the  national  indebtedness.  The  credit 
of  the  United  States  with  European  bankers  stood  at  a 
remarkable  height.  Loans  had  been  issued  at  Amsterdam 
during  the  autumn  which  bore  interest  at  the  low  rate  of 
four  per  cent.1  But  in  spite  of  these  favourable  conditions 
the  Democrats,  unwilling  that  Hamilton  should  have  the 
renown  of  so  conspicuous  a  reform,  encountered  his  sugges- 

1  History,  v.  p.  109 


THE  DEMOCRATS  295 

tions  with  a  determined  opposition.    The  discussion,  by  one     A.D. 
means  or  another,  was  put  off  from  week  to  week,  until  the  1l92~!:7o? 

/n/r.  oo-oo 

expiration  of  Congress  put  an  end  to  the  opportunity.  It 
was  an  extraordinary  spectacle.  Hamilton,  who  had  been 
reproached  with  the  utmost  bitterness  for  his  supposed 
desire  to  perpetuate  the  debt,  was  now  seen  exerting  all 
his  influence  to  discharge  it,  and  did  not  shrink  from  the 
odium  of  new  taxes  to  attain  his  object.  His  opponents, 
on  the  other  hand,  who  had  clamoured  so  loudly  against 
the  debt,  resisted  every  measure  proposed  to  carry  their  own 
recommendations  into  effect,  and  offered  no  substitute  that 
would  have  met  the  case.1 

Immediately  after  Christmas,  Giles  and  another  were  put 
up  to  ask  for  statements  showing  how  the  moneys  derived 
from  the  various  Dutch  loans  had  been  applied,  for  further 
statements  covering  the  whole  field  of  borrowing,  and  for 
returns  of  all  the  employees  of  the  Treasury  with  their 
salaries  and  other  particulars.  Within  ten  days  all  this 
information  was  supplied.2  Then  the  Senate  became  anxious 
for  information  about  the  National  Bank,  the  appropriations 
of  surplus  revenue,  and  a  variety  of  kindred  matters.  The 
following  day  its  curiosity  was  fully  satisfied.3  Finally,  in 
the  fourth  week  of  January,  Giles  opened  his  general  assault. 
Taking  for  his  text  a  purely  technical  point  as  to  the 
authority  under  which  certain  foreign  loans  had  been  raised, 
he  called  for  five  reports  to  be  made  by  the  Treasury.4  The 
speech  of  Giles  admitted  of  no  misunderstanding.  '  Candour 
induced  him '  to  make  it  quite  clear  that  he  accused  the 
Secretary  of  the  Treasury  of  malversation.  He  definitely 
alleged  that  the  accounts  submitted  by  Hamilton  to  Con- 
gress a  few  weeks  earlier  had  been  deliberately  cooked,  and 
that  there  was  in  fact  an  unaccounted  for  balance,  amount- 

1  History,  v.  pp.  144-46.  2  Ibid.  v.  pp.  174-77. 

3  Ibid.  v.  p.  177.  4  Ibid.  v.  pp.  178-200. 


296  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1793  ing  to  a  million  and  a  half  of  dollars.  The  Democratic 
^T-36  press  hastened  to  join  in  the  chorus,  teemed  with  articles 
upon  corruption,  and  even  pointed  to  the  President  as  an 
accomplice  in  the  frauds. 

The  campaign,  it  is  needless  to  say,  had  been  planned  by 
Jefferson.  He  was  anxious  to  bring  pressure  to  bear  upon 
Washington,  and  to  break  up  the  alliance  which  so  far  had 
defeated  all  his  efforts.  The  resolutions  which  Giles  moved 
were  drafted  by  Madison  in  his  own  hand.1  Hamilton, 
weary  but  imperturbable,  issued  his  instructions,  and  the 
Federalists  joined  with  the  Democrats  in  voting  for  the 
fullest  inquiry. 

Hamilton's  organisation  and  system  served  him  well. 
The  Treasury  and  its  chief  had  to  work  for  a  month  long 
after  hours,  but  by  the  third  week  of  February,  Congress 
had  before  it  a  full  statement  of  all  receipts  and  disburse- 
ments since  the  beginning  of  the  national  government. 
The  accounts  were  stated  so  clearly  and  simply  that  it  was 
impossible  to  mistake  their  import.  The  answer  to  the 
opposition  was  cold,  businesslike  and  complete.  In  so 
orderly  a  proceeding  we  do  not  look  for  genius,  but  only  for 
lucidity.  The  lucidity  of  Hamilton  was  a  thing  to  be 
dreaded.  In  his  hands  it  became  a  weapon  of  destruction. 
His  demeanour  was  quiet  and  formal  as  he  proceeded  to 
explain  the  system  of  his  accounts  and  vindicate  the 
integrity  of  his  procedure ;  but  indirectly,  and  apparently 
without  resentment,  certainly  without  temper,  he  explained 
the  motives  of  the  inquiry,  and  exposed  the  tactics  of  his 
enemies. 

Hamilton  as  a  controversialist  had  an  altogether  excep- 
tional gift  for  the  counterstroke.  Regarded  merely  as  a 
fighter  on  behalf  of  his  own  honour,  he  is  far  more  admir- 
able in  defence  than  when  he  delivers  the  attack.  Eighteen 

1  They  still  exist  in  the  State  Department,  History,  v.  p.  18 


THE  DEMOCRATS  297 

months  before,  he  had  fallen  upon  Jefferson  and  driven  him  A.D.  1793 
moaning,  out  of  his  entanglements ;  but  that  was  a  clumsy  T' 
achievement  by  comparison.  In  attack  he  had  a  tendency 
to  get  too  much  heated;  to  hit  too  hard  and  too  pro- 
miscuously ;  to  rely  too  much  on  his  muscles,  too  little  on 
his  eyes;  but  in  defence  he  is  consummate.  Quiet,  and 
grave,  and  self-possessed,  he  yields  nothing  and  overlooks 
nothing;  but  as  the  attack  pauses  and  begins  to  reel,  he 
steps  forward  in  the  same  quiet,  grave  and  self-possessed 
manner,  without  an  appearance  of  haste,  or  enmity,  or  effort, 
and  places  his  blows  so  gently  that  it  is  hard  to  believe  he 
is  putting  forth  his  full  strength.  Every  touch  is  a  shock, 
and  the  end  of  his  enemies  is  ignominious  disaster. 

The  rout  was  completed  when  the  Democrats  played  into 
his  hands  by  a  false  manoauvre.  Anxious  that  Hamilton 
should  not  be  formally  acquitted,  anxious  also  that  if 
possible  the  charges  should  be  kept  hanging  over  his  head 
while  the  elections  for  the  new  Congress  were  in  progress, 
the  indefatigable  Giles  was  put  up  to  move  nine  resolutions 
of  censure  which  it  was  intended  should  be  debated  until 
the  term  of  the  second  Congress  had  elapsed,1  but  not  put 
to  the  vote.  In  this  scheme  he  was  defeated  by  the  sudden 
outburst  of  feeling  not  only  in  the  House  itself,  but  out  of 
doors.  At  the  last  moment  the  Democrats  wished  to  with- 
draw the  resolutions,  but  the  triumphant  Federalists  refused 
to  allow  their  opponents  this  means  of  retreat.  The  nine 
accusations  were  accordingly  carried  to  the  vote,  and 
Madison  and  Giles  kept  one  another  company  in  a  series  of 
ignominious  minorities,  as  a  frail  curate  and  a  drunken 
roisterer  might  keep  one  another  company  in  the  stocks 
after  a  Saturday  night's  carouse. 

The  next  session  was  a  dreary  echo  of  its  predecessor. 
The  only  important  change  in  the  situation  was  that  in  the 

1  4th  March  1793. 


298  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.     lower  House  the  Democrats,  thanks  to  the  French  Revolu- 
3-1794 
.  36-37 


1794  tion,  held  a  clear  majority.     But  as  regarded  the  attacks 


upon  Hamilton,  the  course  of  events  was  a  dull  repetition  of 
the  manoeuvres  of  the  year  before. 

Hamilton's  short  letter  to  the  Speaker  gave  a  formal 
challenge :  "  It  is  known  that  in  the  last  session  certain 
'  questions  were  raised  respecting  my  conduct  in  office, 

*  which,   though    decided    in   a   manner   most    satisfactory 
'  to  me,  were  nevertheless,  unavoidably,  from  the  lateness 
1  of  the  period  when  they  were  set  on  foot,  so  accelerated 
'  in  the  issue,  as  to  have  given   occasion  to  a  suggestion 
'  that    there  was  not  time  for   a   due   examination:   un- 
'  willing  to  leave  the  matter  on  such  a  footing,  I  have  con- 
'  eluded  to  request  the  House  of  Representatives,  as  I  now 
'  do,  that  a  new  inquiry  may  without  delay  be  instituted 
'  in  some  mode,   the  most  effectual  for  an  accurate  and 
'  thorough  investigation;   and  I  will   add,  that  the  more 
'  comprehensive  it  is,  the  more  agreeable  will  it  be  to  me. 

'I  cannot,  however,  but  take  the  liberty  of  assuring  the 
'  House  that  a  like  plan  to  that  which  was  pursued  in  the 
'  last  session  will  never  answer  the  purpose  of  a  full  and 
'  complete  inquiry,  while  it  would  lay  on  me  a  burthen,  with 
'  which  neither  a  proper  discharge  of  the  current  duties  of  my 
'  office  nor  the  present  state  of  my  health  is  compatible.  The 
1  unfavourable  effect  upon  the  business  of  the  department 

*  of  the  very  considerable  portion  of  my  time  which  was 
'  engrossed  by  the  inquiry  of  the  last  session  has  not  yet 
'  entirely  ceased." l 

This  letter  was  written  upon  the  16th  of  December,  and 
the  challenge  was  immediately  taken  up.  Giles,  loyal  to  his 
employers,  and  unaffected  by  the  ruin  of  his  previous  efforts, 
made  a  gallant  attempt  to  pursue  the  charges  of  corrup- 
tion, founding  his  arguments  upon  the  testimony  of  a  clerk 
1  Works,  iii.  p.  179. 


THE  DEMOCRATS  299 

who  had  been  dismissed  from  the  Treasury.  His  success  in  A.D. 
this  endeavour  ended  with  the  appointment  of  a  select  ^f^.  37 
committee  to  inquire.  Upon  the  29th  of  the  same  month 
its  report  was  issued.  The  conduct  of  the  Secretary  was 
justified  at  all  points,  and  by  a  body  in  which  his  opponents 
held  a  majority  against  him,  the  charges  were  pronounced 
to  be  '  wholly  illiberal  and  groundless/ 1 

Towards  the  end  of  February,  Giles  returned  to  the  attack. 
A  committee  was  appointed  to  inquire  into  the  conduct  of 
the  Treasury.  Although  two-thirds  of  this  committee  were 
members  of  the  opposition,  and  none  of  Hamilton's  more 
capable  supporters  were  chosen  to  serve  upon  it,  but  only 
new  members  filled  with  awe  of  their  more  famous  col- 
leagues, it  is  improbable  that  the  sordid  labour  was  under- 
taken with  any  great  hope  of  success.  After  an  exhaustive 
and  hostile  inquiry  this  packed  tribunal  was  obliged,  like  all 
its  predecessors,  to  report  not  only  a  complete  exculpation 
of  the  minister,  but  praise  for  his  loyal  and  upright  service. 
Congress,  therefore,  had  no  alternative  but  to  accept  this 
verdict  without  a  dissenting  voice.2  "  It  was  a  cruel  thing 
'  in  Congress,"  Colonel  Heth  wrote  to  Hamilton,  "  and 
'  somewhat  unprecedented,  I  presume,  to  oblige  your  per- 
'  secutors  and  prosecutors  to  sit  as  your  judges;  and  what 
'  was  still  more  ill-natured,  to  compel  them  to  make  a  report 
'  by  which  they  were  obliged  to  convict  you  of  purity  of 
'  conduct,  unshaken  integrity,  and  a  constant  watchfulness 
'  over  the  public  interest." 3 

But  still  the  opposition  to  all  Treasury  measures  upon 
whatsoever  principle  was  unbroken.  Everything  was  con- 
tested, and  yet  in  this  assembly  where  the  Federalists  were 
in  a  minority  the  essential  things  were  in  the  end  accom- 
plished. "You  are  strange  fellows,"  wrote  a  good-natured 
Democrat  to  one  of  his  opponents ;  "  formerly  you  did  what 

1  History,  v.  p.  425.  2  Ibid.  vi.  p.  33  3  Ibid.  vi.  p.  34. 


300  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  '  you  chose  with  a  small  majority ;  now  we  have  a  great 
'  majority  and  can  do  nothing.  You  have  baffled  every  one 
'  of  our  plans." 1  It  was  not  a  matter  of  tactics.  The 
opposition  was  forced  to  yield  in  the  end  always  by  the 
manifest  good  sense  of  the  proposals  of  their  great  adversary. 
When  the  same  Congress  met  again  in  the  autumn  of 
1794,  Hamilton  notified  the  Speaker  of  his  intention  to  retire 
early  in  the  new  year,  in  order  that  any  inquiries  into  his 
conduct  which  might  be  deemed  necessary  should  be  set 
on  foot  without  delay.  But  by  this  time  even  Giles  was 
surfeited  with  defeat,  and  Madison  was  too  much  relieved 
at  the  thought  of  Hamilton's  withdrawal  from  office  to 
engage  in  any  new  intrigues.  Hamilton's  plans  for  pro- 
viding further  support  to  the  public  credit  were  of  course 
opposed,  but  the  opposition  was  perfunctory.  In  the  end 
his  project  for  the  redemption  of  the  debt  was  carried,  and  on 
the  31st  of  January  1795  he  retired  from  office.  "  In  every 
'  relation  which  you  have  borne  to  me,"  Washington  wrote 
upon  this  occasion,  "  I  have  found  that  my  confidence  in 
*  your  talents,  exertions  and  integrity  has  been  well  placed. 
'  I  the  more  freely  render  this  testimony  of  my  approbation, 
'  because  I  speak  from  opportunities  of  information,  which 
'  cannot  deceive  me,  and  which  furnish  satisfactory  proof  of 
'  your  title  to  public  regard." 

The  opposition  to  Hamilton  during  the  period  under 
review  had  been  the  extreme  of  political  hatred.  His 
measures  were  attacked  in  the  first  place,  his  character  in 
the  second.  With  the  principle  of  the  former  no  fault 
can  be  found  except  the  fault  of  bad  judgment;  nor 
must  the  spirit  in  which  it  was  pursued  be  judged  too 
harshly.  Patriotism  has  a  vague  boundary;  and  if  the 
Democrats  were  frequently  found  far  beyond  the  debat- 
able land,  they  were  not  different  in  this  particular  from 

1  Histvry,  v.  p.  588. 


THE  DEMOCRATS  301 

political  parties  all  the  world   over.    Misrepresentation  of     A.D. 

1—17 
37-38 


the  meaning  and  effect  of  measures,  misrepresentation  of  1794~1795 


the  motives  which  produced  them,  are  conditions  unfortu- 
nate enough,  but  inevitable,  of  all  government  by  party.  A 
strong  minister  pursuing  a  clear  policy  must  be  prepared  for 
such  assaults,  and  his  admirers  will  do  well  to  pass  them  by 
without  too  much  emphasis. 

But  the  second  method  falls  under  a  different  category. 
It  is  bad  leadership  that  assails  the  private  honour  of  an 
opponent,  as  Jefferson  did,  relying  upon  the  abstruse- 
ness  of  accounts  and  the  confusion  of  the  subject,  when 
debated  in  heat  before  a  popular  audience,  to  make  it 
impossible  for  his  opponent  to  get  clear  away.  He  says 
in  his  memoirs  that  he  believed  Hamilton  to  be  a  man  of 
unblemished  personal  integrity,1  and  there  is  no  reason  to 
doubt  that  in  this  case  he  was  speaking  the  truth.  Indeed, 
to  any  one  in  close  personal  relations  with  the  Secretary  of 
the  Treasury,  however  hostile  his  disposition,  this  fact  was  too 
obvious  for  argument.  But  none  the  less  it  was  Jefferson  who 
launched  the  charges  of  corruption  against  his  colleague,  in 
the  same  manner  as  he  had  attacked  his  measures — through 
the  mouths  of  his  well-drilled  partisans.  When  Hamilton 
rolled  up  this  furious  assault  with  the  same  crushing 
disaster  to  his  opponents  that  he  had  dealt  out  to  their 
previous  more  legitimate  efforts;  when,  to  the  amazement 
even  of  his  friends,  he  so  disentangled  both  accounts  and 
charges  that  plain  men  not  only  escaped  from  the  con- 
fusion, but  perceived  that  it  had  been  intended,  and  the  end 
to  which  it  had  been  devised,  the  reaction  for  the  time 
being  against  the  opposition  and  their  leader  was  sharp 
and  scornful ;  and  had  it  not  been  for  other  considerations, 
which  will  be  dealt  with  in  the  following  chapters,  it  must 
have  been  overwhelming.  Hamilton's  defence  of  his  per- 

1  Ford's  Jefferson,  I  p.  166. 


302  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1795  sonal  honour,  no  less  than  his  defence  of  his  national  policy, 
^T-38  was  complete.  At  no  single  point  was  he  touched.  The 
victory  exacted  enormous  labours.  It  damaged  his  health 
and  interfered  seriously  with  his  administrative  work.  But 
the  result  of  the  one  is  as  satisfactory  to  those  who  hold 
his  memory  in  respect  as  the  result  of  the  other  was  for- 
tunate for  his  country.  In  an  age  when  the  charge  of 
corruption  was  the  commonest,  and  as  a  rule  the  most 
reliable  weapon  of  attack  against  a  minister,  Hamilton 
resisted  with  success  every  effort  to  attach  the  shadow  of 
a  suspicion  to  the  uprightness  of  his  administration.  But, 
unfortunately,  the  very  commonness  of  the  charge  made 
men  overlook  the  recklessness  and  the  malice  which  alleged 
it  without  just  cause.  Hamilton,  indeed,  came  out  of  the 
struggle  unscathed,  and  for  the  moment  a  hero;  but  no 
infamy  attached,  as  it  would  have  done  to-day,  to  his 
accusers.  Jefferson  and  Madison  did  not,  strange  as  it  may 
appear,  suffer  in  their  reputations  as  honourable  citizens. 
Giles  continued  unashamed  to  be  a  great  figure  in  debate. 
Full  justice  was  not  done  at  the  time,  great  injustice  was 
done  in  the  years  which  followed,  and  only  in  comparatively 
recent  days  have  the  actors  in  this  drama  come  to  be  rated 
at  their  true  values. 

So  in  the  earliest  years  the  great  constitutional  doctrine 
that  it  is  the  duty  of  an  opposition  to  oppose  was  fully 
grasped.  These  heroes  of  freedom  were  faithful  to  the  logic 
of  this  principle,  if  faithless  in  later  days  to  the  logic  of 
their  own  precepts.  They  had  condemned  the  funding 
and  assumption  of  the  debts  because  they  placed  a  burden 
on  posterity,  because  the  idea  of  a  permanent  federal  debt 
was  inseparable  from  corruption,  and  because  they  were 
charged  with  a  rate  of  interest  which  it  was  possible 
to  represent  as  intolerable.  When  Hamilton,  finding  the 
credit  of  the  country  good  beyond  his  expectations,  its 


THE  DEMOCRATS  303 

wealth  rapidly  expanding,  and  confidence  secured  both  at  A.D.  1795 
home  and  abroad,  proposed  to  extend  the  operation  of  the         '  3* 
sinking  fund,  to  borrow  at  a  lower  rate  of  interest,  to  in-' 
crease  taxation  so  as  to  pay  off  the  heavy-interest,  short- 
loan  stock  and  to  redeem  the  whole  debt  at  an  earlier  date, 
the  same  opponents,  with  different  cries,  condemned  the 
proposal  and  secured  its  defeat. 

Within  a  decade  the  opposition  came  into  power,  hold- 
ing it  for  many  years  without  a  break.  Jefferson,  Madison 
and  Monroe,  three  of  Hamilton's  most  relentless  critics, 
were  presidents  in  succession,  each  for  a  double  term  of 
office.  But  under  their  rule  Hamilton's  organisation  of  the 
Treasury  was  preserved.  His  financial  methods  were  main- 
tained. His  system  of  audit,  which  had  been  derided  as  the 
intended  accomplice  of  corruption,  was  accepted  as  a  fit  safe- 
guard of  the  exchequer.  His  principles  of  national  credit 
and  taxation  were  adopted  and  afterwards  extended.  Even 
the  bank  charter  after  remarkable  vicissitudes  was  renewed. 
All  the  main  pillars  of  his  hated  administration  were  kept 
intact,  partly  because  no  one  was  found  bold  enough  to 
change  them,  but  chiefly  for  the  reason  that  there  had  never 
existed,  except  among  the  ignorant,  any  belief  that  they  were 
fraught  with  danger. 


CHAPTER  IV 

Foreign  Dangers 

IT  appeared  to  Hamilton,  taking  stock  of  the  situation  in 
the  third  year  of  his  office,1  that  the  unexpected  was  in 
course  of  happening,  and  that  the  plan  of  his  campaign  must 
be  changed  accordingly.  To  his  credit  stood  the  policy  of 
the  Treasury,  organised,  in  working  order  and  successful  far 

1  January  1792. 


304  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1792  beyond  even  his  own  sanguine  anticipations.  Sound  finance, 
^Tt  35  the  foundation  of  the  independence  of  states,  was  now  likely 
to  maintain  itself,  and  to  strengthen  its  tradition  year  by  year. 
The  commercial  policy  was  before  the  world  for  discussion ; 
enthusiastically  approved  by  some,  vigorously  denounced  by 
others.  To  carry  it,  however,  would  have  taken  more  time 
and  effort  than  had  been  necessary  in  the  case  of  its  pre- 
decessor. All  political  conditions  had  hardened  in  the  mean- 
while, and  any  proposals  which  Hamilton  might  now  have 
introduced  were  certain  to  be  opposed  by  the  whole  weight 
of  an  organised  party. 

It  is  a  fair  question — Why  did  Hamilton  leave  the  idea 
of  his  commercial  policy  as  a  kind  of  legacy  ?  Why  was 
the  thing  not  accomplished  during  his  administration? 
If  he  truly  loved  his  idea,  why  was  it  set  on  one  side  to  be 
tardily  undertaken  by  a  third  generation?  He  was  an 
indefatigable  minister  against  whom  no  resistance  could 
make  head.  Had  he  chosen  to  urge  it,  surely  success  must 
have  ensued?  But  he  did  not  choose  to  urge  it,  and  from 
this  some  people  have  argued  that  he  came  to  think  better 
of  his  first  opinions. 

The  true  answer  is  somewhat  different.  The  French 
Revolution  upset  many  well-laid  plans.  The  stately  policies 
of  the  Old  World  were  tripped  up  and  stumbled ;  the  eager 
projects  of  the  New  were  arrested  by  it.  All  the  nations, 
except  the  Chinese,  held  their  breath  and,  like  men  in  an 
earthquake,  waited  with  their  hands  on  the  latches  to  make 
fast,  to  undo,  or  to  escape. 

Pitt  dreamed  a  great  dream  as  to  how  he  might  reap  in 
peace  what  his  father  had  sowed  in  war.  The  consolidation 
of  an  empire,  the  development  of  its  resources,  were  the 
objects  which  attracted  his  ambition;  but  the  realisa- 
tion of  this  ideal  required  as  its  condition  a  Britain  aloof 
and  unconcerned  in  the  affairs  of  its  neighbours.  Against 


THE  DEMOCRATS  305 

kings  and  the  old  diplomacy,  had  these  institutions  con-  A.D.  1792 
tinned  to  exist,  he  was  fully  secured.      But  the  dynasties       T'  l 
began   to  topple  headlong,    and   the  new   systems  which 
took  their  place  disturbed  all  calculations.    A  great  peace 
minister  was  therefore  forced  against  his  will  to  become  a 
war  minister.     The   defence   of   the   empire,   and    not  its 
development,  was  his  unexpected  task ;  and  the  boundaries 
which  he  had  never  wished  to  widen  were  set  further  and 
further  over  the  face  of  the  earth. 

Hamilton  no  less  than  Pitt  desired  to  give  himself  wholly 
to  the  task  of  husbanding  the  national  estate  and  gathering 
in  the  harvests  of  prosperity.  He  aimed  at  being  indepen- 
dent of  his  neighbours  and  at  peace  with  them.  It  may  be 
believed  that  he  cursed  the  French  Revolution  as  a  fisher- 
man curses  a  gale  which  suddenly  opens  upon  him  just  as 
he  has  overtaken  the  shoal.  The  energies  of  both  statesmen 
were  diverted  from  a  fruitful  object  to  a  barren  defence, 
necessary,  but  in  their  eyes  most  lamentable.  There  is  no 
difficulty  in  understanding  the  disappointment  of  such  a 
transfer,  though  we  recognise  clearly  a  fertility  in  their 
efforts  which  the  dust  and  heat  obscured  to  some  extent 
from  the  actors  themselves.  The  tradition  of  Pitt  is  not 
sterile,  and  although  Hamilton  was  forced  to  abandon  his 
vision  of  industrial  development,  he  has  earned  the  credit  of 
establishing  the  principles  of  foreign  policy  over  a  period 
which  has  not  yet  ended. 

The  quality  of  permanence  is  the  most  remarkable  virtue 
in  Hamilton's  statesmanship.  What  he  did  at  his  leisure 
after  much  planning,  as  well  as  what  he  did  hastily  under 
great  pressure,  work  which  he  imposed  upon  himself  because 
he  loved  it,  and  irksome  labours  forced  upon  him  by  events, 
have  the  same  character.  They  endure.  Men,  so  far,  have 
been  unable  to  alter  them.  Enemies  had  but  a  short  time 
to  wait  for  the  opportunity.  They  came  eager  and  exultant, 

u 


306  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1792  with  axe  and  crowbar,  furiously  raging,  but  hardly  a  stone  of 
T'  ^    the  edifice  was  displaced. 

In  the  making  of  the  constitution,  in  the  establishment  of 
public  credit,  in  laying  down  the  plain  rules  of  reason  for 
the  relations  of  the  United  States  with  the  outside  world — 
in  each  case  we  find  the  same  quality  of  permanence.  The 
cause  is  not  difficult  to  trace.  Hamilton  knew  what  he 
wished  to  accomplish.  He  knew  what  forces  could  be 
employed  for  the  purpose.  He  valued  them  accurately,  and 
so  disposed  and  arranged  them,  that  out  of  its  own  vigour 
each  gave  to  the  others  its  due  support.  He  built  like  a 
good  bridge-maker,  so  that  the  stress  confirmed  and 
strengthened  the  fabric.  This  is  only  possible  to  a  man 
who  has  the  instinct  of  reality;  who  patiently  considers 
things,  not  as  he  wishes  them  to  be,  but  as  they  are ;  who 
works  not  with  words,  but  with  actual  forces.  A  phrase- 
maker  is  often  serviceable  in  a  work  of  destruction.  He 
is  of  considerable  use  when  it  is  a  question  of  clearing 
out  slums  and  rookeries ;  but  as  a  builder  he  is  of  little 
value,  except  occasionally  to  sing  cheerfully  while  the  other 
men  are  at  work. 

To  the  opposition  the  French  Revolution  came  as  a  god- 
send. The  ferment  which  this  event  excited  in  men's  minds, 
the  difficulties  of  government  in  steering  through  the 
typhoon,  afforded  an  opportunity  of  putting  a  term  to  the 
triumphal  progress  of  Hamilton's  administration.  At  a  time 
when  all  men  are  furiously  taking  sides  upon  the  affairs  of  a 
stranger,  rulers  have  commonly  found  it  hard  to  keep  a  true 
course.  While  one  set  of  partisans  denounces  their  lukewarm 
apathy  to  noble  sentiments,  the  other  set  contemptuously 
derides  their  timid  respect  for  popular  fanaticism.  In  such 
circumstances  an  astute  opposition  finds  its  most  favourable 
opportunity,  and  the  new  Democratic  party  was  accordingly 
highly  favoured  by  events. 


THE  DEMOCRATS  307 

Everything    turns,  at    this    critical  moment,  upon  the  A.D.  1792 
relations  of  the  United  States  with  Britain  on  the  one  hand,    MT'  35 
and  with  France  on  the  other.     From  1783  to  1793,  from 
the  Peace  of  Versailles  to  the  declaration  of  war  by  France 
against  Europe,  the  tendency  of  American  policy  had  been  a 
vivacious  unfriendliness  to  Britain  and  a  sedate  attachment 
to  France. 

The  legacy  of  the  War  of  Independence  was  a  strong 
resentment  towards  the  mother  country.  The  British  view 
of  the  matter  was  that  we  had  been  beaten,  but  that  the 
beating  had  not  changed  the  face  of  affairs  to  any  serious 
extent.  Our  position  with  regard  to  the  great  European 
powers  was  hardly  affected  by  it.  We  had  not  put  forth  our 
full  strength.  A  remote  dependency  had  broken  away,  and 
there  was  an  end  of  the  matter.  It  was  annoying  that  we 
should  have  lost  our  colonies,  but  a  naval  defeat  in  the 
narrow  seas  would  have  been  a  matter  of  incomparably 
greater  importance.  Americans,  on  the  other  hand,  were 
exasperated  because  Britain  would  not  treat  its  own  calamity 
in  a  more  serious  spirit,  and  because  King  George's  cabinet, 
until  the  Union,  six  years  later,  made  difficulties  about 
accepting  the  thirteen  states  as  a  real  nation  in  spite  of 
their  famous  victory.  An  aristocratic  government,  polite 
and  correct,  showed  by  numerous  indications  that  it  did  not 
intend  to  deal  with  them  as  with  an  equal.  To  this  grievance 
was  added  the  injury  inflicted  by  the  commercial  regulations 
of  Britain  during  the  period  of  disunion.  Neither  of  these 
causes  of  anger  was  serious.  A  firm  union  was  the  obvious 
cure  for  both,  and  almost  as  soon  as  Washington's  ad- 
ministration was  formed  the  remedy  began  to  work.  The 
thing  which  really  mattered  was  the  non-fulfilment  of  the 
treaty  of  peace.  Britain  still  held  the  frontier  posts,  alleging 
as  her  justification  the  breach  of  faith  in  regard  to  the  pay- 
ment of  British  debts,  and  the  ill-treatment  of  the  loyalists. 


308  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1792  To  France,  on  the  other  hand,  there  was  an  attachment,  but 
^T>  35  until  1791  or  even  later,  it  was  an  attachment  of  a  political 
rather  than  of  a  sentimental  kind.  King  Louis  xvi.  had 
been  an  ally  in  the  past  because  an  alliance  had  suited  his 
own  interests.  That  fact  was  clearly  understood  by  American 
statesmen,  who  considered  that  France  was  likely  to  continue 
her  alliance  in  the  future  for  the  same  reason.  But  gratitude 
to  France  was  never  the  attitude  of  the  government  of  the 
states  towards  the  government  of  Paris  during  this  period. 
Gratitude  was  not  due,  seeing  that  the  service  rendered  had 
not  been  in  any  sense  disinterested. 

Consequently,  until  the  spring  of  1792,  when  the  Revolution 
was  in  full  blast,  such  a  sentiment  would  have  been  ridiculed 
had  it  ever  been  seriously  urged.  Americans,  while  the  idea 
of  democracy  was  still  in  the  background,  viewed  the 
assistance  which  had  been  given  by  Louis  xvi.  in  its  true 
light.  His  government  had  no  affection  for  the  rebellious 
colonists,  but  merely  desired  to  distress  a  dangerous  rival. 
The  conduct  of  France  during  the  negotiations  for  peace  had 
been  viewed  none  too  favourably  by  the  new  Republic,  and, 
it  must  be  added,  the  conduct  of  the  new  Republic  had  been 
viewed  none  too  favourably  by  the  ancient  monarchy. 

The  ending  of  the  war  left  no  debt  outstanding  as  between 
nations,  except  an  account  which  was  recorded  in  dollars, 
and  this,  thanks  to  Hamilton,  was  in  process  of  being  rapidly 
wiped  out.  France  had  aided  the  American  arms,  and  her 
ample  reward  had  been  the  wounds  thereby  inflicted  upon 
her  European  enemy.  The  treaty  of  alliance  was  complete 
within  itself.  Its  terms  constituted  a  fair  bargain.  In  case 
the  American  possessions  of  King  Louis  were  attacked  with- 
out provocation,  the  states  were  bound  to  come  to'  his  aid ; 
and  in  case  the  United  States  were  menaced  in  their  freedom 
or  possessions,  France  was  to  render  a  similar  service.1 

1  History,  ii.  p.  417. 


THE  DEMOCRATS  309 

Therefore,  though  it  is  true  that,  during  the  ten  years  A.D.  1792 
following    the    signature    of    peace,    Americans    regarded    ^T-35 
Britain  with  dislike,  it   is   altogether    untrue    that    they 
regarded  France  with  any  emotional  fervour.     Until  the 
French  Revolution  brought  certain  ideas  into  prominence, 
'gratitude'    to    France   never  assumed  importance    as    a 
popular  cry. 

Beyond  this  there  was  a  legal  question.  Louis  was  dead 
and  his  system  was  ended.  That  in  itself  was  enough  to 
have  done  away  all  obligations  under  his  treaty  with  Con- 
gress. But  to  make  the  case  clearer,  his  successors  in  the 
government  had  passed  the  scythe  over  all  his  promises. 
The  Revolution  had  denounced  and  solemnly  torn  up  all 
the  treaties  made  by  the  fallen  monarchy.1  Nothing  stood. 
A  new  reckoning  was  opened,  and  all  the  old  accounts  were 
sponged  off  the  slate.  And  it  was  only  after  these  events 
had  occurred  that  the  treaty  between  France  and  the  United 
States  was  invoked  with  frenzied  zeal  as  a  holy  and  binding 
arrangement.  It  was  then  claimed  by  eloquent  people  on 
both  sides  of  the  Atlantic  that  the  American  treaty  had 
been  impliedly  excepted  from  the  massacre  of  the  old 
diplomacy ;  that  it  was  a  debt  between  nations  and  not 
between  rulers ;  that  the  conditions  of  a  defensive  war  and 
danger  to  the  American  possessions  of  France  were  to  be 
ignored  upon  a  generous  interpretation ;  and  that,  in  plain 
words,  if  France  chose  to  go  into  war  with  any  adversary  or 
upon  any  pretext,  the  United  States  were  bound  in  honour 
to  follow  her  to  the  ends  of  the  earth. 

At  the  conclusion  of  the  War  of  Independence,  Hamilton, 
as  we  have  seen,  pressed  upon  his  countrymen,  in  season  and 
out  of  season,  the  sanctity  of  their  treaty  obligations.  The 
principle  of  loyal  observance  of  engagements  was  a  funda- 
mental article  of  his  creed.  The  obligations  incurred 

1  History,  v.  p.  239. 


310  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1792  '  for  ever '  under  the  original  treaty  with  France,  when 
M?.  35  french  aid  was  the  only  hope  of  final  success  in  the  struggle 
against  Britain,  were  no  less  and  no  more  sacred  in  his 
eyes  than  the  obligations  incurred  towards  Britain  when 
the  treaty  of  peace  was  signed ;  for  valuable  consideration 
had  been  given  in  both  cases.  He  viewed  the  situation, 
however,  without  malice  or  excitement,  and  arrived  early 
at  the  conclusion  that  circumstances,  which  were  by  no 
means  unlikely  to  occur,  might  easily  'effect  a  revolution 
in  the  state  of  our  foreign  politics.' x 

To  France  under  the  monarchy,  her  alliance  with  Spain 
was  a  far  more  precious  asset  than  her  alliance  with  the 
United  States.  If  these  alliances  at  any  time  should  prove 
incompatible,  the  ministers  of  King  Louis  would  never 
hesitate  for  a  moment  which  to  choose.  The  European 
situation  must  necessarily  be  regarded  before  the  American. 
Nor  was  it  unlikely  that  such  a  conflict  would  arise  between 
the  treaty  obligations  of  France  with  Spain  on  the  one  hand, 
and  with  the  Union  on  the  other ;  for,  of  all  nations,  Spain 
was  the  most  probable  antagonist  of  the  Union.  The  dangers 
caused  by  the  troubles  with  Britain  on  the  Canadian  border 
were  trivial  as  compared  with  the  menace  from  the  South. 
Spain  held  a  strong  position  at  the  mouth  of  the  Mississippi. 
She  claimed  the  right  to  control  the  navigation  of  that 
river,  and  if  her  pretensions  could  have  been  enforced,  the 
development  of  the  states  would  have  been  throttled.  She 
claimed,  moreover,  all  the  wide  but  undefined  territories 
lying  between  the  western  bank  of  the  Mississippi  and  the 
Pacific  coast. 

It  was  clear  to  Hamilton's  mind  that  sooner  or  later  this 
conflict  of  interests  would  have  to  be  settled,  and  it  seemed 
probable  that  the  mode  of  settlement  would  be  a  war.  In 
such  case  France  would  be  compelled  to  choose  which  of 

1  History,  iv.  p.  194. 


THE  DEMOCRATS  311 

her  allies  she  would  retain,  and  it  was  unreasonable  to  A.D.  1792 
suppose  that  she  would  sacrifice  the  more  valuable  of  the    ^T' 85 
two.      On  the  other  hand,  if  war  broke   out,   the   aid   of 
Britain  would  be  as  serviceable  against  Spain  as  the  aid 
of  France  had  in  former  times  been  serviceable  against 
Britain.     Nor  was  it  likely,  in   the  circumstances  which 
have  been  imagined,  that  it  would  be  difficult  to  obtain  the 
co-operation  of  King  George's  government. 

Hamilton  was  therefore  anxious,  while  maintaining  friendly  , 

relations  with  France,  to  cultivate  good,  if  not  precisely 
friendly,  relations  with  Britain.  On  commercial  as  well  as 
on  political  grounds  he  was  eager  to  arrive  at  a  good  under- 
standing, for  he  saw  clearly  the  enormous  benefit  which 
would  accrue  to  the  states  by  a  treaty  to  facilitate  trade.  The 
first  step  towards  this  end  was  to  get  rid  of  the  disputes, 
charges  and  countercharges  which  had  arisen  out  of  the 
treaty  of  peace.  It  was  of  the  first  importance  that  the 
atmosphere  of  hostility  and  distrust  should  be  changed,  so 
that  the  negotiation  might  be  undertaken  in  a  frank  and 
reasonable  spirit.  Hamilton  had  the  lowest  opinion  of 
provocative  methods  even  in  dealing  with  his  enemies. 
When  it  was  a  question  of  promoting  neighbourly  relations, 
provocation  seemed  to  him  a  form  of  insanity.  While  he 
would  not  have  hesitated  to  adopt  commercial  regulations 
that  would  have  benefited  his  own  country  at  the  expense 
of  Britain,  he  was  utterly  opposed  to  the  popular  demand 
for  legislation  which  would  have  injured  and  irritated 
Britain  without  bringing  any  advantage  to  the  states.  To 
Madison's  proposals1  for  an  invidious  tariff  which  would 
have  injured  both  Britain  and  the  States  for  the  benefit  of 
France  and  Holland,  he  was  even  more  strongly  opposed,  and 
by  his  influence  with  the  senate  he  succeeded  in  securing 
their  defeat. 

1  May  1789,  History,  IT.  p.  7. 


312  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1792  The  sound  sense  of  Hamilton's  policy  seeuis  obvious 
^T>  35  enough  to-day,  but  it  is  not  difficult  to  enter  into  the 
feelings  of  those  who  held  a  different  view.  Their  judg- 
ment was  clouded  by  the  memories  of  the  war.  To  recom- 
pense the  ally  and  to  injure  the  enemy  appeared  in  the 
temper  of  the  times  a  very  natural  and  proper  course  of 
action.  Even  Washington  was  at  first  inclined  to  look  with 
favour  upon  Madison's  proposals. 

Union  and  the  establishment  of  a  federal  government 
had  changed  the  attitude  of  the  British  Cabinet  towards  the 
States.  Britain  was  not  slow  in  testifying  a  respect  for 
the  new  order  which  it  had  denied  to  the  old.  This 
change  of  attitude  was  not  more  remarkable  in  the  case 
of  our  own  country  than  in  the  case  of  others;  but  as 
our  enmity  or  friendship  was,  in  commercial  matters  at 
all  events,  immeasurably  more  important,  the  contrast 
was  more  remarked.  The  success  of  Hamilton's  financial 
policy  in  raising  the  credit  of  the  nation  produced 
as  great  and  favourable  an  impression  in  London  as  in 
Amsterdam  or  Paris.  In  the  autumn  of  1791  Hammond 
was  accredited  as  the  first  British  minister  to  the  United 
States.  A  few  months  later  an  American  minister  was  sent 
to  England. 

In  these  events  Hamilton  saw  a  favourable  opportunity 
for  breaking  down  the  ancient  prejudices.  But  Jefferson,  in 
whose  department  the  matter  lay,  held  opposite  opinions. 
He  had  no  wish  for  friendly  relations  with  Britain,  but,  on 
the  contrary,  desired,  as  he  states  quite  clearly,  to  keep  '  alive 
an  altercation '  with  that  power.1  In  all  likelihood  he  sin- 
cerely believed  this  to  be  the  best  means  of  inducing  Britain 
to  deliver  up  the  frontier  posts  which  she  held  as  hostages 
for  the  fulfilment  of  the  terms  of  peace ;  but  if  so,  he  mis- 
judged the  conditions.  For  Britain  was  incomparably  less 

1  History,  v.  p.  8. 


THE  DEMOCRATS  313 

inconvenienced  than  the  States  by  the  non-settlement  of  the  A.D.  1792 
differences.  The  matters  of  dispute  were  so  remote  that  "ET-35 
they  easily  passed  out  of  recollection.  If  London  merchants 
were  aware  in  a  dim  fashion  that  the  treaty  of  peace  had  not 
been  carried  into  effect,  they  were  also  sensible  that,  thanks 
to  the  hitch,  they  enjoyed  a  very  practical  benefit  in  the 
monopoly  of  the  fur  trade,  which  would  cease  so  soon  as  the 
frontier  posts  were  given  up.  In  the  States,  on  the  other 
hand,  the  disadvantages  of  the  situation  were  felt  keenly,  and 
the  whole  problem,  with  its  annoyances  and  humiliations, 
was  viewed  at  much  closer  range.  The  diplomatic  position 
of  the  Americans  was  a  disadvantageous  one,  for  the  im- 
portant reason  that  they  were  impatient  while  Britain  was 
indifferent.  The  right  means  of  adjustment  was  to  create 
an  atmosphere  in  which  both  parties  could  come  together 
good-temperedly  to  remove  a  serious  danger. 

Jefferson's  diplomacy  was  bad  because  he  misjudged  the 
immediate  interests  of  the  two  countries.  It  was  also  bad 
because  he  allowed  his  personal  ties  with  a  certain  section  of 
Parisian  society  to  colour  his  whole  view  of  the  situation. 
In  Hamilton's  opinion,  both  Jefferson  and  Madison  were 
radically  unsound  and  dangerous  in  regard  to  foreign  politics. 
"They  have  a  womanish  attachment  to  France,  and  a 
1  womanish  resentment  against  Great  Britain.  They  would 
'  draw  us  into  the  closest  embrace  of  the  former,  and  involve 
'  us  in  all  the  consequences  of  her  politics ;  and  they  would 
'  risk  the  peace  of  the  country  in  their  endeavours  to  keep  us 
'  at  the  greatest  possible  distance  from  the  latter." 1  If  these 
gentlemen  were  left  free  to  pursue  their  own  course,  '  there 
would  be,  in  less  than  six  months,  an  open  war  between  the 
United  States  and  Great  Britain.' 2 

Throughout  the  spring  and  summer  of  1792  we  find 
Hamilton  constantly  pleading  for  a  candid,  good-tempered, 

1  Hamilton  to  Carrington,  26th  May  1792,  Works,  ix.  p.  527.        2  Ibid. 


314  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1792  businesslike  attitude.1  He  desired  a  commercial  treaty  with 
^ET.  35  Brftajn  whicli,  in  the  circumstances,  would  have  been  more 
productive  of  benefits  than  commercial  treaties  with  all  the 
rest  of  the  world.  But  Jefferson,  and  not  he,  was  foreign 
minister.  A  confused  thinker  with  a  settled  purpose  is  one 
of  the  most  formidable  opponents.  Jefferson  was  constantly 
overruled  by  the  cabinet,  but  unfortunately  no  power  could 
take  the  '  atmosphere '  out  of  his  department.  The  temper 
of  the  discussion  was  in  his  hands  so  long  as  he  was  allowed 
to  retain  his  office.  It  was  comparatively  easy  to  force  an 
alteration  of  the  purport  of  a  despatch,  but  less  easy  to  intro- 
duce a  more  cordial  spirit  when  the  medium  of  negotiation 
was  his  rasping  phrases. 

The  progress  of  the  French  Revolution  was  a  heavy 
handicap  to  Hamilton's  efforts  towards  a  good  understanding 
with  Britain.  The  popular  sentiment  had  hitherto  been 
dislike  of  Britain  for  her  supposed  hostility  to  the  interests 
of  the  States.  But  now  affection  for  France  trumped  up  a 
plea  of  gratitude,  and  Britain,  who  was  correctly  surmised 
to  be  on  the  brink  of  war  with  her  European  neighbour,  was 
hated  with  a  much  greater  fervour  for  the  sake  of  France 
than  even  from  the  memories  of  the  War  of  Independence, 
or  for  her  retention  of  the  frontier  posts. 

To  this  gospel  of  unreality  Washington,  the  fortunate 
inheritor  of  the  temperament  of  an  English  squire,  was  as 
deaf  as  the  uncharmed  adder ;  but  to  Hamilton,  cursed  with 
the  perfervidum  ingenium  Scotorum,  the  eloquent  and 
invulnerable  confusion  was  a  maddening  opponent.  As  the 
crisis  developed  he  concentrated  his  efforts  upon  foreign 
affairs.  Jefferson,  in  his  ministerial  capacity,  became  a 
reluctant  conduit  for  the  decisions  of  the  cabinet.  These 
decisions  were  in  the  main  Hamilton's.  Jefferson  did  what 
he  could — grumbled,  and  delayed,  and  obstructed  in  council ; 

1  E.g.  History,  v.  pp.  1-20. 


THE  DEMOCRATS  315 

foamed  over  in  indignant  private  correspondence,  which  A.D.  1792 
was  intended  to  have  a  wide  publicity.     But  Hamilton's    ^T-3' 
main  ends  were  achieved,  and  his  opponent  was  forced  in  the 
end,  willy-nilly,  to  register  his  decrees. 

The  outburst  of  popular  feeling  in  favour  of  France  was 
the  result  of  two  sentiments,  neither  of  which  was  well 
grounded  in  the  facts.  The  American  people  were  stirred 
with  gratitude  on  account  of  an  imaginary  generosity  and 
were  nattered  by  an  imaginary  imitation.  In  the  crisis  of 
their  own  fortunes  they  had  derived  efficient  help  from 
Frenchmen  and  from  French  policy.  Many  persons  held 
that  the  alliance  had  provided  what  was  absolutely  indispens- 
able for  the  achievement  of  independence.  And  now,  some 
ten  years  later,  it  appeared  to  the  ordinary  citizen  that  the 
glorious  example  of  the  American  Rebellion  was  the  type 
and  model  of  the  French  Revolution.  The  spirit  that 
animated  the  philosophers  and  the  'speculatists'  was  acknow- 
ledged, somewhat  too  readily,  for  the  same  goddess  who 
had  presided  over  the  highly  practical  deliberations  of 
Philadelphia. 

The  situation  is  crammed  with  paradox.  The  alliance 
with  the  rebellious  subjects  of  King  George  the  Third  was 
the  royal  policy  of  King  Louis  the  Sixteenth,  whom  the 
Revolution  held  a  prisoner,  covered  with  insults  and  was 
shortly  to  decapitate.  The  active  sympathy  and  personal 
sacrifice  in  the  cause  of  the  States  came  from  the  aristocrats, 
from  Lafayette  and  from  others,  some  of  whom  the  Revolu- 
tion sent  fleeing  for  their  lives,  while  others  less  fortunate  it 
put  to  death.  What  had  benefited  the  colonists,  if  we  may 
borrow  the  felicitous  phrase  which  Jefferson  subsequently 
adopted  to  describe  the  most  unfortunate  of  monarchs, 
had  been  the  cold-blooded  calculation  of  '  a  human  tiger.' 
What  had  comforted  their  hearts  had  been  the  '  high-flown 
chivalry '  of  comrades  in  arms,  to  whom  France  now  offered 


316  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1792  the  generous  choice  of  furtive  exile,  the  dungeon,  or  the 

^ET.  35    guillotine.    The  debt  of  American  gratitude  was  due,  if  at 

all,  to  a  king  and  his  nobles,  but  by  an  effort  of  the  popular 

imagination  the  bill  was  made  payable  to  the  assassins  of  the 

true  creditors. 

The  resemblance  of  the  National  Assembly  to  the  Con- 
vention of  Philadelphia  is  visible  only  to  the  eye  of  faith, 
gazing  over  a  thousand  leagues  of  ocean.  To  the  cool 
observer,  untouched  by  cynicism  or  sentiment,  the  two 
assemblages  stand  out  in  the  most  remarkable  contrast  both 
in  methods  and  results.  In  the  one  case  there  was  a  com- 
petition with  a  gallery  for  judges: — limelight,  rhetoric, 
general  ideas,  Rights  of  Man,  paper  constitutions,  quack 
prescriptions,  applause,  heat  and  chaos.  In  the  other  there 
were  closed  doors,  practical  speech,  disagreement,  compromise 
and  a  working  plan.  It  needed  a  superlative  degree  of 
self-deception  to  perceive  any  imitation,  conscious  or  uncon- 
scious, by  which  it  was  possible  to  be  flattered. 

Yet  if  it  happens  that  men  are  in  the  mood  to  display 
gratitude,  skilful  politicians,  interested  in  fanning  their 
emotions,  will  never  find  any  serious  difficulty  in  making 
a  respectable  bonfire  with  worse  materials  than  the 
superficialities  of  resemblance  that  lay  to  Jefferson's 
hand.  His  forces  were  strengthened  by  the  fanaticism  of 
the  phrasemonger.  Finance  and  commerce  he  did  not 
understand ;  but  in  '  general  principles '  he  was  an  expert. 
The  popular  enthusiasm  was  duly  fed  with  literature 
and  speeches.  A  new  edition  of  Tom  Paine  was  brought 
out  as  an  antidote  to  John  Adams,  who  had  propounded  the 
sturdy  view  that  France  for  the  moment  was  little  better 
than  a  rubbish-heap.  The  government  was  blamed  for  its 
coldness.  The  growing  distrust  of  the  Federalist  party 
towards  France  was  ascribed  to  their  vicious  inclination 
towards  royalty.  The  j  udicious  neutrality  of  Washington  was 


THE  DEMOCRATS  317 

explained  by  the  malign,  hypnotic  influence  of  Hamilton.    So  A.D.  1792 
the  tide  rose,  tubs  were  thumped,  banquets  held,  toasts  drunk,    ^T*  3' 
the  tricolour  became  fashionable,  newspapers  indulged  in 
dithyrambic  prose  and  doggerel,  and  Jefferson  all  the  time 
sat  writing  his  forty-five  thousand  letters  and  guiding  the 
storm. 


CHAPTER    V 

The  French  Revolution  and  the  Declaration  of  Neutrality 

THE  opinions  of  Hamilton  and  Jefferson  with  regard  to  the 
French  Revolution  afford  a  remarkable  contrast.  No  other 
occasion  shows  a  sharper  difference  between  the  insight  of 
the  two  men  into  the  causes  and  consequences  which  are 
the  business  of  statesmen. 

Than  Jefferson,  no  man  out  of  France  ever  gave  himself 
greater  airs  of  knowledge.  He  was  a  sort  of  godfather  to 
the  convulsion.  His  official  career  in  Paris  had  lasted  from 
the  middle  of  1784  to  the  end  of  1789.  When  he  arrived, 
the  monarchy  seemed  firmly  established.  Before  he  left, 
the  Bastille  had  fallen.  His  opportunities  for  observation 
were  altogether  exceptional,  and  yet  there  was  hardly  an 
event  in  all  the  startling  series  which  he  foresaw,  or  for 
which  he  was  prepared. 

He  undertook  a  famous  journey  through  the  French 
provinces,  in  the  course  of  which,  while  pursuing  the  most 
admirable  methods,  he  arrived  at  no  suspicion  of  the  storm 
that  was  brewing.  His  admirers  have  praised  his  practical 
shrewdness,  as  described  in  his  own  narrative.  He  invaded 
the  privacy  of  the  peasants,  supped  their  coarse  broth, 
tasted  their  black  bread,  questioned  them  beside  their 
own  hearths,  turned  over  their  bedding  when  they  were 
looking  the  other  way,  and  by  every  means  that  occurred 
to  him  investigated  the  conditions  of  their  existence.  But 


318  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1789  although  he  practised  the  methods  of  common  sense,  he 
^T-32  arrived  at  nothing  worth  finding  out.  He  noted  never  a 
sign  of  approaching  disaster;  thought  the  peasants  in 
certain  parts  were  not  so  well  off  as  in  others ;  compared 
them  favourably  with  their  fellows  in  Italy ;  was  of  opinion 
that  things  would  be  very  much  better  if  their  leases  were 
longer;  moralised  at  considerable  length  upon  general 
topics,  and  ended  his  expedition  over  the  crust  of  lava 
completely  satisfied  that  no  aristocrat  would  ever  have  seen 
into  the  heart  of  things  as  he  had  done.  There  can  be 
nothing  but  praise  for  his  methods.  His  freedom  from 
disdain,  from  class  prejudice,  from  pedantry,  was  admir- 
able. His  easy  familiarity  makes  a  pleasant  picture;  but 
there  is  the  end  of  the  matter.  It  is  merely  the  idyl  of 
a  virtuous  citizen  holidaymaking.  There  was  no  discovery. 
And  yet  he  started  upon  his  tour  in  the  month  following 
the  first  Assembly  of  Notables,  at  which  he  had  been 
present,  and  ended  it  only  two  years  before  the  fall  of  the 
Bastille. 

Jefferson  was  in  Paris  during  July  1789;  but  in  the 
events  that  were  taking  place  around  him,  in  the  bloodshed, 
in  'the  leading  in  triumph'  of  King  Louis,  he  heard  no 
tremendous  mutterings.  The  situation  was  difficult,  and 
in  a  sense  dangerous,  but  to  his  hopeful  mind  it  was  not 
beyond  solution  by  maxims.  So  far  as  his  notes  on  France 
have  a  real  human  interest,  it  is  purely  as  a  record  of  the 
gossip  of  the  court,  the  tattle  of  political  intrigue,  the 
entertaining  superficialities.  When  he  came  to  examine 
matters  of  a  different  order  he  was  blind.  The  profounder 
movements  were  concealed  from  his  gaze.  He  neither 
understood  the  nature  of  the  passions  that  were  wrenching 
at  the  masonry,  nor  the  value  of  the  blocks  that  were  being 
angrily  torn  out.  His  philosophy  entirely  misconceived  the 
fabric  of  society,  and  to  the  end  he  remained  confident  of  a 


THE  DEMOCRATS  319 

bloodless  amelioration,  not  of  social  conditions,  but  of  the  A.D.  1789 

c  f  MT.  32 

forms  of  government. 

Hamilton  had  a  truer  perception.  In  a  letter  to  Lafayette 
in  the  same  year,  but  before  the  news  of  July 1  had  reached 
America,  he  writes : — "  If  your  affairs  still  go  well  when  this 
{  reaches  you,  you  will  ask  why  this  foreboding  of  ill,  when  all 
'  the  appearances  have  been  so  much  in  your  favour.  I  will 
'  tell  you.  I  dread  disagreements  among  those  who  are  now 
'  united  (which  will  be  likely  to  be  improved  by  the  adverse 
'  party)  about  the  nature  of  your  constitution ;  I  dread  the 
'  vehement  character  of  your  people,  whom  I  fear  you  may 
'  find  it  more  easy  to  bring  on,  than  to  keep  within  proper 
'  bounds  after  you  have  put  them  hi  motion ;  I  dread  the 
'  interested  refractoriness  of  your  nobles,  who  cannot  be 
'  gratified,  and  who  may  be  unwilling  to  submit  to  the 
c  necessary  sacrifices.  And  I  dread  the  reveries  of  your 
'  philosophic  politicians,  who  appear  in  the  moment  to  have 
'  great  influence,  and  who,  being  mere  speculatists,  may  aim 
1  at  more  refinement  than  suits  either  with  human  nature  or 
'  the  composition  of  your  nation." 2 

This  is  no  gibing  of  a  partisan,  but  the  high  seriousness  of 
a  wellwisher.  Lafayette  and  Hamilton  had  been  loyal  and 
affectionate  comrades  since  they  first  served  together  on 
Washington's  staff.  The  letter  is  not  a  state  document,  but 
the  casual  correspondence  of  friends :  four  or  five  pages  of 
news  hurriedly  written  on  the  morrow  of  his  appointment  as 
Secretary  of  the  Treasury.  Some  years  later  Talleyrand  used 
of  Hamilton  the  remarkable  phrase  that  he  had  'divined 
Europe/  although  he  had  never  left  the  shores  of  America. 
The  quality  of  his  mind  was  to  see  the  essentials  of  any 
situation  in  great  simplicity.  From  poor  and  incomplete 
accounts  his  imagination  was  able  to  construct  a  picture  of 
the  event  in  its  true  proportions.  His  thoughts  seemed  to 

1  1789  -Fall  of  the  Bastille.  2   Works,  ix.  p.  460. 


320  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1789  work  without  the  support  and  encumbrance  of  other  men  s 
theories,  directly  upon  the  facts;  very  patiently,  but  also 
very  swiftly. 

Jefferson  meanwhile,  with  all  the  advantages  attaching  to 
first-hand  knowledge,  saw  in  these  '  speculatists '  the  hope 
not  only  of  France  but  of  the  world.  Flattered  by  their 
confidence,  he  participated  with  immense  gusto  in  their 
councils  and  discussions.  The  company  was  indeed  worthy 
and  congenial,  for  no  '  philosophic  politician '  in  Paris  could 
have  excelled  the  American  minister  in  the  fashionable 
drawing-room  entertainment  of  spinning  the  foundation 
stones  of  society  out  of  the  gossamer  of  intelligent  con- 
versation. He  went  daily  to  listen  to  the  debates  of 
the  National  Assembly,  and  was  even  asked  to  join  the 
deliberations  of  the  committee  charged  with  drawing  up 
another  constitution.  He  patched  up  coalitions  and  ad- 
justed differences  between  discordant  'speculatists.'  He 
advised  that  a  stance  royale  should  be  held,  and  the  king 
come  forward  with  a  Charter  of  Rights  in  his  hand;  and 
so  great  were  both  his  zeal  and  his  knowledge,  that  he 
drew  up  an  elaborate  sketch  of  a  charter  suitable  to  the 
occasion.  His  motives  were  in  every  case  beyond  reproach. 
His  discretion  under  circumstances  that  were  doubly  trying, 
in  their  own  nature  and  in  his,  was  admirable.  He  made 
many  friends  and  no  enemies.  He  returned  to  his  own 
country  with  an  enhanced,  though  somewhat  vague,  reputa- 
tion ;  but  living  five  years  in  France  he  had  seen  only  the 
surface  of  events,  while  Hamilton,  Washington,  Adams,  Jay, 
Gouverneur  Morris,  and  other  men  living  in  America,  no 
less  well-wishers  to  France  than  himself,  dependent  upon 
belated  despatches  and  tardy  packets  for  their  informa- 
tion, penetrated  much  deeper  into  the  realities  of  the 
revolution  that  was  proceeding,  and  entertained  much 
graver  fears  of  its  results. 


THE  DEMOCRATS  321 

The  feeling  of  Hamilton  from  the  beginning  was  that  the  A.D.  1789 
French  had  gone  the  wrong  way  to  work ;  that  people  of  the  ^T<  32 
greatest  influence  were  engaged  in  the  hopeless  endeavour 
to  fit  facts  to  their  own  principles,  instead  of  looking  for 
principles  that  would  fit  the  facts.  In  the  eloquence  and 
impatience  of  these  unpractical  leaders  he  saw  the  gravest 
dangers  lurking,  and  with  each  arrival  of  fresh  intelligence 
his  judgment  found  confirmation.  There  was  no  hostility 
to  France,  but,  on  the  contrary,  a  very  cordial  wish  for  her 
prosperity.  She  had  been  a  faithful  and  valued  ally  in 
time  of  war,  and  the  alliance  had  continued  after  the 
restoration  of  peace.  It  was  the  interest,  therefore,  as  well 
as  the  sentiment,  of  the  United  States  and  of  Washington's 
government,  that  French  disorders  should  be  brought  to  a 
prosperous  conclusion.  Naturally,  also,  Americans  were  in 
sympathy  with  reforms  that  aimed  at  admitting  the  popular 
element  into  the  constitution ;  but  having  themselves  only 
recently  arrived,  after  years  of  struggle  and  compromise,  at 
what  they  hoped  might  prove  to  be  a  strong  and  enduring 
government,  they  were  keenly  alive  to  the  dangers  of  haste 
and  sceptical  of  the  value  of  general  principles. 

When  Jefferson  landed  in  America  in  the  winter  of  1789 
he  found  himself  in  an  atmosphere  of  doubt  and  appre- 
hension, very  different  from  that  irresponsible  elation  which 
he  had  left  behind  him  at  Paris.  The  lack  of  confidence 
in  general  principles,  of  belief  in  the  virtues  of  enthusiasm, 
of  admiration  for  popular  debate  and  the  eloquence  of 
tribunes,  filled  him  at  first  with  amazement  and  shortly 
with  disgust.  Having  taken  no  part  in  the  great  Federal 
struggle,  he  might  well  have  been  excused  if  he  underrated 
the  difficulties  of  setting  up  a  strong  government.  But 
beyond  this  important  fact  it  is  necessary  to  bear  in  mind 
that  his  supreme  object  in  the  making  of  constitutions 
was  not  a  government  which  should  be  strong,  but  a 

x 


322  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON" 

A.D.  1792  people  that  should  be  free.  His  ideal  was  an  executive 
^T- 35  nation,  inspired  by  noble  emotions.  The  functions  of  the 
ruler,  or  the  first  citizen,  were  merely  to  expound  and 
interpret  from  time  to  time  in  sonorous  language  the  senti- 
ments latent  in  every  righteous  breast.  The  Revolution  in 
France  had  not  then  become  a  party  question  in  the 
United  States,  but  with  such  a  divergence  of  opinion  upon 
essentials  political  division  was  bound  to  be  the  result. 

When  a  man  returns  from  his  travels  he  looks  to  have 
his  opinions  on  climate,  scenery  and  manners  treated  with 
respect.  He  resents  nothing  with  a  deeper  mortification 
than  that  people  who  have  never  stirred  from  home  should 
assert  contrary  views  based  upon  a  knowledge  at  second- 
hand. The  perspicacious,  well-informed  person  of  sedentary 
habits  is  as  much  the  natural  enemy  of  the  credulous  and 
inquisitive  globe-trotter  as  a  cat  is  the  natural  enemy  of 
a  mouse.  No  punishment  is  harder  to  bear  with  than 
correction  by  fellow-creatures  who  have  had  opportunities 
of  knowledge  inferior  to  your  own.  Jefferson  may  therefore 
be  forgiven  if  he  felt  uncharitably  towards  the  cold  critics 
who  declined  to  share  his  enthusiasm. 

He  hoped,  and  not  in  vain,  for  a  better  disposition  and  a 
more  favourable  judgment  in  the  people  at  large.  From 
the  date  of  his  return  until  the  middle  of  1792  (two  and 
a  half  years  later)  the  popular  tide  of  sympathy  rose 
rapidly,  and  for  nearly  two  years  more  it  stood  at  the  turn. 
In  these  matters  his  flair  was  usually  to  be  trusted.  He 
gauged  the  rhetorical  possibilities  of  any  cause  with  the 
eye  of  a  general  selecting  a  position. 

The  great  cleavage  came  during  1792,  and  parties  were 
then  divided  with  that  peculiar  bitterness  which  frequently 
attaches  itself  to  causes  which  are  remote  and  ill  understood. 
The  fact  which  caused  public  opinion  to  precipitate  was 
the  certainty  that  France  was  preparing  for  war.  Phrases, 


THE  DEMOCRATS  323 

maxims,  and  general  principles  were  no  longer  the  pre-  A.D.  1792 
dominant  partners;  for  having  admitted  violence  to  be  a  Tt  l 
member  of  the  firm,  they  found  themselves  ousted  from 
all  influence  and  direction.  As  was  natural  the  party  of 
physical  force  was  gradually  gaining  the  upper  hand,  while 
the  more  timid  revolutionaries,  who  were  willing  to  debate 
interminably  but  shrank  from  action,  were  daily  growing 
in  discredit.  In  comparison  with  paper  constitutions  and 
edicts  which  nobody  heeded,  even  riots  and  massacres 
appeared  to  be  preferable ;  for  the  temper  of  the  times  was 
weary  of  speeches  and  cried  loudly  for  simple  solutions  and 
definite  achievements. 

The  extreme  party  desired  war  because  they  had  deter- 
mined on  a  Republic ;  and  as  Lafayette  also  desired  war,  for 
the  reason  that  he  aimed  at  a  duly  regulated  monarchy,  it 
was  to  be  predicted,  in  view  of  such  an  alliance,  that  war 
was  likely  to  ensue.  Exiled  princes  were  making  trouble  on 
the  Rhine,  and  upon  this  menace  in  April  war  was  declared 
against  Austria.  In  August,  France  was  invaded  by  the 
Duke  of  Brunswick.  Prussians  and  Austrians  menaced 
general  principles  and  the  millennium  with  advancing 
cannons.  Tyrants,  screamed  the  party  of  Jefferson,  were 
about  to  throttle  Freedom.  But  by  the  end  of  October 
jubilant  salvos  announced  that  the  sacred  soil  of  France 
was  freed  from  the  hirelings  of  despotism.  To  the  panic 
of  the  early  autumn  there  succeeded  an  exaltation  and 
self-confidence  that  was  worth  many  army  corps.  The  arms 
of  France  were  offered  magniloquently  to  the  service  of  all 
men  who  would  spurn  the  base  condition  of  slaves  and  rise 
against  their  rulers.  '  All  governments  are  our  enemies ;  all 
peoples  are  our  friends.'  On  the  first  day  of  February 
1793  war  was  declared  on  Britain  and  Holland. 

Upon  these  facts  glowingly  expanded,  American  opinion 
was  persuaded  to  rivet  its  attention.  The  coalition  against 


324  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1793  liberty  was  drawn  and  coloured  according  to  the  rhetorical 
/ET'36  probabilities,  so  that  a  statement  of  the  dull  truth  was 
disbelieved.  That  the  Emperor  would  have  preferred  most 
things  to  war ;  that  the  King  of  Prussia  saw  nothing  in  it 
but  an  uncomfortable  disturbance;  that  Pitt  detested  the 
idea  with  his  whole  heart ;  that  the  outbreak  was  the  con- 
trivance of  Jacobins  anxious  for  external  enemies,  in  order 
that  they  might  add  the  count  of  treachery  to  the  indictment 
of  their  king,  and  of  scatter-brained  Lafayette,  whose  gift 
it  was  to  pursue  his  ends  by  means  that  secured  their 
defeat — these  simple  facts  had  no  chance  of  persuading  a 
heated  opinion  that  had  already  settled  by  geometrical 
principles  the  nature  of  tyrants  on  the  one  hand,  and  of  lovers 
of  liberty  on  the  other. 

In  these  circumstances  the  rumour  of  war  not  unnaturally 
excited  a  thrill  of  sympathy.  The  declaration  of  a  Republic, 
the  retreat  of  the  allies,  the  victories  of  Dumouriez  and 
the  conquest  of  Savoy,  evoked  a  frantic  outburst  of  applause. 
Stripped  of  all  mendacity,  the  situation  was  great  enough  to 
have  moved  men's  hearts  to  wonder  and  admiration;  but 
under  the  inspiration  of  Jefferson's  luxurious  fancy  it  became 
something  akin  to  a  religious  frenzy.  When  in  February 
(1793)  Britain,  the  oppressor  of  American  freedom,  was  forced 
reluctantly  into  the  confederacy  of  tyrants,  indignation,  un- 
mingled  with  surprise,  excited  popular  sensibility  to  the 
highest  pitch.  Not  only  in  the  classes  addicted  to  indulgence 
in  clamour  and  sensation,  but  among  the  general  body  of 
citizens,  a  large  majority  were  ready  to  take  up  arms  upon 
a  sincere  impulse  of  fraternity,  though  upon  an  erroneous 
plea  of  alliance. 

In  Europe  other  incidents  of  this  ominous  autumn  and 
winter  had  arrested  a  gloomier  attention.  Even  men  who 
were  eager  to  excuse  the  excesses  of  the  10th  of  August, 
and  to  applaud  the  declaration  of  the  Republic,  were  struck 


THE  DEMOCRATS  325 

dumb  by  the  September  massacres  and  the  execution  of  the  A.D.  1793 
King.  With  a  boundary  no  broader  than  the  Rhine  or  the  ^T' 3e 
Channel  it  is  not  easy  to  shut  out  the  noise  of  murder,  or  to 
listen  patiently  to  the  edifying  discourses  of  theorists  who 
complacently  account  for  it  on  general  principles.  For  the 
moment  the  roar  of  the  Paris  mob  drowned  the  apologies, 
explanations  and  bluster  of  '  the  Society  of  the  Friends  of 
the  People/  the  '  London  Corresponding  Society,'  the  '  Society 
for  Constitutional  Information '  and  the  '  Sons  of  Freedom.' 
But  in  the  states  three  thousand  miles  away  Jefferson  found 
himself  but  little  inconvenienced  by  the  doings  of  Robespierre, 
Danton  and  Marat.  So  much  had  been  already  discounted 
of  possible  horror  by  the  judicious  language  of  Jefferson  and 
his  immediate  friends,  that  the  public  opinion  of  clubs  and 
newspapers  was  fully  prepared,  not  merely  to  condone  or 
approve,  but  even  to  exult  in  the  most  violent  forms  of 
purification  by  blood.1 

In  a  small  society  it  is  impossible  for  a  man  of  eminence 
and  many  friends,  a  great  talker,  a  prodigious  letter-writer, 
accessible  at  all  times  to  his  political  supporters,  patron  of 
the  arts  and  letters  and  inspirer  of  journalists,  to  keep  him- 
self free  from  the  condemnation  of  history  on  the  plea  that 
no  public  speech  or  state  document  can  be  alleged  against 
him.  If  his  indulgent  opinion  of  homicides,  his  hopeful 
rejoicings  over  the  millennium  did  not  actually  claim  fresh 
glory  from  what  was  happening  at  Paris,  at  least  they  found 
an  easy  explanation  in  the  depravity  of  tyrants.  You 
cannot,  if  you  are  a  man  of  Jefferson's  eminence,  be  held 

1  History,  v.  p.  259.  When  it  was  reported  (untruly  as  it  turned  out)  that 
the  American  ambassador  (Gouverneur  Morris)  had  been  murdered  at  Paris, 
the  supposed  murder  was  excused  by  the  Democratic  papers  on  the  ground 
that  the  sentiments  of  their  minister  were  favourable  to  the  fallen  dynasty. 
Astonishment  was  even  expressed  that  he  had  been  '  suffered  to  live  so  long, 
under  the  protection  of  an  American  diploma,  to  triumph  in  unexampled 
folly  and  impertinence.' 


326  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1793  irresponsible  for  the  results  of  your  confidential  communica- 
"ET>36  tions,  made  to  all  men  and  sundry,  merely  by  labelling 
them  as  '  private.'  For  he  intended  that  they  should  pro- 
duce a  public  effect.  He  was  no  incontinent  babbler  when 
he  used  the  nomenclature  of  natural  history  to  inform  the 
popular  mind,  and  described  the  classes  of  society  that  had 
incurred  his  reprobation  as  lions,  and  tigers,  and  kites, 
and  mammoths,  and  hydras,  and  hyaenas,  and  wolves. 
Jefferson  understood  his  times,  and  the  method  which  we 
should  now  consider  to  be  somewhat  banal,  was  an  admirable 
success. 

The  preparation  had  been  so  complete  that  upon  the 
occasion  of  the  September  massacres  Jefferson  was  able  to 
soar  unflustered  into  one  of  his  noblest  flights  of  perverse 
unreality.  "  In  the  struggle  which  was  necessary,  many 
'  guilty  persons  fell  without  the  forms  of  trial,  and  with 
1  them  some  innocent.  These  I  deplore  as  much  as  any- 
'  body,  and  shall  deplore  some  of  them  to  the  day  of  my 
'  death.  But  I  deplore  them  as  I  should  have  done  had 
'  they  fallen  in  battle.  It  was  necessary  to  use  the  arm  of 
'  the  people,  a  machine  not  quite  so  blind  as  balls  and  bombs, 
'  but  blind  to  a  certain  degree.  A  few  of  their  cordial 
'  friends  met  at  their  hands  the  fate  of  enemies.  But  time 
'  and  truth  will  rescue  and  embalm  their  memories,  while 
'  their  posterity  will  be  enjoying  that  very  liberty  for  which 
1  they  would  never  have  hesitated  to  offer  up  their  lives. 
'  The  liberty  of  the  whole  earth  was  depending  on  the  issue 
'  of  the  contest,  and  was  ever  such  a  prize  won  with  so  little 

*  innocent  blood  ?      My  own  affections  have  been  deeply 

*  wounded  by  some  of  the  martyrs  to  this  cause,  but  rather 
'  than  it  should  have  failed  I  would  have  seen  half  the 
'  earth  desolated ;  were  there  but  an  Adam  and  an  Eve  left 
'  in  every  country,  and  left  free,  it  would  be  better  than 
'  as  it  now  is.     I  have  expressed  to  you  my  sentiments 


THE  DEMOCRATS  327 

'  because  they  are  really  those  of  ninety-nine  in  a  hundred  A.D.  1793 
<  of  our  citizens." l  ^T'  36 

Fourteen  hundred  persons — men,  women  and  boys — were 
murdered  or  executed  in  Paris  between  the  3rd  and  the  7th 
of  September  1793,  among  them,  inadvertently,  some  male- 
factors who  already  inhabited  the  prisons  when  the  packing 
was  begun.  For  the  rest,  they  were  selected  with  much  care 
by  the  most  vigilant  and  discriminating  of  ruffians ;  herded 
together  thoughtfully  and  without  haste  (as  was  only  seemly 
when  '  the  liberty  of  the  whole  earth  was  depending  on  the 
issue ').  Only  the  manner  of  their  death  lacked  the  appear- 
ance of  premeditation,  and  this  was  in  accordance  with  the 
plan.  '  A  few  of  their  cordial  friends  met  at  their  hands  the 
fate  of  enemies,'  is  Jefferson's  complacent  comment,  with 
finger -tips  devoutly  pressed  to  finger-tips,  and  eyes  turned, 
heavenwards.  But  except  the  dozen  or  two  poor  devils  of 
malefactors,  what  '  cordial  friends '  had  Robespierre  among 
the  victims  ?  It  would  be  impious  to  attach  such  meaning 
to  the  words  of  Jefferson,  a  man  who  was  twice  President 
of  the  United  States,  and  believed  in  the  love  of  humanity ; 
but  for  any  other  meaning  we  search  vainly  in  the  vacuity 
of  his  rhetoric. 

King  Louis, '  the  friend  of  America,'  had  been  for  Jefferson 
a  subject  of  much  praise  during  his  ministry  in  France. 
His  dispositions  were  solidly  good.  He  was  capable  of  great 
sacrifices.  All  he  wanted  was  to  be  assured  it  would  be  for 
the  good  of  the  nation.  He  was  the  honestest  man  in  the 
kingdom,  and  the  most  regular  and  economical;  a  true 
friend  to  liberty. 

On  January  the  21st  the  head  of  the  honest  and  solidly 
good  man  was  taken  off  by  the  grateful  nation  whose  well- 
being  was  his  chief  care.  Jefferson  retained  his  heroic 
calm: — "We  have  just  received  here  the  news  of  the 

1  Ford's  Jefferson,  vi.  pp.  153-54. 


328  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1793  '  decapitation  of  the  King  of  France.  Should  the  present 
Ms' 36  '  foment  in  Europe  not  produce  republics  everywhere,  it  will 
'  at  least  soften  the  monarchical  governments  by  rendering 
'  monarchs  amenable  to  punishment  like  other  criminals, 
'  and  doing  away  with  that  rage  of  insolence  and  oppression, 
'  the  inviolability  of  the  king's  person."  What  wonder  that 
Madison,  under  the  influence  of  such  noble  precepts,  should 
become  almost  tepid  in  his  enthusiasm  ?  '  If  he  were  a 
traitor  he  ought  to  be  punished  as  well  as  another  man.'1 
What  wonder  that  simpler  people  with  no  official  reticence 
should  carry  the  principles  of  their  excellent  master  to  a 
more  fantastical  conclusion  ?  We  read  of  a  dinner  of  the 
Second  Regiment  of  Philadelphia  Militia,  to  which  Governor 
Mifflin  and  the  French  ambassador  were  invited,  at  which 
"  the  head  of  a  pig  was  severed  from  its  body,  and,  being 
'  recognised  as  an  emblem  of  the  murdered  King  of  France, 
'  was  carried  round  to  the  guests.  Each  one  placing  the 
'  cap  of  liberty  upon  his  head  pronounced  the  word  '  Tyrant ! ' 
'  and  proceeded  to  mangle  with  his  knife  the  head  of  the 
'  luckless  creature  doomed  to  be  served  for  so  unworthy  a 
'  company." 2 

If  it  be  the  proof  of  a  really  great  man  that  he  can  look 
upon  the  consequences  of  his  works  approving  and  undis- 
mayed, Jefferson's  reputation  needs  no  other  establishment. 
For  all  this  bloodthirsty  inanity  he  had  no  reproaches,  but 
only  for  his  own  government  that  refused  to  be  drawn  into 
the  war.  The  excitement  that  was  making  was,  in  his  judg- 
ment, the  flood-tide  to  float  him  off  an  uncomfortable  sand- 
bank into  power ;  but,  in  spite  of  all  his  letters  and  intimate 
conversations,  the  ebb  came  and  he  was  still  fast  aground. 

The  Cabinet  disagreements,  noted  by  Hamilton  in  his 

1  History,  v.  p.  222. 

a  Hazen,  American  Opinion  on  the  French  Revolution  t  p.  183. 


THE  DEMOCRATS  329 

letter  to  Carrington,1  increased  in  bitterness  during  the  A.D.  1793 
autumn  and  winter  of  1792.  The  news  of  victories  gave  ^ET-3e 
strength  to  those  partisans  of  France  who  sought  to  entangle 
their  country  in  a  war  with  Europe,  more  perhaps  for  the 
purposes  of  an  opposition  than  even  for  the  sake  of  the 
sentiment.  In  the  peculiar  situation  of  the  United  States, 
having  regard  to  the  youth  and  complexity  of  their  institu- 
tions, an  exemption  from  war  was  no  less  necessary  for  the 
development  of  their  natural  resources  than  for  the  security 
of  their  political  system.  Upon  the  preservation  of  peace, 
Hamilton  believed  with  good  reason  that  the  success  of  the 
experiment  in  republican  government  would  depend.2 

Leaving  out  of  account  the  fact  that  the  French  Revolu- 
tion had  deliberately  cancelled  all  the  international  obliga- 
tions of  the  monarchy,  and  admitting  in  its  fullest  latitude 
the  argument  that  a  nation  has  the  right  in  its  own  dis- 
cretion to  change  its  form  of  government,  Hamilton  firmly 
denied  the  further  right  which  was  claimed  "  to  involve  other 
'  nations,  with  whom  it  may  have  had  connections,  absolutely 
'  and  unconditionally,  in  the  consequences  of  the  changes 
1  which  it  may  think  proper  to  make."  3 

The  plea  that  the  friendship  of  France  for  the  United 
States  was  of  so  exceptional  a  character  that  it  ought  to 
override  the  natural  interpretation  of  the  treaty,  could  not  be 
supported  for  a  moment.  Judged  by  its  actions  the  govern- 
ment of  the  Revolution  was  no  less  oppressive  than  the 
government  of  King  Louis  had  been  towards  the  commerce 
of  their  ally.  Its  restrictions,  in  disregard  of  frequent  assur- 
ances of  attachment,  were  firmly  enforced.  Advances  towards 
a  more  liberal  policy  had  even  been  met  with  insult  and 
menace.4  The  government  of  King  George,  which  it  was  the 
popular  habit  to  execrate  on  all  occasions,  was  a  gentler  task- 

1  May  1792,  Works,  ix.  p.  528.  2  History,  v.  p.  215. 

8  History,  v.  p.  238.  4  Ibid.  v.  p.  215. 


330  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1793  master  and  a  more  generous  client.     In  Hamilton's  opinion 

T*        there  was  therefore  nothing  in  the  interests  of  the  United 

States,  or  in  the  obligations  of  the  treaty,  or  in  the  demeanour 

of  France,  which  could  justify  engaging  in  a  war  for  her 

support. 

The  news  that  war  had  been  declared  on  Britain  reached 
Philadelphia  in  the  early  days  of  April  1793.  A  month 
earlier  the  second  Congress  had  come  to  an  end,  with  the 
signal  defeat  of  the  first  great  campaign  of  Madison  and 
Giles  against  the  integrity  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury. 
In  the  ordinary  course  of  events  the  new  Congress  would  not 
meet  until  the  early  winter,  and  therefore  the  sole  responsi- 
bility of  dealing  with  the  emergency  was  fortunately  placed 
upon  the  shoulders  of  the  Cabinet. 

In  the  war  which  France  had  undertaken  in  the  previous 
autumn  against  Austria  and  Prussia  there  were  no  dangers 
for  America.  There  had  been  a  strong  sympathy  towards 
the  revolutionary  campaign,  a  great  rejoicing  in  its  success; 
but  there  the  matter  ended.  The  citizens  of  the  United 
States  had  no  desire  to  take  up  arms  in  the  quarrel,  and  had 
they  so  desired  it  would  have  been  a  practical  impossibility 
to  gratify  their  impulse.  But  when  war  broke  out  between 
France  and  Britain,  every  day  found  more  people  in  a  belli- 
cose mood.  Circumstances  had  unfortunately  placed  no 
barriers  against  the  realisation  of  their  object.  War  with 
Britain  was  only  too  possible,  both  by  sea  and  land. 

It  was  therefore  necessary,  if  war  was  to  be  avoided,  that 
the  government  should  take  up  a  strong  and  decided  line. 
Four  days  after  the  news  arrived,  Hamilton  wrote  to  Jay 
urging  the  need  for  a  declaration  of  neutrality,  and  asking 
him  to  draft  an  instrument  suited  to  the  occasion.  Wash- 
ington was  in  full  agreement  that  it  was  the  duty  of  the 
executive  to  impose  a  strict  neutrality  upon  its  subjects. 
The  Cabinet  met,  and  the  matter  was  discussed.  Jefferson, 


THE  DEMOCRATS  331 

as  may  be  supposed,  was  altogether  hostile  to  any  measures  A.D.  1793 
which  might  give  offence  to  the  susceptibilities  of  France.    ^T* 36 
He  argued  strongly  for  his  favourite  policy  of  drift.     He 
accused  Hamilton  of  aiming  at  a  defensive  alliance  with 
Britain.     His  organ,  the  National  Gazette,  started  simul- 
taneously a  skilful  campaign,  the  object  of  which  was  to 
identify  Hamilton,  and  even  Washington,  with  'a  British 
party.'1     It  exulted  in  the  execution  of  Louis   xvi.,  and 
pointed  a  moral  for  the  benefit  of  all  tyrants  and  imitators 
of  royal  ceremonies. 

Washington  was  slow  in  certain  matters.  Finance  was 
always  a  laborious  effort  to  him;  but  upon  this  issue  his 
vision  was  clear,  his  judgment  swift.  He  had  no  doubts  or 
scruples,  but  at  the  first  glance  knew  his  own  mind  through 
and  through.  The  United  States  were  on  no  account  to  be 
dragged  into  a  war  which  did  not  touch  their  interests  at  a 
single  point. 

Hamilton,  with  his  customary  energy,  made  all  the  pre- 
parations and  found  most  of  the  arguments.  He  drafted 
the  questions  for  the  consideration  of  the  Cabinet  which 
met  on  the  19th  of  April  to  consider  the  tremendous 
issue.  Jefferson  opposed  neutrality  on  principle,  and  was 
defeated.  He  urged  delay,  and  was  again  defeated.  He 
then  argued  the  matter  on  constitutional  grounds.  The 
President  had  no  powers,  without  the  consent  of  Congress, 
to  take  such  a  step  as  was  contemplated.  He  favoured 
calling  a  special  meeting  of  the  two  Houses  to  debate  the 
matter.  This  advice,  had  it  been  accepted,  must  have  meant 
war.  For  delay  of  any  kind  meant  war,  and  further,  the 
new  Congress  contained  a  majority  of  the  Democratic 
party. 

The  Cabinet  was  firm.  The  Declaration  of  Neutrality 
was  agreed  to ;  only,  as  a  concession  to  Jefferson's  feelings, 

1  History,  v.  pp.  218-22. 


332  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A. D.  1793  the  word  'neutrality'  was  left  out.  The  substance  was 
secured,  but  the  offensive  description  was  omitted.  On  the 
22nd  of  April  it  was  promulgated. 

It  has  been  said  that  when  Washington  issued  his  Declara- 
tion of  Neutrality  he  could  not  have  been  more  violently 
execrated  by  the  Democratic  party  had  he  proclaimed  a  mon- 
archy. When  we  recall  Washington's  services  in  war  and 
peace,  his  clear  and  disinterested  character,  and  then  turn  to 
the  political  literature  of  the  day,  we  are  once  more  struck  with 
admiration  for  the  rapidity  with  which  the  United  States 
had  assimilated  the  fashions  and  procedure  of  government 
by  party.  Merciful  opponents  excused  the  President  as 
a  man  of  weak  intellect  hypnotised  by  Hamilton,  his  evil 
genius.  More  vigorous  and  less  refining  orators  brushed 
aside  such  excuses,  and  advocated  dealing  with  the  in- 
iquitous despot  in  the  simple  manner  of  Robespierre  and 
Marat. 

It  is  unnecessary  to  dwell  upon  the  extravagance  of  the 
period,  further  than  to  mark  it  for  a  dangerous  and  consider- 
able force.  It  was  as  much  an  epidemic  as  the  yellow 
fever. 

The  sequence  of  events  during  this  fateful  year  may  be 
briefly  chronicled.  The  Minister  of  France,  Citizen  Genet, 
arrived  in  Charlestown  on  the  8th  of  April,  and  proceeded 
by  leisurely  steps  to  the  seat  of  government  at  Philadelphia, 
where  he  arrived  in  the  middle  of  May.  Jefferson  was 
overflowing  with  kindness — a  contrast  to  the  calm  correcti- 
tude  of  his  chief.  In  the  face  of  British  protests  against  the 
infringements  of  neutrality  that  were  occurring  every  day, 
it  was  necessary  to  communicate  the  firm  intentions  of  the 
Cabinet  to  Genet,  who  was  the  prime  instigator  of  these 
events.  A  week  after  his  arrival  he  was  at  loggerheads 
with  the  government  to  which  he  was  accredited,  and 
Jefferson,  who  in  private  was  everything  that  was  agreeable 


THE  DEMOCRATS  833 

and    indiscreet,1    was    compelled    reluctantly,    in    official  A.D.  1793 
correspondence,  to  repel  the  outrageous  pretensions  of  his 
friend.    By  the  month  of  June  Genet  began  to   talk  of 
'appealing  to   the   people,'   and    Hamilton    had   published 
the  first  numbers  of  his  famous  letters  of  Pacificus. 

The  sympathy  of  Jefferson  was  misleading.  The  popular 
ferment  which  saluted  the  French  minister  on  every  hand 
was  even  more  misleading.  The  situation  was  dangerous, 
and  it  was  also  intolerable.  In  all  the  great  seaports  were 
seen  tricoloured  ensigns  floating  above  the  American  stan- 
dards. French  ships  of  war  were  moored  so  as  to  command 
the  feeble  batteries.  The  coasts  were  lined  with  privateers,  and 
cruisers  roamed  the  high  seas  commissioned  to  capture  every 
neutral  vessel.  An  internecine  party,  rallying  against  their 
own  government,  tendered  homage  to  a  foreign  minister. 
The  foreign  minister  was  found  rebuking  Washington  as  a 
violater  of  the  laws,  dictating  to  him  his  duty,  and  appearing 
to  divide  with  him  the  affections  of  the  people.  The  Cabinet 
was  often  in  discord,  while  Britain,  with  every  justification, 
was  threatening  reprisals.  Hamilton  urged  the  necessity  of 
prompt  and  vigorous  measures  against  the  French  minister, 
and  in  the  end  his  counsels  prevailed.2 

At  the  beginning  of  August,  Hamilton's  draft  of  the  rules 
of  neutrality  was  agreed  to  by  the  President  and  the  majority 
of  the  Cabinet.  It  was  determined  to  ask  for  Genet's  recall. 
Hamilton  was  in  favour  of  making  public  the  correspondence 
with  this  strange  ambassador,  confident  that  the  announce- 
ment would  appeal  to  the  good  sense  and  dignity  of  the 
nation.  Jefferson  was  opposed  to  this  step,  and  again 
advocated  the  calling  together  of  Congress. 

Jefferson,  fearful  of  the  consequences  which  seemed 
imminent,  spoke  of  resignation  in  the  following  month; 
but  Washington,  indignant  at  the  attacks  of  the  Democratic 

1  History,  v.  p.  262.  2  Ibid.  v.  pp.  314-15. 


334  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1793  party  and  their  press,  and  determined  to  pin  the  Secretary 
Mi.  36  Q£  Sf^e  to  the  policy  of  the  government,  refused  to  entertain 
his  retirement  before  the  end  of  the  year.  This  attitude  was 
natural ;  but  it  is  difficult  to  see  in  what  way  it  was  of  any 
benefit  to  the  administration.  The  chief  advantage  in  the 
arrangement  has  accrued  to  the  reputation  of  Jefferson  in 
modern  times.  His  animosity  against  the  Federalist  policy 
of  aloofness  from  European  quarrels  is  now  usually  over- 
looked. What  is  remembered  is  that  he  was  Secretary  of 
State  when,  at  the  height  of  revolutionary  enthusiasm,  it 
was  wisely  decided,  in  the  teeth  of  the  popular  frenzy,  to 
pursue  a  course  of  neutrality.  It  is  also  remembered  that  he 
was  the  mouthpiece  through  which  Genet  was  censured  and 
exposed.  By  reason  of  Washington's  compulsion  Jefferson 
has  accordingly  earned  a  great  credit  for  sagacious  statesman- 
ship of  which  he  was  not  only  entirely  innocent,  but  the 
most  determined  and  hysterical  opponent.1 

Throughout  August  Hamilton  pursued  his  success.  It 
was  decided  that  British  prizes  wrongfully  captured  were  to 
be  restored  and  compensation  given.  Jefferson's  doctrine 
that  '  French  ships  of  war  and  privateers  with  prizes  may 
come  and  go  freely,  English  may  not/2  was  emphatically 
repudiated.  Hamilton  drafted  letters  to  Genet  of  no  amiable 
tenour,  and  to  the  United  States  ambassador  in  Paris,  de- 
manding Genet's  recall.  To  these  documents  Jefferson  was 
obliged  meekly  to  append  his  signature.  Finally,  at  the 
very  end  of  the  month  Genet's  unwary  insolence  completed 
the  victory.  He  launched  a  public  attack  upon  Washington 
and  his  administration.  The  National  Gazette  clamoured 
indignant  approbation  of  his  action.  But  the  country  viewed 
the  matter  in  another  light.  Suddenly,  from  all  sides,  there 

1  History,    v.    p.    337.      Of.    also    Redda way's    Monroe    Doctrine,    pp. 
15-16. 

2  History,  v.  p.  232. 


THE  DEMOCRATS  335 

was  a  rally.    A  foreign  agent  had  dared  to  insult  the  chief  A.D.  1793 
officer  of  the  Union. 

By  December,  Genet  had  sunk  to  the  sad  plight  of  a 
blackmailer.  He  wrote  angry  letters  threatening  disclosures ; 
had  instalments  struck  off,  and  demanded  that  they  should  be 
officially  circulated  in  Congress.  Jefferson,  on  the  eve  of  his 
retirement,  was  anxious  to  escape  the  pain  of  sending  the 
necessary  reply.  But  Washington  was  obdurate,  summoned 
a  hasty  Cabinet  on  a  Sunday,  and  the  last  act  of  the 
Secretary  of  State  was  a  reluctant  but  emphatic  denuncia- 
tion of  his  former  confederate.1 

On  the  31st  of  December  Jefferson,  with  a  sigh  of  relief, 
relinquished  his  office.  The  National  Gazette  was  dis- 
continued, and  the  Democratic  party  arrived  at  the  wise 
decision  that  in  the  present  state  of  popular  feeling  they 
would  no  longer  champion  the  cause  of  France  against  their 
own  government. 

To  support  the  policy  of  neutrality  against  the  fanatics 
Hamilton  wrote  the  letters  of  Pacificus  which,  apart  from 
their  special  argument  on  the  facts,  will  ever  remain  a  classic 
of  wise,  dignified,  illusionless,  unprovocative  statesmanship. 
Gradually,  in  the  face  of  an  indomitable  resolution,  the 
violence  died  away.  Once  more  Jefferson  (now  no  longer  in 
office)  saw  the  assault  that  he  had  planned  and  cheered  on 
thrown  back  with  disaster.  Common  sense  had  prevailed. 
The  citizens  of  the  United  States  had  come  to  realise  that  the 
policy  of  safety  was  a  higher  patriotism  than  the  indulgence 
of  any  sentiment.  A  consciousness  that  their  antics  had 
been  somewhat  ludicrous,  a  suspicion  that  for  two  years 
or  more  they  had  been  the  dupes  of  a  parody  of  free- 
dom, began  to  steal  upon  them;  and  with  these  the  slow 
conviction  that  a  government  they  did  not  love  had  all 
the  time  succeeded  in  keeping  its  head  in  spite  of  threats 

1  History,  v.  p.  436. 


336  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1793  and  unpopularity.    They  began  to  remember  that  after  all 

^Tt36    they  were  for  the   most  part  Anglo-Saxons,  and   that  for 

such   a  stock  it  was  possibly  unbecoming  to  caper  round 

poles   of  liberty,   to  embrace  in  the  streets,  to  guillotine 

emblematical  pigs  and  to  wear  tricolour  ribbons. 

Citizen  Genet,  the  ambassador  of  the  French  Republic, 
came  to  America  with  the  deliberate  object  of  engaging  the 
Union  in  a  war  against  tyranny.  The  disposition  of  the 
shouting  portion  of  the  populace  was  altogether  favourable 
to  the  purpose  of  his  mission.  Had  the  rule  of  the  country 
which  accredited  him  held  good  in  that  to  which  he  carried 
his  credentials,  he  might  easily  have  fulfilled  his  hopes. 

He  was  a  gay  and  sanguine  gentleman  of  pleasing  address 
and  a  facile  eloquence  in  several  tongues.  Handsome, 
debonair  and  audacious,  with  a  fine  ruddy  complexion  and 
busy  and  bustling  manners,  he  advanced  to  the  assault  of 
the  position  unencumbered  by  the  gyves  of  experience,  or 
suspicion  of  any  variety,  racial  or  climatic,  among  citizens 
who  gloried  in  their  freedom.  With  a  sublime  air  of 
condescending  fraternity,  as  became  one  who  had  arrived 
by  express  from  the  fashionable  Metropolis  of  Liberty,  he 
wore  his  tricolour  ribbon  with  a  good-natured  swagger,  and 
played  the  lofty  gentleman  to  open-mouthed  rustics  of 
virtue.  He  was  not  so  much  an  ambassador  to  Washing- 
ton's government  as  its  patron ;  less  of  a  diplomatist  than 
the  vice-gerent  of  the  Rights  of  Man.  His  portmanteaux 
were  stuffed  with  letters  of  marque.  He  had  hardly  stepped 
upon  the  quay  before  he  began  putting  privateers  in  com- 
mission. The  enlistment  of  American  subjects  was  a  regular 
item  in  his  daily  routine.  For  this  well-born  and  accom- 
plished youth,  with  a  fresh  experience  of  the  instability 
of  the  most  ancient  and  glorious  of  European  Governments, 
the  resistance  of  any  human  institution  to  his  summons 
seemed  a  chimsera  as  ridiculous  as  the  virtue  of  Clarissa  to 


THE  DEMOCRATS  337 

Lovelace.    With  the  government  he  was  civil,  of  course,  A.D.  1793 
and  good-humoured,  as  a  gallant  in  a  Restoration  drama    ^Tt  36 
with  the  husband,  or  the  father,  of  his  mistress ;  kindly,  but 
contemptuous,  letting  it  be  understood  that  he  considered 
official  dignity  to  be  somewhat  in  the  way. 

He  was  in  no  hurry  to  present  his  credentials.  To  do 
him  full  justice  we  must  endeavour  to  put  ourselves 
into  his  point  of  view,  and  to  realise  that  the  power 
to  which  he  conceived  himself  to  have  been  truly  accredited 
was  the  Sovereign  People.  The  forms  of  diplomacy 
lingered,  but  these  were  merely  survivals,  harmless  if 
every  one  understood  their  symbolism,  but  otherwise  to  be 
torn  down  and  destroyed  like  other  pasteboard  rubbish  of 
the  feudal  era.  In  his  opinion,  the  proper  business  of  an 
ambassador  was  to  be  in  close  touch  and  direct  communica- 
tion with  the  Popular  Master  to  whom,  in  any  respectable 
state,  the  executive,  legislative  and  judicial  powers  stood 
in  the  relation  of  humble  servants.  Nor  when  forms  were 
tedious  and  involved  delay  did  he  consider  it  necessary  to 
observe  them  pedantically.  Where  there  was  such  absolute 
good  feeling,  such  a  perfect  understanding  as  was  proved  by 
the  enthusiastic  uproar  of  his  reception,  to  tie  the  hands  of 
all  men  and  his  own  by  the  punctilious  observance  of  cere- 
monies would  have  been  to  chill  ungratefully  the  warmth  of 
his  welcome. 

And  so  without  delay  Genet  proceeded  to  his  business, 
taking  the  parade  and  shoutings  as  sufficient  warrant 
for  his  vigour.  Privateers  were  desirable  to  prey  upon 
the  commerce  of  Britain  and  her  allies.  He  accordingly 
chartered  and  fitted  them  out,  providing  them  with  stores 
and  munitions  of  war.  Privateers  needed  officers  and  crews 
to  man  them ;  so  that  logically  he  was  compelled  to  give  his 
attention  to  enlistment  and  commissions.  Prize  courts  in 
safe  and  comfortable  American  harbours  were  conveniences 


338  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1793  demanded  by  civilisation;  so  with  French  consuls  for  judges 
^T<  36  he  established  these  tribunals.  Everywhere  as  he  went  he 
spoke  with  enthusiasm  of  'the  alliance'  between  the  two 
Republics  as  a  thing  already  in  existence ;  of  mutual  sacri- 
fices, loans,  and  subsidies;  of  French  help  that  had  been 
given  to  colonists  struggling  for  freedom ;  and  of  the  obliga- 
tion of  a  grateful  return,  seeing  that  the  debtors  were  men 
of  such  well-known  honour  and  probity. 

Among  his  hearers,  while  the  progress  lasted,  there  was 
no  one  to  say  him  nay;  but  on  his  journey  northward  he 
learned  that  Washington  had  issued  his  Declaration  of 
Neutrality.  Genet  read  the  terms  of  this  document  with 
incredulity  and  horror.  Privateers,  enlistment  and  prize 
courts  were  things  that  must  altogether  cease.  British 
merchantmen  must  not  be  seized  in  American  waters,  and 
if  so  seized  must  be  immediately  released.  Some  mind, 
evidently  not  that  of  Jefferson  or  of  the  Sovereign  People, 
was  forcing  this  reluctant  minister  to  utter  very  hard  and 
definite  forbiddings,  which  were  an  outrage  not  merely  upon 
the  decency  of  gratitude,  but  upon  the  very  chastity  of 
freedom. 

To  all  lovers  of  fine  comedy  Genet  will  ever  be  a  hero, 
miscalculating  so  buoyantly,  suspecting  nothing,  clothed 
always  in  a  smiling  dignity,  till  suddenly  Jefferson,  his 
confidential  valet,  and  Jeffersonism,  the  credit-balance  of 
his  account,  faded  into  thin  air,  and  a  grim  Washington 
supported  by  a  grave  and  polite  Hamilton  appeared  in 
unlooked-for  authority.1  Altogether  in  the  background 
stood  his  friend  Jefferson,  perturbed  and  deprecatory,  with 
an  anxious  recollection  of  sundry  letters  and  conversations 
'as  between  friends1  which  it  might  be  inconvenient  to 
reconcile  with  his  official  duty,  if  an  irate  emissary,  out- 
raged in  his  office  and  feather-brained  by  nature,  should 

1  History,  v.  pp.  335-37. 


THE  DEMOCRATS  339 

entertain    no  scruples   with   regard   to   publication.     The  A.D.  1793 
scruples  of  an  angry  Genet  were  but  pea-sticks  against  a    ^T-36 
hurricane.1 

Facts  following  the  written  words  began  to  take  place. 
Force  under  severe  provocation  at  last  stretched  out  a  paw, 
making  it  clear  that  the  warning  was  to  be  supported  by  the 
aid  of  constables  and  prisons,  or  if  the  lamentable  necessity 
should  arise,  even  by  gunpowder  and  cannon-balls.  The 
private  sympathy  of  Jefferson  was  consoling  to  Genet  as  a 
man ;  but  when  it  became  apparent  that  the  sentiment  was 
merely  'as  between  friends,'  and  not  politically  efficacious 
in  the  smallest  degree,  it  is  hardly  to  be  wondered  at  that 
contempt  succeeded  to  amazement,  and  wrathful  revelations 
to  contempt. 

Genet  may  be  forgiven  for  finding  the  situation  some- 
what puzzling.  Looking  around  him  he  saw  still  the  same 
fervour  of  popular  demonstration;  anger  loudly  expressed 
and  almost  equal  to  his  own  against  the  Declaration  of 
Neutrality.  Not  only  the  people,  but  their  leaders,  Madison 
and  Monroe,  spoke  of  the  act  with  horror, — '  a  most  unfor- 
tunate evil ' ;  injurious  to  '  the  national  honour  by  seeming 
to  disregard  the  stipulated  duties  to  France';  wounding 
'the  popular  feelings  by  a  seeming  indifference  to  the 
cause  of  liberty ' ;  violating  '  the  forms  and  the  spirit  of  the 
constitution ' ;  a '  millstone '  round  the  neck  of  Washington's 
reputation,  and  so  forth  and  so  forth.2  Even  the  Secretary  of 
State  himself  made  no  secret  of  his  opinion  that  he  viewed 
it  with  detestation,  speaking  of  it  openly  as  '  an  English 
neutrality.' 

Genet  grew  daily  more  bewildered  by  his  environment. 
He  was  in  a  strange  land ;  not  free,  as  he  had  supposed,  but 
governed  by  a  baleful  paradox.  The  Will  of  the  People  was 

1  History,  v.  p.  374. 

3  Madison  to  Jefferson,  19th  June  1793  ;  History,  v.  p.  28*. 


340  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1794  not  then  really  supreme.  Ministers  carried  out  measures 
^Ti  37  which  they  privately  denounced.  What  power  sat  over  the 
heads  of  the  citizens  ?  Why  and  by  whom  were  they  thus 
compelled  and  coerced  ?  The  one  clear  thing  in  the  situation 
was  that  the  lesson  of  liberty  had  been  learned  only  by 
halves.  Tyranny  held  the  reins  in  a  misnamed  Republic. 
In  the  New  World  things  were  even  more  topsy-turvy 
than  in  the  Old,  for  here  the  theory  of  the  Rights  of  Man 
walked  hand  in  hand  with  the  dark  practices  of  despotism. 

Only  a  touch  seemed  necessary,  only  a  bold  word,  and 
the  shackles  of  paradox  would  be  struck  for  ever  off  the 
limbs  of  struggling  Democracy.  To  him,  Genet,  minister 
plenipotentiary  of  the  French  Republic,  the  glorious  duty  was 
clearly  appointed  by  destiny.  So,  without  undue  hesitation, 
he  struck  manfully  at  the  encumbering  chains. 

The  result  was  not  what  he  had  foreseen,  but  as  nearly 
as  possible  the  reverse  of  it.  He  appealed  directly  to  the 
Sovereign  People,  which  might  have  been  endured,  but  for 
the  fact  that  the  appeal  was  by  its  nature  an  attack  upon 
the  President  of  the  United  States,  and  this  was  unforgiv- 
able in  any  foreigner.1  Thereupon  paradox  deepened  to  a 
tragedy.  The  Sovereign  People  was  shocked  beyond  all 
words  capable  of  expressing  it ;  Jefferson  and  Madison  and 
Monroe  were  seen  publicly  and  privately  wringing  their 
hands  and  casting  ashes  on  their  heads.2 

To  Citizen  Genet,  logically  pursuing  the  path  of  General 
Principles,  it  appeared  that  he  was  in  the  land  of  the  mad. 
His  gallant  effort  had  miscarried.  Failure  descended  upon 
him  and  his  mission.  Letters  of  recall  arrived  in  time  to 
prevent  further  mischief.  He  passed  rapidly  out  of  sight 
in  a  haze  of  banquets  and  sympathy,  blustering  eloquently 
in  a  swiftly  dying  fall.  Dreading  what  might  befall  him  if 
he  returned  to  France,  he  became  an  American  citizen,  and 

1  History,  v.  pp.  357-58,  also  p.  377.       2  Jefferson  to  Madison,  v.  pp.  342-45. 


THE  DEMOCRATS  341 

married  Governor  Clinton's  daughter.     He  had  come  near  A.D.  1794 
to  provoking  a  revolution  in  the  United  States;  but  although    ^T-  37 
he  found  himself  well  placed  for  combustibles  and  had  acted 
with  great  spirit,  he  did  not  arrive  at  his  object.     He  had 
blundered  into  an  error  of  tact  for  which  his  origin  and 
experience  afford  sufficient  excuse ;  for  how  was  a  French- 
man to  understand  a  wilful  race  which  rated  its  institutions, 
even  in  their  first  youth,  far  beyond  logic  ? 


CHAPTER  VI 

The  Treaty  with  Great  Britain 

THE  danger  of  a  war,  undertaken  out  of  sympathy  with 
France,  may  be  said  to  have  ended  with  the  retirement  of 
Jefferson  and  the  discredit  of  Genet.  But  two  dangers  were 
still  to  be  dreaded.  The  one  was  internal  disorder;  the 
other  was  a  war  with  Britain,  arising  partly  out  of  the 
unsettled  grievances  and  partly  out  of  fresh  provocations. 
The  year  1794  was  therefore  a  period  hardly  less  critical 
than  its  predecessor. 

Britain,  engaged  in  a  struggle  for  life  or  death,  judged  it 
sound  policy  to  take  advantage  to  the  uttermost  of  her 
naval  supremacy.  It  was  her  object  to  cut  off  all  supplies 
that  came  by  sea  to  France,  and  to  this  end  she  adopted  a 
procedure  with  regard  to  neutral  shipping  that  neutrals  had 
every  right  to  resent  as  high-handed  and  oppressive.  The 
question  has  been  argued  as  if  it  were  one  of  morals,  but 
in  reality  it  was  purely  a  matter  of  military  expediency. 
Which  was  the  greater  evil  from  the  standpoint  of  Britain : 
to  allow  her  enemy  the  advantage  of  sea-borne  commodities, 
or  to  provoke  the  United  States  to  take  up  arms?  The 
principle  of  the  calculation  is  easy  to  state,  but  the  sum 
itself  was  less  easy  to  work  out.  The  fact  that  Britain 


342  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1794  modified  her  action  from  time  to  time,  that  orders  were 
MT'  37  issued,  amended,  withdrawn,  and  renewed,  seems  to  indicate 
that  she  was  by  no  means  certain  as  to  the  wisdom  of  her 
policy.  There  was  a  wavering  note.  Things  hung  in  the 
balance.  It  is  perhaps  safe  to  assume  that  had  her  relations 
with  America  been  frank  and  friendly,  the  regulations  would 
never  have  been  pressed  to  a  point  at  which  they  could 
have  caused  serious  offence.  But  the  reverse  was  the  case. 
While  it  was  true  that  the  attitude  of  Washington's  govern- 
ment was  correct,  the  feeling  of  the  nation  was  notoriously 
hostile,  and  all  the  power  of  the  executive  had  been  unable 
to  keep  the  people  within  bounds.  In  addition  there  were 
the  outstanding  disputes  with  regard  to  the  non-fulfilment 
of  the  treaty  of  peace.  While  these  were  left  unsettled  it 
was  beyond  hope  to  get  rid  of  mutual  distrust. 

Early  in  March,  particulars  of  the  latest  orders  to  British 
men-of-war  became  known  in  Philadelphia.  Their  character 
was  so  oppressive  that  common  men,  and  even  the  coolest 
members  of  the  government,  judged  them  to  be  altogether 
intolerable.  The  day  following  the  receipt  of  this  informa- 
tion, Hamilton  put  his  views  into  writing  and  submitted 
them  to  Washington.  He  urged  the  importance  of  fortify- 
ing the  chief  harbours,  raising  troops,  and  placing  certain 
special  powers  for  the  time  being  in  the  hands  of  the 
President.1  When  so  sincere  a  friend  of  peace  as  Hamilton 
was  found  denouncing  the  grievance  as '  atrocious/  it  seemed 
much  more  likely  than  not  that  war  would  break  out. 

Still  he  did  not  abandon  hope.  He  was  as  anxious  as 
ever  to  pursue  an  honourable  neutrality  if  it  were  practic- 
able; but  he  judged  it  wise  to  prepare  for  war,  with  the 
double  object  of  impressing  Britain  with  the  earnestness  of 
American  intentions,  and  of  putting  the  country  on  a  foot- 
ing to  prevent  injury,  and  to  strike  an  early,  decisive  blow 

1  History,  v.  pp.  507-8. 


THE  DEMOCRATS  343 

if  it  were  assailed.1    At  the  same  time  he  advocated  a  frank  A.D.  1794 
discussion  with  the  British  government.    The  language  and    "ET-  37 
temper  of  the  protest  should  be  firm  and  determined,  but 
provocation  should  be  studiously  avoided.    He  was  in  favour 
of  a  special  mission  to  England  to  negotiate  for  the  with- 
drawal of  the  oppressive  regulations  and  the  removal  of  the 
old  grievances  of  the  loyalists  and  the  frontier  forts. 

Washington  approved  this  policy  at  every  point,  but  the 
Democrats,  under  the  leadership  of  Madison,  opposed  it  root 
and  branch.  They  lamented  among  themselves  that  their 
enemy  should  have  been  beforehand  with  them  in  advo- 
cating resistance  to  Britain.2  They  defeated  the  Army 
Bill.  They  accused  Hamilton,  possibly  with  a  grain  of 
truth,  'of  turning  every  contingency  into  a  resource  for 
accumulating  force  in  the  government.' 3  In  private  they 
admitted  that  war  was  probable,4  but  in  Congress  they 
pretended  that  Britain  could  be  brought  to  reason  by  com- 
mercial pressure.5  "While  they  were  eager  to  engage  in 
provocations  that  must  inevitably  lead  to  war,  they  were 
resolute  that  no  preparation  for  the  consequences  of  their 
action  should  be  undertaken.  If  a  commercial  campaign 
proved  insufficient,  there  still  remained  the  weapon  of 
repudiation.  The  debts  due  to  British  citizens  should  be 
sequestrated.6  This  plan  was  proposed  upon  various  occa- 
sions and  with  difficulty  defeated;  but  it  had  the  chief 
weight  of  the  Democratic  party  behind  it,  and  was  warmly 
supported  by  Monroe.7 

Washington,  determined  to  put  an  end  to  the  danger  if  it 
were  at  all  possible,  accepted  Hamilton's  proposal  for  a 
mission  to  England.  He  wished  Hamilton  to  undertake 

1  History,  v.  p.  516. 

2  Livingston  to  Monroe,  History,  v.  p.  507. 

3  Madison  to  Jefferson,  Ibid.  p.  517. 

4  Madison  to  Jefferson,  Ibid.  p.  517. 

5  History,  v.  p.  516.  6  Ibid.  v.  p.  523.  7  Ibid.  v.  p.  570. 


344  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A. D.  1794  the  duty — 'an  abler  and  an  honester  man  they  cannot 
"ET<37  find/1  The  whole  Federalist  party  would  have  accepted 
this  nomination  with  enthusiasm;  but  the  clamour  that 
had  been  raised  against  Hamilton  was  too  strong,2  his 
unpopularity  among  his  opponents  was  too  great,  for  the 
appointment  to  be  made.  In  the  peculiar  circumstances 
it  would  have  been  unwise  to  send  to  London  the  man  who 
was  constantly  denounced  as  the  leader  of  the  British  party. 
He  himself  refused  on  these  grounds  to  entertain  the  idea, 
and  a  further  reason  for  his  refusal  is  found  in  his  desire  to 
be  free  to  advise  the  Cabinet  in  the  crowd  of  impending 
difficulties  which  he  clearly  foresaw. 

In  the  end,  upon  Hamilton's  advice,  Jay  was  nominated 
by  the  President.  By  way  of  speeding  him  on  his  mission, 
the  opposition  brought  forward  motions  in  Congress  for 
non-intercourse  with  Britain,  and  their  supporters  outside 
Congress  burned  him  in  effigy.  But  during  April  con- 
ciliatory despatches  arrived  from  London,  the  Senate 
approved  of  the  mission,  and  before  the  middle  of  April 
the  minister  sailed.  Time  at  least  was  gained  by  this 
measure.  The  opposition  was  outmanoeuvred.  For  the 
moment  the  British  bogey  dropped  out  of  sight,  and 
another  set  of  troubles  came  into  prominence. 

For  several  years  a  dangerous  agitation  had  been  in 
progress  against  the  excise.  The  centre  of  disturbance 
was  Pennsylvania,  and  the  leading  mind,  if  not  the  leading 
character,  was  Gallatin,  who  in  Jefferson's  subsequent  ad- 
ministration succeeded  to  the  office  of  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury.  The  ostensible  cause  of  rebellion  was  the  duty  on 
whisky.  The  real  danger  was  a  widespread  terrorism  and  an 
armed  defiance  of  the  powers  of  the  Union.  The  example  of  the 
French  Revolution  had  strengthened  the  natural  disposition 

1  Washington  to  Taylor,  History,  v.  p.  535. 

2  Ibid.  v.  p.  533. 


THE  DEMOCRATS  345 

of  a  large  body  of  the  people  to  regard  strong  government  A.D.  1794 
as  identical  with  tyranny.  When  laws  were  felt  to  be  ^T-37 
irksome  by  any  considerable  number  of  the  citizens,  it 
became  excusable  to  render  them  null  and  void  by  non- 
compliance.  Force  might  justifiably  be  encountered  by 
force.  The  basis  of  any  true  republic  being,  according  to 
the  prevalent  ideas,  the  voluntary  obedience  of  the  people, 
it  was  clear  that  the  cardinal  principle  of  Union  was  violated 
if  taxes  were  imposed  by  Congress  upon  whisky.  For  to 
such  an  exaction  Pennsylvania,  and  other  districts  also,  were 
violently  opposed.  It  seemed  to  infringe  their  private 
interests.  Their  consent  was  therefore  involuntary,  and  it 
followed  that  they  were  entitled  to  withhold  it  if  they 
desired  so  to  do. 

These  doctrines  had  been  disseminated  far  and  wide 
by  the  industry  of  the  secret  democratic  societies,  whose 
connection  with  the  official  Democratic  party  was  intimate  if 
informal.  In  Congress  the  opposition  had  been  overcome 
by  an  invulnerable  alliance  between  Hamilton,  the  ablest 
mind,  and  Washington,  the  most  revered  character  in  the 
Union.  There  are  reasons  for  the  belief  that  in  many 
quarters  a  physical  resistance  to  the  tyranny  of  the  central 
government  was  regarded  as  the  only  means  open  for  securing 
freedom.  But  it  is  clear  that  the  chief  sympathisers  with 
these  loose  principles  of  anarchy  did  not  regard  the  time  as 
fully  ripe.  By  temperament  they  were  averse  from  reasoning 
out  the  consequences  of  their  propaganda,  and  ever  shrank 
from  a  definite  course  of  action  when  it  could  be  avoided. 
Their  preference  for  a  policy  of  drift  was  not  confined  to 
dealings  with  foreign  nations,  but  was  equally  notable  in 
domestic  affairs. 

In  July  lawlessness  came  to  a  head.  Hamilton's  opinion 
was  in  favour  of  mobilising  an  army  of  twelve  thousand  men 
by  the  10th  of  September,  and  issuing  a  proclamation  calling 


346  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1794  Upon  the  rebels  to  disperse.  The  majority  of  the  Cabinet 
concurred  in  this  view.  The  only  dissentient  was  Randolph, 
who  had  succeeded  Jefferson  as  Secretary  of  State.  His 
arguments  are  highly  characteristic  of  the  Democratic  party 
to  which  he  belonged.  He  doubted  whether  the  rebellion 
was  serious ;  doubted  also  the  legality  of  the  course  proposed 
to  be  taken ;  doubted  if  the  troops  would  serve ;  doubted  if 
public  opinion  would  support  the  measures  of  government. 
He  was  afraid  that  the  insurgents  might  enter  into  an 
alliance  with  Britain,  and  concluded  with  the  sagacious 
observation  that  the  expedition  would  certainly  cost  a  great 
deal  of  money.1  Although  Randolph  had  not  then  fallen 
into  disgrace,  his  judgment  was  disregarded.  It  was  after- 
wards alleged  that  he  had  been  friendly  to  the  rebellion,  but 
judged  it  premature  and  feared  it  might  miscarry  from  a 
lack  of  funds.  A  year  later  it  transpired  that  at  this  very 
time  he  had  made  an  extraordinary  request  to  the  French 
ambassador  for  money,2  and  Washington  forthwith  dismissed 
him  from  his  office.  Randolph  published  a  vindication 
which  earned  the  approval  of  Jefferson,  joined  the  Demo- 
cratic attacks  on  Washington's  character  which  were  then 
in  progress,  and  likened  his  late  chief  to  Tiberius  and  an 
assassin.  Washington's  opinion  was  less  rhetorical  but  no 
less  emphatic :  '  A  damneder  scoundrel  God  Almighty  never 
permitted  to  disgrace  humanity.' 3 

In  spite  of  Randolph's  opposition,  fifteen  thousand  troops 
were  assembled  on  the  appointed  day.  Washington  was  in 
chief  command,  and  Hamilton,  without  any  military  rank, 
seemed  nevertheless  to  direct  the  whole  of  the  proceedings. 
It  was  he  who  had  proposed  the  prompt  and  overwhelming 
display  of  military  force.  The  policy  was  his,  and  so  also 
were  the  matters  which  flowed  from  it — the  Cabinet 

1  History,  vi.  pp.  70-71.  2  History,  vi.  pp.  72-73,  also  p.  247. 

3  History,  vi.  p.  309. 


THE  DEMOCKATS  347 

opinions,  instructions  to  state  governors,  proclamations,  A.D.  1794 
reports  and  vindications  necessary  for  the  purpose  of  inform- 
ing and  guiding  public  opinion.  The  conduct  of  the  war,  if 
the  short  and  bloodless  campaign  can  be  described  by  such 
a  title,  seems  also  to  have  been  in  his  hands  more  than  in 
those  of  any  of  the  generals.  When  Washington,  towards  the 
end  of  October,  returned  to  Philadelphia,  Hamilton  remained 
for  several  weeks  longer  guiding  the  movements  of  the  ex- 
pedition. The  situation  has  its  humorous  side — Hamilton's 
appetite  for  work  and  responsibility  is  so  prodigious  that  his 
comrades  in  the  campaign,  no  less  than  his  colleagues  in  the 
Cabinet,  appear  to  have  resigned  themselves  to  his  direction 
and  to  have  left  everything  in  his  hands. 

Most,  if  not  all,  of  Randolph's  prognostications  proved 
untrue.  The  insurgents  did  not  seek  to  enter  into  an 
alliance  with  Britain.  Public  opinion  did  not  withhold  its 
support.  The  troops  did  not  refuse  to  serve,  but,  on  the 
contrary,  turned  out  with  enthusiasm  and  in  greater  numbers 
than  were  required.  The  rebels  faded  away,  overawed  by 
an  overwhelming  display  of  power,  and  by  the  fourth  week 
of  October  their  unconditional  submission  was  accepted. 
The  wisdom  of  providing  forces  adequate  to  the  worst  con- 
tingencies was  never  more  admirably  exemplified.  What 
might  with  more  timid  counsels  or  a  more  foolhardy  confi- 
dence have  proved  to  be  a  serious  and  bloody  contest,  rending 
the  Union  from  one  end  to  the  other,  was  quietly  extinguished 
and  left  no  bitter  memories  behind  it. 

The  campaign  in  suppression  of  this  rebellion  was  blood- 
less. The  opposition  of  men  who  had  issued  terrible  mani- 
festoes in  praise  of  freedom  and  all  its  consequences,  who 
had  shown  the  boldest  enterprise  in  the  tarring  and 
feathering  of  revenue  officers,  melted  ignorniniously  before 
the  progress  of  the  army.  The  importance  of  the  incident 
lies  in  two  facts.  Under  one  aspect  it  was  the  vindication, 


348  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1795  by  a  display  of  armed  force,  of  sane  government  against  the 
&r.  38  vague  and  disorderly  clamour  of  the  party  which  aimed  at 
an  alliance  with  the  revolutionary  government  of  France. 
Under  the  other  it  was  the  first  stern  proof  that  the  central 
authority  of  the  United  States  was  able  and  willing,  without 
the  aid,  or  favour,  or  goodwill  of  any  intermediary  legisla- 
ture, to  put  forth  its  strength  and  to  exercise  a  direct 
and  overwhelming  coercion  against  its  rebellious  subjects. 
Under  both  aspects  it  was  a  salutary  demonstration,  and 
neither  Washington  nor  Hamilton  was  blind  to  the  double 
intention  and  effect. 

Meanwhile  there  was  good  news  from  Jay.  In  November 
the  government  learned  of  the  probable  success  of  his 
mission.  Hamilton's  resignation  took  effect  at  the  end  of 
January  1795.  Early  in  March  the  draft  of  the  treaty 
reached  Philadelphia.  The  Senate  met  in  June  to  consider 
it,  and  after  a  fortnight's  discussion  accepted  it  conditionally. 
The  terms  having  become  public  through  the  indiscretion 
or  bad  faith  of  a  senator,  the  country  was  plunged  im- 
mediately in  an  agitation  which  had  not  been  exceeded  in 
violence  even  by  the  outburst  of  sympathy  with  France. 
Jay  was  accused  of  having  accepted  bribes.  Hamilton, 
when  he  addressed  a  meeting  in  New  York,  was  stoned 
and  hooted  down.  Washington  was  attacked  for  '  his  mock 
pageantry  of  monarchy  and  apish  mimickry  of  kings.' 1  He 
was  taunted  with  being  the  tool  of  Hamilton,  and  was  even 
accused  of  peculation.2  An  impeachment  of  the  President 
was  loudly  demanded.3 

The  Democrats  were  bolder  in  Congress,  upon  platforms 
and  in  the  press,  than  they  had  shown  themselves  in  the 
field.  From  the  date  of  the  Whisky  Rebellion  to  the  end 
of  his  term  of  office  Washington  was  the  object  of  their 
constant  attacks.  His  censure  of  the  secret  Democratic 

1  History,  vi.  pp.  282-83.  2  Ibid.  vi.  p.  296.  3  Ibid.  vi.  p.  283. 


THE  DEMOCRATS  349 

societies  in  his  opening  speech  to  Congress  had  the  effect  A.D.  1796 
of  extirpating  these  pests,  but  the  official  Democratic  party  JSrs' 39 
fiercely  resented  his  action  and  forced  him  to  endure  various 
petty  discourtesies  at  the  hands  of  the  legislature.  Gallatin, 
the  ex-rebel,  was  now  the  most  prominent  figure  of  the 
opposition.  He  had  succeeded  Giles,  who  had  become  old- 
fashioned,  as  the  chief  fabricator  of  injurious  innuendoes, 
and  Madison,  whose  creaking  constitutional  prolixity  had 
grown  somewhat  wearisome,  as  the  intellectual  leader  of  the 
party  in  debate.  Under  his  inspiration  the  campaign  of 
words,  spoken  and  written,  was  conducted  with  a  zeal  and 
a  measure  of  success  which  partly  retrieved  his  timid  and 
ignominious  disaster  in  the  rebellion.  Nor  must  it  be  lost 
sight  of  that  all  the  while  Jefferson,  from  an  unassailable 
obscurity,  was  still  directing  the  movements  of  the  party. 

Washington  issued  his  Farewell  Address  in  September 
1796,  and  John  Adams  succeeded  him  in  the  Presidency 
in  the  following  March.  The  Democratic  press  excelled  even 
its  past  records  upon  the  occasion.  "  The  man  who  is  the 
'  source  of  the  misfortunes  of  our  country  is  this  day  reduced 
'  to  a  level  with  his  fellow-citizens,  and  is  no  longer  possessed 
'  of  the  power  to  multiply  evils  on  the  United  States.  If 
'  ever  there  was  a  period  for  rejoicing  this  is  the  moment." 
The  name  of  Washington  would  no  longer  continue  to  give 
currency  to  political  iniquity  and  to  legalise  corruption. 
In  the  retrospect  of  his  eight  years  of  administration  it 
was  considered  marvellous  that  a  single  individual  could 
have  cankered  the  principles  of  republicanism  in  an  en- 
lightened people,  and  should  have  carried  his  designs  against 
the  public  liberty,  so  far  as  to  have  put  in  jeopardy  its  very 
existence.  The  eloquent  writer  concludes  that  the  day  of 
Washington's  retirement  should  be  commemorated  as  a  day 
of  jubilee  throughout  the  Union.1 

1  The  Aurora,  4th  March  1797,  History,  vi.  p.  607. 


350  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1797  The  new  President  sat  in  the  Speaker's  chair,  and  alone, 
J2r.  4(  in  front  of  the  judges,  sat  the  late  President.  John  Adams 
made  his  address,  took  the  oath  of  office,  and  retired. 
During  the  short  ceremony  Washington  remained  standing, 
and  when  it  was  over  made  a  courteous  bow  to  the  vast 
throng  of  onlookers  and  returned  to  his  home  on  foot. 
The  assembly  dispersed  silently,  many  of  them  in  tears, 
and  followed  him  on  his  way.  He  smiled  gently  at  this 
spontaneous  exhibition  of  affection  and  turned  to  acknow- 
ledge it,  but  could  find  no  words.  "  It  is  the  general  report," 
John  Adams  wrote,  "that  there  was  more  weeping  than 
'  there  ever  has  been  at  the  representation  of  a  tragedy. 
'  But  whether  it  was  from  grief  or  joy,  whether  from  the 
'  loss  of  their  beloved  President,  or  from  the  accession  of  an 
'  unbeloved  one,  or  from  the  novelty  of  the  thing,  or  from 
'  the  sublimity  of  it,  arising  from  the  multitude  present, 
'  or  whatever  other  cause,  I  know  not.  One  thing  I 
1  know.  I  am  a  being  of  too  much  sensibility  to  act  any 
'  part  well  in  such  an  exhibition.  Perhaps  there  is  little 
'  danger  of  my  ever  having  such  another  scene  to  feel  or 
'behold."1 

CHAPTER    VII 

The  Foundations  of  Foreign  Policy 

BEFORE  the  end  of  Washington's  administration  the  founda- 
tions of  foreign  policy  were  laid  as  firmly  as  the  foundations 
of  public  credit,  of  order,  and  of  the  executive  power.  The 
Declaration  of  Neutrality  and  Jay's  treaty  with  Great  Britain 
were  the  two  most  noteworthy  acts  in  the  chain  of  bold 
conduct,  whose  tradition  has  maintained  itself  in  subsequent 
times.  The  thing  done,  rightly  claims  the  chief  place,  but 
the  reasons  for  the  doing  of  the  thing  are  hardly  less  impor- 

1  History,  vi.  pp.  606-7. 


THE  DEMOCRATS  351 

tant.     Hamilton's  writings  during  this  period  are  therefore     A.D. 
deserving  of  close  attention,  both  because  of  the  effect  they 
produced  at  the  time  and  because  they  set  out  the  broad 
principles  upon  which  his  policy  was  founded. 

The  letters  of  Pacificus  were  written  during  the  summer 
and  autumn  of  1793,  to  stem  the  tide  of  feeling  in  favour  of 
France ;  the  letters  of  Americanus  in  February  1794,  to  stem 
the  tide  of  feeling  against  Britain.  In  July  1795  he  wrote 
the  letters  of  Horatius,  and  began  the  series  over  the  sig- 
nature of  Camillus,  to  justify  the  ratification  of  Jay's  treaty 
by  the  Senate  and  the  President.  In  September  1796  Wash- 
ington issued  his  Farewell  Address — one  of  the  most  famous 
documents  in  American  history — and  this  also  was  from 
Hamilton's  pen. 

These  Latin  names  are  somewhat  absurd  to  our  way  of 
thinking,  but  they  were  then  the  fashion.  Every  one  knew 
that  Pacificus,  Americanus,  Horatius  and  Camillus  were 
Hamilton,  just  as  every  one  knew  that  Helvetius  was  Madison. 
The  writers  made  no  secret  of  their  identity  even  as  they 
wrote ;  but  clearly  the  practice  must  have  conciliated  some 
notion  of  propriety,  for  it  was  universally  adopted  except  by 
Tom  Paine. 

It  was  impossible,  in  Hamilton's  view,  for  a  nation  to  act 
towards  other  nations  as  a  man  of  warm  feelings  would  act 
towards  his  neighbours.  A  nation  cannot  afford  to  indulge 
itself  in  hatred  or  affection,  magnanimity  or  revenge.  In 
deciding  upon  its  course  of  action,  sentiment  is  as  irrelevant 
a  consideration  as  malice,  and  wars  of  chivalry  are  as  ini- 
quitous as  wars  of  religion.  The  statesman  who  bends  to 
an  emotional  outburst  of  public  opinion  as  richly  deserves 
to  be  shot  as  a  general  who  surrenders  a  city  out  of  corn- 
passion  for  the  inhabitants.  The  stern  test  of  the  righteous- 
ness of  a  war  is  the  permanent  security  of  the  state.  A 
government  which  goes  knight-erranting  out  of  sympathy 


352  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  for  foreign  nations  is  like  a  trustee  who  subscribes  to  charities 
oufc  °^  tne  ProPerfcv  ne  nas  undertaken  to  administer.  A 
government,  like  a  trustee,  is  responsible  for  the  estate.  Its 
business  is  sound  investments,  not  the  encouragement  of 
deserving  institutions  or  the  succour  of  honest,  poor  men 
overwhelmed  by  adversity.  Pity  and  prejudice  are  equally 
out  of  place  when  ministers,  in  whom  king  or  people  has 
placed  the  serious  confidence  of  decision,  come  to  determine 
the  tremendous  issues  of  alliances  and  wars. 

Some  philosophers,  indeed,  have  discovered  a  distinction 
in  the  case  of  a  Democracy.  A  nation  which  goes  mad  is 
surely  free  to  do  as  it  likes.  But  a  nation,  in  Hamilton's 
judgment,  is  in  the  position  of  a  tenant  for  life  who  must  be 
restrained  from  spoiling  the  timber,  pawning  the  heirlooms, 
and  dilapidating  the  estate  for  his  successors.  In  such 
issues  there  is  room  only  for  the  charity  of  individuals  who 
may  deal  as  they  please  with  their  life  interest,  and  be 
praised  unreservedly  for  their  sacrifice.  They  may  give 
their  own  lives,  and  their  own  money  if  they  choose,  to  the 
side  which  engages  their  approval,  but  out  of  the  trust 
funds  not  a  penny  and  not  a  grenadier.  Lord  Byron  was 
all  right ;  Exeter  Hall,  as  a  rule,  is  all  wrong. 

Aloofness  from  the  struggles  of  other  nations  has  been 
freely  judged  to  be  uncharitable  and  ungenerous  ;  but  what 
government  that  has  fully  realised  its  responsibilities  will 
ever  engage  in  crusades  and  adventures  ?  It  is  reasonable 
to  expect  that  ministers  should  have  wiser  and  cooler  heads 
than  the  electors,  and  the  courage  necessary  to  stand  out 
against  the  tumults  of  popular  indignation,  that  are  often 
ready,  upon  a  sudden  impulse,  to  risk  the  safety  of  the  state 
and  even  the  freedom  of  future  generations. 

Nor  does  a  man  need  to  have  lived  for  many  years  in  a 
free  country  to  realise  that  in  such  outbursts  there  is  apt 
to  be  much  hollo wness  and  considerable  error.  What  did 


THE  DEMOCRATS  353 

the   citizens  of  the  United  States  actually  know  of  the     A.D. 


conditions   of    Frenchmen    three    thousand    miles    away  ?  , 

*        .oc/r.  oo-<±0 

Tardy  and  irregular  packets  brought  news  with  a  fine  gloss 
of  rhetoric  on  the  facts.  Battles  and  revolutions  made  good 
reading  and  stirred  the  blood;  but  the  causes  were  more 
lightly  touched  upon  and  less  eagerly  studied.  Phrases 
and  ideas  were  translated  by  glib  pedants  who  had  no 
suspicion  of  a  difference  between  the  Gallic  and  the  Saxon 
scale,  between  the  Liberte*  of  Paris  and  the  Freedom  of 
New  England. 

When  one  nation  is  swept  by  a  violent  admiration  or  by 
a  tempest  of  hatred  for  another,  it  is  nearly  certain  that 
the  situation  has  not  been  truly  understood.  Nations  are 
not  like  the  characters  in  a  novel.  They  are  rarely  fit 
subjects  for  chivalry;  still  more  rarely  are  they  odious. 
Partisans  —  and  more  particularly  remote  partisans  —  are  ever 
blinder  and  more  furious  than  their  principals.  They  are 
mesmerised  by  the  dramatic  and  led  to  conceive  of  friends 
impossibly  good,  enemies  impossibly  bad,  and  both  im- 
possibly uniform  throughout  —  nations  of  devils  and  nations 
of  angels.  No  man  ever  sees  his  own  countrymen  under 
this  homogeneous  aspect  ;  for  there  is  always  the  candour  of 
the  Opposition  and  the  obvious  imperfections  of  his  neigh- 
bours to  correct  and  temper  the  illusion. 

That  Hamilton  profoundly  distrusted  the  French  Revolu- 
tion, and  heaped  scorn  upon  its  pretensions  with  regard  to 
liberty  and  the  Rights  of  Man,  gave  point  to  his  arguments, 
but  did  not  in  the  least  affect  his  main  position.  Had  his 
sympathies  been  entirely  in  the  other  scale  his  principles 
of  statesmanship  would  still  have  compelled  him  to  advocate 
the  same  policy  which  he  pursued. 

In  the  struggle  of  France  against  the  world,  the  sole 
concern  of  Washington's  government  was  the  true  interest 
of  the  United  States.  Gratitude  to  Frenchmen  was  a 


354  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.     worthy  feeling  for  private  men  to  entertain ;  but  gratitude 
to  France  was  a  meaningless  phrase.     French  aid  had  been 

r  . 

politic,  not  sentimental.  The  object  of  their  statesmen  was 
neither  love  of  American  freedom  nor  hatred  of  British 
tyranny,  but  merely  the  warrantable  desire  to  injure  and 
embarrass  a  dangerous  enemy  by  comfort  extended  to  its 
subjects  in  rebellion.  So  long  as  the  interests  of  France 
and  the  interests  of  the  states  lay  along  the  same  line,  it  was 
wise  and  patriotic  to  join  forces ;  but  at  a  later  time,  when 
the  ways  diverged  and  the  benefits  of  such  co-operation 
would  have  accrued  only  to  one  side,  the  risks  and  the 
dangers  to  the  other,  it  would  have  been  a  breach  of  trust 
for  government  to  yield  to  popular  clamour  and  to  enter 
into  a  new  alliance  out  of  consideration  for  the  advantage 
which  had  been  reaped  from  a  similar  engagement  in  former 
times. 

The  counter  policy  of  Jefferson  was  in  Hamilton's  opinion 
a  huge  bubble  blown  up  by  windy  rhetoric  and  a  purely  verbal 
enthusiasm.  Gratitude  was  not  due  even  to  the  King  of 
France;  how  therefore  could  it  be  due  to  the  subjects  who 
had  cut  off  his  head  ?  Freedom  was  a  great  name,  but  a 
poor  casus  belli  unless  it  were  your  own  that  was  menaced. 
Events  which  had  occurred  were  to  be  considered  done  with. 
They  left  no  legacies.  Britain  the  ancient  enemy,  France 
the  ancient  friend,  must  be  treated  on  a  bare  equality. 
Hatred  of  Britain  was  a  vague  and  unreal  sentiment.  If 
encouraged  to  the  length  that  it  was  allowed  to  prevent  the 
one  nation  from  entering  into  relations  with  the  other  for 
their  mutual  advantage,  there  could  be  no  folly  too  impos- 
sible for  mankind.  To  remain  on  bad  terms  with  Britain 
by  choice,  and  from  a  general  dislike  that  eluded  definition 
both  as  to  its  nature  and  its  object  (for  no  man  was  alto- 
gether certain  whether  it  was  directed  against  the  king, 
the  government,  or  the  people),  was  a  paradox  that  filled 


THE  DEMOCRATS  855 

his    clear    mind    and    humane  spirit  with  immeasurable     A.D. 


In  Hamilton's  opinion  the  honour  of  his  nation  was  in  no 
way  engaged  to  support  the  arms  of  France.  So  far  as 
honour  entered  into  the  discussion  it  was  at  a  wholly  different 
point.  He  was  deeply  concerned  that  the  United  States 
should  hold  their  head  high  among  nations,  scrupulously 
observing  the  sanctity  of  their  engagements  even  towards 
the  subjects  of  those  with  whom  they  were  at  war.  The 
doctrine  of  repudiation  of  debts,  whether  public  or  private, 
towards  which  Jefferson  had  a  kindly  indulgence,  was  to 
Hamilton  the  most  destructive  and  abominable  of  all 
policies,  striking  at  the  roots  not  only  of  respect  among 
nations,  but  of  stability  of  government  and  preservation 
of  the  Union. 

When  it  was  suggested  by  the  Democratic  faction  that 
Britain  might  be  brought  to  terms  by  a  policy  of  whole- 
sale confiscation  of  the  debts  due  by  American  citizens 
and  the  American  government  to  her  subjects,  Hamilton 
did  not  trim  his  phrases  to  the  popular  tune.  "  Serious 
1  as  the  evil  of  war  has  appeared,  at  the  present  stage  of 
'  our  affairs,  the  manner  in  which  it  was  to  be  apprehended 
'  it  might  be  carried  on  was  still  more  formidable,  in  my 
'  eyes,  than  the  thing  itself.  It  was  to  be  feared  that,  in 
'  the  fermentation  of  certain  wild  opinions,  those  wise,  just, 
'  and  temperate  maxims,  which  will  for  ever  constitute  the 
'  true  security  and  felicity  of  a  State,  would  be  overruled  ; 
'  that  a  war  upon  credit,  eventually  upon  property,  and  upon 
'  the  general  principles  of  public  order,  might  aggravate  and 
'  embitter  the  ordinary  calamities  of  foreign  war.  The  con- 
'  fiscation  of  debts  due  to  the  enemy  might  have  been  the 
'  first  step  of  this  destructive  process.  From  one  violation 
*  of  justice  to  another  the  passage  is  easy.  Invasions  of 
'  right,  still  more  fatal  to  credit,  might  have  followed  ;  and 


356  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  '  this,  by  extinguishing  the  resources  which  that  could  have 
'  a^°r^e^  might  have  paved  the  way  to  more  comprehensive 
'  and  more  enormous  depredations  for  a  substitute.  Terrible 
'  examples  were  before  us,  and  there  were  too  many  not 
'  sufficiently  remote  from  a  disposition  to  admire  and  imitate 
'  them."1 

The  interests  of  the  States,  in  Hamilton's  view,  were  not 
in  Europe,  but  only  in  America.  With  the  future  of  that 
continent  their  destiny  was  bound  up ;  but  whether  Europe 
should  succeed  in  erasing  the  name  of  France  from  the 
map,  or  France  in  subduing  the  whole  of  Europe,  mattered 
not  one  pin's  head;  and  all  the  loose  talk  about  gratitude 
and  freedom  added  not  a  single  drachm  to  the  weight  of 
the  argument.  The  signal  advantage  of  the  American 
Republic  over  all  other  nations  lay  in  its  position,  which 
enabled  it,  if  only  it  could  keep  a  cool  head,  to  hold  itself 
aloof  from  European  broils.  Distribution,  conquest  and 
annexation  of  territory  mattered  nothing  to  the  United 
States,  save  in  the  continents  of  America.  Alliances  were 
to  be  avoided  except  in  so  far  as  they  might  serve  to  keep 
American  soil  free  from  the  menace  of  European  rivalries. 

To  maintain  such  an  attitude  against  the  honest  excite- 
ment of  your  fellow-countrymen  is  at  no  time  an  easy  or  a 
pleasant  task.  Washington  lost  his  popularity.  Hamilton 
became  an  object  of  execration.  Jay  was  burned  a  hundred 
times  in  effigy.  The  remote  approval  of  history  is  a  poor 
substitute  for  the  affectionate  clamour  of  your  fellow-towns- 
men when  you  emerge  bowing  gratefully  upon  a  balcony. 
To  practical  fellows  like  Jefferson  a  preference  for  the 
former  reward  appeared  a  kind  of  idiotcy.  The  successful 
politician  is  ever  something  of  a  sentimentalist;  an  astute 
sharer  in  the  joys,  sorrows  and  emotions  of  the  people, 
even  in  those  which  are  least  profound  and  permanent; 

i   Works,  v.  p.  406. 


THE  DEMOCKATS  357 

and  he  is  not,  therefore,  to  be  damned  as  insincere.  But  the  A.D. 
wise  statesman  must  ever  be  prepared  to  accept  loneliness  ~  7 
for  a  bride  and  to  cultivate  fortitude  upon  a  rock. 

Here,  as  in  all  Hamilton's  public  acts,  the  dominant  note 
is  the  wise  and  faithful  stewardship  of  the  estate.  The 
stumbling-blocks  of  popular  perversity,  muddled  thought 
and  imaginary  duties  were  what  he  set  himself  to  remove. 
If  only  his  countrymen  could  be  made  to  realise  their 
true  place  in  the  world  of  nations,  their  few  simple  and 
obvious  interests  as  a  people,  if  the  rule  of  conduct  in  ex- 
ternal affairs  could  be  but  once  practised  with  courage  and 
consistency  in  the  tender  infancy  of  the  Republic,  and  made 
to  sustain  itself  in  the  teeth  of  popular  clamour — could 
these  things  be  achieved  on  one  conspicuous  occasion,  he 
had  the  foresight  to  understand  that  it  would  take  some 
man  greatly  his  own  superior  in  force  to  break  away  from 
the  tradition  that  would  thus  have  been  created.  In  a  demo- 
cracy the  thing  done  successfully  against  the  outcry  of  the 
people,  when  it  comes  in  after  times  to  be  judged  by  its 
results  and  approved  by  the  wisdom  of  men  whose  heads 
have  in  the  meanwhile  grown  cool,  is  like  timber  in  the 
wind-swept  spaces,  gnarled  and  twisted  into  a  prodigious 
strength. 

The  principle  of  aloofness,  having  been  successfully  up- 
held and  extended  by  Washington  and  Hamilton  during 
the  fever  of  the  French  Revolution,  came  in  later  years, 
by  a  singular  perversity,  to  be  associated  with  the  name  of 
the  least  dignified,  and  one  of  the  most  active,  of  Hamilton's 
enemies.  To  any  one  who  has  read  the  scurrilous  invective 
poured  out  on  both  men  from  1793  to  1797 ;  to  any  one  who 
has  realised  the  eagerness  with  which  Jefferson,  Monroe, 
and  their  followers  endeavoured  to  destroy  all  confidence  in 
the  characters  of  the  President  and  the  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury,  it  must  appear  one  of  the  strangest  of  historical 


358  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  ironies  that  a  lineal  descendant  of  the  policy  of  Washington 
and  Hamilton  should  now  be  cherished  by  posterity  under 
the  name  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  The  compelling  force  of 
a  precedent  boldly  established  by  brave  men  in  times  of 
difficulty  is  a  truly  marvellous  phenomenon.  The  spectacle 
of  Monroe,  the  defeated  but  undiscouraged  assailant  of 
Hamilton's  private  honour  and  public  policy,  roaring  most 
nobly  to  all  the  ages  out  of  the  stolen  skin  of  the  '  Little 
Lion,'  is  possibly  the  crowning  triumph  of  a  great  idea. 

The  Monroe  Doctrine  is  an  unfortunate  phrase,  suggestive 
of  a  pedant,  mildly  obstinate,  carrying  a  scroll  of  sheep- 
skin formulas  under  his  arm.  A  doctrine,  as  we  understand 
it,  is  a  prim  challenge  to  argument ;  a  thing  open  to  doubt 
and  controversy,  about  which  endless  logic  may  be  chopped^ 
hairs  split,  and  tempers  lost,  until  fashion  finds  another 
object. 

The  Monroe  Doctrine  is,  in  fact,  the  very  opposite  of 
all  this.  It  is  not  a  challenge,  but  a  very  simple  warning. 
Nothing  less  arguable  was  ever  made,  and  among  its  many 
virtues  this  is  not  the  least.  Deceived  by  its  title,  eminent 
men,  on  various  occasions,  have  assumed  or  denied  it  to 
be  a  part  of  international  law.  But  it  has  no  nearer  kin- 
ship to  that  branch  of  human  study  than  to  astronomy  or 
tactics.  It  is  in  no  sense  a  lawyer's  business,  but  only  a 
statesman's.  It  amounts  to  a  plain  declaration  that  for 
certain  objects,  which  are  well  understood,  the  United  States 
are  prepared  to  spend  the  substance  and  the  lives  of  their 
citizens  until  they  are  victorious  or  ruined.  If  another 
nation  chooses  to  dispute  these  pretensions  it  has  a  perfect 
right  to  do  so.  There  is  no  legality  in  them  that  makes  that 
power  which  refuses  to  conform  a  moral  outcast.  The 
sanction  is  not  in  the  conscience  of  mankind,  but  in  Che 
strong  arm  of  a  formidable  people.  If  a  time  should  come 
when  the  United  States  are  unable  to  enforce  the  observance, 


THE  DEMOCRATS  359 

or  are  unwilling  to  incur  the  risk  and  inconvenience  of  an     A.D. 

1793-1797 
appeal  to  arms,  they  will  call  in  vain  to  a  general  congress  of  ^  36.40 

the  world  to  support  the  Monroe  Doctrine. 

The  greatness  of  this  idea  lies  in  its  simplicity.  Instead 
of  higgling  and  niggling  like  a  small  shopkeeper  over  con- 
tiguous house  property,  afraid  to  state  his  object  plainly 
from  a  fear  of  abandoning  the  advantages  of  obscurity, 
delaying  the  accomplishment  of  his  ambitions,  destroying 
confidence,  engendering  mischief  and  suspicion  at  each  suc- 
cessive step,  one  nation  has  had  the  sense  and  courage  to 
declare  its  intentions  clearly  and  to  attach  the  penalty  of 
war  to  their  infringement.  Instead  of  weakening  its  posi- 
tion by  this  procedure,  it  has  enjoyed  an  immunity  from 
attack  that  even  its  great  resources  and  remote  position  are 
inadequate  to  explain.  The  frank  method  of  a  declaration, 
which  is  the  rule  of  great  business  dealings,  has  so  far  at 
any  rate  proved  itself  superior  to  the  elaborate  duplicity 
and  concealment  that  European  diplomacy  has  inherited 
from  the  Middle  Ages. 

In  establishing  this  extraordinary  method  Hamilton  had 
the  chief  share.  The  instinct  of  Washington  was  his  main 
support,  but  the  part  played  by  the  President  was  rather  that 
of  disciple  than  of  master.  The  clear  perception  was  Hamil- 
ton's. The  initiative  and  tne  defence  were  also  his.  There  is 
some  sense  in  the  Democratic  sneer  that  the  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury  led  Congress,  cabinet  and  chief  executive  officer  of 
the  Republic  by  the  nose.  Nonsense  begins  when  it  is 
pretended  that  any  of  these  three  followed  him  blindly, 
from  personal  loyalty  or  interest,  or  in  indolence.  Men 
did  not  follow  Hamilton  blindly.  He  lacked  this  quality 
of  greatness ;  possibly  he  despised  it.  His  appeal  was  not 
limited  to  the  reason  of  mankind,  but  it  was  always 
through  the  reason  that  he  made  his  approaches.  In  his 
writings  there  are  many  excellent  phrases,  but  they  are  the 


360  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  cap  and  plume  of  the  argument,  not  the  main  matter  of 
!E  s^o  *k  ^s  Power  °f  reducing  the  '  forts  of  folly '  lay  not  in  his 
phrases  or  eloquence,  but  in  his  exhaustive  discussion  of  the 
theme.  The  progress  of  his  argument  was  like  that  of  an 
army  which  burns,  consumes  and  devastates  every  particle 
of  sustenance  in  the  enemy's  country,  overcoming  resistance 
by  the  destruction  of  supplies. 

The  Declaration  of  Neutrality  was  the  first  position  gained. 
It  was  a  bold  step  considering  the  temper  of  the  time  and 
the  fact  that  there  was  disunion,  bordering  close  on  treachery, 
even  in  the  cabinet.  In  addition  to  the  outcry  it  provoked, 
as  a  document  deemed  to  be  unsympathetic  and  unfriendly 
to  France,  there  was  the  further  awkward  fact  that  it  in- 
volved action.  The  whole  procedure  of  the  eloquent, 
smiling,  fire-raising  Genet  was  illegal.  The  minister  pleni- 
potentiary of  a  foreign  power  had  to  be  restrained,  always  a 
delicate  and  ticklish  business ;  but  when  a  good  half  or  more 
of  the  citizens,  inspired  in  a  subterranean  fashion  by  their 
own  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs,  were  shouting 
for  him  enthusiastically,  it  became  a  situation  of  extreme 
complexity. 

Hamilton's  method  of  defending  the  policy  on  which 
Washington  and  he  were  united  was  characteristic  of  the 
man  and  of  the  nation  of  his  paternal  origin.  He  did  pre- 
cisely what  a  good  English  solicitor  will  always  forbid  his 
client  upon  any  consideration  to  undertake — he  trusted  to 
reason  and  wrote  long  letters.  To  trust  to  the  luck  of  the  law 
and  put  nothing  upon  paper  that  can  be  avoided  is  no  doubt 
the  safer  rule  for  ordinary  men.  But  Hamilton  was  not  an 
ordinary  man,  and  he  entertained  an  almost  fanatical  belief 
in  the  efficacy  of  practical  arguments,  of  reason  as  dis- 
tinguished from  logic,  for  persuading  an  excited  democracy 
to  abandon  the  pursuit  of  folly. 

Nature  had  not  endowed  him  with  wit  or  humour,  so  that 


THE  DEMOCRATS  361 

he  escaped  without  danger  the  pitfalls  of  a  mistimed  vivacity  A.D 
that  have  swallowed  up  so  many  brilliant  controversialists. 
His  writings  have  a  most  dangerous  quality,  for  it  is  all  but 
impossible  to  read  them  without  being  dragged  to  his  con- 
clusions. If  Jefferson  could  have  included  them  in  an  index 
expurgatorius,  he  would  certainly  have  risked  the  imputa- 
tion of  tyranny  for  the  sake  of  the  result.  This  being 
impossible,  he  laid  his  hand  upon  the  very  worst  device 
that  could  have  been  contrived :  he  put  up  inferior  men 
to  answer  them.1  The  inferior  men  got  terribly  mauled  and 
knocked  about,  and  people  with  Jeffersonian  sympathies, 
reading,  we  may  suppose,  innocently  and  for  the  sake  of 
the  fun,  gradually  found  themselves  in  the  opposite  camp. 

The  letters  of  Pacificus 2  were  aimed  at  a  popular  illusion. 
The  plea  of  gratitude  to  France  was  analysed,  in  a  spirit 
neither  hostile  nor  cynical,  but  generous  and  practical ;  and 
out  of  the  discussion,  as  with  Hamilton  is  invariably  the 
case,  out  of  the  examination  of  the  particular  facts  under 
observation,  he  arrives  at  general  principles  of  rich  wisdom 
and  wide  obligation.  To  say  that  he  had  a  lawyer's  mind 
might  be  misunderstood  if  the  statement  were  made  without 
qualification.  No  man  was  ever  more  free  from  the  tyranny 
of  legal  pedantry  or  a  slavish  adherence  to  forms  and 
formulas ;  but  he  was  urged  on  by  his  nature  to  that  per- 
petual quest  after  the  governing  principle  in  every  new 
situation  and  set  of  circumstances  which  is  the  mark  of  the 
greatest  lawyers. 

Pacificus  found  an  unexpected  ally  in  Genet,  who,  having 
in  the  first  instance  tickled  sentimental  unreason  with  much 
success,  ended  by  treading  on  its  toes.  Neutrality  was  estab- 
lished in  a  position  unassailable  by  sympathy  with  France ; 

1  History,  v.  p.  340. 

2  Works,  iv.  pp.  460-482.     See  particularly  numbers  iv.,  v.  and  vi.,  which 
seem  to  reach  the  high- water  mark  of  political  controversy. 


362  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.      but  it  remained  to  secure  neutrality  against  attacks  inspired 

by  a  blind  hatred  of  Britain- 

It  is  probable  that,  from  trie  point  of  view  of  the  United 

States,  Hamilton  would  have  made  a  better  treaty,  but  Jay 
succeeded  in  making  a  sufficiently  good  one.  The  differences 
were  removed  and  substantial  advantages  were  obtained  by 
the  Americans.  Jay  accordingly  was  burned  in  effigy,  and 
the  infamy  of  Washington  and  the  Senate  in  confirming  the 
agreement  was  denounced  under  Democratic  inspiration  in 
terms  that  had  hardly  been  exceeded  in  regard  to  the 
treachery  of  Arnold. 

Hamilton,  now  no  longer  in  office,  came  to  the  defence  of 
the  government,  the  treaty,  and  of  Jay.  Camillus  is  a 
tremendously  long  document,  consisting  of  nearly  forty 
letters  that  would  have  occupied  not  less  than  a  hundred 
columns  of  the  Times.1  The  process  of  conquest  by  exhaus- 
tion is  carried  so  far  that  one  marvels  at  the  heroic  qualities 
of  the  generation  that  was  wooed  in  such  a  fashion.  Few 
people  will  read  Camillus  to-day  from  cover  to  cover.  Those 
who  achieve  it,  while  not  ceasing  to  marvel  at  the  popular 
taste  in  1795,  will  derive  much  comfort  even  from  the  dis- 
cussions of  Yatel,  Bynkershoeck,  Puffendorf,  Grotius  and 
other  classical  writers  upon  the  Law  of  Nations.  For  the 
casual  reader,  interested  in  the  difficult  problem  of  how 
nations,  whose  interest  it  is  to  be  friends,  may  adjust  their 
differences  without  loss  of  dignity,  the  seven  letters  which 
commence  the  series  are  still  as  full  of  life  and  meaning  as 
on  the  day  when  they  were  written.  Of  all  Hamilton's 
writings  we  should  put  them  in  the  highest  place.  There 
is  in  them  a  noble  spirit  of  vigorous  wisdom.  They  have 
a  practical  quality  which  is  not  sordid,  a  sympathy  and  con- 
sideration for  the  feelings  of  the  other  nation  which  is  far 

1  Works,  v.  p.  189  et  seq.     Eight  of  these  letters  were  written  by  Rufua 
King. 


THE  DEMOCRATS  363 

removed  from  weakness.    Even  in  his  onslaught  upon  the     A.D. 

1793-17 
Mr.  36-40 


factions  and  the  mischief-makers  he  is  magnanimous.     His 


contempt  is  terrible,  because  it  is  entirely  without  malice. 
Looking  beyond  the  persons  of  his  opponents,  he  pours  out  a 
measureless  scorn  upon  government  by  weak  men  and  vague 
words;  upon  the  policy  of  drift,  which  possesses  neither 
the  courage  to  foresee  results  nor  the  energy  to  prepare 
for  them ;  upon  those  people,  arguing  interminably  to  delay 
action,  who  grudged  every  sacrifice  whether  its  object  were 
peace  or  war,  who  denounced  with  the  same  cantankerous 
hostility  all  preparations  as  aggressive,  and  all  concessions  as 
cowardice. 

There  are  two  documents  of  pre-eminent  fame  in  the 
early  history  of  the  United  States  —  the  Declaration  of 
Independence  and  Washington's  Farewell  Address.  The 
former  was  written  by  Jefferson,  while  in  his  thirty-third 
year,1  to  embody  the  ideas  and  aspirations  of  Congress  on 
the  eve  of  the  struggle  for  independence.  The  latter  was 
written  by  Hamilton  twenty  years  later2  to  convey  the 
counsels  of  the  first  President  to  the  nation  on  his  retire- 
ment from  public  life.  The  two  papers  invite  a  comparison 
at  several  points. 

To  the  cold  reader  of  to-day,  who  owes  no  duty  of 
gratitude  or  reverence  in  either  case,  the  comparison  is  to 
the  disadvantage  of  the  earlier  document.  We  are  inclined 
to  rate  it  lower  than  it  deserves,  because  of  the  somewhat 
faded  fashion  of  its  rhetorical  bedizenments.  We  lament  its 
lack  of  restraint,  and  suspect  unreality  lurking  under  a 
wealth  of  phrases  that  have  come  to  be  somewhat  dis- 
credited as  currency.  It  occurs  to  us,  looking  back  upon 
the  event,  that  the  occasion  was  one  when  the  simplest  words 
would  have  served  best.  We  are  affected  by  certain  flourishes 
unpleasantly,  as  by  things  misplaced  and  somewhat  gaudy. 

1  Summer  of  1776.  2  1796.     Mt.  39. 


364  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  We  breathe  an  atmosphere  of  travesty  and  burlesque.  The 
reac*y  writer>  fr°m  an  artistic  standpoint,  is  rarely  the  best 
spokesman  when  stern  citizens  are  preparing  to  go  out  to 
battle  for  the  idea  of  liberty.  The  proclamations  of  Generals 
Botha  and  Delarey  have  an  accent  of  dignity  which  is  lacking 
in  the  flowing  smoothness  of  Dr.  Leyds. 

If  we  are  to  view  this  Declaration  fairly  on  its  merits,  we 
must  put  on  one  side  both  the  enthusiasm  with  which  it 
has  been  regarded  ever  since  by  the  American  nation,  and 
that  derisive  contempt  with  which  the  brilliant  reviewer 
is  apt  to  welcome  the  appearance  of  a  new  poet.  The 
enthusiastic  judgment  combines  a  natural  gratitude  to  the 
man  with  the  pride  of  a  very  remarkable  achievement.  We 
are  stirred  by  it  as  we  are  apt  to  be  stirred  by  the  con- 
templation of  a  monument,  good,  bad,  or  indifferent,  which 
has  been  erected  on  a  famous  battlefield.  The  derisive 
judgment  is  equally  inadequate,  for  the  cool  test  of  reason 
cannot  be  applied  to  a  purely  dramatic  incident. 

Jefferson  was  constitutionally  incapable  of  writing  for 
posterity.  When  he  attempted  it  with  the  greatest  care,  as 
in  his  Anas  and  Autobiography,  he  made  the  most  con- 
spicuous failure.  The  more  he  tried  for  it,  the  worse  was 
the  result,  the  more  contrary  to  his  desires  and  intentions. 
But  to  catch  the  emotions  of  the  moment  and  express 
them  in  words  that  made  men  shout  as  they  read  them 
was  his  peculiar  gift.  Even  if  the  Declaration  of  In- 
dependence lacks  every  quality  of  permanence,  and  remains 
a  famous  piece  of  writing  merely  because  it  is  associated 
inseparably  with  a  great  event,  that  criticism  does  not  affect 
its  virtue  for  the  purpose  it  was  designed  to  accomplish. 
It  has  the  essential  quality  of  great  oratory,  for  it  blew 
upon  the  smouldering  embers  in  the  hearts  of  the  men 
to  whom  it  was  addressed  until  they  burst  into  flame. 
It  proclaimed  the  justice  of  the  cause,  held  up  an  ideal  of 


THE  DEMOCRATS  365 

conduct,  inspired  hope  and  courage;   and  these  were  the     A.D. 

-17 

36-40 


supreme  needs  of  the  moment.     A  still  greater  man  might  1793  1797 


have  achieved  this,  and  at  the  same  time  something  more. 
The  Declaration  is  no  mine  of  political  wisdom,  no  model 
of  literary  excellence;  but  the  thing  it  did  was  of  far 
higher  importance  than  the  thing  it  has  failed  to  do. 

The  Farewell  Address  being  less  dramatic  in  its  occasion 
afforded  fewer  opportunities  to  the  spirit  of  oratory.  It  is 
the  testament  of  a  man  who,  having  served  his  country  for 
five-and-forty  years  in  war  and  peace,  felt  that  his  work 
was  done,  his  strength  for  contest  spent,  his  rest  well  earned. 
There  were  no  personal  or  party  ends  to  serve.  To  a  vain 
man  there  might  have  been  a  temptation  to  chronicle  his 
services.  A  lover  of  applause  might  have  yielded  to  the 
desire  to  part  company  with  a  universal  benediction — a  good 
word  for  every  one,  so  that  his  enemies  might  unite  with 
his  friends  in  praise  of  the  departing  hero.  These  were  the 
obvious  snares.  But  Washington  was  not  the  man  to  fall 
into  either  trap ;  and  had  there  been  a  danger,  he  was  saved 
from  it  by  his  choice  of  a  clerk. 

The  Farewell  Address  is  a  stern  document.  Duty  is  its 
keynote ;  not  complacency  or  smooth  words.  Most  men  who 
have  read  it  will  be  inclined  to  name  the  Farewell  Address 
as  among  the  noblest  public  statements  that  men  have  made. 
About  his  own  services  Washington  says  little,  except  to 
plead,  with  every  appearance  of  sincerity,  his  fallibility,  and 
to  justify  his  retirement,  not  on  grounds  of  eminent  success, 
but  of  prolonged  labour.  He  utters  three  solemn  warnings : — 
against  any  weakening  of  the  Union ;  against  the  growth  of 
party  spirit ;  and  against  foreign  entanglements.  As  to  the 
second  his  words  have  been  unheeded;  not  from  a  lack  of 
reverence  in  his  countrymen,  but  from  the  nature  of  the 
case.  The  authors  of  the  Farewell  Address  desired  an 
excellence  incompatible  with  the  form  of  government  that 


366  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  had  been  deliberately  chosen.  A  Democracy  that  is  not 
g°verned  ky  parties,  parties  that  are  not  affected  by  the 
spirit  of  faction,  are  things  yet  undiscovered.  But  for  the 
rest  they  have  been  justified  in  their  countrymen,  whether 
we  judge  the  result  by  the  test  of  sacrifices,  or  by  the  test  of 
success. 

To  attempt  a  separation  of  Washington  and  Hamilton  in 
the  authorship  of  the  Farewell  Address  would  be  a  futile 
and  invidious  task.  In  their  political  aims  no  two  men 
were  ever  more  nearly  at  one.  Privately,  there  would 
appear  to  have  been  a  certain  barrier  of  formality.  The 
difference  in  age,  the  temperament  of  the  President,  the 
deliberate  effort  on  the  part  of  Hamilton  to  surround  the 
highest  office  with  respect  and  stateliness,  are  enough  to 
explain  it.  But  in  public  affairs  the  unanimity  was  a 
perfection  that  leaves  us  amazed.  That  Hamilton's  extra- 
ordinary intellect  may  have  influenced  his  chief  is  more 
than  likely ;  but  in  every  serious  emergency  the  instinct  of 
the  two  men  pointed  out  the  same  course.  The  special 
function  of  Hamilton  was  to  set  forth  the  reasons  on  which 
the  policy  was  founded,  and  to  discover  the  means  for 
carrying  it  into  execution.  The  spirit  of  the  Address  belongs 
equally  to  both.  It  was  the  message  of  Hamilton  and 
Washington  together  to  the  people  of  the  Republic. 

But  what  gives  this  statement  a  universal  value,  and 
places  it  permanently  in  the  literature  of  the  world,  is  the 
mind  of  Hamilton,  and  not  the  character  of  Washington. 
It  is  no  disparagement  to  the  fame  of  one  who  was  a  great 
soldier  and  a  wise  ruler  to  deny  him  a  further  reward  to 
which  he  himself  would  never  have  laid  a  claim.  Had 
Washington  written  his  Farewell  Address  without  assistance 
from  any  quarter,  it  is  incredible  that  it  would  not  have 
been  a  memorable  document,  full  of  noble  counsel,  high 
dignity  and  sincere  patriotism ;  but  what  makes  its  im- 


THE  DEMOCRATS  367 

portance  for  us,  who  are  not  citizens  of  the  United  States  A.D 
and  are  concerned  only  indirectly  in  their  wellbeing,  is 
precisely  that  quest  of  the  universal  in  the  facts,  the  diffi- 
culties and  the  particular  dangers  of  the  hour,  which  is  the 
inimitable  distinction  of  the  genius  of  Hamilton  among  all 
the  men  of  his  time. 

The  principles  of  public  credit,  of  the  true  relations  of 
any  country  to  its  neighbours,  of  honour,  of  perpetual 
sacrifice  as  the  condition  of  strength,  and  of  union,  above 
all  things,  as  the  foundation  of  the  whole  fabric,  are 
stated  and  set  forth  with  such  intensity,  that  a  French- 
man reading  it  will  think  of  France,  an  Englishman  of 
England.  Under  the  excitement  of  his  personal  interest  the 
occasion  is  forgotten,  and  the  United  States  of  America 
could  be  replaced  by  some  legendary  title — Utopia  or  No- 
man's  Land — without  impairing  the  significance.  Such  an 
achievement  is  the  rare  triumph  of  the  man  of  letters,  who 
may  or  may  not  be  a  soldier  or  a  statesman  in  addition,  but 
who  in  this  case,  beyond  any  doubt,  was  Hamilton  and  not 
Washington, 


BOOK   V 

THE    POLITICIANS 
A.D.  1795-1804. 


2  A 


Let  the  long  contention  cease  ! 
Geese  are  swans  and  swans  are  geese. 
Let  them  have  it  how  they  will  I 
Thou  art  tired :  lest  be  still. 

They  outtalked  thee,  hissed  thee,  tore  thee  ? 
Better  men  fared  thus  before  thee ; 
Fired  their  ringing  shot  and  passed, 
Hotly  charged  and  sank  at  last. 

Charge  once  more  then  and  be  dumb  I 
Let  the  victors  when  they  come, 
When  the  forts  of  Folly  fall, 
Find  thy  body  by  the  wall. 

MATTHEW  ARNOLD, 


BOOK    V 
THE  POLITICIANS 

CHAPTER  I 
The  End  of  an  Epoch 

HAMILTON  retired  from  Washington's  cabinet  on -the  last  day     A.D. 
of  January  1795.     He  had  been  in  office  for  upwards  of  five  H95-1797 
years.    He  remained  in  power  for  six  years  longer.     To  the 
end  of  Washington's  term  (March  1797)  he  was  the  chief 
counsellor  and  the  strongest  supporter  of  the  President  and 
his  government.     The  letters  of  Camillus  and  the  Farewell 
Address  were  only  the  most  conspicuous  of  his  many  public 
labours;  and  it  is  the  fact  that  his  private  industry,  of  which 
we  get  a  glimpse  in  his  voluminous  correspondence,  was  of 
an  even  more  arduous  character. 

The  confidence  with  which  his  great  chief  sought  his 
assistance  during  this  stormy  period,  the  deference  paid 
him  by  the  newly  constituted  cabinet,  his  successors  in 
office,  the  admiration  and  allegiance  of  the  whole  Federalist 
party,  might  have  compensated  for  the  bitterness  and  abuse 
of  the  Democrats  had  the  question  uppermost  in  his  mind 
been  the  personal  one.  But  this  with  him  was  never  the 
case,  not  from  virtue  so  much  as  from  temperament.  The 
permanence  of  the  works  of  his  hands  was  ever  more 

871 


372  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  precious  to  him  than  his  own  prosperity  and  reputation. 
Tlie  growin£  Power  °f  tne  opposition  seemed  to  him  to  be 
a  menace  against  the  institutions  of  the  Republic.  The 
faithfulness  and  good  opinion  of  his  friends,  although  grate- 
ful to  him  in  a  personal  sense,  did  not  provide  an  adequate 
security  against  the  dangers  which  he  dreaded. 

He  still  continued  after  Washington's  retirement  to  be  the 
most  powerful  influence  in  political  affairs  until  the  end  of 
the  presidency  of  John  Adams.  But  during  these  four 
years  the  conditions  and  their  issue  were  less  fortunate. 
With  the  new  head  of  the  State  he  was  united  by  their 
common  hatred  of  anarchy ;  but  in  their  personal  relations 
all  was  discord  and  intolerance.  Hamilton,  said  Adams, 
speaking  bitterly  of  his  own  term  of  office,  was  all  the  time 
"  the  commander-in-chief  of  the  House  of  Representatives, 
'  of  the  Senate,  of  the  heads  of  Department,  of  General 
'  Washington,  and  last,  and  least,  if  you  will,  of  the  President 
'  of  the  United  States ! "  It  cannot  be  a  pleasant  position  for 
any  man  to  preside  over  a  cabinet  which  reposes  its  con- 
fidence, and  takes  its  inspiration,  if  not  actually  its  orders, 
from  an  outsider — from  a  lawyer  in  New  York  engaged,  but 
unfortunately  not  absorbed,  in  the  labours  of  an  enormous 
practice. 

The  motives  of  Hamilton's  resignation  were  mainly 
private.  He  had  spent  all  his  savings.  The  official  salary 
of  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  was,  even  in  those  days,  an 
impossible  pittance  for  a  man  without  private  means.  He 
was  deeply  in  debt,  not  through  an  inability  to  manage  his 
affairs,  but  because  he  had  given  his  time  and  energies  to 
his  country  instead  of  to  the  pursuit  of  his  own  fortune. 
No  suspicion  of  miscalculation  or  incompetence  attaches  to 
him.  Had  rich  admirers  been  willing  to  endow  him,  and 
had  he  been  willing  to  accept  their  alms,  it  is  probable, 
from  his  conduct  in  the  matter  of  his  actual  savings,  he 


THE  POLITICIANS  373 

would  have  employed  the  funds  shrewdly.  The  chance,  A.D 
however,  did  not  come  his  way.  Political  admiration  at  the 
end  of  the  eighteenth  century  had  not  yet  learned  to  write 
large  cheques.  He  was  in  debt,  and  had  no  mind  to  die  in 
debt.  He  was  acutely  conscious  that  his  public  work  had 
entailed  a  sacrifice  not  merely  of  his  own  ease,  but  of  the 
interests  of  his  family.  The  last  nine  years  of  his  life  were 
devoted  to  the  honourable  but  undramatic  end  of  dis- 
charging his  debts  and  providing  for  his  children. 

On  the  political  side  the  motive  of  his  retirement  is  pro- 
bably clearer  to  the  world  to-day  than  it  was  to  Hamilton 
himself  at  the  time.  He  was  the  man  of  an  epoch,  and  the 
epoch  was  ended.  On  the  ground  which  the  Revolution  had 
cleared  the  plan  of  a  nation  had  been  marked  out,  the 
foundations  had  been  trenched  and  laid,  the  fabric  had 
begun  to  rise.  The  main  work  he  had  set  himself  with 
Washington  to  do  was  done.  The  States  were  independent. 
They  were  united.  They  were  financially  sound.  They 
were  started  upon  a  wise  and  dignified  course  of  policy  with 
regard  to  other  nations.  They  were  at  peace  when  all  the 
European  continent  was  plunged  in  war. 

For  the  permanency  of  human  institutions  two  things  are 
necessary :  a  clear  idea  consistent  within  itself,  and  a  living 
and  vigorous  tradition.  Thought  alone  is  not  enough  to 
entitle  a  man  to  the  fame  of  a  constructive  statesman.  It 
must  be  converted  into  action.  To  him,  therefore,  who  not 
only  thinks,  but  proves  the  thought  capable  of  serving  his 
purpose,  is  the  power  present  and  to  come.  His  institutions, 
like  an  estate,  pass  to  future  generations  under  a  beneficent 
mortmain. 

Of  Hamilton's  main  ideas  only  that  concerned  with  com- 
mercial policy  was  left  unachieved.  Political  conditions 
would  have  rendered  it  a  long  and  most  difficult  task.  His 
private  circumstances  made  even  an  effort  towards  it  impos- 


374  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  sible.  Moreover,  he  foresaw  clearly  that  if  only  the  fabric  of 
t^ie  ^ni°n  keld  together,  his  plans  for  industries  and  manu- 
factures would  inevitably  be  adopted,  sooner  or  later,  by 
his  successors.  For  until  they  were  carried  into  practice 
a  blank  would  remain  in  the  general  scheme  of  policy,  so 
obvious  that  it  could  not  be  overlooked. 

He  may  not  have  been  fully  conscious  at  the  period  of 
his  retirement  that  he  had  been  the  chief  factor  in  one 
of  those  rare,  great  works  of  statesmanship  that  stand  out 
from  the  mass  of  merely  useful  accomplishment  like  a 
mountain  island  in  mid-ocean.  For  although  he  had  a 
soaring  ambition,  he  lacked  the  power  of  standing  back 
and  regarding  his  times  and  his  own  actions  therein  in 
a  spirit  of  detachment.  The  golden,  dramatic  imagination 
which  has  been  so  rich  a  recompense  to  some  great  men 
and  to  many  mountebanks,  was  wanting  in  his  composition. 
He  may  not  have  foreseen,  and  in  all  likelihood  did  not 
endeavour  to  foresee,  his  place  in  history ;  but  as  a  true 
descendant  of  two  shrewd  and  well-judging  races,  the 
Huguenot  and  the  Lowland  Scot,  he  did  not  nourish  his 
fancy  on  illusions.  He  was  fully  aware  at  the  age  of  forty, 
when  most  men  are  entering  upon  their  careers,  that  the 
greatest  work  he  could  ever  hope  to  do  was  done,  and  lay 
behind  him.  In  comparison  with  what  had  been  accom- 
plished, the  present  was  a  time  of  little  problems  and 
wearisome  details,  of  party  triumphs  and  personal  ambitions. 
His  energy  continued,  but  the  zest  was  gone  out  of  public 
life.  After  having  slain  giants,  only  a  philosopher  could 
return  contentedly  to  the  herding  of  sheep. 

There  is  a  tragical  element  in  these  last  nine  years 
quite  apart  from  the  circumstances  of  his  death.  He  under- 
valued what  had  been  done.  He  feared  that  the  institu- 
tions he  had  been  unable  to  strengthen  according  to  his 
judgment,  would  fail  to  stand  the  stress  of  events.  His 


THE  POLITICIANS  375 

public  papers  maintain  a  discreet  and  statesmanlike  reserve     A.D 
upon  this  dangerous  topic,  but  his  private  correspondence 
and  his  recorded  conversations  leave  us  in  no  doubt  as  to 
his  opinions. 

In  addition  to  the  original  disintegrating  force  of  State 
Rights,  a  fresh  and,  to  his  eyes,  a  terrible  danger  had  arisen 
in  the  shape  of  Democracy.  These  two  forces  his  great 
rival  Thomas  Jefferson  had  compacted  into  a  party  which 
was  growing  rapidly  in  popularity  and  power,  and  threatened 
very  soon  to  seize  upon  the  government.  It  must  be  ad- 
mitted by  his  strongest  admirers  that  he  misjudged  these 
dangers,  and  overrated  the  destructive  power  of  both  forces. 
If  Hamilton,  who  saw  so  far  and  so  wide,  did  not  see  these 
things  as  men  see  them  to-day,  it  is  not  after  all  very 
wonderful;  for  he  was  bound  to  judge  both  pleas  as  they 
were  presented  by  their  advocates,  and  to  weigh  to  some 
extent  the  characters  of  their  advocates. 

The  case  for  State  Rights  was  in  the  hands  of  the 
Democratic  party.  The  chief  argument  was  an  appeal  to 
mean  motives  and  dangerous  jealousies,  which  rallied  to  its 
support  all  those  who  hated  the  constitution.  The  true 
virtues  of  the  State  Rights  doctrine  were  hidden  as  closely 
from  Jefferson  as  from  Hamilton.  The  zeal  of  the  one,  the 
opposition  of  the  other,  were  equally  grounded  upon  a  mis- 
conception of  its  nature.  It  was  the  same  with  Democracy. 
The  sturdiest  upholder  of  the  institution  turns  with  disgust 
from  the  records  of  those  years  when  blatancy  and  disordered 
emotions  are  its  representatives.  If  we  were  called  upon  to 
judge  democracy  solely  upon  the  manifestations  of  French 
and  American  opinion  during  the  period  of  the  Revolution, 
we  should  not  hesitate  any  more  than  Hamilton  did  to 
condemn  it  utterly. 

The  growing  confidence  of  the  people  in  Jefferson's  inspira- 
tion seemed  to  Hamilton  to  be  proof  of  his  forebodings. 


376  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  Men  have  always  been  apt  to  take  this  view  of  any  popular 
mclmati°n  towards  a  political  opponent.  But  after  all,  it 
is  the  tradition  which  drives,  and  the  politician  who  has  to 
draw  the  coach  along.  Hamilton,  fearful  for  the  safety  of 
his  institutions,  did  not  take  this  comfortable  view  of  the 
matter.  The  predilection  for  Jefferson  showed  a  lack  of 
power  in  the  people  to  discriminate  between  leaders  who 
saw  into  the  realities  of  things,  and  those  others  who  saw 
only  the  shadows  that  phrases  cast  upon  the  wall.  From  a 
long  and  bitter  conflict  he  knew  Jefferson  to  be  neither  wise 
nor  brave.  He  knew  him  to  be  incapable  of  looking  at  the 
facts.  He  knew  him  to  be  entirely  lacking  in  executive 
ability,  and  he  assumed  as  a  matter  of  course,  though 
wrongly  as  things  turned  out,  that  the  first  need  in  the 
President  of  the  United  States  was  that  he  should  be  a 
man  of  action. 

But  even  allowing  for  so  much  of  error  in  his  calculations, 
it  cannot  be  pretended  that  Hamilton's  vision  of  the  dangers 
to  the  Union  which  seemed  to  lie  in  State  Eights  was 
altogether  an  illusion,  or  anything  resembling  an  illusion. 
More  than  half  a  century  later  one  of  the  bloodiest  wars  in 
history,  lasting  over  a  period  of  four  years,  grimly  justified 
his  presage  of  disaster.  All  that  can  be  urged  against  his 
judgment  is  that  he  thought  the  peril  to  be  more  imminent 
than  was  actually  the  case.  But  even  this  is  doubtful.  It 
is  impossible  to  avoid  the  feeling,  as  we  read  the  history  of 
those  sixty  years,  that  it  was  a  freak  of  fortune,  good-luck 
or  ill-luck,  which  postponed  the  struggle  to  the  presidency 
of  Lincoln.  The  outbreak  might  have  occurred  as  naturally 
under  Jefferson  or  Monroe,  Jackson  or  Harrison. 

As  regards  Democracy,  Hamilton  must  be  judged  to  have 
been  even  more  in  the  wrong;  for  he  believed  anarchy 
to  be  its  necessary  issue.  The  spectacle  of  France  had 
disturbed  the  compass  of  his  mind,  as  it  disturbed  also 


THE  POLITICIANS  377 

the  judgments  of  all  his  great  contemporaries;  of  Fox  A.D 
no  less  than  of  Burke,  of  Washington  as  much  as  Jefferson, 
To  one  set  of  thinkers  there  seemed  to  be  a  promise 
of  the  millennium,  to  the  other  a  certainty  of  the  inferno. 
From  the  tumults  and  massacres  of  Paris,  Hamilton  argued, 
without  proper  allowance  either  for  race  or  tradition,  and 
without  a  clear  perception  of  the  essential  difference  between 
the  two  cases.  Democracy  in  France,  where  alone  it  had 
been  indulged  in  its  purity,  had  led  to  inconceivable  political 
folly,  to  the  destruction  of  order,  to  wholesale  murder  and 
finally  to  despotism.  To  his  mind  this  seemed  to  be  a 
natural  and  even  an  inevitable  sequence.  He  did  not 
penetrate  the  disguises  in  which  the  supreme  needs  and  the 
passionate  desires  of  the  two  peoples  were  enveloped.  Had 
he  so  penetrated  he  must  have  distinguished  between  the 
two  cases  and  endured  less  anxiety. 

It  is  of  all  political  events  the  most  improbable  that  a 
strong  nation  will  allow  its  institutions,  even  in  their  green 
youth,  to  be  overset  by  any  merely  imaginary  grievance.  A 
ferment  may  be  caused  by  words  and  phrases  that  have  no 
practical  meaning,  but  with  average  good  fortune  things 
will  settle  before  it  comes  to  serious  action.  That  a 
number  of  agitators  and  journals  depicted  Washington  as 
a  bloodthirsty  tyrant  and  an  oppressor  of  liberty  did  not 
constitute  any  real  menace  to  the  Union.  That  the  citizens 
of  New  York  and  Philadelphia  banqueted,  and  mangled  pigs, 
and  shouted  French  phrases,  and  wore  tricolour  ribbons,  and 
sang  the  Marseillaise  Hymn,  did  not  prove  them  to  be 
impregnated  with  the  spirit  of  the  September  massacres. 
The  whole  manifestation  was  a  mere  fashion,  and  when  we 
review  it  calmly  at  a  distance,  the  most  we  feel  inclined 
to  say  of  anything  having  so  little  real  importance  is  that 
it  was  an  ugly  fashion  entirely  unsuited  to  the  wearers 
and  their  conditions. 


378  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  ,  The  obstruction  to  his  plans  explains  much  of  Hamilton's 
anfcipafcny  to  Democracy,  but  under  what  other  form  of 
government  a  man  gifted  and  circumstanced  like  himself 
might  have  been  sure  of  faring  better  he  would  probably 
have  been  puzzled  to  explain.  Certainly  not  under  a 
despotism,  or  a  limited  monarchy,  or  under  such  a  republic 
as  he  had  desired  to  set  up.  But  finding  difficulties 
in  his  way  at  every  fresh  effort  to  improve  the  prosperity 
of  his  country,  he  laid  the  charge  of  placing  them  there 

I  at  the  door  of  a  malicious  Democracy,  without  consider- 
ing that  all  men  at  all  times,  and  under  every  variety 

\of  political  institution,  have  fared  as  he  did,  and  few 
of  them  so  fortunately,  We  feel  with  him  in  his  chagrin, 
but  we  quarrel  with  his  indictment.  The  far-sighted,  swift- 
thinking  reformer,  the  builder  of  states  and  maker  of 
constitutions,  may  as  well  lay  his  account  at  starting  with 
much  mortification.  That  the  people,  the  force  without 
which  all  his  efforts  must  fall  to  the  ground,  will  not 
understand  and  cannot  keep  pace ;  that  on  many  occasions 
they  prefer  the  catch-penny  tags  of  his  ill-wishers  to  his 
own  well-reasoned  advocacy ;  that  base  words  often  soothe 
their  vanity  or  allure  their  selfishness,  while  truth  boldly 
spoken  grates  upon  their  ears  and  fills  their  hearts  with 
resentment, — all  these  things  are  no  good  reason  for  a 
profound  distrust. 

During  the  whole  of  this  period  Hamilton  was  over- 
wrought, worked  almost  to  death,  and  assailed  with  the 
most  malignant  calumnies.  His  courage  never  flagged. 
His  wisdom  in  great  things  remained  as  clear  as  ever. 
But  he  saw  everything  black;  not  only  his  enemies,  but 
even  the  people  and  the  future  of  the  nation.  It  is  to 
his  credit  that  he  should  have  kept  the  outward  form  of 
his  faith  as  firmly  as  he  did.  With  few  exceptions,  his 
public  documents  give  no  evidence  of  distrust.  Their 


THE  POLITICIANS  379 

ppeal  is  founded  always  upon   reason    and  directed  by     A.D. 

"*«-17< 

38-40 


high  motives.     Cynicism  is  entirely  absent.    But  although  1795 


we  admire  the  fortitude  of  his  conduct,  we  are  conscious 
of  the  presence  in  him  of  a  spirit  that  would  have  made 
future  victory  impossible. 

Making  every  allowance  for  the  circumstances,  we  must 
judge  him  to  have  been  of  too  impatient  a  temper  ever  to 
have  held  the  position  of  a  great  party  leader  in  a  democracy 
settled  to  its  round  of  humdrum  business.  His  true  place, 
and  the  place  which  he  so  gloriously  filled,  was  at  the  begin- 
ning. His  fit  task,  his  joy  and  his  triumph,  were  in  dragging 
order  out  of  chaos,  while  ordinary  men  stood  about  him 
dazed  and  confounded  by  the  hugeness  of  an  unexampled 
crisis.  He  lacked  astuteness  and  natural  cunning.  He  lacked 
also  sympathy  and  tact.  He  treated  men  severely  upon  ' 
their  merits,  which  is  fatal,  and  failed  conspicuously  when  he 
attempted  to  secure  the  adhesion  of  important  mediocrities, 
who  are  at  all  times  vain  and  usually  self-interested.  When 
a  compliment  would  have  served  his  purpose  admirably,  he 
gave  a  reason  and  left  his  audience  cold.  He  failed  in 
the  management  of  the  rank  and  file  of  his  party,  and  he 
failed  no  less  with  popular  opinion.  He  never  allowed  it  to 
have  its  head;  never  waited  till  a  favourable  opportunity 
offered  for  guiding  it  as  he  wished  it  to  go.  In  small  things, 
as  in  great  ones,  if  the  people  were  in  his  judgment  wrong, 
he  fought  against  them.  He  could  not,  like  Jefferson,  stand 
aside  until  the  storm  had  passed.  This  is  magnificent  but 
it  is  not  the  art  of  governing  a  Democracy.  He  was,  in  fact, 
a  great  statesman,  but  a  poor  politician  under  the  con- 
ditions that  had  been  imposed.  In  spite  of  all  his  defects 
he  had  qualities  which,  under  the  British  system  of  parlia- 
mentary government,  would  probably  have  altered  the  face  of 
affairs.  But  under  the  system  of  Cabinet  responsibility  which 
had  been  adopted  in  the  United  States,  what  he  lacked  was 


380  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.     fatal  and  what  he  possessed  was  of  little  value  when  once 

2-1797 

.  35-40 


1797  the  first  great  struggle  was  concluded. 


CHAPTER  II 

James  Monroe 

SHORTLY  before  Christmas  1792  an  incident  occurred  of 
which  at  the  time  only  a  vague  rumour  was  bruited  in 
political  circles.  Had  all  the  five  gentlemen  concerned  in  it 
kept  to  their  words,  given  as  gentlemen  (as  four  of  them  did), 
it  is  improbable  the  world  would  ever  have  known  Hamilton 
in  the  full  strength  of  his  character.  To  the  chief  actor  it 
was  in  all  likelihood  the  severest  trial  of  his  life.  It  was 
squalid,  sensational  and  undignified.  The  private  life  of  the 
Secretary  of  the  Treasury  was  thrown  open,  like  the  house 
of  some  notorious  bankrupt,  when  the  bills  are  up  and  the 
auctioneer  rattles  his  hammer,  to  a  crowd  of  vulgar  gazers 
and  curious  gossips.  It  is  clear  that  to  Hamilton  the  mere 
fact  that  the  world  was  to  be  admitted  to  an  inspection  of 
his  personal  affairs  was  odious  and  repugnant.  The  intru- 
sion was  what  chiefly  mattered.  That  men  busied  them- 
selves in  pronouncing  moral  verdicts,  condemning  vice  and 
jeering  at  the  predicament  of  the  sinner,  was  doubtless  an 
odious  aggravation,  but  it  was  subordinate.  Had  the  crowd 
pushed  their  way  in  to  admire  his  private  virtues  and  gloat 
over  the  spectacle  of  his  domestic  affections,  it  would  have 
been  almost  as  intolerable.  For  he  had  never  traded,  like 
other  statesmen  then  and  since,  upon  his  private  virtues. 
The  Scots  character  at  its  best,  both  gentle  and  simple, 
abhors  such  invasions  with  an  intensity  that  has  its  equal 
perhaps  only  among  the  Jews.  He  was  a  servant  of  the 
nation,  and  as  regarded  the  performance  of  his  public  duties 
any  charges,  the  most  malevolent,  the  most  trivial,  or  the 


THE  POLITICIANS  381 

most  absurd,  he  was  bound  to  answer  patiently  and  at     A.D. 
length.    It  was  a  part  of  his  duty.     To  have  alleged  his  ^jjf^7^ 
personal  honour  as  a  reason  for  not  answering  a  political 
opponent  would  have  struck  him  as  admitting  the  world  to 
a  familiarity  which  his  pride  forbade.     The  world  had  no 
right  to  concern  itself  with  him  save  as  a  steward ;  and  for 
every  detail  of  his  stewardship  he  was  at  all  times  fully 
prepared  to  answer. 

But  this  plan,  whereby  a  man  endeavours  to  keep  his  two 
lives  apart — his  private  life  in  one  watertight  compartment, 
his  public  in  another — has  always  been  difficult  in  demo- 
cracies, even  in  the  earliest  democracies  of  which  we  have 
records.  It  requires  a  vigilance,  a  correctness  of  behaviour, 
a  perpetual  concern  and  circumspection  even  about  trifles — 
good  as  well  as  bad,  wise  as  well  as  foolish — that  is  seldom 
found  in  conjunction  with  the  exuberant  temperament  of 
genius.  Moreover,  it  was  easier  to  escape  the  personalities 
of  Aristophanes,  the  penetrating  curiosity  of  Athenian 
scandalmongers,  than  the  rectitudinous  inquisition  that  is 
enjoyed  under  the  freedom  of  the  press.  In  private  life 
Hamilton  was  not  always  vigilant,  not  seldom  incorrect,  and 
with  regard  to  precautions  against  assassins,  of  life  or  char- 
acter, he  viewed  them  impatiently,  as  Caesar  did,  considering 
that  immunity  was  not  worth  the  purchase  at  such  a  price. 

Accordingly  he  did  not,  any  more  than  Caesar,  secure 
immunity;  and  the  price  he  had  afterwards  to  give  for 
redemption  would  have  staggered  a  poorer  spirit  into 
bankruptcy.  For  not  only  had  he  to  pay  dearly  in  derision, 
in  offence  to  his  pride,  in  the  loss  of  the  good  opinion  of 
many  good  men;  but  also  in  the  distress  and  humiliation 
of  a  wife  whom,  in  spite  of  his  errant  disposition,  he  loved 
and  cared  for,  as  more  respectable  characters  occasionally 
do  not,  from  the  beginning  of  their  courtship  to  the  end  of 
his  days. 


882  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.         In  the  summer  of  1791  Hamilton  had  drifted  into  an 
92-1797 
JEn.  35-40 


~1797  intrigue  with  a  woman  of  the  name  of  Reynolds,  who  pro- 


fessed to  him  that  she  had  been  deserted  by  her  husband. 
The  husband  in  due  course,  being  a  sort  of  stage  husband, 
appeared  upon  the  scene.  At  first  he  attempted  the  bully ; 
afterwards  became  lachrymose  and  pathetic;  talked  of 
his  ruined  happiness  and  home.  Finally,  on  receipt  of  a 
thousand  dollars,  paid  in  two  instalments,  he  was  consoled ; 
and  throughout  the  remainder  of  the  first  act  played  the 
part  of  a  zealous  and  cheerful  pandar.  Letters  passed 
between  the  three  persons  concerned,  which  Hamilton 
(vigilant  in  this  particular)  filed  and  docketed.  The  neces- 
sities of  Reynolds,  induced,  as  it  is  hardly  necessary  to  state, 
by  undeserved  misfortunes,  recurred  at  short  intervals,  and 
Hamilton  parted  with  a  considerable  sum,  in  small  amounts, 
in  exchange  for  formal  receipts. 

The  second  act  began  towards  the  end  of  1792,  when 
Hamilton's  own  department,  the  Treasury,  in  the  ordinary 
routine  of  its  public  duty,  and  apparently  without  the 
cognisance  of  its  chief,  proceeded  to  the  prosecution  and 
conviction  of  Reynolds  and  a  confederate  called  Clingman, 
for  subornation  of  perjury  in  a  case  of  fraud.  Political 
influence  was  brought  to  bear  on  behalf  of  the  felons ;  but 
Hamilton  refused  to  interfere,  and  they  were  ultimately 
released,  upon  terms  which  the  officials  of  the  Treasury, 
in  whose  jurisdiction  the  matter  lay,  considered  to  be  regular 
and  advantageous  to  the  public  service.  When  they  came 
out  of  prison  Clingman  communicated  with  Muhlenberg, 
the  Democratic  Speaker  of  the  House  of  Representatives, 
informing  him  that  his  friend  and  fellow-prisoner,  Reynolds, 
possessed  documents  that  would  '  hang  the  Secretary  to  the 
Treasury ' ;  that  Hamilton  had  frequently  supplied  him 
(Reynolds)  with  money  for  the  purpose  of  speculating  in  the 
funds  on  their  joint  behalf,  their  operations  being  based 


THE  POLITICIANS  383 

upon  Hamilton's  internal  knowledge.  Muhlenberg  hastened  A.D 
to  share  these  joyful  tidings  with  two  members  of  his  party 
— with  Venables  and  Monroe,  afterwards  famous  as  the 
godfather,  if  not  actually  as  the  maker,  of  the  'doctrine/ 
These  three  highly  respectable  politicians  proceeded  to  hold 
interviews  with  the  two  gaol-birds  and  Mrs.  Reynolds,  who 
now  came  upon  the  stage  in  her  true  colours.  The  game 
of  blackmail  was  up.  There  might  be  advantages,  pecuni- 
ary and  otherwise,  in  a  new  policy :  at  any  rate  there  were 
the  pleasures  of  revenge. 

The  three  worthy  congressmen  eagerly  studied  the  docu- 
ments offered  for  their  inspection,  and  being  carried  away 
by  excitement,  did  not  stop  to  ponder  over  the  improba- 
bilities. That  a  minister  of  finance,  accustomed  to  think  in 
millions,  should  have  doled  out,  never  more  than  five 
hundred,  usually  only  thirty  or  forty  dollars  at  a  time, 
to  accomplish  his  crooked  ends,  roused  no  suspicions.  They 
gravely  considered  the  propriety  of  going  hot-foot  to  Presi- 
dent Washington  with  their  mare's  nest;  but  by  good 
fortune  for  themselves  and  ill  fortune  for  Hamilton,  they 
prudently  decided  to  ask,  in  the  first  place,  for  an  explana- 
tion of  the  damning  evidence. 

The  first  scene  of  act  the  third  was  laid  at  Hamilton's 
office  in  the  Treasury,  where  the  three  gentlemen  were 
begged  to  be  seated,  and  proceeded  to  open  the  matter  of 
their  visit.  The  event  may  be  described  in  Hamilton's  own 
words.  "Muhlenberg  introduced  the  subject  by  observing 
'  to  me  that  they  had  discovered  a  very  improper  connection 
1  between  me  and  a  Mr.  Reynolds ;  extremely  hurt  by  this 
'  mode  of  introduction,  I  arrested  the  progress  of  the  discourse 
'  by  giving  way  to  very  strong  expressions  of  indignation. 
1  The  gentlemen  explained,  telling  me  in  substance  that  I  had 
'  misapprehended  them ;  that  they  did  not  take  the  fact  for 
'  established ;  that  their  meaning  was  to  apprise  me  that, 


384  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  '  unsought  by  them,  information  had  been  given  them  of  an 
'  imPr°Per  pecuniary  connection  between  Mr.  Reynolds  and 
'  myself;  that  they  had  thought  it  their  duty  to  pursue  it, 
'  and  had  become  possessed  of  some  documents  of  a  sus- 
'  picious  complexion ;  that  they  had  contemplated  laying  the 
'  matter  before  the  President,  but  before  they  did  this  they 
'  thought  it  right  to  apprise  me  of  the  affair,  and  to  afford  an 
'  opportunity  of  explanation ;  declaring  at  the  same  time  that 
'  their  agency  in  the  matter  was  influenced  solely  by  a  sense 
'  of  public  duty  and  by  no  motive  of  personal  ill-will.  If  my 
'  memory  be  correct,  the  notes  from  me  in  a  disguised  hand 
'  (i.e.  to  Reynolds)  were  now  shown  to  me,  and  without  a 
'  moment's  hesitation  I  acknowledged  to  be  mine. 

'I  replied  that  the  affair  was  now  put  upon  a  different 
'  footing — that  I  had  always  stood  ready  to  meet  fair  inquiry 
'  with  frank  communication — that  it  happened,  in  the  present 

*  instance,  to  be  in  my  power  by  written  documents  to  remove 
'  all  doubts  as  to  the  real  nature  of  the  business,  and  fully  to 
'  convince  that  nothing  of  the  kind  imputed  to  me  did  in  fact 
'  exist.      The  same  evening  at  my  house  was  by  mutual 
'  consent  appointed  for  an  explanation."  l 

Hamilton  engaged  his  friend  Wolcott  to  be  present  at  this 
interview.  The  letters  and  other  documents  were  taken 
from  their  pigeonhole,  and  the  reading  of  them  commenced. 
"  One  or  more  of  the  gentlemen  (i.e.  Venables  and  Muhlenberg) 
'  were  struck  with  so  much  conviction,  before  I  had  gotten 
'  through  the  communication,  that  they  delicately  urged  me 

*  to  discontinue  it  as  unnecessary.     I  insisted  upon  going 
'  through  the  whole,  and  did  so.     The  result  was  a  full  and 
'  unequivocal   acknowledgment   on   the  part  of   the   three 
'  gentlemen  of  perfect  satisfaction  with  the  explanation,  and 
'  expressions  of  regret  at  the  trouble  and  embarrassment 
4  which  had  been  occasioned  to  me.     Mr.  Muhlenberg  and 

*  Works,  vii.  pp.  398,  399. 


THE  POLITICIANS  385 

'  Mr.  Venables,  in  particular,  manifested  a  degree  of  sensibility     A.D 
*  on  the  occasion.     Mr.  Monroe  was  more  cold,  but  entirely 
1  explicit." ! 

Following  upon  this,  memoranda  were  made,  letters  were 
exchanged,  documents  were  copied.  No  shred  of  doubt  was 
permitted  to  remain  by  any  of  the  persons  concerned  that 
Hamilton's  statements  were  fully  accepted  by  them,  and 
entirely  proved  by  the  evidence  which  he  had  submitted  to 
their  examination.  It  was  further  agreed  that  all  notes,  copies 
and  originals,  should  be  retained  by  the  gentlemen  them- 
selves, and  not  allowed  to  come  into  the  possession  of  the 
blackmailing  trio,  or  of  any  others  who  might  misuse  them. 
The  undertaking  was  carefully  observed  by  all  except 
Monroe. 

After  the  interview  at  Hamilton's  house,  Monroe  "had 
'  another  interview  with  Clingman,  who  declared  Hamilton's 
'  explanation  to  be  a  fabrication,  originally  made  up  between 
'  Hamilton  and  Reynolds  to  cover  their  real  transactions ; 
'  and  all  this  rascally  stuff  Monroe  embodied  in  still  another 
'  memorandum," 2  which,  however,  he  does  not  appear  to 
have  communicated  to  either  of  his  colleagues;  certainly 
not  to  either  Hamilton  or  Wolcott.  He  then  consigned  all 
the  papers  to  '  a  respectable  character  in  Virginia/  in  whose 
custody  (if  indeed  he  were  anything  but  a  pigeon-hole  in 
Monroe's  desk)  they  remained — until  they  were  wanted. 

The  fourth  act  took  place  after  an  interval  of  more  than 
four  years.  The  mine  was  laid  in  1792 ;  it  was  not 
exploded  till  1797.  Hamilton  had  left  office,  but  was  still 
the  leader  of  the  Federalist  party.  Monroe  had  been 
minister  in  Paris,  and  had  conducted  himself  with  so 
great  a  fatuity,  that  Washington  was  forced  to  recall  him. 
He  was  an  object  of  derision  and  attack  to  the  Federalists. 
Hamilton's  influence  with  the  President  and  the  public 

1  Works,  vii.  pp.  399, 400.       2  Works  (Senator  Lodge's  footnote),  vii.  p.  370. 

2  B 


386  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  had  been  used  with  his  accustomed  energy  and  frankness 
to  bring  about  the  recall  of  the  scatter-brained  diplo- 
matist. The  time  therefore  for  firing  the  mine  was  clearly 
indicated  by  the  finger  of  destiny.  Monroe  did  not  hesitate. 
'The  respectable  character  in  Virginia'  handed  over  the 
documents  to  one  Callender,  the  editor  of  an  annual  publi- 
cation avowedly  in  the  interest  of  the  Democratic  party, 
called  the  History  of  the  United  States.  In  the  volume 
published  early  in  1797,  which  covered  the  events  of  the 
previous  year,  the  charge  of  corruption  was  revived  against 
Hamilton,  and  was  based  upon  the  subsequent  memorandum 
of  Monroe.  There  was  a  little  bungling.  The  editor  did 
not  profess  to  be  'influenced  solely  by  a  sense  of  public 
duty/  but  naively  pleaded  the  further  justification  that  the 
Federalist  party  were  assailing  the  reputation  of  the  good 
and  valuable  man  Monroe. 

The  choice  of  the  instrument  of  defamation  is  worthy 
of  notice.  Callender  was  a  drunken  and  profligate  rascal. 
His  slanders  against  Washington  were  as  copious  and 
malignant  as  those  against  Hamilton  himself.  Neverthe- 
less he  was  in  the  counsels  and  confidence  of  the  Democratic 
party ;  for  the  excellent  reason  that  he  did  them  vigorous 
service  in  bespattering  their  enemies  with  mud.  He  enjoyed 
the  special  protection  of  Jefferson,  who  befriended  him  in 
various  ways  and  was  not  backward  to  aid  him  with  money. 
This,  it  may  be  heartily  admitted,  he  had  fairly  earned. 
When  he  was  prosecuted  for  sedition  in  May  1800,  we  find 
Monroe  still  his  upholder,  denouncing  the  prosecution,  and 
suggesting  that  the  executive  should  employ  counsel  to 
defend  him.  But  in  June  1801,  and  for  ever  afterwards,  he 
is  a  '  serpent/  and  deserving  of  a  serpent's  doom.  The  ex- 
planation of  this  change  in  sentiment  was  that  Callender, 
an  artist  in  calumny,  had  in  the  meantime  turned  his 
attention  to  the  private  life  of  his  former  patron  Jefferson, 


THE  POLITICIANS  387 

where  he  had  discovered  materials  for  the  exercise  of  his     A.D. 

talents  1792-1797 

talents'  JEfs.  35-40 

The  fifth  act  was  short,  and  sharp,  and  full  of  dramatic 

movement.  Hamilton  wrote  at  once  to  the  three  gentle- 
men— his  opponents — asking  them  for  an  explanation. 
Muhlenberg  and  Venables  replied,  clearly  and  definitely: 
first,  that  they  never  had  had  copies  of  the  documents 
in  their  possession,  and  consequently  had  no  responsibility 
for  the  publication,  which  they  regretted  and  deplored  as  a 
breach  of  an  honourable  understanding ;  secondly,  that  they 
had  always  adhered  to  the  opinion  expressed  by  them  at  the 
conclusion  of  the  interview  in  December  1792,  viz. — "  that 
'  they  were  perfectly  satisfied  with  the  explanation  Hamilton 
'  had  then  given,  and  that  there  was  nothing  in  the  transac- 
'  tion  which  ought  to  affect  his  character  as  a  public  officer, 
1  or  lessen  the  public  confidence  in  his  integrity." 1 

In  a  joint  letter  written  with  Muhlenberg,  Monroe  thinks 
"  proper  to  observe  that  ...  we  had  no  agency  in,  or  know- 
'  ledge  of,  the  publication  of  these  papers,  till  they  ap- 
'  peared  " 2  in  Callender's  volume — a  statement  which  places 
too  great  a  strain  upon  human  credulity.  That  Monroe 
alone  had  the  documents  which  Callender  made  use  of; 
that  Monroe  alleged  that  he  had  entrusted  them  'to  a 
respectable  character  in  Virginia/  whom  he  did  not  pro- 
duce; and  that  they  turned  up  precisely  when  they  were 
wanted  in  order  to  blacken  the  character  of  a  man  who 
was  leading  an  attack  on  Monroe — all  these  things  were 
sufficiently  clear,  and  the  world  has  never  hesitated  to  draw 
the  obvious  conclusion. 

Monroe,  whose  writings  are  ever  tuned  to  a  bleating  note, 
now  entered  into  a  separate  correspondence  with  Hamilton. 
So  far  from  taking  the  open  line  of  his  colleagues  with 
regard  to  the  original  interview,  he  ambiguously  hints 

1  Works,  vii,  pp.  400,  450.  2  Ibid.  vii.  p.  456. 


388  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  that  he  has  always  entertained  suspicions,  and  impudently 
1792-1797  g0es  on  £O  state  that  he  will  preserve  an  open  mind  upon 
Hamilton's  guilt  or  innocence  of  the  corruption  alleged, 
until  Hamilton  has  laid  his  explanation  before  the  public. 
"Whether  the  imputations  against  you  as  to  speculation 
'  are  well  or  ill  founded,"  he  proceeds  sanctimoniously, 
"depends  upon  the  facts  and  circumstances  which  appear 
'  against  you  upon  your  defence." : 

It  was  always  dangerous  to  provoke  Hamilton  to  make  a 
defence,  for,  as  we  have  seen,  he  had  the  gift  of  the  counter- 
stroke.  He  continued  to  conduct  the  correspondence  for  a 
few  weeks  longer ;  accused  Monroe  of  being  '  actuated  by 
motives  towards  me  malignant  and  dishonourable';2  and 
informed  him  that  he  intended  to  publish  the  whole  of  the 
documents,  along  with  the  present  correspondence  and  a 
full  explanation.  Monroe  shuffled  and  blustered.  If  Hamil- 
ton wished  to  fight,  he  was  ready  to  oblige  him.  Hamilton 
replied  courteously  that  he  had  no  intention  of  challenging 
Monroe,  but  if  that  gentleman  should  feel  himself  aggrieved 
by  the  publication  of  documents  in  which  he  was  to  be 
pilloried  as  '  malignant  and  dishonourable,'  Hamilton  would 
be  delighted  to  name  his  friend.  But  Monroe  explained 
that  he  had  no  such  intention. 

This  is  the  story.  The  accusation  in  Callender's  publica- 
tion was  corruption.  It  was  alleged  that  Hamilton  had 
entered  into  a  conspiracy  with  Reynolds  to  speculate  upon 
his  knowledge  of  the  government's  intentions.  The  public 
was  ignorant  of  all  the  rest. 

Three  courses  were  open :  to  ignore  the  charge ;  to  deny 
it ;  or  to  tell  the  whole  story.  The  first  was  tantamount  to 
an  admission.  The  second  could  never  have  ended  the 
matter.  The  third  needed  a  steadiness  of  nerve  that  Monroe 
and  his  partner  might  be  excused  for  believing  to  be  beyond 

1  Works,  vii.  p.  466.  2  Ibid.  vii.  p.  473. 


THE  POLITICIANS  389 

the  reach  of  human  nature.  It  is  clear  they  calculated  upon 
the  second,  and  relied  upon  an  elaborate  and  protracted  duel 
of  rejoinders  and  surrejoinders,  rebutters  and  surrebutters,  in 
which  they  would  have  enjoyed  an  infinite  advantage,  seeing 
that  Hamilton  would  all  the  time  have  been  fighting  with 
one  hand  tied  behind  his  back.  He  would  never,  so  they 
may  have  argued,  be  man  enough,  or  fool  enough,  to  admit 
his  connection  with  Mrs.  Reynolds,  and  to  publish  the 
squalid  documents  that  alone  could  clear  his  reputation. 
One  cannot  find  fault  with  their  conclusion,  which  was  pro- 
bably based  upon  a  careful  self-analysis.  But  what  might 
have  been  the  rule  for  Monroe  and  Callender  was  not  the 
rule  for  Hamilton. 

Hamilton  elected  to  tell  the  whole  story ;  to  publish  every 
document  in  his  possession,  and  to  expound  the  situation, 
the  motives  of  the  parties,  and  the  dangers  to  the  com- 
munity and  to  public  life  arising  out  of  such  methods,  in 
that  vehement  and  copious  manner  which  he  was  famed  for 
pursuing  at  the  bar.  He  'exhausted '  the  case.  When  he  had 
made  an  end,  there  was  nothing  more  to  be  said.  The  state- 
ment is  without  a  reservation,  and  yet  it  is  never  familiar. 
He  shirks  nothing,  nor  seeks  for  any  shelter  against  the 
opinion  of  the  world.  His  sole  aim  is  to  set  his  honesty  in 
discharge  of  his  public  duty  beyond  attack.  A  single 
departure  from  the  strictest  rule  of  simplicity,  a  single  dis- 
ingenuous excuse  or  sentimental  quaver,  would  have  made 
the  statement  odious.  Temptations  to  an  eternal  loss  of 
dignity  lay  on  every  side,  but  he  had  only  one  concern :  to 
clear  his  honour.  No  one  has  yet  been  found  bold  enough 
to  challenge  the  completeness  of  the  vindication.1 

1  On  the  whole  matter  we  are  content  with  the  terse  verdict  of  Senator 
Lodge:  "The  character  which  suffers  most  in  the  business  is  that  of 
*  Monroe.  On  him  rests  a  dark  stain  of  dishonour,  of  slippery  evasion  and 
'  of  mean  revenge,  which  has  never  been  wiped  out,  and  which  apparently 
'  can  never  be  lightened  or  diminished." —  Works  (Senator  Lodge's  footnote), 
vii.  p.  371. 


390  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

CHAPTER   III 

John  Adams 

A.D.  THE  result  of  the  election  of  1796  was  to  make  John  Adams 
Presidenfc  of  fche  United  States.  The  Federalists  thereby 
scored  a  success  in  the  first  party  contest,  but  the  narrow 
majority  of  three  votes  by  which  Jefferson,  the  Democratic 
candidate,  was  defeated  made  it  apparent  that  his  partisans 
were  gaining  ground. 

John  Adams  has  been  described  by  Franklin  as  "  always 
'  an  honest  man,  often  a  wise  one,  but  sometimes  and  in  some 
'  things  absolutely  out  of  his  senses." l  Anger  was  usually 
the  cause  of  his  madness,  and  while  the  fit  lasted  his  activity 
was  only  equalled  by  his  blindness.  Some  characters,  having 
been  associated  with  great  events,  have  a  way  of  passing,  by 
mere  longevity,  from  the  second  rank,  to  which  by  nature 
they  belong,  into  the  first  rank  in  the  estimation  of  their 
fellow-citizens.  They  become  popular  institutions.  The 
dramatic  virtue  of  a  date  has  done  much  to  embalm 
Adams's  memory  and  exalt  his  reputation.  He  died  on 
the  4th  of  July  1826 — the  anniversary  of  the  Declaration 
of  Independence — and,  by  an  amazing  coincidence,  on  the 
same  day  a  few  hours  before  him  died  Thomas  Jefferson — 
both  at  a  great  age. 

Adams  had  a  pleasant  face — plump,  self-satisfied,  and 
honourable.  In  his  sayings  and  writings  there  is  a  humor- 
ous, sardonic,  pompous  quality ;  a  dogmatism  that  suggests 
a  man  posing  as  stupider  and  more  prejudiced  than  it  was 
actually  his  nature  to  be.  In  the  many  quarrels  and  con- 
tests of  his  long  life  he  showed  always  a  very  great  pug- 
nacity, a  very  bad  judgment  and  a  very  hot  temper.  He 

1  History,  ii.  p.  486. 


THE  POLITICIANS  391 

was  a  strong  personal  force  in  the  Kevolution;  but  when  he     A.D. 
had  the  chance  of  showing  himself  a  statesman  he  came  to 
disaster.    Judged  merely  as  a  politician  he  was  even  worse 
than  Hamilton  himself. 

As  it  takes  two  people  to  make  a  quarrel,  so  it  takes  two 
conflicting  personalities  to  smash  a  party.  Hamilton  with- 
out Adams,  or  Adams  without  Hamilton,  would  in  all  likeli- 
hood have  kept  the  Federalists  together  in  a  formidable 
minority.  But  Hamilton's  contempt  was  excessive,  and  the 
jealousy  of  Adams  was  grotesque.  A  party  is  required  by' 
nature  to  be  united.  Disunited,  it  is  a  kind  of  disease  in  the 
body  politic,  good  for  nobody  and  nothing,  not  even  for  its 
opponents.  A  party  with  a  single  leader,  even  if  he  is  a 
bad  one,  will  do  more  good  not  only  for  itself  but  in  the 
world,  than  one  fighting  under  the  standards  of  two  leaders 
who  cannot  co-operate.  The  disastrous  administration  of 
Adams  split  the  Federalists  in  two,  and  the  party  which  had 
made  the  constitution  and  had  set  it  to  work  passed  gradu- 
ally and  ignominiously  to  meaner  and  meaner  things,  and 
finally  out  of  existence. 

John  Adams's  grievance  against  Hamilton  was  mainly  a 
personal  one.  He  had  no  quarrel  with  his  politics,  but  he 
suspected  him  of  an  overweening  ambition.  He  resented  the 
deference  paid  to  him  by  his  own  supporters  and  even  by  his 
own  government,  and  he  hated  the  superiority  of  his  mind. 
At  the  first  election  of  a  President  it  was  the  desire  of  all 
men  that  Washington  should  be  called  to  fill  the  post ;  but 
according  to  the  clumsy  system  of  choice  the  candidate  who 
received  the  second  largest  number  of  votes  cast  for  the 
Presidency  became  Yice-President.  Two  candidates,  there- 
fore, had  to  be  nominated,  and  as  it  was  necessary  to  secure 
Washington's  election  it  was  agreed,  on  Hamilton's  sugges- 
tion, that  while  all  voters  should  give  their  first  vote  to 
Washington,  a  certain  number  should  throw  away  their 


392  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  second  vote  lest  by  an  accident  Adams  might  have  been 
e^ecte(^-  *fc  was  a  perfectly  legitimate  device  in  view  of  the 
inconvenience  of  the  system,  but  Adams  took  it  very  much 
amiss. 

When  it  came  to  Adams  himself  being  a  candidate  for  the 
Presidency,  Hamilton  omitted  to  take  the  same  precautions, 
and  Adams's  wrath  was  even  greater.  Our  sympathies  are 
with  Adams,  although  logic  is  against  him.  If  the  device 
was  unwarrantable  to  elect  General  Washington,  it  was 
equally  so  in  his  own  case.  But  Hamilton's  position  was 
both  unfair  and  unwise.  For  Adams  was  the  party  candi- 
date, and  the  duty  of  a  party  is  to  support  its  candidate  with 
loyalty.  Hamilton  said  frankly  that  he  would  have  pre- 
ferred it  had  Thomas  Pinckney,  the  second  Federalist 
nominee  (intended  for  the  Vice-Presidency),  secured  the 
first  position.  To  leave  things  in  such  a  position  of  un- 
certainty was  to  reduce  party  organisation  to  an  absurdity. 
It  would  hardly  have  been  more  unreasonable  if,  on  the  eve 
of  battle,  one  of  the  armies  was  undecided  which  of  two 
generals  it  would  follow,  and  left  the  point  to  be  settled  by 
the  issue  of  the  contest.1 

The  result  of  this  half-hearted  co-operation  was  what 
might  have  been  expected.  Federalists  who  favoured  Adams 
threw  away  their  votes  for  Pinckney,  admirers  of  Pinckney 
threw  away  their  votes  for  Adams.  Adams  was  elected  by 
the  narrow  majority  of  three,  while  Pinckney  was  defeated 
by  nine  votes  by  Jefferson.  It  is  an  undignified  episode,  and 
shows  very  plainly  that  Hamilton  had  failed  to  grasp  the 
rudimentary  conditions  of  government  by  parties.  Indeed, 
it  is  clear  he  hated  parties  as  much  as  he  loved  ideas ;  and 
the  fact  that  he  believed  a  Republic  which  rested  upon 
popular  suffrage  could  be  conducted  on  any  other  system  is 

1  Much,  however,  may  be  said  for  Hamilton's  course  of  action,  v.  Morse's 
Hamilton,  ii.  pp.  224-27. 


THE  POLITICIANS  393 

proof  that  he  did  not  fully  realise  the  nature  of  the  institu-     A.D. 
tions  he  had  been  the  means  of  creating. 

A  few  months  later  a  fresh  disagreement  arose  between 
the  crowned  and  the  uncrowned  leaders,  and  on  this  occasion 
the  blame  lies  wholly  at  the  door  of  the  President.  The 
affections  and  hatreds  between  nations  stand,  as  Washington 
had  warned  his  countrymen,  upon  no  basis  except  pure 
fantasy.  An  ounce  of  real  interest,  a  foolish  insult,  a  single 
blundering  act,  is  sufficient  to  banish  the  whole  cloud- 
cuckoo-town  of  the  sentimentalist  like  mist  before  a 
morning  breeze.  The  same  citizens  who  had  with  so  great 
difficulty  been  preserved  from  a  war  with  Britain  as  the 
allies  of  France  in  1793,  were  with  equal  fervour  clamouring 
in  1798  for  a  war  with  France  as  the  allies  of  Britain.  The 
Republic  of  the  West  had  been  affronted  in  the  persons  of 
their  envoys,  whom  the  Republic  of  the  Seine  had  treated 
with  contumely. 

The  nation  made  ready  for  war.  General  Washington 
was  called  out  of  his  retirement  to  become  commander-in- 
chief.  He  made  his  own  conditions :  the  first  that  he  should 
not  give  his  services  until  the  army  took  the  field;  the 
second  that  Hamilton,  Charles  Pinckney  and  Knox  should 
be  immediately  appointed  as  his  generals.  The  order  of 
nomination  marked  the  respective  rank.  He  made  it  clear 
that  he  meant  to  place  upon  Hamilton's  shoulders  the 
burden  of  chief  command,  and  all  the  responsibilities  of 
organisation,  until  hostilities  had  actually  commenced. 
Adams  assented;  but  when  the  commissions  were  made 
out  and  signed  it  was  found  that  Knox  had  been  placed 
before  Hamilton.  Washington  protested  and  tendered  his 
resignation.  Before  this  awful  threat  even  Adams  in  the 
mad-bull  fit  was  reduced  to  submission.  Hamilton's 
appointment  was  ungraciously  confirmed  after  a  public 
exhibition  of  ill-feeling  that  destroyed  all  hope  of  future 


394  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  concord  between  the  leaders  of  the  Federalist  party.  The 
,7 40*43  attempt  to  exclude  Hamilton  from  the  command  of  the 
army  had  earned  the  reprobation  not  only  of  Washington 
and  all  the  leading  Federalists,  but  also  of  the  great  majority 
of  the  party.  It  was  the  first  of  a  series  of  great  blunders 
which  Adams  committed  during  his  term  of  office  under 
the  influence  of  uncontrollable  rage.  While  it  began  the 
fatal  split  among  his  own  supporters,  it  also  shook  the 
confidence  of  the  country  in  his  judgment.  For,  strange 
as  it  may  appear,  enemies  as  well  as  friends,  Democrats  as 
well  as  Federalists,  desired  that  Hamilton  should  be  ap- 
pointed. In  a  national  emergency  safety  was  the  supreme 
object,  and  it  was  felt  upon  all  sides  that  the  chief  power 
should  be  in  the  hands  of  the  man  who  had  given  the 
clearest  proofs  of  executive  ability. 

Hamilton  desired  peace  for  his  country.  War  with  any 
nation  was  to  be  avoided  if  possible ;  but  he  was  not  blind 
to  certain  advantages  of  a  war  with  France,  which  might 
compensate  in  some  measure  for  the  evils  and  disturbance. 
No  war  with  France  could  take  place  except  at  sea,  and 
the  British  navy  kept  the  ships  of  the  Directory  too  well 
employed  to  give  them  much  leisure  for  remote  activity. 
On  the  other  hand,  Spain  was  the  ally  of  France,  so  that 
war  with  one  meant  war  with  both.  The  Spaniards  held 
Louisiana  and  the  Floridas,  and  possessed  inconvenient 
conflicting  rights  with  regard  to  the  navigation  of  the 
Mississippi.  The  object,  therefore,  of  any  war  would  neces- 
sarily be  the  acquisition  of  these  territories  and  the  settle- 
ment of  these  disputes  for  ever.  The  United  States,  given 
that  war  was  inevitable,  had  much  to  gain  by  it  and  hardly 
anything  to  lose,  providing  they  acted  promptly  and  with  a 
clear  aim. 

It  is  probable  that  Hamilton  also  saw  other  advantages  in 
a  war,  advantages  in  the  matter  of  internal  order  and  the 


THE  POLITICIANS  395 

strengthening   of   the  executive.      But  the  idea  that  he     A.D. 


desired  it  either  from  his  hatred  of  France,  or  because  he 

&tH.  40-43 

had  ambitions  of  a  Napoleonic  career,  is  not  to  be  entertained 
seriously.  As  to  the  first,  not  even  Bismarck  himself  was 
less  influenced  by  his  personal  antipathies  in  questions  of 
foreign  policy.  As  to  the  second,  his  whole  history  is  a 
contradiction  of  it.  No  man  whose  object  is  personal  glory 
will  sacrifice  his  popularity  to  his  opinions,  and  this  was 
Hamilton's  constant  habit.  At  no  great  crisis  of  his  life  do 
we  ever  find  him  engaged  in  considering  whether  a  certain 
course  of  action  will  or  will  not  conduce  to  his  personal 
aggrandisement.  He  belonged  to  the  class  of  men  with 
whom  the  accomplishment  of  their  objects  is  the  most 
powerful  motive.  In  the  pursuit  of  renown  he  hardly  rose 
above  the  average  of  public  characters,  but  his  desire  for 
achievement  was  a  passion. 

In  the  end  there  was  no  war.  It  was  possible  to  avoid  it 
with  dignity.  Adams  chose  to  give  dignity  away  with  the 
bargain.  It  is  beyond  doubt  that  he  caught  at  peace 
in  order  to  prevent  Hamilton  from  obtaining  credit. 
His  action  was  too  inconsistent  and  precipitate  to  be  ex- 
plained on  any  other  hypothesis.  As  at  the  beginning  he 
had  disregarded  the  calmer  counsels  of  his  cabinet  in  the 
heat  of  his  indignation  against  France,  so  in  the  end  he 
ignored  them  in  scrambling  helter-skelter  for  peace  at  any 
price.  This  was  the  second  of  the  series  of  great  blunders  by 
which  the  ruin  of  the  Federalist  party  was  accomplished. 

Hamilton's  discharge  of  military  duties  during  this  period 
of  doubtful  negotiations  was  marked  by  his  usual  inability 
to  turn  out  flimsy  work.  His  measures  of  organisation  were 
effective  for  their  immediate  purpose,  and  possessed  in 
addition  the  same  quality  of  permanence  that  is  the  dis- 
tinction of  his  political  achievements—  the  quality  of  the 
Roman  road-makers  who  laid  for  the  purposes  of  a  single 


396  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1800  march  a  causeway  that  centuries  could  not  destroy.  Wher- 
^T<  43  ever  Hamilton  had  been  at  work  his  successors  found  their 
task  reduced,  a  body  of  coherent  principles,  a  consistent 
plan  that  was  capable  of  service  long  after  the  object  for 
which  it  had  been  undertaken  had  been  attained  or 
forgotten. 

7r/  ^  i  /•  -^  • 

CHAPTER  IV 

The  Victory  of  Jefferson 

IT  is  not  wonderful  that  a  party  rent  by  such  internal  dis- 
agreements was  in  a  poor  position  to  face  a  contest  with  its 
opponents.  The  attempt  to  exclude  Hamilton  from  command 
of  the  army,  and  the  disgraceful  conduct  of  the  negotiations 
with  France,  were  followed  shortly  afterwards  by  a  third 
blunder.  Adams,  seeing  everything  red,  and  unable  to  tolerate 
the  respect  entertained  for  Washington  and  Hamilton  by 
M'Henry,  Pickering,  and  Wolcott,  dismissed  these  gentle- 
men from  his  Cabinet  on  the  very  eve  of  the  Presidential 
election.  Apart  from  schism,  however,  the  Federalists  had 
lost  heavily  in  public  esteem.  The  blunders  of  Adams  were 
of  a  large  variety  and  wide  extent.  His  administration 
carried  things  with  a  very  high  hand  against  their  opponents. 
Their  Sedition  and  Alien  Acts,  passed  by  a  Congress  heated 
by  hostility  to  France  beyond  the  temperature  at  which  wise 
legislation  is  likely  to  be  distilled,  gave  to  Jefferson,  quietly 
waiting  and  watching,  the  opportunity  he  needed. 

These  measures  were  oppressive,  panic-stricken  and  unwise. 
They  were  contrary  to  the  spirit  of  reasonable  liberty,  and 
not  beyond  suspicion  of  infringing  the  constitution.  Jefferson 
seized  upon  the  advantage  with  his  instinctive  sagacity. 
The  ears  of  men  were  yearning  for  the  old  tunes,  and  he 
gave  them  loud  and  brazen  in  his  best  manner :  State  Rights 


THE  POLITICIANS  397 

and  the  Rights  of  Man ;  liberty,  equality,  and  the  rest  of  the  A.D.  1800 
phrases,  formulas,  maxims  and  war-cries  of  the  golden  age  T' 4c 
of  paper  constitutions  and  philosophic  revolutions.  He 
blundered,  say  critics  zealous  for  his  reputation,  with  pos- 
terity. He  went  far  beyond  the  mark,  alienating  and 
distressing  good  men  who  would  otherwise  have  ranged 
themselves  on  his  side.  His  object  was  to  create  an  atmo- 
sphere favourable  to  his  candidature,  and  it  cannot  be 
denied  that  he  succeeded.  His  methods  excite  more  ad- 
miration for  his  skill  than  respect  for  his  frankness.  With 
characteristic  cowardice  he  concealed  his  authorship  of  the 
most  incendiary  of  his  electioneering  addresses.  The  Ken- 
tucky Resolutions 1  were  transmitted  to  the  legislators  who 
brought  them  forward  upon  the  solemn  assurance  that  his 
name  should  not  be  disclosed.  The  kernel  of  this  violent 
document  was  a  proposition  which,  if  approved,  would  have 
been  fatal  to  the  Union.  Each  state,  he  announced,  had  an 
equal  and  inalienable  right  to  judge  for  itself  whether  or 
not  any  act  of  the  central  government  constituted  an  infrac- 
tion of  the  constitution.  If  a  state  arrived  at  the  conclusion 
that  the  constitution  had  been  infringed,  nullification  of  the 
Act  of  Union  was  the  proper  remedy.  Even  for  the  persons 
to  whom  this  draft  was  forwarded  its  purport  appeared  too 
formidable,  and  it  was  found  necessary  to  water  down 
certain  expressions.  The  Kentucky  Resolutions,  according 
to  one  admiring  biographer,  were  a  wicked  act  of  passion 
amounting  to  a  precedent  and  authority  for  the  War  of 
Secession.2  But  to  judge  in  this  fashion  is  to  miss  the 
real  point  of  the  matter.  To  the  true  Jefferson,  the  great 
planner  of  electoral  victories,  the  skilful  manoeuvrer,  the 
brilliant  foreseer  of  popular  opinion  for  twelve  months 
ahead,  what  did  it  matter  if  a  few  wise  and  good  men 
were  alienated  ?  What  did  he  know  or  care  about  Wars  of 

1  Ford's  Je/erson,  vii.  pp.  289-309.  2  Morse's  Jefferson,  p.  194. 


398  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1800  Secession  ?  Jefferson  at  his  greatest  is  entirely  unconcerned 
Mj!' 43  with  posterity  and  its  opinion  of  him.  The  art  in  which  he 
excelled  was  not  the  art  of  governing,  but  the  art  of  sitting 
in  the  highest  place  of  popular  favour.  As  an  artist  he  was 
inspired  when  he  drew  the  Kentucky  Resolutions.  Their 
wild  extravagance  gave  to  the  extremists  of  his  party  pre- 
cisely what  they  wanted.  The  opportunity  was  one  for  a 
noisy  orchestra.  A  subdued  melody  would  have  missed  the 
mood,  and,  while  it  might  possibly  have  earned  the  respect 
of  future  generations,  would  have  awakened  but  little 
enthusiasm  at  the  time,  The  man  who  chooses  the  right 
means  to  an  end  will  always  compel  a  certain  degree  of 
admiration.  The  aim  of  Jefferson  was  to  be  President  of  the 
United  States  at  the  election  following,  and  the  plan  of  his 
campaign  was  admirably  calculated  to  serve  this  purpose. 

The  election  which  fell  at  the  end  of  1800  was  con- 
tested more  keenly  and  upon  clearer  lines  than  its  pre- 
decessor. Party  organisation  had  advanced  by  great  strides 
during  the  four  years  of  John  Adams's  presidency.  The 
campaign  began  in  early  spring,  with  the  election  of  the 
state  legislatures  in  whose  hands  lay  the  choice  of  the 
presidential  electors.  Pennsylvania  was  the  first  great 
Federalist  defeat.  Short  of  miracles,  the  result  would  be 
decided  by  the  voting  in  New  York  state,  where  Hamilton, 
conscious  of  the  great  issues,  was  leading  his  party  against 
a  powerful  Democratic  combination.  His  defeat  was  the 
work  of  Aaron  Burr. 

Burr  was  a  consummate  party  organiser  in  a  constituency 
compact  and  small  enough  to  be  brought  into  actual  touch 
with  his  remarkable  personality.  By  a  truly  marvellous 
exercise  of  tact  he  laid  for  the  few  necessary  months  the 
jealousies  and  discords  of  the  Clinton  and  the  Livingston 
groups,  and  united  them  in  firm  co-operation  with  his  own. 
He  devised  a  new  weapon  in  party  warfare,  an  elaborate 


THE  POLITICIANS  399 

organisation  of  ward  committees  and  canvassers,  placing  his  A.D.  1800 
trust  in  machinery  rather  than  in  ideals.  New  conditions  M*' 43 
make  new  tactics.  The  leader  whose  pride  disdains  to  adapt 
the  old  drill-book  to  the  facts  before  him  is  usually  out- 
manoeuvred. Hamilton  followed  the  plan  which  had  so  well 
served  him  in  the  past, — reason  and  argument,  pamphlets 
and  speeches,  vigorous,  convincing,  dignified,  and  in  the 
grand  manner.  Burr  in  his  unconspicuous  fashion  worked 
quietly  at  his  lists,  interviewed  multitudes  of  unimportant 
men,  pleasing  every  one  by  his  tactful  compliments,  his 
ready  counsel,  his  unassuming  courtesy  and  good  manners. 
He  was  not  fighting  for  any  cause,  but  merely  for  victory. 
Opinions  and  convictions  were  never  allowed  to  embarrass 
the  contest  or  endanger  its  result.  A  negative  was  much 
safer.  The  overthrow  of  those  evil-minded  Federalists, 
hankering  after  monarchy,  distrusting  the  people,  tampering 
with  the  constitution,  filling  the  air  with  their  noisy  dis- 
cords, was  a  stronger  '  ticket '  than  any  positive  propaganda. 
Burr's  party  was  but  newly  healed  of  its  wounds,  and  an 
outbreak  of  disunion  was  a  constant  menace.  He  viewed 
these  conditions  calmly  as  a  wirepuller,  without  prejudice 
and  without  enthusiasm,  and  judged  the  highest  wisdom  to 
lie  in  keeping  the  minds  of  his  supporters  fixed  upon  the 
iniquity  of  their  opponents,  and  not  allowing  them  to  stray 
into  premature  speculations  upon  the  various  uses  to  which 
a  Democratic  victory  might  be  turned. 

The  unfortunate  Burr  stands  in  American  history  like 
some  figure  of  straw,  at  whose  riddled  reputation  every 
aspirant  for  a  virtuous  renown  lets  off  his  pistol.  He  is  a  sort 
of  universal  cockshy  for  all  good  men ;  a  kind  of  scapegoat 
for  democratic  institutions.  Doubtless  he  was  a  rascal  who 
deserved  all  he  got ;  but  he  is  less  distinguished  from  other 
politicians  by  the  pre-eminence  of  his  rascality  than  by  the 
attainment  of  his  deserts.  He  was  certainly  a  wirepuller,  a 


400  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A,D.  1800  successful  practitioner  of  petty  intrigue  (if  it  be  desired  to 
^T* 43  call  things  by  unpleasant  names) ;  but  in  our  flight  of  indig- 
nation it  may  profitably  be  remembered  that  the  methods  of 
working  an  election  which  he  employed,  and  which  to  a 
large  extent  he  discovered,  have  been  adopted  by  every 
country  to  which  we  allow  the  titles  of  free  and  enlightened. 

The  fact  is,  obloquy  has  attached  itself  so  tightly  to 
the  name  of  Burr,  that  it  is  customary  to  abuse  him  for 
everything  he  did  during  his  long  and  variegated  life. 
Among  other  things  for  which  he  has  been  attacked  are  the 
methods  he  employed  during  the  New  York  election,  and 
people  who  employ  no  other  methods  at  the  present  time, 
in  New  York  and  elsewhere,  shake  their  heads  over  him 
and  call  him  knave.  The  sin  would  appear  to  lie  in 
his  originality,  and  the  plagiarists  may  escape  censure. 
His  methods  were  hated  and  denounced  by  the  defeated 
Federalists  mainly  because  they  were  new,  clever  and  suc- 
cessful. They  were  pronounced  unworthy ;  but  seeing  that 
they  fitted  the  wants  of  the  situation,  and  have  continued 
to  fit  them  from  that  day  to  this,  the  charge  can  only  be 
supported  upon  the  admission  that  Democracy  itself  is 
unworthy. 

The  sum  of  his  offence  in  this  particular  is  that  he 
applied  a  sound,  businesslike  organisation  to  the  problem 
of  a  popular  election.  In  principle,  when  closely  examined. 
WQ  cannot  see  that  it  is  open  to  any  grave  moral  objection. 
Only  in  some  visionary  republic  will  the  citizens  ever  vote 
in  full  force  without  much  management.  Ideals  alone  will 
serve  the  purpose  only  on  occasions  of  exceptional  exalta- 
tion. As  for  his  practice,  there  is  probably  much  in  it  that 
may  be  reprehended ;  much  dirt  and  mire,  bribery  and  pro- 
mises, sordid  expectations  and  mean  appeals  to  low  motives, 
with  drams  and  libations  and  other  like  influences  which  do 
not  enter  into  our  theory  of  a  perfect  State.  But  allowing 


THE  POLITICIANS  401 

so  much,  it  is  but  reasonable  to  look  at  the  fashion  of  the  A.D.  isoo 
times.     In  the  general  drab  of  morality  Burr's  historical    ^T-43 
campaign  attracts  no  remark.      It  is  not   even  a  darker 
shadow.     What  is  remarkable  about  the  event  is  that  he 
had  discovered  a  machinery  for  working  the  Democracy, 
and  that  Hamilton  had  not. 

The  Federalist  candidates  were  defeated,  and  with  their 
defeat  a  Democrat  President  became  almost  a  certainty. 
To  Hamilton  such  a  result  appeared  equivalent  to  the 
destruction  of  all  his  labours ;  the  overthrow  of  the  constitu- 
tion, repudiation  of  the  debt,  a  French  alliance,  and  the 
reign  of  the  philosophers.  He  made  the  double  error  of  j 
believing  the  windy  threats  of  his  opponents,  and  of  under- 
rating the  strength  of  his  own  work.  He  had  a  tendency 
to  exaggerate  the  dangers  to  be  apprehended  from  men 
who  spoke  loud  and  vaguely.  Jefferson  was  in  reality  too 
indefinite,  and  Burr  too  shrewd  a  thinker,  to  threaten  very 
seriously  any  existing  institution.  An  arrest  of  progress 
was  the  main  thing  to  be  dreaded,  but  to  Hamilton's  imagi- 
nation nothing  less  than  revolution  and  civil  war  seemed 
imminent.  The  real  ballast  of  his  singular  character  was  the 
confidence  and  exuberance  of  youth.  Middle  age  instead  of 
ripening  his  judgment  warped  it. 

Foreseeing  an  enormous  disaster,  and  considering  that 
any  measure  was  justifiable  to  avoid  it,  he  committed  the 
error  of  petitioning  the  Governor  to  call  together  the  old 
legislature  and  give  the  choice  of  presidential  electors  to 
districts.1  By  this  means,  instead  of  a  solid  Democratic 
vote  there  would  be  something  less  formidable — a  division, 
at  all  events;  possibly  a  neutrality.  For  this  suggestion, 
had  it  been  made  before  and  not  after  the  election,  there 
was  much  to  be  said.  On  a  former  occasion  it  had  even 
been  advocated  by  Burr  himself ;  but  in  the  particular  cir- 
1  Works,  x.  pp.  371-74. 
20 


402  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1800  cumstances  it  was  a  blunder  of  the  first  order,  and   the 
^ET'  43    proposal  was  rightly  rejected  by  Governor  Jay. 

After  the  New  York  election  a  great  party  leader  would 
have  seen  clearly  that  the  only  chance  of  defeating  the 
Democrats  lay  in  closing  up  the  ranks.  Absolute  solidarity 
was  the  first  essential.  Accidents  and  dissensions  among 
the  enemy,  of  which  signs  were  not  altogether  wanting, 
might  conceivably  have  prevented  disaster.  But  Hamilton 
was  not  a  great  party  leader,  and  in  the  particular  circum- 
stances his  distrust  of  Adams  ran  away  with  him.  It  has 
been  assumed,  entirely  contrary  to  the  facts,  that  Hamilton, 
like  the  President,  was  actuated  by  personal  pique.  The 
assumption  is  a  natural  one,  for  there  was  a  long  account 
unsettled  between  them.  The  last  item  was  an  act  of  stupid 
insolence  that  undoubtedly  estopped  the  President  from  all 
legitimate  complaint  and  absolved  Hamilton  of  all  personal 
allegiance.1  It  is  quite  conceivable  that  Adams's  course  of 
fatuous  jealousy  may  have  warped  Hamilton's  judgment  of 
his  character ;  but  it  is  also  clear  that  his  action  during  the 
elections  was  not  due  to  any  desire  to  wipe  out  old  scores. 
Indeed,  it  may  be  said  truly  that  on  no  single  occasion 
during  his  public  career  did  Hamilton  ever  allow  his  political 
course  to  be  influenced  by  a  spirit  of  revenge.  The  sequel 
to  this  very  election  is  one  of  the  most  conspicuous  examples 
of  his  restraint.  The  issue  was  not  a  question  between 
individuals;  and  in  all  the  United  States  no  man  realised 
this  fact  more  clearly  than  Hamilton  himself.  It  is  therefore 
difficult  to  explain  why  he  should  have  prepared  a  document, 
written  in  his  usual  cogent  and  convincing  style,  the  main 
purpose  of  which  was  to  expound  the  errors  of  John  Adams, 
and  to  lay  the  blame  of  the  dissensions  in  the  Federalist 
party  at  his  door.  His  reasoning  and  his  array  of  facts  were 
irresistible ;  but  they  entirely  quarrelled  with  the  conclusion 

1  Lodge's  Hamilton,  pp.  230-31. 


THE  POLITICIANS  403 

of  his  address,  in  which  he  advised  that  the  Federalist  party  A.D.  isoo 
should  unite  in  support  of  Adams's  candidature  in  spite  of  ^T* 43 
everything  that  had  gone  before.  His  first  intention  appears 
to  have  been  to  publish  this  manifesto  broadcast ;  but  under 
pressure  he  reduced  the  scope  of  his  original  design,  and 
the  mischievous  pamphlet  was  converted  into  a  confidential 
communication  to  the  leaders  of  the  party  in  the  various 
districts  of  the  Union.  It  is  possible  that  even  this  folly 
might  have  yielded  to  cooler  counsels;  but  unfortunately, 
if  we  may  believe  tradition,  Burr  happened  to  be  walking 
early  one  morning  in  the  streets  of  New  York  when  he  met 
the  printer's  boy  carrying  the  proofs  to  Hamilton's  house. 
Possessing  himself  of  a  copy  he  proceeded  to  make  the 
contents  of  it  public,  so  that  the  author's  original  intention 
was  fulfilled. 

The  indiscretion  was  much  greater  than  its  actual  effect. 
The  voting,  in  spite  of  the  blow  to  the  Federalist  party, 
appears  to  have  been  solid.  Jefferson  and  Burr  received 
an  equality ;  between  Adams  and  Pinckney  there  was  only 
a  difference  of  one. 

Then  followed  a  long  period  of  alarm  and  intrigue. 
The  biographer 1  of  Burr  represents  him  as  having  played  the 
part  of  a  calm  and  angelic  personage,  willing  to  abide  by 
the  choice  of  the  people.  Biographers  of  Jefferson,  on  the 
other  hand,  represent  Burr  as  a  dangerous  and  devilish 
character,  ambitious  of  obtaining  the  presidency  '  by  foul 
means,'  and  the  author  of '  a  gross  betrayal.' 

The  venue  was  changed  to  the  House  of  Representatives, 
which  had  to  determine  which  of  the  two  should  be  Presi- 
dent. The  choice  was  therefore  in  the  hands  of  the  routed 
and  distempered  Federalists.  They  believed  Burr  to  be  a 
knave,  courteous,  amusing,  clever,  ambitious,  and  corrupt ; 
but  Jefferson  they  believed  to  be  a  successful  hypocrite. 

1  Parton. 


404  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON" 

A.D.  1800  Things  having  gone  all  wrong  in  the  party  sense  they  had 
^T.43  grown  reckless,  and  were  inclined,  like  any  demoralised 
and  discomfited,  mob,  to  let  off  their  pieces  in  a  desperate 
fashion.  It  was  rather  a  question  with  them  which  of  the 
two  candidates  they  hated  least  than  which  would  do  least 
harm  to  the  United  States.  Being  entirely  beaten  and 
without  hope  of  carrying  their  own  man,  they  came  down  to 
purely  social  considerations.  They  knew  Burr  to  have  been 
a  distinguished  soldier,  a  very  brave  man,  cynical,  brilliant, 
affectionate,  good-humoured,  good-mannered,  dignified,  and 
most  faithful  to  his  personal  friends — all  these  things,  but 
a  knave  notwithstanding.  When  the  issue  was  reduced  to 
a  question  of  comradeship  they  were  inclined  upon  private 
and  personal  grounds  to  prefer  the  knave  to  the  hypocrite. 
Their  inclination  was  certainly  against  the  interest  of  the 
state,  and  it  is  probable  that  each  Federalist  was  in  his 
heart  fully  aware  of  this  fact;  but  he  also  knew  that  his 
opponents  of  the  Democratic  faction  regarded  the  election 
of  Jefferson  as  a  matter  of  supreme  importance,  and  malice 
urged  him  to  defeat  this  aspiration. 

That  Burr  intrigued  for  Federalist  support  does  not  appear 
to  be  beyond  doubt.  Even  had  he  done  so  the  fact  would 
hardly  justify  such  grandiose  phrases  of  abuse  as  'foul  means' 
and  '  gross  betrayal/  especially  in  view  of  the  fact  that  Jeffer- 
son himself  gave  pledges  to  his  opponents  that  he  would  not 
reverse  the  chief  acts  of  their  policy.  The  presumption  is 
always  against  Burr,  and  therefore  it  is  settled  in  history  that 
he  was  open  to  an  offer.  While  the  Federalist  party  was 
swithering,  the  matter  was  settled  by  Hamilton.  He  hated 
Jefferson  as  a  man  and  despised  him  as  a  statesman.  He 
had  no  dislike  to  Burr  as  a  man,  but  abhorred  him  as  a 
politician.  The  idea  of  this  cool,  cynical  and  ambitious 
adventurer  coming  into  a  position  where  the  beloved  con- 
stitution would  lie  at  his  mercy  was  intolerable.  Jefferson 


THE  POLITICIANS  405 

was  at  least  honest  in  private  matters,  and  in  affairs  of  state  A.D.  1801 
he  had  ideals.  He  would  be  a  weak  ruler,  but  not  a  rascal.  ^T>  ** 
Moreover,  it  was  clear  beyond  any  doubt  that  the  Democrats 
were  in  a  large  majority,  and  that  the  choice  of  this  party 
was  in  favour  of  Jefferson.  To  take  advantage  of  a  clumsy 
system  of  election  in  order  to  defeat  the  nomination  of  the 
victorious  party  appeared  to  Hamilton  to  be  bad  politics. 
In  great  matters,  though  not  in  little  ones,  he  kept  his  head. 
Contrary  to  the  irresponsible  opinion  of  his  party  he  urged 
the  claims  of  Jefferson.  All  his  great  influence  was  exerted 
against  Burr,  and  in  the  end,  against  the  predilection  of  his 
own  supporters,  his  great  rival  was  chosen  President  of  the 
United  States. 

With  the  administration  of  Jefferson  Hamilton  had  no 
relations  and  no  influence.  He  continued  to  be  the  chief 
mind  of  the  broken  and  dispirited  Federalist  party;  the 
most  prominent  figure,  the  most  active  and  industrious 
inspirer,  exercising  great  power  by  his  private  correspon- 
dence and  personal  influence.  But  he  was  no  longer  in  any 
sense  a  director  of  the  policy  of  his  country.  He  lived  long 
enough  to  be  reassured  as  to  the  permanency  of  his  own 
work,  to  be  ashamed  possibly  of  his  misgivings,  and  to 
realise  the  enormous  potency  of  a  tradition.  The  Union 
stood.  The  financial  policy  which  had  been  so  bitterly  re- 
viled was  maintained.  The  foreign  relations  were  dominated 
by  the  principles  of  the  Farewell  Address.  The  doctrine 
of  the  '  implied  powers '  was  stretched,  the  authority  of  the 
executive  was  magnified,  even  beyond  his  most  daring 
anticipations,  and  with  his  full  approval,  by  the  purchase 
of  Louisiana.  It  seemed  as  if  Hamilton's  opponents  were 
hypnotised  by  his  institutions.  They  might  protest  elo- 
quently, but  they  were  nevertheless  subdued.  Escape  became 
impossible.  The  tradition  was  everywhere  victorious. 


406  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

.  <v    '    '  v 

CHAPTER  V 

Aaron  Burr 

A-D-  AARON  BURR  became  Vice-President  of  the  United  States  in 
Mi.  44-47  March  1801,  when,  contrary  to  their  inclinations,  and  under 
the  influence  of  Hamilton,  the  Federalists  permitted  the 
will  of  their  opponents  to  prevail,  and  Jefferson  was  elected 
to  the  highest  office.  The  Vice-President  is  not  an  active 
force  in  government.  He  is  not  even  a  member  of  it;  but  a 
sort  of  Queen  Bee  kept  in  reserve  in  a  cell  in  case  the  acting 
monarch  should  die  or  be  killed.  His  position  is  one  of 
honour  and  dignity,  but  of  no  executive  importance.  He 
presides  over  the  Senate,  and  in  earlier  times  was  held  to 
have  a  kind  of  reversionary  interest  in  the  Presidency. 

It  was  no  post  for  an  active  and  ambitious  man  up  to  the 
ears  in  debt,  with  many  enemies  and  a  dubious  reputation. 
The  President  treated  him  with  something  more  than 
coolness.  Prior  to  the  New  York  election  Burr  had  been  the 
recipient  of  letters  from  the  great  man  distinguished  by  the 
warmth  of  their  well-wishing.  Jefferson  had  written  taking 
'  an  opportunity  of  recalling  myself  to  your  memory,  and  of 
evidencing  my  esteem  for  you.' 1  But  Burr  the  quiet  organiser 
of  victory  in  New  York  State,  and  Burr  the  rival  for  the 
Presidency,  were  two  very  different  individuals.  Burr  had 
endangered  his  election,  and  had  shared  his  popularity. 
By  a  man  of  a  less  jealous  temperament  than  Jefferson 
these  incidents  might  have  been  held  sufficient  to  cancel 
all  previous  obligations. 

In  January  1804,  when  the  next  Presidential  election  was 
within  sight,  Burr,  who  was  certainly  never  found  wanting 
either  in  courage  or  candour,  sought  an  interview  with 
Jefferson  with  the  object  of  arriving  at  the  President's  true 

1  Ford's  Je/erson,  vii.  p.  145. 


THE  POLITICIANS  407 

disposition  with  regard  to  himself.     There  was  a  supposed     A.D. 

-18 

44-47 


intention  on  the    part  of   the  Virginia    clique  (Jefferson,  1! 


Madison,  and  Monroe)  to  keep  the  reversion  of  the  highest 
office  in  their  own  hands.  Yice-President  Adams  had  suc- 
ceeded to  President  Washington;  Yice-President  Jefferson 
had  succeeded  to  President  Adams,  but  Yice-President  Burr 
was  not  to  be  allowed  to  follow  after  President  Jefferson.  In 
New  York  State  the  Democratic  party  was  split  in  two. 
The  Clintonians,  supported  by  the  Livingston  faction,  had 
now  become  the  bitter  opponents  of  Burr,  and  had  started 
a  paper  i<l  a  more  than  usually  calumnious  character  to 
destroy  mm.  They  were  supposed,  and  not  without  some- 
thing to  show  for  it,  to  draw  encouragement  from  the 
President  himself.  The  Federalists,  it  is  true,  were  some- 
what inclined  to  favour  Burr;  but  more  from  hatred  of 
Jefferson,  the  Clintons  and  the  Livingstons,  than  from  any 
love  of  Burr.  Federalist  affections  were,  however,  little  to 
be  counted  upon;  for  Hamilton  had  already  shown  that  on 
any  great  issue  he  could  overawe  all  personal  sentiments, 
and  as  to  Hamilton's  opinion  of  Burr  there  existed  no  shadow 
of  a  doubt. 

In  these  circumstances  Burr  came  to  Jefferson  to  ask  that 
he  would  put  a  stop  to  the  'use  of  his  name  to  destroy 
him.'  Burr  professed  himself  willing  to  retire  from  the 
Presidential  candidature  in  order  to  avoid  a  party  schism, 
but  was  averse  from  taking  this  step  unless  it  were  accom- 
panied by  some  signal  mark  of  favour  '  which  would  declare 
to  the  world  that  he  retired  with  Jefferson's  confidence. 
The  results  of  the  interview  were  hardly  encouraging. 
Jefferson  appears  from  his  own  account1  to  have  spoken 
at  great  length,  making  nothing  clear  except  that  he  was 
not  disposed  to  take  the  step  which  Burr  desired.  We 
gather,  although  it  does  not  appear  precisely  in  so  many 
1  Ford's  Jefferson,  i.  pp.  301-4. 


408  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.      words,  that  had  Jefferson  been  willing  to  give  a  promise  of 
'    office,  Burr  would  have  undertaken  to  withdraw  from  the 

2&f.  44-47 

coming  contest,  to  leave  the  Virginian  clique  a  clear  field, 
and  to  use  his  influence  in  New  York  and  the  Northern 
States  in  favour  of  the  official  candidates.  But  this  price 
Jefferson  was  not  willing  to  pay  ;  nor  had  he  much  tempta- 
tion to  purchase  Burr's  adherence,  seeing  that  his  own 
re-election  was  practically  certain. 

Finding  the  President  disinclined  to  grant  him  any  terms, 
Burr  thereupon  played  his  own  game  boldly  and  at  once. 
He  proceeded  to  strengthen  himself  in  the  Northern  States, 
and  as  a  step  in  the  campaign  he  stood  for  the  Governor- 
ship of  New  York.  For  this  he  has  been  accused  of  disloyalty; 
but  then  it  was  his  misfortune  always  to  be  so  accused.  It 
is  difficult  to  say  why  he  should  have  acted  otherwise  than 
he  did.  The  official  Democrats  were  no  friends  of  his.  They 
had  ignored  him  upon  all  occasions,  and  had  lent  their  names 
to  damage  his  reputation  with  his  own  constituents.  He 
was  not  a  malicious  man.  His  object  was  not  to  cause 
annoyance  or  embarrassment  to  his  party,  but  merely  to  win 
their  confidence  by  one  of  the  most  practical  means  known 
to  the  human  race — to  make  himself  so  powerful  that  he 
could  not  be  disregarded.  The  Clinton-Livingston  factions 
do  not  appear  to  have  had  any  illusions  in  favour  of  Jefferson, 
but  they  fought  Burr  heartily  for  the  good  and  sufficient 
reason  that  they  were  jealous  of  his  predominance.  Con- 
sequently the  issue  was  once  more  in  the  hands  of  his 
opponents  the  Federalists.  Again  the  rank  and  file  of  this 
party  was  inclined  in  his  favour.  Again  Hamilton  put  forth 
all  his  great  influence  with  his  adherents  against  one  whom 
he  considered  to  be  a  national  danger.  Again  Burr  was 
defeated,  and  the  defeat,  situated  as  he  then  was,  in  debt  and 
distrusted  by  his  leaders,  meant  nothing  less  than  the  end 
of  his  political  ambitions 


THE  POLITICIANS  409 

The  catalogue  of  injuries  that  Burr  had  received  at  the  A.D. 
hands  of  his  great  enemy  was  a  long  one.  If  it  is  true  that 
Washington  took  his  estimate  of  Burr  from  his  Secretary  of 
the  Treasury,  then  Hamilton  had  prevented  his  appointment 
to  a  foreign  mission,  and  had  again  foiled  his  application  for  a 
high  military  post  in  the  Adams  administration.  Hamilton's 
authority  alone  had  prevented  him  from  receiving  the  votes 
of  the  Federalists,  and  securing  the  Presidency  of  the  United 
States  over  the  head  of  Jefferson.  Finally,  Burr  had  been 
defeated  by  the  same  relentless  adversary  in  his  forlorn  hope 
of  the  Governorship  of  New  York,  and  the  position  of  greatest 
power  in  the  Northern  States.  Hamilton  had  denounced 
him  in  public  utterances  and  private  correspondence.  The 
unguarded  phrases  of  his  letters  had  passed  into  the  current 
vocabulary  of  the  Federalist  party.  However  admirable  the 
result  for  the  fortunes  of  the  nation,  this  personal  antagonism 
was  a  thing  which  could  not  be  overlooked.  At  each  fresh 
attempt  towards  the  attainment  of  his  ambition  Burr  found 
himself  headed  off  by  Hamilton. 

Hamilton  and  Burr  were  born  within  a  year  of  one 
another.  Both  had  served  with  distinction  in  the  war. 
Both  had  won  a  high  reputation  for  military  organisation,  for 
leadership  of  men,  and  for  courage,  not  only  of  the  spirits, 
but  of  the  head.  Both  had  served  on  General  Washington's 
staff,  although  in  Burr's  case  this  association  endured  only 
for  a  few  weeks.  They  had  been  called  to  the  bar  at  the 
same  time,  and  immediately  and  together  they  found  them- 
selves famous  as  its  leaders.  Both  were  dandies,  handsome, 
dashing  and  gallant.  Both  were  eager  and  ambitious,  well- 
read  and  well-mannered.  Both  were  of  the  same  slight 
build,  and  diminutive  stature,  and  essential  dignity.  Burr 
had  wit  and  humour,  Hamilton  gaiety  and  eloquence.  Up 
to  the  last  they  met  politely  in  court  and  in  society,  and 
dined  at  one  another's  houses.  They  were  not  separated  by 


410  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

any  personal  dislike  or  constitutional  antipathy,  nor  were  they 
knit  together  by  any  natural  attraction.  Each  was  intelligent 
enough  to  take  a  pleasure  in  the  conversation  and  good 
manners  of  the  other.  Their  relations  were  not  warm,  but 
they  were  friendly  and  tinged  with  a  certain  respect.  Both 
hated  phrases,  and  had  an  eye  for  reality.  The  disposition 
of  both  was  to  be  men  of  action,  and  both  followed  the  law 
with  much  distinction,  but  mainly  as  a  means  to  a  living. 

In  so  much  that  was  alike  in  their  personal  qualities 
and  in  the  circumstances  of  their  lives,  one  great  difference 
prevented  a  private  intimacy  or  a  political  alliance.  Hamil- 
ton, for  all  his  combativeness,  viewed  politics  as  a  religion, 
and  never  as  a  game.  The  ideas  of  the  nation,  the  Union 
and  the  constitution,  were  sacred  ideas,  hardly  to  be  spoken 
of  lightly  even  in  jest.  He  desired  power,  in  order  that  he 
might  strengthen  the  state.  His  energies  were  concentrated 
upon  his  ideas,  and  only  to  a  small  extent  upon  his  career. 
He  is  a  type  of  great  rarity,  a  fighting  politician  who  was 
also  a  disinterested  statesman. 

To  Burr  this  view  of  the  matter  was  foolishness.  When 
he  believed  men  guilty  of  it,  which  he  did  but  rarely,  he 
spoke  of  them  with  a  good-natured  scorn.  The  only  serious 
zest  of  public  life  was  personal :  to  win  the  game,  to  prevail 
over  arduous  things,  to  prove  oneself  superior  to  fortune, 
and  men's  favour,  and  every  adversary.  His  manners  were 
amiable, -his  instincts  predatory.  What  we  have  already 
spoken  of  as  the  religion  of  the  hive  was  the  mainspring  of 
Hamilton's  politics.  Burr  was  a  plunderer  of  the  hive,  stand- 
ing in  the  same  relation  to  men  as  Atropos  the  Death's-head 
moth  to  bees.  To  Hamilton  the  welfare  of  the  race,  the 
eternity  of  the  city,  the  divine  obligation  of  the  law,  were  as 
the  Ark  of  the  Covenant.  He  was  a  man  of  the  world  and 
he  lived  in  rough  times,  but  he  kept  this  faith  till  Burr  shot 
him  in  the  heart  at  Weehawken.  His  strong  nature  was  a 


THE  POLITICIANS  411 

cave  of  passions  of  every  sort  and  description  over  which 
this  ideal  ruled  like  a  tyrant.  It  shook  his  whole  being  as 
men  are  shaken  by  avarice,  hatred,  or  love ;  as  wild  beasts 
are  stirred  by  danger  to  their  young.  When  a  man  is  born 
in  whom  the  instinct  of  self-preservation,  as  in  a  bee,  is 
habitually  and  spontaneously  dominated  by  the  instinct  of 
the  safety  of  society,  we  are  apt  to  regard  him  as  an  admir- 
able but  startling  departure  from  the  normal  type.  If  it 
were  possible  to  conceive  of  a  nation  in  which  such  a 
disposition  was  the  rule  with  ordinary  men,  it  is  clear  that 
at  its  pleasure  it  could  conquer  the  earth. 

Burr  also  was  much  driven  by  his  passions,  but  they  were 
unusual  only  in  their  vigour,  not  in  their  direction.  In  a 
sense  both  men  loved  the  hive,  but  Hamilton  loved  it 
because  it  contained  bees,  Burr  because  it  contained  honey. 

It  is  only  fair  to  judge  a  man  to  some  extent  from  his 
own  point  of  view  and  by  his  own  standards.  If  he  passes 
this  test  with  credit,  it  is  something  even  to  the  world,  and  a 
great  deal  to  himself.  Like  Hamilton,  Burr  was  conscious 
of  great  abilities  and  of  a  great  influence  over  men.  Neither 
took  the  slothful  servant  for  his  pattern,  but  all  the  endow- 
ments which  each  possessed  he  put  to  the  most  daring  use. 
But,  unlike  Hamilton,  Burr  viewed  his  laborious  enterprise 
as  being  strictly  bounded  by  the  limits  and  conditions  of  his 
time.  The  future  that  should  begin  when  his  own  life  ended 
was  nothing  to  him.  It  did  not  stir  him  even  to  curiosity, 
far  less  to  labour,  sacrifice,  or  enthusiasm.  What  moved 
Hamilton  was  something  far  greater  than  himself,  some- 
thing which  surrounded  him  on  all  sides,  which  had  been 
before  he  was,  which  would  be  for  centuries  after  he  walked 
no  longer  among  men.  Hamilton  beheld  a  vision.  Burr  saw 
no  visions,  and  such  men  as  did  he  accounted  the  victims 
of '  superstition.  He  saw  only  himself  and  some  private 
persons  whom  he  loved. 


412  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

Burr  did  not  underrate  his  own  qualities,  and  he  feared 
nothing.  As  a  ruler  of  men,  as  the  head  of  a  great  nation,  he 
would  be  best  able  to  justify  the  gift  of  his  talents  and  to 
make  them  yield  the  largest  usufruct.  But  both  men  and 
the  state  were  of  subordinate  importance,  and  although  he 
probably  considered,  honestly  enough,  that  his  triumph 
would  be  a  high  advantage  to  both,  it  would  not  have  altered 
his  resolution  had  he  judged  the  matter  otherwise.  Men  and 
the  state  were  the  medium  in  which  he  worked.  They  were 
the  lump  of  marble  and  he  was  the  sculptor.  The  supreme 
end  was  not  their  happiness,  but  his  own  art.  His  clear 
objective,  therefore,  was  the  highest  place,  and  his  first  duty 
was  to  arrive. 

We  are  familiar  with  the  spectacle  of  the  man  who  makes 
a  cult  of  his  own  career.  We  who  live  in  peaceful  times, 
under  fixed  and  powerful  traditions,  can  regard  this  solemn 
devotion  of  a  man  to  himself  without  anxiety ;  with  interest, 
amusement,  or  weariness,  according  to  the  gifts  of  each  wor- 
shipper. Out  of  little  men  it  produces  prigs,  out  of  great 
ones  buccaneers.  Burr  was  unfortunate  in  his  conditions ;  he 
might  have  had  a  chance  in  the  British  Parliament  of  those 
days,  but  he  was  too  artificial  a  gamester  for  the  circum- 
stances in  which  he  found  himself.  He  needed,  as  it  were, 
the  prop  of  highly  civilised  conventions  for  his  success.  His 
pirate  nature  was  hardly  exuberant  and  direct  enough  for  the 
rough  vigour  of  a  new  nation.  The  example  of  Napoleon 
was  his  misleading.  Against  the  wild  forces  of  the  Revolu- 
tion Burr  would  have  contended  in  vain  with  his  fine 
manoeuvres  and  delicate  intrigue.  His  faith  in  himself  was 
serene  and  imperturbable,  but  it  never  amounted,  as  in  the 
case  of  Buonaparte,  to  fanaticism,  and  that  perhaps  is  the 
chief  cause  of  his  failure  as  a  buccaneer.  For  in  the  supreme 
events  it  is  not  sufficient  to  be  reasonably  persuaded;  the 
man  who  is  to  succeed  must  be  unreasonably  confident. 


THE  POLITICIANS  413 

Burr's  minor  virtues  astound  us :  his  industry,  his  self- 
discipline — upon  Chesterfield  maxims — his  dignity  unruffled 
by  misfortune  or  success.  He  was  never  arrogant  and  never 
abased.  Exile,  poverty,  starvation,  deferred  hopes  and 
private  sorrows,  the  neglect  and  contumely  of  his  fellow- 
countrymen  found  him  still  the  same — smiling,  courteous, 
considerate  for  the  feelings  of  those  whom  he  met.  He  had 
also  an  extraordinary  courage,  daring  to  undertake,  persistent 
in  the  carrying  out,  and  patient  under  failure  and  adversity. 
His  charm  made  him  a  conqueror  in  all  societies,  nor  was  it 
a  thing  cultivated  merely  for  his  own  advantage  (though, 
doubtless,  he  must  have  known  its  utility),  but  sprang  spon- 
taneously from  a  sympathetic  and  affectionate  nature,  from 
an  eager  and  ever  youthful  interest  in  thought  and  in  men. 
He  was  wanting  in  enthusiasm  in  public  life,  but  he  was 
equally  wanting  in  misanthropy.  His  enemies  prevailed, 
he  suffered  great  misfortunes ;  but  he  never  appears,  like  the 
good  men  Jefferson  and  Monroe,  malicious  and  revengeful. 
He  could  lead  men  of  all  ranks — not,  like  Hamilton,  only 
leaders.  He  was  tolerant  of  foibles,  'was  not  impatient  of 
interested  motives,  and  did  not  exact  homage  to  incon- 
venient ideals.  He  neither  'bored'  nor  drove,  avoided 
treading  on  men's  toes,  dealt  quietly  and  courteously,  and 
until  the  time  was  ripe  appeared  to  be  quite  unambitious 
of  any  personal  distinction.  Possessing  such  qualities,  the 
puzzle  is  that  he  should  have  failed  so  completely  as  he  did. 

One  reason  of  Burr's  failure  is  that,  for  all  his  cleverness, 
he  never  arrived  at  seeing  things  together.  He  saw  them 
singly,  or  in  twos  and  threes,  with  an  admirable  perspicacity 
But  his  sight  was  dim  and  blurred  when  he  tried  to  grasp  in 
their  rough  proportions  all  the  multitude  of  facts  that 
compose  a  situation.  He  relied  too  much  on  the  minor 
arguments.  But  beyond  this,  his  nature,  sympathetic  to 
individual  men,  was  senseless  as  regarded  popular  emotions. 


414  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

He  lacked  entirely  the  intuition  of  Jefferson  for  the  moods  of 
the  constituency.  It  is  true  that,  like  Hamilton  and  unlike 
Jefferson,  he  saw  real  things  and  not  the  shadows  of  phrases ; 
but  he  saw  them  in  his  cool,  analytic  brain  without  per- 
spective. A  beetle  crossing  the  window-pane  was  larger  than 
an  elk  a  hundred  yards  away. 

Hamilton  not  only  saw  real  things,  but  he  saw  them  in 
their  true  proportions.  His  spirit  was  ever  seeking  for  a 
harmony  in  them,  for  a  law  and  a  purpose.  To  Burr's  clear 
but  disconnected  vision  things  were  altogether  purposeless 
and  lawless.  The  only  harmony  to  be  sought  for  by  the  wise 
man  was  in  his  own  career  and  not  in  externals.  The  levity 
of  human  creatures,  their  meanness,  sentimentalism,  timidity 
and  distrust,  all  the  veneer  that  covers  patriotism,  he  under- 
stood, and  no  man  better;  but  he  entirely  misjudged  the 
strength  of  the  fabric  because  he  made  no  account  of  what 
is  to  be  looked  for  underneath.  Something,  which  is  pos- 
sibly more  of  an  instinct  and  less  of  a  virtue  than  what  we 
understand  by  patriotism,  has  to  be  reckoned  with  at  its 
proper  value  when  a  man  is  meditating  violence  against  the 
state. 

Hamilton  also  made  the  error  of  underrating  this  resist- 
ance. He  saw  that  Burr  despised  the  strength  of  the  fabric, 
and  would  attempt  to  destroy  it  by  a  political  revolution; 
that,  failing  at  the  first  effort,  he  would  not  hesitate  to 
plunge  the  country  into  civil  war  rather  than  abandon  his 
project.  Hamilton  feared  that  society  would  not  stand 
the  strain  of  civil  war.  There  is  no  doubt  that  there  was 
in  fact  in  Burr's  mind  a  design  for  severing  the  Northern 
States  from  the  Union  should  he  have  succeeded  in  carrying 
them  in  his  favour  against  Jefferson  and  the  Virginia  clique. 
The  attempt  was  rendered  impracticable  only  by  his  defeat 
for  the  governorship  of  New  York.  A  few  years  later  (after 
Hamilton's  death)  we  find  him  actually  engaged  in  an 


THE  POLITICIANS  415 

endeavour  to  detach  the  South- Western  territories  from 
their  allegiance  by  force  and  arms,  and  to  found  a  great 
empire  and  a  Burr  dynasty  by  the  conquest  of  Mexico.  His 
imagination  soared  to  courts,  and  constitutions,  and  a  mili- 
tary monarchy.  His  plans  were  complete  and  admirably 
suited  for  dealing  with  the  opposition  of  those  contingencies 
which  he  foresaw,  and  of  such  forces  as  he  had  carefully 
measured.  But  his  foresight  was  at  fault,  and  his  calcula- 
tions were  absurdly  out  of  scale.  All  his  tact  and  courage 
were  insufficient  to  make  even  a  respectable  failure  of  this 
enterprise  which  inhabits  the  limbo  of  historical  fiascos. 
Hamilton  must  therefore  be  judged  right  in  his  estimate  of 
Burr's  intentions.  When  he  denounced  him  as  a  Catiline 
and  a  Napoleon,  and  prophesied  that  he  would  not  hesitate 
to  become  a  traitor  to  the  constitution,  he  was  not  using 
words  of  vain  exaggeration,  as  was  thought  even  by  many 
upon  his  own  side.  His  error  consisted  in  his  failure  to 
estimate  the  futility  of  such  an  effort. 

Another  cause  of  Burr's  non-success  was  the  atmosphere 
of  distrust  which  even  from  the  beginning  of  his  career 
enveloped  his  public  reputation.  Few  men  have  had  more 
loyal  and  devoted  friends,  and  few,  judged  by  their  fidelity 
to  private  friendship,  have  deserved  attachment  better.  But 
the  distrust  of  people  who  were  not  his  intimates  followed 
him  from  the  class-room  to  the  grave.  It  is  difficult  to 
discover  sufficient  grounds  for  this  opinion,  but  it  is  even 
more  difficult  to  believe  it  to  have  been  ill-founded.  It 
resembles  an  instinct  of  the  hive  against  an  enemy  of  the 
hive.  The  grounds  which  are  alleged  leave  always  some- 
thing to  seek.  The  rumours  of  pecuniary  irregularity  lack 
precision.  They  were  never  clearly  proven,  and  sometimes 
they  were  disproven.  The  mere  existence  of  debts  does  not 
constitute  a  man  corrupt.  The  attacks  of  his  opponents 
were  party  philippics,  less  violent,  certainly,  than  the 


416  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

charges  which  Giles  and  Jefferson  and  Monroe  directed 
against  Hamilton,  but  of  the  same  order.  The  malicious 
mendacity  of  his  domestic  enemies,  the  democratic  cliques 
of  New  York,  carries  even  less  authority.  And  yet  the  fact 
remains  that  every  one  did  distrust  him,  with  the  exception 
of  his  personal  friends,  not  only  as  a  loyal  citizen,  but  also 
as  an  honest  man. 

It  is  impossible,  moreover,  to  resist  the  conclusion  that 
Aaron  Burr,  with  all  his  great  and  admirable  qualities,  was 
in  fact  a  sham.  Chesterfieldian  maxims  are  not  the  best 
foundation  for  a  real  human  character.  His  manner  and  his 
pose  were  magnificent.  His  attitude  in  the  face  of  the  world 
was  sublime.  But  we  have  the  feeling  all  the  time  that  he 
was  acting ;  that  in  public  affairs  his  eye  was  fixed  upon  the 
pit  and  the  stalls,  or,  at  any  rate,  upon  the  critics,  rather  than 
upon  the  object.  He  made  no  vulgar  appeal  to  a  mean 
audience.  We  feel,  indeed,  that  often  his  sole  audience — pit, 
stalls  and  critics — consisted  of  himself,  and  he  was  a  severe 
judge.  But  it  was  acting  all  the  same.  It  was  self-conscious- 
ness and  concern  about  the  manner  of  doing,  much  more 
than  about  the  thing  to  be  done.  The  actual  goal  was 
always  secondary. 

To  be  a  great  man  of  action — statesman  or  buccaneer — 
there  must  be  a  subordination  of  self-consciousness  to  the 
external  aim;  a  simple,  artless,  overwhelming  passion  for 
attainment.  Burr  is  artistic  and  artificial ;  in  action  always 
the  dandy.  His  style  is  admirable.  He  has  the  most 
beautiful  manners.  He  is  neat  and  apt.  None  of  his  effort 
is  wasted.  But  always  in  great  attempts  he  fails  with  as 
much  certainty  and  grace  as  a  Stewart  Pretender.  It  was 
so  at  the  beginning  and  at  the  zenith  of  his  fame ;  and  to 
his  credit  be  it  said,  disappointment  and  sorrow,  dishonour 
and  neglect,  found  him  still  faultless  at  the  end.  The  game 
which  he  believed  himself  to  be  playing  he  lost.  The  game 


THE  POLITICIANS  417 

which  he  really  played  he  won.  His  true  object  was  a  kind 
of  fantastic  self- discipline,  in  which  pursuit  he  attained  the 
supremest  excellence. 

His  last  years  are  a  strange  picture.  He  continues  the  rule 
of  his  early  life— eats  little,  drinks  less,  works  hard  and 
makes  love  everlastingly.  At  the  age  of  seventy-eight  he 
marries  a  lady  of  beauty,  spirit  and  fortune,  and  another  lady 
breaks  her  heart  at  the  event.  Within  a  few  months  he 
is  separated,  coming  under  the  suspicion  of  infidelity. 

Stories  of  his  wit  and  pose  are  without  end.  'Was 
Hamilton  a  gentleman?'  inquired  some  foreigner  with  a 
notebook.  The  reply  is  filled  with  a  quiet  resentment: 
'  Sir,  I  met  him  ! ' 

But  there  is  always  the  actor:  the  actor  with  the 
severest  standard,  but  still  the  actor.  He  is  never  content 
with  the  effect  unless  he  himself,  the  hardest  of  the  critics, 
is  satisfied.  No  external  applause  will  compensate.  He 
was  not  a  great  man  of  action,  but  he  enacted  the  part  of  a 
great  man  of  action  to  admiration. 

Two  things  about  him  passed  the  bounds  of  acting — his 
generosity  and  his  affection.  He  had  at  all  times  many 
creditors,  and  it  cannot  be  said  of  him  that  he  was  depressed 
by  the  weight  of  his  obligations.  Strictly  he  was  an  immoral 
citizen,  because  he  flouted  the  sanctity  of  contract  and  gave 
away  upon  an  impulse  what  was  already  hypothecated  to 
others.  But  at  least  he  did  not  spend  upon  himself.  The 
simplicity  and  industry  of  his  life  were  exemplary.  He 
gave  because  he  could  not  resist  appeals,  because  he  could 
not  help  giving.  And  he  was  none  of  your  cold  givers, 
but  gave  always  with  sympathy;  never  the  benefactor, 
but  ever  the  comrade.  His  charity  was  of  the  heart, 
spontaneous,  promiscuous  and  usually  misdirected.  It 
lacked  organisation,  and  possibly  did  more  harm  than 
good.  It  was  emotional  and  not  deliberate,  and  upon  all 

2  D 


418  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

the  principles  of  his  friend  Jeremy  Bentham  its  method 
was  deplorable.  Still  he  lived  frugally,  and  gave  when  he 
felt  compassion,  and  that  is  something  to  set  against  the 
sanctity  of  contract  and  a  queue  of  creditors.  In  his  old 
age  the  habit  amounted  to  a  mania.  He  fancied  himself  rich 
and  gave  still  more  recklessly — a  more  amiable  and  a  less 
common  trait  in  septuagenarians  than  to  fancy  themselves 
poor  and  hoard. 

It  is  no  plea  for  a  public  character  that  he  was  loyal  to 
his  private  friends  and  beloved  by  them,  or  that  his  family 
affections  were  strong  and  unselfish.  In  these  respects 
there  was  something  of  a  likeness  between  Hamilton  and 
Burr.  As  a  husband  neither  was  distinguished  by  a  rigid 
fidelity,  but  in  affectionate  devotion  to  their  wives  both 
men  were  conspicuous.  In  an  age  when  respectful  awe 
rather  than  intimacy  and  comradeship  marked  the  relations 
between  parents  and  children,  both  were  altogether  excep- 
tional. They  were  not  only  respected  but  adored.  The 
correspondence  between  Burr  and  his  daughter,  his  constant 
devotion  to  his  little  grandson,  are  filled  with  an  intelligence 
and  sympathy  that  explain  the  intensity  with  which  his 
love  was  returned. 

Burr  was  in  his  last  period,  an  industrious  outcast  in  New 
York,  when  the  boy  died  in  the  south.  The  ship  which 
was  bringing  the  broken-hearted  mother  to  visit  him  never 
came  into  port.  These  were  the  real  griefs  of  his  long  life, 
in  comparison  with  which  poverty,  and  defeat,  and  the  dis- 
favour of  men  were  insignificant.  It  is  upon  his  conduct 
under  these  sorrows  that  we  rate  him  highest.  He  altered 
nothing  of  his  quiet  courtesy,  continuing  to  smile  upon  the 
world,  continuing  to  treat  mankind  with  friendliness,  to 
enjoy  their  society,  and  the  light  and  warmth  of  the  sun  and 
the  rest  of  God's  gifts  to  the  utmost  extent  of  which  his 
ardent  nature  was  capable ;  and  this  not  from  an  easy  self 


THE  POLITICIANS  419 

indulgence,  but  on  his  simple  theory  that  he  would  have 
been  ungrateful  and  a  coward  had  he  acted  otherwise. 

Not  only  with  his  family  and  friends,  but  wheresoever  he 
went,  travelling  sumptuously  or  living  on  crusts,  this  quiet 
little  gentleman,  with  his  eighteenth -century  manner, 
radiates  an  affectionate  atmosphere  that  even  his  wit,  his 
self-command,  his  exquisite  manners,  cannot  chill.  Jeremy 
Bentham  is  as  much  under  his  spell  as  the  testy  old  man  he 
meets  in  a  mail-coach.  English  philosophers  and  statesmen, 
Scots  lawyers  and  ministers,  Swedish  merchants,  German 
princes,  dukes  of  the  empire,  rough  frontiersmen,  clerks  and 
shop-boys,  soldiers  and  sailors,  every  variety  of  man,  rich  and 
poor,  old  and  young,  honest  citizen  or  reckless  outlaw,  every 
casual  acquaintance  and  simple  wayfarer,  are  won  with  the 
same  magic.  They  like  him  because  they  believe  that  he 
likes  them  and  understands  them,  which  there  is  little  doubt 
he  did.  As  for  women  and  children,  they  followed  him  as  if 
he  had  been  the  Pied  Piper  of  Hamelin — the  former  not 
always  to  their  own  advantage. 

Lovers  of  Hamilton  and  of  a  settled  order,  Federalist  par- 
tisans and  outraged  Democrats,  have  drawn  the  picture  of 
Burr  which  is  accepted  in  history  books.  It  is  only  natural 
that  the  shadows  have  been  overblackened.  He  was  a  bad 
citizen,  no  doubt,  but  he  was  a  brave  gentleman.  His  public 
career  ended  in  blank  failure,  bitter  derision  and  merited 
obloquy.  Moralists  are  certainly  in  the  right  when  they 
point  to  his  vices  as  the  cause,  but  the  cynics  would  no  less 
certainly  be  in  the  right  if  they  pointed  to  his  virtues  as 
contributory.  From  a  kind  of  intellectual  coxcombry  he 
elected  to  play  a  part  in  the  world  for  which  his  nature  was 
altogether  unsuited,  a  part  which  demanded  that  he  should 
have  been  stern,  relentless,  masterful  and  something  of  a 
fanatic.  The  possession  of  these  qualities  was  denied  to  him. 
He  could  only  put  on  their  masks,  and  that  was  not  enough. 


420  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 


CHAPTER  VI 
and  Death 


A.D.  1804  THE  immediate  cause  of  the  duel  in  which  Hamilton  lost 

JJITI—        *  tj 

his  life  was  so  trivial  as  not  to  merit  examination  —  what 
somebody  had  written1  that  Hamilton  had  said  to  some- 
body else.  The  challenge  was  sent  upon  that  verbal 
pretext,  but  as  Hamilton  well  knew,  the  real  occasion 
was  an  essential  antagonism.  When  gentlemen  of  delicacy 
shot  one  another  on  account  of  a  lady,  it  was  usual 
to  feign  a  disagreement  about  the  claret  or  a  difference 
over  cards.  It  was  a  graceful  fashion  which  kept  logic, 
and  upon  rare  occasions  even  gossip  itself,  from  inter- 
meddling in  the  question.  It  would  have  savoured  too 
much  of  the  melodrama  if  Burr  had  sent  his  challenge 
on  the  ground  of  '  an  essential  antagonism.'  We  are  inclined 
to  agree  with  his  biographer  that,  having  regard  to  the 
conventions  of  the  time,  the  two  men  were  by  circumstances 
foredoomed  to  fight.  They  had  been  pitted  against  one 
another,  not  on  one  occasion,  but  on  many.  The  result 
had  not  been  a  drawn  battle,  but,  with  a  single  exception, 
a  series  of  defeats.  Hamilton  had  been  the  vigorous  and 
successful  aggressor;  Burr,  constantly  within  sight  of 
victory,  had  been  completely  discomfited.  Few  gentlemen 
have  ever  sent  a  friend  with  a  message  upon  more  substan- 
tial provocation. 

It  has  been  generously  assumed  that  Burr  challenged, 
because  he  was  revengeful  and  a  scoundrel.    Much  discus- 

1  Dr.  Cooper,  in  an  electioneering  letter,  had  stated  that  Hamilton  had 
described  Burr  as  '  a  dangerous  man,  and  who  ought  not  to  be  trusted  '  ;  and 
subsequently,  '  I  could  detail  to  you  a  still  more  despicable  opinion  which 
General  Hamilton  has  expressed  of  Mr.  Burr.'  (Morse's  Hamilton,  vol.  ii. 
p.  356.  For  account  of  duel,  etc.,  see  also  Parton's  Burr.) 


THE  POLITICIANS  421 

sion,  however,  has  taken  place  and  many  words  have  been  A.D.  1804 
wasted  upon  the  question  why  Hamilton  fought.  He  was  ^T<  47 
a  Christian,  enlightened  and  liberal,  a  hater  and  despiser 
of  the  institution  of  duelling.  He  was  a  man  whose 
courage  was  beyond  suspicion,  whose  eminence,  services  and 
family  circumstances  might  well  have  justified  a  refusal. 
Why  had  he  not  the  moral  courage  to  decline  the  combat  ? 
Much  censure  and  some  elaborate  theories  leave  us  to  face 
the  fact  that  he  fought  because  duelling  was  an  institution 
and  because  he  was  Hamilton.  Had  Jefferson  found  him- 
self placed  in  like  circumstances  he  would  undoubtedly 
have  refused,  and  even  by  the  standards  of  the  day  his 
action  would  have  been  considered  natural  and  proper. 
For  Jefferson  belonged  to  the  new  school.  He  was  a  phil- 
anthropist and  a  philosopher.  His  position  and  influence 
with  his  party  would  have  been  enhanced  rather  than 
diminished  by  a  refusal  to  engage. 

But  with  Hamilton  it  was  altogether  different.  His 
whole  scheme  of  politics  and  plan  of  life  rested  upon  the 
old  fashions.  What  was  bad,  foolish,  or  archaic  he  accepted 
with  the  rest  in  the  fear  that  by  eliminating  anything  the 
fabric  might  be  loosened.  The  idea  of  his  state  was  an 
aristocracy,  and  duelling  was  somewhat  in  the  nature  of 
a  cockade.  In  his  own  case  he  attached  little  importance 
to  the  privilege,  but  he  could  not  logically  deny  it  to  others. 
He  had  given  the  provocation,  and  it  was  not  for  him  (so 
he  may  well  have  argued)  to  refuse  his  enemy  satisfaction. 
The  Federalists  as  a  party  shared  his  opinions.  If  he  had 
suddenly  taken  up  a  humanitarian  position  when  it  was 
a  case  of  avoiding  a  personal  risk,  he  would  undoubtedly 
have  been  sustained  by  many  of  his  friends,  but  he  would 
with  equal  certainty  have  lost  caste  with  a  large  section 
of  his  followers.  Had  Hamilton  found  himself  in  Burr's 
position  there  is  no  doubt  that  he  would  not  have  sought  a 


422  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1804  duel;  but  when  it  is  a  question  of  putting  down  duelling  it 
^ET.  47    must  ^Q  by  the  aggrieved  party  waiving  his  rights,  not  by 
the  giver  of  offence  pleading  the  privilege  of  his  conscience. 

With  Burr's  conduct  leading  up  to  the  duel,  and  during 
the  period  of  four  weeks  that  elapsed  between  the  challenge 
and  the  meeting,  imaginative  animosity  has  been  busy,  as 
with  all  the  principal  events  of  his  career.  Federalist  and 
anti-Burr  journals  hastened  to  allege  after  the  event  that 
he  had  employed  the  period  advantageously  by  practising 
in  cold  blood  at  a  tree  in  his  garden.  It  is  probable  that 
he  did  nothing  of  the  kind ;  but  if  he  had,  he  was  not  only 
well  within  his  rights,  but  also,  well  within  established 
custom,  which  in  this  particular  of  the  duello  at  all  events 
is  founded  upon  common-sense.  It  has  also  been  stated  that 
on  the  eve  of  the  appointment,  anticipating  the  possibility 
of  his  death,  he  did  up,  and  arranged  neatly  and  orderly 
in  packets  his  large  and  compromising  correspondence  with 
women,  leaving  the  collection,  and  the  necessary  clues, 
as  a  bequest  to  his  daughter,  with  the  cynical  direction 
that  if  she  made  use  of  them  discreetly  she  need  never 
want.  His  daughter  was  well  married,  and  in  no  danger 
of  want.  If  we  may  judge  her  by  her  letters,  she  was  of 
too  noble  a  disposition  to  consider  blackmail  in  the  light 
of  a  possible  alternative  even  to  starvation ;  and  if  we  may 
judge  Burr  by  his  letters  to  her,  much  as  he  loved  her,  he 
would  rather  have  seen  her  dead  than  stooping  to  such 
infamy.  The  truth  was  precisely  the  contrary,  for  he 
appears  to  have  been  at  considerable  pains  to  arrange  for 
the  destruction  of  his  letters  lest  they  should  come  into 
hands  that  would  misuse  or  even  dare  to  read  them.  These 
stories,  unimportant  in  themselves,  are  only  worthy  of 
attention  as  showing  the  extent  to  which  Burr's  very  ragged 
reputation  has  been  converted  into  an  unbelievable  scare- 
crow by  the  inartistic  zeal  of  his  enemies. 


THE  POLITICIANS  423 

When  Hamilton  accepted  the  challenge  he  asked  for  a  A.D.  1804 
delay  of  several  weeks  in  order  to  conclude  the  cases  in 
which  he  was  engaged,  and  to  settle  his  personal  affairs. 
The  latter  obviously  could  not  have  required  so  long  a 
period.  They  might  easily  have  been  dealt  with  in  a  few 
days,  if  not  in  a  few  hours.  It  is  characteristic  of  Hamilton 
to  have  been  concerned  that  the  clients  who  had  trusted 
him  should  not  be  deprived  of  his  services  until  the  settle- 
ment of  their  business ;  but  it  is  an  unusual  case  to  find  a 
man  coolly  and  cheerfully  (for  the  accounts  are  very  precise 
upon  this  point)  attending  to  the  affairs  of  other  people 
during  such  a  time  of  suspense. 

For  the  last  nine  years  of  his  life  Hamilton  had  devoted 
himself  seriously  to  the  practice  of  the  law.  He  was  the 
leader  of  the  New  York  bar  during  the  whole  of  this  period, 
and  although,  had  he  abstained  altogether  from  public  work, 
he  doubtless  might  have  added  considerably  to  his  income, 
his  earnings  were  substantial  even  if  we  judge  them  by 
modern  standards,  and  very  large  indeed  compared  with  the 
rewards  of  his  own  day.  His  first  task  on  resuming  prac- 
tice was  to  discharge  the  debts  he  had  contracted  while  in 
office ;  his  second,  to  provide  for  his  family.  The  salary  of 
the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  was  totally  inadequate  to  the 
position,  and  as  has  already  been  stated,  he  was  forced  to 
live  upon  his  savings  while  they  lasted,  and  afterwards  to 
contract  serious  liabilities.  It  seems  certain  that  he  had 
succeeded  in  clearing  himself  of  many  if  not  all  of  his  old 
debts,  and  was  engaged  successfully  in  providing  for  his 
family  when  he  met  with  his  death. 

On  an  average  calculation,  he  had  reasonable  expectations 
of  at  least  twenty  years  of  active  professional  life.  There 
was  no  obligation  to  an  excessive  frugality.  The  charges 
of  incompetence  and  misjudgment  do  not  attach  to 
Hamilton  at  any  point.  He  was  successful  and  industrious 


424  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1804  in  his  profession.     Though  generous,  he  was  no  spendthrift. 
Mi.  47    j^  pjan  £or  tke  jnvestment  Of  his  savings  was  judicious,1 

and  only  an  accident  put  him  at  a  disadvantage.  The 
man  of  business  who  so  frames  his  budget  as  to  provide 
for  every  contingency,  whose  aim  is  to  shelter  his  property 
from  every  conceivable  risk,  will  never  'make  a  spoon  or 
spoil  a  horn.'  He  will  never  be  overtaken  by  failure, 
and  he  will  never  achieve  success.  He  will  deserve  blame, 
according  to  the  Gospels.  He  will  receive  praise  only 
from  the  writers  of  moral  tales.  Hamilton  acted  in  this 
matter  as  it  is  worthy  to  act.  He  regarded  the  few  main 
probabilities,  he  disregarded  the  thousand  and  one  things 
that  were  only  possible.  The  Caesarian  maxim  applies  to 
worldly  gear  as  well  as  to  a  man's  life.  There  is  a  pre- 
cautionary price  at  which  it  is  not  worth  while  to  possess  it. 

Hamilton,  it  should  be  remembered,  gave  the  best  years 
of  his  life  to  his  country,  and  took  for  his  services  less  than 
a  living  wage.  He  lived  before  the  days  of  party  presenta- 
tions and  teapots  full  of  sovereigns.  Millionaires  were  scarce 
in  those  times  in  the  United  States,  and  neither  political 
enthusiasm  nor  personal  gratitude  had  stirred  the  prosperous 
classes  to  write  cheques  in  six  figures  for  the  endowment  of 
their  champions.  Hamilton  started  upon  his  career  as  a 
penniless  student.  He  gave  much  time  and  effort  for 
nothing,  or  for  an  utterly  inadequate  stipend.  He  never 
enjoyed  the  recompense  due  to  his  military  services ;  for 
he  resigned  all  his  claims  in  order  that  he  might  be  free 
to  serve  the  army  by  advocating  their  cause  in  Congress. 
Neither  from  the  Union  nor  from  the  State  of  New  York 
did  he  ever  receive  any  allowance  of  lands  such  as  was 
made  to  officers  of  similar  rank.2  No  man  had  ever  better 
excuse  for  dying  penniless. 

In  his  will,  made  in  anticipation  of  the  duel,  he  estimates 

1  He  bought  land  in  the  vicinity  of  New  York.  2  Works,  x.  p.  479. 


THE  POLITICIANS  425 

the  chances  of  his  dying  insolvent.     "  Should  it  happen  A.D.  1804 

'  that  there  is  not  enough  for  the  payment  of  my  debts,  I    ^Tl  47 

'  entreat  my  dear  children,  if  they  or  any  of  them  shall  ever 

'  be  able,  to  make  up  the  deficiency.     I,  without  hesitation, 

'  commit  to  their  delicacy  a  wish  which  is  dictated  by  my 

'  own.    Though  conscious  that  I  have  too  far  sacrificed  the 

'  interests  of  my  family  to  public  avocations,  and  on  this 

'  account  have  the  less  claim  to  burthen  my  children,  yet  I 

'  trust  in  their  magnanimity  to  appreciate,  as  they  ought, 

'  this  my  request." * 

"  On  the  fourth  of  July  Hamilton  and  Burr  met,  for  the 
'  last  time,  at  the  convivial  board.  It  was  at  the  annual 
'  banquet  of  the  Society  of  the  Cincinnati,  of  which  Hamilton 
'  was  president  and  Burr  a  member.  Hamilton  was  cheer- 
'  ful,  and  at  times  merry.  He  was  urged,  as  the  feast  wore 
'  away,  to  sing  the  only  song  he  ever  sang  or  knew,  the 
'  famous  old  ballad  of  The  Drum.  It  was  thought  afterward 
'  that  he  was  more  reluctant  than  usual  to  comply  with  the 
'  company's  request ;  but  after  some  delay  he  said,  '  Well, 
'  you  shall  have  it,'  and  sang  it  in  his  best  manner,  greatly 
*  to  the  delight  of  the  old  soldiers  by  whom  he  was  sur- 
'  rounded.  Burr,  on  the  contrary,  was  reserved,  mingled 
'  little  with  the  company,  and  held  no  intercourse  with  the 
'  president.  He  was  never  a  fluent  man,  and  was  generally, 
'  in  the  society  of  men,  more  a  listener  than  a  talker.  On 
'  this  occasion  his  silence  was,  therefore,  the  less  remarked ; 
'  yet  it  was  remarked.  It  was  observed,  too,  that  he  paid 
'  no  attention  to  Hamilton's  conversation,  nor,  indeed,  looked 
'  toward  him  until  he  struck  up  his  song,  when  Burr  turned 
'  toward  him,  and,  leaning  upon  the  table,  looked  at  the 
'  singer  till  the  song  was  done.  The  difference  in  the 
'  behaviour  of  the  two  men  was  doubtless  owing  partly  to 

1  Works,  x.  pp.  481-82. 


426  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1804  '  their  different  positions  at  the  banquet.  Hamilton,  as  the 
T<  '  '  master  of  the  feast,  was  in  the  eye  of  every  guest,  while 
*  Burr  could  easily  escape  particular  observation.  The  object 
'  of  both  was,  of  course,  to  behave  so  as  not  to  excite 
'  inquiry." l  It  is  an  odd  picture,  and  as  it  is  drawn  by  Burr's 
biographer,  who  had  the  evidence  of  persons  present  to  found 
upon,  we  may  take  it  as  authentic. 

The  duel  was  fought  on  the  llth  of  July,  under  the 
heights  of  Weehawken,  upon  a  grassy  platform  overlooking 
the  Hudson  River.  Hamilton  fell  mortally  wounded  at  the 
first  fire.  There  has  been  much  dispute  as  to  his  action. 
Burr  and  his  second  maintained  that  he  fired  at  his 
opponent  and  missed.  The  generally  accepted  version  is 
that,  in  accordance  with  his  expressed  intention,2  he  did 
not  fire  at  the  word,  but  that  his  pistol  went  off  as  he  was 
falling.  It  is  certain  that  he  refused  to  have  the  hair-spring 
set.  The  matter  is  of  little  moment.  If  a  moral  stigma 
attaches  to  duelling  under  the  conditions  of  that  time,  it 
attaches  because  the  man  consented  to  engage.  That  he 
held  his  fire,  or  let  off  his  pistol  in  the  air,  is  merely 
irrelevant  chivalry. 

Hamilton  died  on  the  following  day.  The  world  mourned 
for  him  with  a  fervour  that  is  remarkable  considering  its 
treatment  of  him  in  later  years,  and  the  speed  with  which  it 
proceeded  to  forget  him.  It  mourned ;  and  then,  in  order 
that  the  emotion  might  be  complete,  turned  upon  Burr  and 
made  a  scapegoat. 

Hamilton  came  by  his  death  as  he  had  spent  his  life,  in 
the  service  of  his  country.  He  did  not  die  in  a  private 
quarrel.  If  he  had  fallen  at  Yorktown  or  been  killed,  as 
nearly  came  to  pass,  by  the  heavy  labours  of  his  office,  he 
would  not  more  certainly  have  sacrificed  himself  to  the 
interests  of  the  nation.  In  attacking  Burr  at  every  point 

1  Parton's  Burr.  a  Works,  x.  p.  474. 


THE  POLITICIANS  427 

he  was  not  attacking  a  man  whom  he  hated,  but  the  most  A.D.  1804 
formidable  and  conspicuous  type  of  a  class  of  men  whose  T' 
ambitions,  if  unchecked,  must  in  his  judgment  have  led  to 
the  ruin  of  the  state.  He  took  the  whole  circumstances  of 
the  case  into  account.  He  did  not  overlook  the  temper  or 
underrate  the  courage  of  his  opponent.  He  knew  only  too 
well  the  dangers  of  political  controversy,  for  his  eldest  son, 
a  mere  boy,  had  already  been  killed  in  a  similar  quarrel. 
He  was  well  aware  that  his  unrelenting  efforts  to  exclude 
Burr  from  public  life  were  nearly  certain  in  the  end  to 
provoke  an  appeal  to  arms,  which  from  his  own  position  and 
the  views  of  the  Federalist  party  and  the  people  in  general 
it  would  be  impossible  for  him  to  decline. 

Hamilton,  Jefferson  and  Burr  are  three  distinctive  types 
of  public  men.  Hamilton  was  a  type  of  the  statesman, 
Jefferson  of  the  sophist,  and  Burr  of  the  politician.  Their 
enmity  was  fundamental,  and  in  no  sense  peculiar  to  the 
special  period  in  which  they  lived,  or  due  to  any  accidents 
in  their  circumstances.  The  predominant  motive  of  the 
politicians  is  ever  their  own  advantage.  In  the  case  of 
Burr  this  was  not  only  the  predominant,  but  the  single 
motive.  His  adventures  and  his  fortunes,  his  great  talents 
and  his  engaging  personality,  introduced  an  element  of 
romance.  His  defects  of  character  led  to  failure  so  complete 
and  ludicrous  that  there  is  some  temptation  to  misjudge  the 
main  issue,  and  to  think  of  him  as  harmless  merely  because 
of  his  futility.  But  romance  and  futility  were  both  acci- 
dents. His  career  was  perfect  in  the  simplicity  of  its  aims. 
A  man  of  coarser  fibre  and  stronger  will  would  have  been  a 
more  dangerous  enemy  to  the  Union ;  but  no  politician  that 
has  ever  lived  is  a  truer  type  of  mischievous  intention. 

Hamilton's  public  career  was  a  long  struggle  against  the 
politicians  and  the  sophists.  In  the  green  youth  of  the 
republic  the  dangers  to  be  apprehended  from  the  latter  were 


428  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

A.D.  1804  of  more  account  than  the  attacks  of  the  predatory  classes. 
T'  The  early  period  was  one  of  exaltation.  Men  were  wrought 
up  to  a  high  pitch  of  emotion.  The  chief  peril  was  lest  they 
should  be  misled,  not  by  their  personal  interests,  but  by 
an  enthusiasm  for  shadows.  Jefferson's  loose  and  eloquent 
phrases  about  liberty,  fraternity  and  the  Rights  of  Man 
were  more  likely  to  wreck  the  Union,  by  stripping  the 
government  of  its  powers  and  by  involving  the  nation  in 
struggles  which  it  was  too  weak  to  bear,  than  the  plots  and 
combinations  of  greedy  adventurers.  But  as  the  tradition 
grew,  as  the  Union  hardened  and  became  strong  through  the 
exercise  of  its  functions,  the  sophists  ceased  to  be  a  formid- 
able menace.  Their  intention,  after  all,  was  virtue,  not 
mischief.  They  were  great  experts  in  the  use  of  words, 
which  often  did  not  correspond  to  facts ;  and,  as  they  guided 
their  own  course  of  action  as  they  would  have  guided  the 
policy  of  the  state — to  a  large  extent  by  words — they  were 
not  likely  to  prevail  against  settled  institutions  and  a 
vigilant  opposition. 

By  the  date  of  the  election  of  1800  danger  was  to  be 
apprehended  from  a  different  quarter.  Clearheaded  men 
who  had  no  scruples  about  using  the  state  for  the  purpose 
of  their  own  advancement  were  much  greater  evils.  The 
sophists,  being  to  a  large  extent  dupes  of  their  own  fancies 
and  slaves  of  the  passing  moods  of  the  people,  might  ulti- 
mately fall  a  prey  to  the  intrigues  of  adventurers  hampered 
by  no  concern  for  the  national  advantage.  For  the  poli- 
ticians, if  successful,  would  endeavour  to  use  the  sophists 
for  their  own  ends.  But  when  it  was  a  choice  between 
Jefferson  and  Burr  for  the  Presidency,  Hamilton  took  a 
practical  view  of  the  conditions  and  acted  without  hesitation, 
although  he  cannot  have  been  blind  to  the  possibility  that 
the  course  he  adopted  might  cost  him  his  life. 


THE  POLITICIANS  429 

4 ,,        j 

CHAPTER  VII 

The  Failure  of  ike  Democrats 

MEASURED  by  years,  Hamilton,  like  Pitt,  his  contemporary, 
died  young,  at  the  age  of  forty-seven.  It  is  difficult  to 
picture  him  as  an  old  man,  for  the  note  of  his  character  was 
youth.  It  was  said  of  Pitt  that  '  he  did  not  grow,  he  was 
cast.'  At  twenty-five  he  was  as  good  as  at  forty-five.  To 
a  certain  extent  the  same  is  true  of  Hamilton,  with  this 
difference — that  he  was  cast  in  the  mould  of  a  young 
man,  Pitt  in  that  of  an  old  one.  The  highest  virtue  of 
each  was  his  courage ;  but  Hamilton's  courage  was  eager 
and  impetuous,  while  the  courage  of  Pitt  was  remark- 
able chiefly  for  its  extraordinary  endurance.  There  is  in 
all  Hamilton's  work — writings  and  speeches — the  intense 
seriousness  of  youth.  The  qualities  that  made  him  a  great 
statesman  and  a  terrible  combatant  were  force,  lucidity  and 
conviction.  His  confidence  in  himself  and  in  his  ideas  is 
amazing,  amounting  almost  to  fanaticism.  It  is  possible 
that  the  Union  of  the  States  would,  in  one  way  or  another, 
have  achieved  itself  had  he  been  shot  at  Yorktown  instead 
of  Weehawken,  for  it  was  in  the  order  of  great  events ;  but 
the  speculative  historian  would  be  puzzled  to  supply  the 
deficiency  or  explain  the  method. 

If  we  seek  for  a  complete  presentment  of  the  man  in 
what  he  wrote  and  spoke  we  shall  not  find  it.  He  treats 
his  public  ceremoniously  and  with  reserve.  An  excessive 
gravity  is  the  rule.  Anger  is  the  only  passion  which  is 
permitted  to  appear;  not  a  beam  of  humour  or  a  flash  of 
wit.  The  whole  procedure  is  stately  and  tense.  This  also 
is  in  accordance  with  the  nature  of  youth. 

Hamilton  has    left  us    no   records   of   his  private    life 


430  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

from  which  we  can  construct  a  human  being.  His  pen  was 
a  sacred  weapon  which,  if  it  had  to  write  of  private  affairs, 
dealt  with  them  as  if  they  had  been  state  papers  or  a 
legal  precis.  The  elaborate  sprightliness  of  his  correspon- 
dence with  Gouverneur  Morris  and  Laurens  is  intimidating. 
The  picture  of  Hamilton  is  drawn  from  the  accounts  of 
others.  This  serious  young  statesman  we  gather  to  have 
been  remarkable  in  private  life  chiefly  for  his  high 
spirits,  his  good  looks,  his  bright  eyes,  and  his  extra- 
ordinary vivacity.  He  loved  the  society  of  his  fellow- 
creatures,  and  shone  in  it.  He  loved  good  wine  and  good 
company  and  beautiful  things — even  clothes  and  ruffles  of 
fine  lace.  He  despised  slovens  and  people  like  Jefferson, 
who  dressed  ostentatiously  in  homespun.  He  belonged  to 
the  age  of  manners,  and  silk  stockings,  and  handsome  shoe- 
buckles.  In  Bagehot's  excellent  phrase,  he  was  '  an  enjoying 
English  gentleman ' ;  companionable  and  loyal,  gay  and 
sincere,  always  masterful  and  nearly  always  dignified. 

Hamilton  would  have  appeared  in  all  likelihood  a  more 
heroic  figure  in  the  annals  of  his  country,  his  memory 
would  have  been  brighter  and  more  fortunate,  his  fame 
more  splendid  and  universal,  had  his  death  chanced  to 
coincide  with  the  retirement  of  Washington  instead  of  fall- 
ing some  eight  years  later.  For  he  would  then  have  died 
at  the  very  height  of  his  achievement.  Up  to  this  time  he 
had  never  known  defeat.  His  ideas  had  prevailed  even 
against  the  racing  tide  of  popular  emotion.  He  had  won  a 
victory  not  merely  against  his  rivals,  or  over  a  party.  He 
had  fought  with  the  people  itself,  and  had  held  it  till  it 
yielded  to  his  masterful  intention.  Men  knew  they  had 
been  beaten  by  him,  and  as  wisdom  in  due  course  began  to 
illuminate  the  confusion  of  their  thoughts,  they  were  satisfied 
with  the  issue.  They  did  not  love  him,  for  he  had  treated 
them  rudely,  nor  ever  hesitated  to  speak  his  mind ;  but  they 


THE  POLITICIANS  431 

feared  his  great  strength,  and  his  unerring  sagacity  filled 
them  with  respect.  They  felt  towards  him  as  one  running 
upon  a  precipice  feels  towards  a  rough  deliverer  who, 
catching  him  by  the  throat,  pitches  him  on  to  a  heap 
of  rubbish.  The  escaped  victim  is  at  once  grateful  and 
indignant;  safe,  but  badly  bruised.  His  dignity  is  ruffled, 
and  he  feels  himself  to  have  been  a  fool.  In  his  heart, 
perhaps,  he  thinks  that  he  might  have  been  rescued  from 
his  folly  with  something  more  of  tenderness,  and  considera- 
tion for  his  feelings. 

When  the  Farewell  Address  and  the  last  of  the  letters  of 
Camillas  had  been  read,  and  being  read  had  worked  the 
revolution  in  the  public  mind  which  their  authors  intended, 
the  fame  of  Hamilton  was  complete.  It  rested  upon  a  basis 
of  fact,  not  of  opinion.  He  had  arrived  at  authority  and ' 
power  without  incurring  popularity,  and  in  a  pure  democracy 
it  is  impossible  to  conceive  any  triumph  more  overwhelming. 
Up  to  this  time  he  had  been  concerned  with  great  events, 
with  the  welfare  of  a  nation,  in  which  the  exigencies  of  a 
party  were  barely  considered.  But  the  party  which  had 
grown  up  and  formed  itself  around  his  ideas  demanded 
consideration.  It  had  been  the  instrument  of  his  policy, 
and  after  the  conclusion  of  the  campaign,  like  an  army 
which  through  its  conquests  has  become  superfluous,  it  em- 
barrassed him  by  its  clamours  to  be  exalted  from  the  status 
of  a  means  to  that  of  an  end.  Nature  had  not  fitted  Hamil- 
ton for  such  a  task,  and  his  failure  was  no  great  marvel. 

The  effect  of  contact  with  great  events  is  comparable  to 
the  effect  of  contact  with  a  great  mind.  Every  man  is 
conscious  of  an  expansion  and  exhilaration  of  his  spirit  when 
he  is  thrown  into  relations,  friendly  or  hostile,  with  some 
character  beyond  the  common  stature,  who  errs  in  the  grand 
manner  by  overrating  the  virtues  of  his  opponents,  and  over- 
taxing their  strength;  who  joins  issue  boldly  upon  the 


432  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

principles  of  conduct  and  disdains  to  concern  itself  with  the 
smaller  motives.  The  reverse  of  this  condition  is  when  a 
magnanimous  nature  becomes  entangled  in  controversy  with 
mean  minds  about  mean  things,  when  his  pursuit  of  lofty 
aims  is  tripped  up  by  petty  obstacles.  In  such  a  contest  the 
chief  danger  lies  in  the  distraction.  Each  file  in  the  legion 
of  mediocrity  invites  an  easy  and  separate  annihilation. 
Every  knave  deserves  to  be  trounced.  Every  fallacy  cries 
out  for  exposure.  A  great  mind  engaged  with  a  multitude 
of  small  enemies  must  be  overwhelmed  by  sheer  weight  of 
numbers  when  once  it  loses  the  weather- gage,  and  is  forced 
to  accept  a  contest  on  terms  of  their  choosing.  Up  to  the 
period  of  the  Farewell  Address  Hamilton  had  kept  the 
weather-gage,  and  in  the  compulsion  of  events  had  found 
a  gale  favourable  to  his  battle.  The  struggle  for  inde- 
pendence, the  foundation  and  defence  of  the  Union,  strained 
his  nature  to  its  highest  pitch.  But  with  the  accomplish- 
ment of  these  objects  there  was  a  swift  change  in  the 
conditions.  Gradually  national  interests  tended  to  become 
subordinate  to  those  of  parties,  and  party  interests  in  turn 
to  those  of  persons  who  discovered  a  business  advantage  to 
be  gained  by  inhabiting,  like  hermit  crabs,  the  derelict  shells 
of  political  ideas. 

Hamilton  feared  lest  the  Constitution  might  not  prove 
strong  enough  to  stand  against  the  results  of  this  general 
deterioration.  When  we  remember  that  the  Constitution 
and  the  tradition  which  supported  it  were  for  the  most  part 
his  own  handiwork,  it  is  easy  to  excuse  his  distrust.  He 
regarded  the  Union  with  the  tenderness  and  doubt  of  an 
anxious  lover,  who  would  seclude  his  mistress  from  the 
society  of  rakes ;  confident  in  her  good  intentions,  but 
dubious  of  her  fortitude.  In  reality,  neither  Jefferson 
fatuously  worshipping  phrases,  nor  Burr  with  his  busy 
intrigue,  had  even  a  far-off  chance  of  playing  the  successful 


THE  POLITICIANS  433 

Lovelace.  The  constitution  was  delicate  indeed,  but  not 
frail.  Neither  Burr  play-acting  the  part  of  Catiline,  nor 
Jefferson  dressed  in  the  ribbons  of  popularity,  was  a  danger 
worthy  of  consideration.  The  lassitude  of  the  times  was 
the  result  of  easy  circumstances,  and  any  serious  peril 
would  have  changed  it  to  a  fierce  alertness.  The  state  of 
popular  opinion  in  those  years  may  be  compared  to  some 
strong  beast  dozing  and  blinking  in  the  sun. 

It  was  not  so  much  that  the  efforts  of  the  Revolution 
had  exhausted  statesmanship,  as  that  peace,  prosperity 
and  a  sense  of  security  induced  men  to  rest  comfortably 
upon  what  had  been  already  done.  It  was  more  because  they 
believed  the  constitution  safe  than  for  any  other  reason  that 
they  had  ceased  to  take  politics  seriously. 

For  those  men  who  looked  beyond  party  triumphs  to  the 
needs  and  dangers  of  the  future,  State  Rights  and  slavery 
remained  two  menacing  problems,  of  which  there  must  be 
a  final  settlement  before  the  Union  could  be  secure  from 
internal  disaster.  Two  ways  were  possible  to  this  end :  the 
slow,  constant  and  increasing  pressure  of  a  policy,  or  the 
sharp  means  of  civil  war.  Wise  men,  who  loved  their  country, 
prayed  for  the  first,  but  their  prayers  were  answered  ad- 
versely by  the  gods.  For  a  quarter  of  a  century  power  was 
in  the  hands  of  statesmen  who  were  lacking  both  in  vision 
and  courage,  and  without  these  qualities  in  government  it  is 
vain  to  look  for  strong  and  consistent  effort  towards  any 
national  aim.  The  successors  of  Washington  and  Hamilton 
were  astute  but  timid.  They  kept  an  unremitting  watch 
against  rivals  who  might  supplant  them  in  the  affections 
of  the  people,  but  they  were  negligent  and  feeble  guards 
against  the  dangers  which  threatened  the  existence  of  the 
state. 

Jefferson,  Madison  and  Monroe  held  office  in  succession,  [ 
each  for  a  double  term,  during    the  first  quarter  of  the 

9   TT 

<ft     & 


434  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

nineteenth  century.  Few  rulers  in  the  history  of  modern 
democracy  ever  enjoyed  office  in  greater  security,  had  to  face 
opponents  so  feeble  and  distracted,  or  were  fixed  with  the  duty 
of  governing  a  people  in  an  easier  temper.  Strong  men,  with 
such  currents  to  aid  them,  would  have  made  much  progress ; 
but  these  had  no  aim  in  view.  They  relied  upon  the  wisdom 
of  the  people  to  inspire  as  well  as  judge  them.  They  regarded 
the  people  not  merely  as  a  tribunal  but  as  an  oracle.  Great 
things  will  never  come  out  of  a  democracy  treated  in  this 
obsequious  spirit  by  its  governors.  Statesmen  have  to  submit 
themselves  in  the  end  humbly  to  the  verdict  of  the  man  in 
the  street,  but  to  go  to  him  for  advice  or  for  ideas  is  almost 
as  futile  as  for  a  captain  of  a  ship  to  consult  his  passengers 
upon  problems  of  navigation.  Jefferson's  chief  sin  is  that 
he  substituted  the  ostentatious  patronage  of  a  democracy 
for  the  leadership  of  a  people. 

These  three  Presidents  denied  most  vehemently  that  any 
Federalist  revered  the  Union  more  than  they,  or  would 
have  been  capable  of  greater  sacrifices  had  it  been  in 
jeopardy.  They  acknowledged,  sorrowfully,  that  slavery 
was  a  great  evil  in  society,  and  expressed  desires  to  see 
it  removed.  But  unfortunately  their  personal  sympathies 
were  warmly  engaged  for  the  doctrine  of  State  Rights, 
which  was  the  only  internal  enemy  of  the  Union ;  and  the 
interests  of  their  supporters,  of  their  private  friends  and  of 
their  family  traditions,  were  bound  up  with  the  institution 
of  slavery.  In  Jefferson's  philosophy  of  eighteenth  century 
phrases  State  Rights  were  applauded ;  slavery,  on  the  con- 
trary, was  utterly  condemned.  He  has  left  it  on  record  that 
he  disapproved  of  slavery ;  but,  except  in  early  days  when 
it  was  convenient  to  denounce  the  institution  in  order  to 
add  a  count  to  the  indictment  of  George  the  Third,1  he  was 
at  considerable  pains  to  conceal  his  opinions  from  his 

1  See  Declaration  of  Independence. 


THE  POLITICIANS  435 

countrymen.1  His  private  practice  was  in  fantastic  contrast 
to  his  beliefs.  His  public  activities  did  not  advance  by 
one  hairsbreadth  the  sacred  cause  of  liberty  which  he 
professed  to  have  at  heart.  In  his  political  career  the 
humanitarian  always  walked  behind  the  opportunist  when 
the  road  was  too  narrow  to  admit  of  the  two  going  arm 
in  arm. 

It  has  been  maintained  that  had  the  United  States  been 
compelled  to  face  the  difficulties  of  a  European  environment 
during  the  first  half  of  the  nineteenth  century,  they  must 
have  collapsed  or  fallen  asunder.  Except  for  the  fortune 
of  their  isolated  position,  and  the  immeasurable  resources 
which  nature  had  given  them,  it  is  alleged  that  they  could 
not  have  made  head  against  the  intrigue  and  open  attack 
of  their  enemies,  and  against  the  discontent  and  disorder 
that  would  thereby  have  been  induced  among  their  citizens. 
But  two  things  have  been  left  out  of  notice  in  this  calcula- 
tion, and  if  the  nation  had  lacked  these  two  things,  it  must 
certainly  have  gone  to  pieces,  despite  the  advantages  of 
natural  wealth  and  fortunate  position.  The  first  of  these 
is  the  spirit  of  the  people,  upon  which  no  crisis  up  to  the 
present  time  has  ever  called  in  vain.  The  second  is  the 
great  legacy  of  laws  and  traditions  which  it  inherited  from 
the  first  eight  years  of  Federal  government;  the  ideas  of 
the  sanctity  of  the  Union,  of  national  probity  and  of  a 
dignified  independence.  The  spirit  of  the  nation  is  a  great 
force,  but  it  is  one  which  cannot  be  always  on  the  alert, 
and,  while  it  sleeps,  the  part  of  noble  institutions  is  to  keep 
watch. 

The  names  of  Washington  and  Hamilton,  which  we 
honour  together,  must  be  honoured  in  both;  for  even 

1  When  Jefferson's  Notes  on  Virginia,  previously  circulated  in  manuscript, 
were  printed,  he  imposed  conditions  that  all  '  Strictures  on  Slavery '  should 
be  omitted.  History,  iv.  p.  453,  also  pp.  454  and  455. 


436  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

the  spirit  of  a  people  is  in  large  measure  a  tradition 
with  an  origin  in  the  effort  and  suffering  of  its  great 
men.  Washington  and  Hamilton  governed,  and  directed 
the  policy  of  the  United  States  when  occasion  required 
it  against  the  opinions  of  the  majority.  They  incurred 
much  hatred  in  consequence,  which  even  the  memory 
of  their  services  could  not  keep  within  bounds.  But  this 
bold  and  uncompromising  disregard  of  opinion  is  more  akin 
to  the  special  genius  of  their  country,  and  to  the  role 
which  it  has  played  in  the  affairs  of  the  world,  than  the 
fine  discernment,  the  smooth  and  pliant  dexterity  of  Jef- 
ferson. A  man  who  never  disagrees  with  his  countrymen, 
and  who  shrinks  from  unpopularity  as  the  worst  of  all  evils, 
can  never  have  a  share  in  moulding  the  traditions  of  a  virile 
race,  though  for  a  time  he  may  make  its  fashions.  With- 
out paradox,  we  may  truly  say  that  Jefferson,  in  spite  of  all 
his  triumphs,  missed  every  opportunity.  He  takes  rank 
among  the  men  who  succeeded  only  in  success,  but  had 
nothing  to  show  for  it  at  the  end,  save  only  success.  He 
maintained  himself  in  office  and  floated  gloriously  upon  a 
kind  of  vapour.  He  built  no  new  defences  for  his  country, 
and  those  which  he  received  in  custody  he  barely  kept  in 
repair. 

Every  difficulty  which  could  be  postponed  was  left  to  a 
future  generation.  Every  awkward  question  was  adroitly 
shelved.  He  was  an  indulgent  and  courteous  physician, 
who  alleviated  the  symptoms  and  soothed  the  nerves,  but 
lacked  both  the  skill  to  understand  the  cause  and  the 
courage  to  treat  the  root  of  the  disease.  His  legacy  was  a 
lexicon  of  phrases,  a  dramatic  reputation  of  homespun 
equality,  and  a  tangle  for  posterity  to  unwind. 

The  making  of  the  United  States  owes  nothing  to  Jef- 
ferson except  a  few  eccentric  fashions,  often  ungraceful 
and  sometimes  absurd.  The  work  of  Washington  and 


THE  POLITICIANS  437 

Hamilton,  after  a  long  and  dreary  interval,  passed  into 
worthier  hands.  Sixty  years  after  the  duel  at  Weehawken 
the  constitution  was  confirmed.  What  Hamilton  had 
feared  came  to  pass — a  civil  war ;  but  what  he  had  given 
his  life  for  was  as  the  result  of  it  secured.  The  tremen- 
dous cost  does  not  lie  at  his  door.  To  lay  so  awful  a 
charge  against  any  man  is  perhaps  beyond  justice,  but  as 
we  read  of  the  complacent  beatitude  of  Jefferson,  full  of 
years  and  adulation,  our  memory  calls  up  a  contrasting 
scene,  in  which  the  action  is  a  great  rebellion;  in  which 
orators  of  the  South  invoke  not  unfairly  the  protection  of 
his  name ;  in  which  brave  men  go  into  battle  with  his 
phrases  on  their  lips ;  in  which  the  aim  of  the  whole  Con- 
federate party,  which  does  him  honour,  is  to  destroy  the 
constitution  and  to  break  the  Union.  It  is  a  common  event 
that  when  a  man  is  dead  his  name  and  authority  are  mis- 
used, his  words  misinterpreted ;  but  Jefferson  has  to  answer 
a  much  graver  charge  than  careless  sympathy,  or  a  mere 
verbal  indiscretion.  The  Union  which  he  professed  to 
venerate  was  intrusted  to  his  keeping,  and  fortune  put  it 
in  his  power  to  render  it  secure.  He  failed  even  to  make 
the  attempt. 

The  state  which  Alexander  Hamilton  had  planned  and 
inaugurated  Abraham  Lincoln  completed  and  confirmed. 
It  is  natural  to  contrast  these  two  men,  who  in  all  super- 
ficial things  were  most  unlike — in  circumstances,  manners, 
age,  temper  and  appearance.  But  in  the  great  matter 
that  concerned  each  of  them  most  nearly  they  were  at 
one.  In  many  of  their  qualities  they  were  alike.  In  both 
there  was  the  same  instinct  for  reality  and  contempt  for 
phrases,  the  same  clear  judgment  and  swift  decision.  Their 
eyes  saw  '  far  and  wide/  and  things  appeared  to  them  ever  in 
a  splendid  and  true  proportion,  rhythmical  and  harmonious, 
governed  by  great  laws.  In  richness  of  nature  they  were 


438  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

equals,  and  equals  also  in  integrity  and  courage.  And  in 
both  there  was  the  same  rare  and  consummate  mastery  of 
the  English  tongue,  begotten  of  great  thoughts  and  a  fiery 
sincerity,  which  not  only  increases  an  hundredfold  the  power 
of  a  man  in  his  own  day,  but  continues  it  as  an  intimate 
and  living  force  among  generations  to  whom  otherwise  he 
would  have  been  but  a  remote  actor  or  a  great  historical 
shadow. 


BOOK   VI 
CONCLUSION 


On  the  most  elaborate  and  correct  detail  of  facts,  the  result  seems  to  be 
that  at  no  time  has  the  wealth  and  power  of  Great  Britain  been  so  con- 
siderable as  it  is  at  this  very  perilous  moment.  We  have  a  vast  interest 
to  preserve,  and  we  possess  great  means  of  preserving  it.  But  it  is  to  be 
remembered  that  the  artificer  may  be  encumbered  by  his  tools,  and  that 
resources  may  be  among  impediments.  If  wealth  is  the  obedient  and 
laborious  slave  of  virtue  and  of  publick  honours,  then  wealth  is  in  its 
place  and  has  its  use.  But  if  this  order  is  changed,  and  honour  is  to  be 
sacrificed  to  the  conservation  of  riches,  riches,  which  have  neither  eyes  nor 
hands,  nor  anything  truly  vital  in  them,  cannot  long  survive  the  being  of 
their  vivifying  powers,  their  legitimate  masters,  and  their  potent  protectors. 
If  we  command  our  wealth  we  shall  be  rich  and  free.  If  our  wealth 
commands  us,  we  arepooi'  indeed. — BURKE. 


BOOK    VI 

CONCLUSION 

CHAPTER    I 

Some  General  Remarks 

AN  attempt  has  been  made  in  the  foregoing  chapters  to  give 
a  general  view  of  the  events  which  preceded  and  followed 
the  formal  Union  of  the  States,  to  describe  the  two  hostile 
tendencies  of  political  thought  during  that  epoch,  and  to 
make  a  rough  estimate  of  the  chief  personal  forces  and 
antagonisms  which  were  concerned  in  the  result.  The 
intention  of  the  author,  so  far,  has  been  to  regard  the  career 
of  Alexander  Hamilton  mainly  in  its  relation  to  the  fortunes 
of  the  United  States  of  America. 

In  the  remaining  pages  the  achievements  of  Hamilton  will 
be  considered,  very  briefly,  under  a  different  aspect.  The 
quality  of  his  statesmanship,  the  nature  of  that  inarticulate 
desire  for  union  on  which  he  built,  the  strength  and  the 
obstinacy  of  those  difficulties  which  he  encountered  at  every 
turn,  are  subjects  of  universal  interest.  He  is  no  local  hero, 
but  one  whose  work  and  greatness  have  a  meaning  for  the 
whole  world ;  and  for  the  British  race  at  the  present  time 
they  have  a  special  and  intimate  concern. 

Among  many  things  that  appear  to  be  widely  different 
when  we  contrast  the  circumstances  of  America  in  the  years 
preceding  the  convention  of  Philadelphia  with  those  of  our 

441 


442  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

own  empire  as  it  stands  to-day,  at  least  one  thing  is  the 
same.  In  both  cases  we  find  the  same  widespread  conscious- 
ness of  an  issue  that  must  be  faced  before  the  world  has 
grown  much  older,  that  cannot  be  put  off  indefinitely  by 
dilatory  prudence  or  sentimental  make-believe.  The  conse- 
quences of  this  issue  are  so  tremendous  that  even  the  most 
reckless  partisan  is  willing  at  times  to  treat  it  with  a  grave 
attention.  In  both  cases  there  is  the  same  vague  but  im- 
patient yearning  for  some  bold,  constructive  efforts  towards 
a  solution,  and  on  the  other  hand  the  same  clear  and  cogent 
arguments  of  destruction  are  brought  to  bear  against  every 
plan  which  the  wit  of  man  has  yet  been  able  to  devise. 

Before  proceeding  to  a  consideration  of  these  topics,  the 
author  desires  to  offer  a  few  remarks  upon  the  scope  and 
intention  of  his  work.  It  may  reasonably  be  urged  that 
reflections  of  such  a  character  would  have  figured  more 
suitably  in  a  preface;  but  for  various  reasons  which  it  is 
unnecessary  to  set  forth,  it  has  been  judged  better  to  reserve 
them  to  a  later  stage. 

The  author  is  fully  aware  of  his  many  disqualifications 
for  the  task  which  he  has  undertaken.  It  is  not  merely 
upon  the  literary  side  that  he  is  ready  to  admit  the  in- 
adequacy of  his  equipment.  Faults  arising  from  this  cause 
might  have  been  easily  pardoned.  But  he  is  conscious  also 
of  a  deficiency  in  knowledge  of  American  political  conditions 
as  they  exist  to-day.  Without  something  more  than  book- 
learning  the  spirit  and  atmosphere  of  the  United  States  at 
the  end  of  the  nineteenth  and  the  beginning  of  the  twentieth 
century  cannot  be  completely  understood.  A  writer,  ignorant 
of  these  things,  lacking  the  freedom  and  confidence  which  an 
intimacy  with  American  politics  alone  can  give,  is  debarred 
from  following  Hamilton's  great  ideas  into  modern  times. 
Although  he  is  dimly  aware  that  morals  could  be  drawn, 


CONCLUSION  443 

principles  established,  and  forecasts  clinched,  he  is  shut 
out  from  the  attempt.  The  few  references  to  later  events 
are  therefore  of  a  general  character,  and  are  concerned  only 
with  facts  too  notorious  for  dispute. 

It  may  reasonably  be  asked  why,  if  the  author  was  con- 
scious of  such  hampering  limitations,  he  had  ever  the 
temerity  to  undertake  the  task.  His  answer  is  that  he 
undertook  it  because  he  was  unable  to  discover  any  account 
of  Hamilton's  career  which  satisfied  his  curiosity.  In  making 
this  statement  he  denies  any  intention  to  depreciate  the 
many  learned  and  diligent  American  authors  who  have  dis- 
coursed upon  the  topic.  He  readily  admits  his  debt  to  their 
industry,  but  at  the  same  time  he  has  to  acknowledge  that 
their  efforts  have  not  met  his  requirements.  Their  view  of 
the  man  and  his  epoch  is  in  every  case  too  '  American.'  It 
is  natural  that  this  should  be  the  case,  and  it  would  be  the 
height  of  absurdity  to  utter  any  complaint.  But  there  is 
room  for  an  estimate  arrived  at  by  a  different  method.  To 
Englishmen  the  achievements  of  Hamilton  may  not  mean 
precisely  the  same  thing  as  they  do  to  citizens  of  the  United 
States,  but,  unless  this  essay  has  entirely  missed  its  mark, 
it  will  hardly  be  contended  that  they  mean  anything  less. 
Our  kinsmen  do  not  hesitate  to  claim  a  share  in  the  heritage 
of  our  literature,  and  in  fairness,  therefore,  we  may  claim 
some  part  and  interest  in  their  statesmen.  The  work  of 
Hamilton's  life  was  the  solution  of  problems  which  we  have 
not  yet  found  any  means  to  solve.  That,  for  us,  is  the  chief 
interest  of  his  career.  Admitting  frankly  and  fully  that 
what  he  achieved  is  no  precedent  to  govern  our  actions, 
his  example  is  inspiring.  We  may  draw  morals  from  his 
fortitude  and  find  encouragement  in  his  success.  And  here 
and  there,  as  we  read  his  words  upon  the  events  and 
difficulties  of  a  bygone  age,  the  darkness  and  perplexity 
of  the  situation  in  which  we  find  ourselves  is  lit  up  with 


444  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

sudden,  luminous  flashes  which  pierce  to  the  four  corners 
of  the  canopy. 

It  is  probable  that  fault  may  also  be  found  with  the  pro- 
portions of  this  essay.  Complaint  may  be  made  that  certain 
matters  have  been  forced  into  an  undue  prominence,  while 
others  which  ought  to  have  been  dealt  with  at  length  have 
been  slurred  over  in  a  few  paragraphs  or  sentences.  The 
space  devoted  to  an  account  of  the  war  will  be  cited  under 
the  first  head,  and  under  the  second  the  omission  of  any 
substantial  discussion  of  the  constitution.  But  having 
regard  to  the  author's  intention,  the  war  was  a  matter  of 
capital  importance,  the  terms  of  the  constitution  were  not. 
Consequently,  although  the  attempt  to  describe  the  course 
of  the  dreary  and  protracted  struggle  for  independence  was 
surrounded  with  obvious  dangers  for  one  who  has  had  no 
experience  in  military  affairs,  it  was  necessary  to  make  it. 
The  war  is  the  key  to  the  whole  situation.  If  the  hazards 
and  difficulties  which  attended  Washington's  campaigns  are 
not  fully  realised,  those  which  attended  the  acceptance  of  a 
formal  union  and  the  making  of  a  real  one  must  be  entirely 
missed.  The  disasters  arising  out  of  disunion  were  apparent 
from  the  very  beginning  of  the  contest  with  Britain.  In  a 
sense  the  two  struggles — for  independence  and  for  union — 
originated  at  the  same  moment,  were  retarded  by  the  same 
obstacles,  and  were  achieved  by  the  same  spirit,  and  to  a 
large  extent  by  the  same  men. 

But  the  constitution  occupies  a  different  place.  Its 
terms  and  provisions  are  matters  of  a  subordinate  interest. 
Had  they  been  better  suited  than  they  were  to  the  needs  of 
the  situation,  the  labours  of  the  early  administrations  might 
have  been  less  arduous,  but  the  final  result  could  hardly 
have  proved  very  different.  Or  if  the  constitution  had  been 
a  much  less  efficient  instrument  than  it  was  in  fact,  the 
energy  and  courage  of  Washington  and  Hamilton  would  in 


CONCLUSION  445 

all  likelihood  have  found  some  means  of  making  it  serve 
their  purpose,  The  constitution  has  now  been  on  trial  for 
upwards  of  a  century,  and  it  can  hardly  be  imagined  that 
any  reflective  citizen  of  the  United  States  would  seriously 
propose  it  as  a  model  for  another  nation  which  found  itself 
faced  by  a  similar  emergency.  Its  weakness  in  certain 
directions  has  been  constantly  made  clear,  while  in  others 
its  very  strength  seems  to  be  a  danger  no  less  formidable. 
Its  power  for  resistance  to  all  reforms,  sane  or  insane,  is  a 
lesson  even  more  of  what  should  be  avoided  than  of  what 
should  be  copied.  The  British  constitution  is  a  thing  by  itself, 
and  stands  outside  comparison.  But  the  Canadian  constitu- 
tion is  comparable,  and  as  a  model  it  is  immensely  superior. 
Its  makers  had  profited  by  the  experience  of  others.  Its 
strength  is  strongest  where  the  strain  is  greatest — at  the 
heart.  Sovereignty  is  firmly  established.  The  majesty  of 
the  law  is  acknowledged  without  question  from  one  end 
of  the  Dominion  to  the  other.  The  characteristics  of 
Canada  are  order  and  freedom.  No  man  fears  either  that 
he  will  call  in  vain  upon  justice,  or  that  the  development  of 
the  estate  will  be  hampered  by  a  misplaced  strength  or  an 
inelastic  charter.  The  constitution  of  Canada  was  made  in 
186*7 — eighty  years  after  the  convention  of  Philadelphia — 
and  the  debt  which  it  owes  to  the  efforts  and  example  of  our 
kinsmen  is  immeasurable. 

It  is  not,  therefore,  the  precise  terms,  or  even  the  prin- 
ciples of  the  American  constitution,  which  move  our  admira- 
tion; but  the  great  facts  that  the  Americans  made  a 
constitution  sufficient  for  their  purpose,  that  they  set  it  to 
work,  and  in  a  few  years  built  round  it  an  upholding  tradi- 
tion which  has  stood  the  fiercest  trials.  They  had  no 
precedents  to  guide  them.  Republican  institutions  were  in 
discredit.  Obstacles  and  difficulties  existed  upon  every 
hand.  And  yet  men  had  the  wisdom  to  plan  and  the 


446  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

courage  to  succeed  in  their  attempt.  These  are  the  matters 
to  which  it  has  been  the  object  of  this  essay  to  call 
attention. 

This  book  is  neither  a  history  nor  a  biography,  but 
merely  an  essay  upon  the  character  and  achievements  of  a 
man  who,  in  the  author's  opinion,  was  the  chief  figure  in  a 
series  of  striking  events.  It  has  been  written,  frankly,  from 
the  standpoint  of  Hamilton.  The  aim  has  been  to  make  it 
an  honest  account;  but  the  aim  has  not  been  to  make  it 
an  impartial  account.  A  staid,  unbiased  narration  of  the 
career  of  a  great  man  of  action,  who  lived  in  stirring  times, 
and  engaged  in  controversies  of  an  exceptional  fierceness, 
might  have  a  certain  value;  but  it  would  never  give  any 
true  picture  of  the  man  or  measure  of  his  work.  The  value 
of  this  quality  or  of  that  effort  cannot  be  shown  by  sub- 
mitting it  to  the  alien  standard  of  some  cold  arbiter,  but 
only  in  relation  to  the  divine  unity  of  the  character  of  the 
man  himself.  The  diatribe  of  an  enemy  is  preferable,  for  it 
has  at  least  a  dramatic  consistency  and  the  merit  of  a 
caricature.  Our  endeavour,  therefore,  has  been  to  show 
Hamilton  as  he  saw  himself,  and  to  judge  him  as  he  would 
have  judged  himself. 

But  it  is  not  to  be  denied  that  there  are  disadvantages  of 
a  serious  nature  attaching  to  such  a  method.  One  of  the 
best  biographical  essays  that  ever  was  written  is  Froude's 
Julius  Ccesar,  but  no  man  in  search  of  a  true,  positive 
estimate  of  Cicero  or  Pompey  would  accept  it  as  final.  It 
is  necessary  to  consider  not  only  the  limitations  of  space, 
but  the  mood  of  the  reader.  To  hustle  him  about  from 
pillar  to  post,  to  make  him  regard  characters  and  events  in 
one  chapter  from  the  standpoint  of  the  statesman,  in  the 
next  from  that  of  the  sophist,  in  the  next  again  from  that 
of  the  politician,  would  be  to  irritate  and  weary  him  into 


CONCLUSION  447 

an  utter  confusion.  In  accepting  the  dramatic  necessities 
of  the  situation,  we  have  to  realise  the  impossibility  of  doing 
lull  justice  to  the  rest  of  mankind.  The  friends  of  Hamilton 
are  dwarfed  and  obscured  by  the  central  figure.  His  oppon- 
ents are  less  in  shadow,  but  they  appear  under  a  negative 
aspect.  They  assume  a  great  importance  only  wh"en  they 
offend.  Our  attention  is  concentrated  upon  their  incon- 
venient angles,  and  with  the  best  will  in  the  world,  it  is 
impossible  to  construct  a  complete  and  positive  likeness 
upon  such  evidence.  And  yet  it  is  impossible  to  avoid  this 
injustice.  In  considering  any  period  of  history  from  the 
standpoint  of  a  great  man  of  action,  we  are  certain — con- 
temptuously certain — of  the  value  of  his  enemies.  We  read 
what  they  have  said,  striving  to  give  just  attention,  but  their 
words  have  the  hollow  resonance  of  an  echo. 

Indeed,  in  proportion  as  an  opponent  of  the  man,  whose 
mood  and  standpoint  we  have  accepted,  has  ideas  of  his 
own,  it  becomes  harder  to  realise  him  positively  and  truly. 
It  is  much  easier  to  deal  generously  with  the  fighting 
qualities  of  an  enemy  than  with  the  motives  which  in- 
duced him  to  fight.  It  is  much  easier,  therefore  to  draw 
a  picture  of  Burr  than  of  Jefferson ;  for  in  the  case  of  Burr 
it  was  only  his  personal  ambition  which  entered  into  the 
conflict,  while  in  the  case  of  Jefferson  it  was  not  only  his 
personal  ambition,  but  probably  to  quite  as  great  an  extent 
his  political  ideas  and  sympathies. 

And  there  is  this  further  consideration,  that  even  im- 
partial history  is  apt  to  be  unfair  to  the  opposition,  when 
the  matter  under  discussion  is  a  series  of  events  upon  which 
the  world  has  already  formed  a  favourable  and  final  judg- 
ment. Between  the  founder  of  a  state  and  the  eccentric 
human  creature,  stuffed  with  an  honest  conceit,  who  de- 
nounces the  great  idea  on  some  ground  of  particular  injustice, 
there  is  not  that  tremendous  moral  gulf  which  the  dramatic 


448  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

brush  of  history  has  painted.  The  good  congressmen  who 
formed  the  opinion  that  Washington  was  a  poor  soldier,  who 
intrigued  against  him  at  the  height  of  his  difficulties,  who 
stinted  his  supplies  and  obstructed  his  endeavours;  the 
loyal  opposition  who  were  quite  ready  to  deal  with  Pitt  and 
Wellington  as  malefactors,  and  hailed  any  victory  of  the 
French  with  far  greater  joy  than  a  feat  of  British  arms, — 
all  these  were  fairly  honest  people  in  their  way,  and  not  so 
very  different,  merely  as  human  units,  from  their  opponents. 
But  history  is  mainly  concerned  with  other  things  than 
the  psychology  of  human  units,  and  leaves  the  study  of  it  to 
novelists  and  poets.  If  a  man  has  chosen  to  play  a  part 
upon  the  larger  stage,  and  by  ill-luck  or  a  natural  propensity 
has  chosen  the  wrong  part,  he  is  damned  beyond  redemption. 
History  will  not  waste  her  time  in  finding  an  excuse  for  him 
merely  because  he  was  a  good  father,  a  faithful  husband,  or 
a  punctual  discharger  of  his  debts.  Development  is  a  rough 
force,  and  if  any  man  has  obstructed  it,  he  may  not  expect 
to  be  remembered  kindly  or  with  honour  by  posterity. 


CHAPTER  II 

Whig  or  Tory? 

UNTIL  the  Federalist  party  was  formed  Hamilton  described 
himself  as  a  Whig ;  and  although,  like  Burke,  he  considered 
that  the  French  Revolution  could  claim  no  affinity  with  his 
political  faith,  it  is  probable  that  he  would  have  maintained 
himself  to  be  a  true  Whig  to  the  end  of  his  days. 

Even  in  the  flux  of  politics  it  is  possible  to  attach  a 
certain  general  meaning  to  the  party  labels.  If,  at  the 
particular  moment,  there  is  often  a  confusion  which  obscures 
the  underlying  principles,  at  the  end  of  each  epoch  things 


CONCLUSION  449 

settle  down  and  become  clearer.  If  the  terms  Whig  and 
Tory  stand  for  any  essential  differences  in  human  thought, 
if  they  are  anything  better  than  mere  rosettes  or  favours, 
Hamilton  was  not  a  Whig,  but  a  Tory.  It  must  be 
added  that  he  was  a  Tory  of  the  type  which  great  Tory 
statesmen  have  beheld  in  their  dreams,  but  have  rarely,  if 
ever,  attained  to  under  the  conditions  of  party  government 
His  achievements  began  before  government  by  parties  had 
got  to  work.  Although  the  greater  part  of  his  public  life 
was  spent  in  a  bitter  contest,  hand  to  hand,  the  system  of 
faction  was  not  fully  accepted  as  an  institution  until  his 
retirement.  Whether  he  could  have  kept  his  political  faith 
so  consistently  in  later  days  is  open  to  doubt.  What  is 
certain  about  his  actual  career  is  that  his  ideal  never  wore  a 
mask  or  suffered  any  kind  of  compromise. 

The  fact  that  Hamilton  called  himself  a  Whig  does  not 
count  for  much  one  way  or  the  other.  All  men  who  engaged 
in  the  rebellion  assumed  the  same  title,  partly  for  the 
reason  that  the  Whig  party  in  Britain  was  notoriously  in 
sympathy  with  their  demands,  their  methods  and  even  with 
their  arms ;  but  partly  also  from  the  belief  that  their  own 
revolution  was  founded  upon  the  '  glorious '  principles  of 
1688.  But  when  the  war  was  ended,  when  the  interest 
shifted  from  a  struggle  with  external  enemies  to  problems  of 
a  different  order,  when  the  chief  questions  which  demanded 
consideration  were  those  concerned  with  a  settled  and 
permanent  foundation,  the  inadequacy  of  the  Whig  cockade 
became  apparent.  The  Federalists  and  the  Democrats  might 
dispute  about  their  rights  in  the  political  tradition,  but  it  is 
clear  that  the  latter  had  the  juster  claim. 

The  names  Whig  and  Tory  are  not  used  here  with  any 
partisan  intention.  The  controversy  is  ancient,  and  the 
descriptions  themselves  are  nearly  obsolete.  The  former 
title,  indeed,  has  almost  turned  into  a  term  of  general  abuse. 

2  F 


450  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

It  is  not  intended  to  claim  the  shelter  of  Hamilton's  great 
authority  for  all  the  preposterous  propaganda  which  at 
various  times,  under  the  pressure  of  opportunism  or  by  the 
misfortune  of  blindness,  have  been  temporarily  associated 
with  Toryism.  But  if  we  pierce  to  the  core  of  those  prin- 
ciples which  have  been  devoutly  held  by  the  noblest  spirits 
in  the  opposing  parties,  we  must  recognise  an  essential 
difference  and  antagonism. 

Hamilton's  love  for  his  country  was  always  greater  than 
his  love  for  his  countrymen.  The  emotional  side  of  his 
nature  was  stirred  by  the  idea  of  a  nation,  rather  than  by 
the  interests  or  sufferings  of  the  various  masses  or  classes  of 
which  every  nation  is  composed.  He  was  humane,  but  he 
was  never  the  philanthropist.  At  the  sight  of  disorder  and 
injustice  he  was  not  swept  away  by  a  passionate  impatience, 
but  viewed  the  nature  of  the  evils  with  a  relentless  scrutiny. 
Against  the  doctrine  that  some  alleviation  must  immediately 
be  discovered,  he  was  usually  found  in  opposition.  His 
enemies  alleged,  untruthfully,  that  his  heart  was  incapable 
of  a  generous  impulse.  What  they  meant  was  that  he  was 
incapable  of  acting  upon  the  spur  of  the  moment  under  no 
guidance  save  that  of  his  emotions.  His  aim  was  always  a 
complete  and  permanent  cure.  He  distrusted  palliatives 
and  temporary  expedients.  He  would  not  put  forward  a 
remedy  for  any  particular  trouble  until  he  had  convinced 
himself  that  the  means  proposed  would  work  in  harmony 
with  the  general  principles  of  his  policy. 

Hamilton's  idea  of  statesmanship  was  the  faithful  steward- 
ship of  the  estate.  His  duty  was  to  guard  the  estate,  and, 
at  the  same  time,  to  develop  its  resources.  He  viewed  man- 
kind and  natural  riches  as  material  to  be  used,  with  the 
greatest  possible  energy  and  with  the  least  possible  waste, 
for  the  attainment  of  national  independence,  power  and 
permanency.  A  means  to  this  end  was  certainly  the  pros- 


CONCLUSION  451 

perity  of  the  people,  but  the  end  itself  was  the  existence  of 
a  nation.  The  emotional  spring  or  motive  of  his  endeavours 
was  not  a  passionate  love  or  pity  for  his  fellow-creatures,  but 
an  overwhelming  sense  of  duty  towards  his  Creator,  whose 
providence  had  appointed  him  to  the  stewardship.  This 
attitude  may  justly  be  described  as  beneficent ;  but,  beyond 
doubt,  it  is  not  the  attitude  of  the  philanthropist  or  of  the 
eighteenth-century  Whig. 

His  foreign  policy  was  dominated  by  the  same  principle. 
The  nation  had  been  given  into  his  hands,  and  the  task  of 
keeping  it  secure  was  one  sufficient  for  his  powers.  What 
happened  to  other  nations  was  the  care  and  concern  of  other 
stewards.  He  had  private  sympathies  with  France  and 
Frenchmen,  and  to  a  considerably  less  extent  with  England 
and  Englishmen ;  but  these  feelings  were  never  allowed  to 
interfere  with  the  performance  of  what  he  considered  to  be 
his  duty  as  a  steward.  He  judged  that  the  task  to  which 
the  Almighty  had  appointed  him  was,  not  to  put  the  whole 
world  right,  but  to  keep  his  own  country  safe.  The  view  of 
the  philanthropist  is  widely  different.  During  the  ferment 
of  the  French  Revolution  the  steadfast  refusal  of  Hamilton 
to  consider  anything  but  the  wellbeing  of  his  own  nation 
was  freely  judged  to  be  inhuman.  The  Whig  spirit  con- 
demned him  as  a  cold  and  selfish  schemer.  His  enemies 
had  abundant  excuse  for  their  attacks,  since  they  believed 
sincerely  that  an  opportunity  had  offered  itself  of  changing 
the  whole  order  of  human  institutions  for  the  great  advan- 
tage of  the  race.  Hamilton  profoundly  disbelieved  in  this 
opinion,  and  held  unmoved  upon  his  course. 

The  final  test  of  Toryism,  according  to  some  critics,  is  the 
belief  in  Divine  Right.  "  The  divine  right  of  kings,"  Disraeli 
wrote,  "may  have  been  a  plea  for  feeble  tyrants,  but  the 
'  divine  right  of  government  is  the  keystone  of  human  pro- 
'gress."  Hamilton  believed  in  the  divine  right  of  government 


452  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

with  his  whole  heart.  The  right  to  enforce  order  and  to 
compel  men  to  live  justly,  he  derived,  not  from  the  interests 
of  the  people,  but  from  the  ordinances  of  God.  The  forms 
of  government  without  an  upholding  tradition  were  useless 
phrases.  That  the  leaders  of  men  should  trim  their  sails  to 
popularity  was  in  his  view  a  fatal  abdication.  Human  society 
was  something  nobler  than  a  mere  convenience,  a  nation 
something  greater  than  the  sum  of  its  subjects.  One  of  the 
duties  of  the  state  was  the  wellbeing  of  its  citizens,  but  the 
whole  duty  of  every  citizen  was  the  wellbeing  of  the  state. 

The  reason  of  Hamilton's  increasing  honour  is  the  endur- 
ance of  his  handiwork.  The  constitution,  after  more  than  a 
century  of  stress  and  rough  weather,  is  stronger  than  it  was 
at  the  beginning.  The  public  credit  is  still  based  upon  the 
foundations  which  he  laid.  Foreign  relations  continue  to  be 
governed  by  the  principles  which  he  sacrificed  popularity  to 
uphold.  The  growth  of  population  and  prosperity  which  he 
foresaw  has  come  to  pass.  Men  did  not  choose  to  follow  the 
guidance  of  his  sane  and  moderate  maxims  for  the  regula- 
tion of  commerce,  but  at  any  rate  they  lived  and  did  their 
work  under  the  shelter  of  those  institutions  which  he  had 
the  chief  share  in  moulding.  He  prevailed  upon  his  fellow- 
countrymen  to  make  a  trial  of  union,  and  by  the  audacity  of 
his  procedure  he  filled  a  written  charter  with  the  spirit  of 
life.  He  left  things  better  than  he  found  them ;  firm  insti- 
tutions to  replace  a  quarrelsome  anarchy;  a  wide  co- 
operation instead  of  an  insensate  independence ;  a  proud 
nation  and  a  noble  tradition  where  there  had  been  but  an 
angry  strife  between  '  thirteen  jarring  states.'  If  a  states- 
man has  achieved  these  things,  his  lovers  may  view  with 
equanimity  his  failure  in  all  meaner  contests. 

Anything  which  has  stood — a  tradition  of  conduct  or  the 
fabric  of  an  empire — compels  our  admiration  with  little 


CONCLUSION  453 

regard  for  our  personal  interest  or  national  pride.  A  true 
instinct  of  mankind  insists  on  homage  to  those  great  spirits 
who  have  built  enduring  monuments.  The  mere  permanence 
is  proof  of  a  certain  m  agnanimity  in  the  author.  Our  imagina- 
tion working  backwards  to  the  confusion  of  the  particular 
time  discovers  in  each  case  the  same  group  of  qualities — 
a  true  judgment,  without  which  the  work  must  have 
crumbled  in  a  few  seasons;  fortitude  which  overcame  the 
doubts  of  men  and  difficulties  of  the  material;  a  grim 
patience  that  refused  to  abandon  hope  even  in  the  blank 
spaces  of  dull  stagnation  and  dreary  vigilance.  If  an  institu- 
tion has  stood,  we  assume  that  it  must  in  some  way  or 
another  be  harmonious  with  the  divine  purpose  of  the 
world. 

American  union,  order  and  good  husbandry  of  the  estate 
make  so  strong  a  vision,  the  memory  of  enmity  and  defeat 
is  by  comparison  so  faint  a  shadow,  that  no  competition 
is  possible  between  them.  In  our  tribute,  therefore,  to 
Washington  and  Hamilton,  nothing  is  kept  back.  And 
even  in  the  case  of  Germany,  which  is  more  recent,  our 
admiration  for  the  great  minister  who,  with  so  great  odds 
against  him,  crowned  his  sovereign  and  his  policy  of  union 
in  the  Hall  of  Mirrors  is  not  hindered  by  any  conflict  of 
national  aims.  The  reason  is  not  difficult  to  find.  These 
men,  in  their  various  ways,  did  the  work  which,  when 
once  it  is  done,  the  world  readily  acknowledges  to  be 
the  greatest.  They  subdued  the  forces  of  disunion,  and 
reduced  the  most  jealous  and  reluctant  interests  to  a 
serviceable  harmony. 

Hamilton  discovered,  as  others  before  and  since  have  also 
discovered,  that  there  are  two  opposite  forces  to  be  reckoned 
with  when  it  is  a  question  of  drawing  together  a  loose 
federation  into  a  nation  or  an  empire :  the  centrifugal  and 
the  centripetal,  the  forces  of  disunion  and  union. 


454  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

Local  sympathies,  as  well  as  the  interest  of  mediocrity, 
are  strongly  enlisted  on  the  side  of  the  former.  They  are 
in  favour  of  flying  apart,  of  the  independence  of  sections, 
of  devolution  and  separation.  They  pretend  to  be  satisfied 
with  some  sentimental  phrase  as  a  bond  of  union.  Antici- 
pating, in  the  case  of  any  change,  a  future  all  in  black,  they 
grow  impatient  as  their  imaginations  conjure  up  a  picture 
of  the  apathy,  ignorance  and  incompetence  of  a  strong 
central  government.  Running  through  everything  is  a 
tendency  on  the  part  of  individuals  who  are  unhopeful 
or  unambitious  of  distinction  on  the  greater  stage  to  cling 
to  and  magnify  their  offices  under  a  number  of  smaller 
sovereignties. 

On  the  other  hand,  in  the  minds  of  the  people  at  large, 
unconcerned  with  any  thought  of  posts  or  privileges,  when 
they  judge  the  matter  disinterestedly  in  a  cool  hour,  the 
idea  of  union — the  centripetal  idea — is  ever  predominant. 
The  instinct  of  civilisation,  seeking  security  and  justice,  is 
towards  co-operation.  But  it  is  a  vague  and  inarticulate 
instinct,  easy  to  overcome  by  sophistry,  or  by  appeals  to 
prejudice,  vanity  and  discontent.  The  issue  of  the  contest 
between  these  two  forces  is  never  a  foregone  conclusion. 
Among  Americans,  at  the  end  of  the  eighteenth  century,  the 
centripetal  was  victorious.  In  the  British  empire,  at  the 
beginning  of  the  twentieth,  the  result  is  still  hanging  on 
the  balance. 


CHAPTER  III 

Union  and  its  Difficulties 

IN  the  United  States,  from  the  Declaration  of  Indepen- 
dence onwards  for  twelve  years  until  the  constitution  was 
accepted,  the  sentiment  in  favour  of  union  in  the  abstract 


CONCLUSION  455 

was  practically  universal.  No  man  dared  get  up  boldly  and 
proclaim  himself  an  advocate  of  disintegration.  But  disputes 
began  so  soon  as  it  came  to  a  definition  of  terms.  The  end 
was  willed  sincerely  enough,  but  not  the  means  to  it.  In 
popular  debate  every  plan  put  forward  was  riddled  with 
objections.  The  British  people,  at  any  rate,  need  have  little 
difficulty  in  understanding  such  a  situation,  since  for  many 
years  they  have  been  living  in  a  similar  one.  The  ordinary 
man  in  a  serious  mood  has  no  hesitation  in  preferring  a  firm 
union  to  an  uncertain  union  or  to  disintegration.  His  view 
is  that  ours  would  be  a  better  empire  if  it  were  a  real 
empire ;  if  all  its  countries  were  bound  inseparably  together, 
sharing  their  burdens,  aiming  at  a  development  of  the  whole, 
offering  the  swift  opposition  of  a  united  government  and 
coherent  institutions  to  every  threat  of  foreign  aggression. 
He  would  be  happier  in  his  mind  if  he  were  certain  that  we 
were  one  people  as  much  in  times  of  peace,  as  at  those  rare 
moments  of  high  emotion  which  are  the  result  of  danger, 
grief,  or  victory.  Such  is  the  natural  mood  of  his  mind. 
He  is  vague,  but  altogether  sincere.  It  is  not  his  business 
to  think  things  out ;  and  the  foundations  of  his  belief  are 
therefore  easily  unsettled  by  the  first  fluent  person  who, 
having  put  instinct  contemptuously  on  one  side,  does  his 
thinking  on  the  squares  of  a  draught-board. 

This  universal,  timid  adhesion  to  the  principle  of  union 
was  the  material  out  of  which  Washington  and  Hamilton 
sought  to  create  a  strong  nation.  The  widespread  distrust 
of  all  means  calculated  to  secure  this  end  was  the  force 
which  had  to  be  subdued.  As  in  the  case  of  Moses  and 
Aaron,  plagues  came  to  their  aid ;  but  the  achievement  of 
union  grew  each  year  more  difficult  owing  to  the  continu- 
ance of  disunion.  Every  inconvenience,  distress  and  disaster 
was  adroitly  charged  by  the  opponents  of  union,  not,  as 
they  should  have  been,  against  the  condition  of  impotence 


456  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

which  prevailed,  but  against  the  folly,  or  arrogance,  or 
selfishness,  or  fraud  of  each  neighbour  state.  The  spirit  of 
criticism  among  the  thirteen  separate  sovereignties  was 
by  this  means  fanned  into  prejudice,  and  prejudice  hi  to 
enmity.  When  any  state  for  a  moment  seemed  to  be 
favourable  to  a  closer  union,  its  motives  were  immediately 
impugned.  It  was  suggested  that  it  sought  a  mean  profit  by 
diminishing  the  natural  advantages  of  its  rivals.  New  York, 
rejoicing  in  a  harbour  and  a  judicious  tariff,  bled  its  less 
fortunate  neighbours  at  its  leisure,  resented  as  a  matter 
of  honour  any  alteration  of  so  lucrative  a  system,  and  made 
its  fiscal  independence  a  condition  in  every  scheme  of  union. 
Any  suggestion  to  the  contrary  was  resented  as  the  gospel 
of  spoliation. 

The  case  of  New  York  was  no  exception.  The  whole 
atmosphere  was  charged  with  the  imputation  of  mean 
motives,  selfish  interests  and  sordid  considerations.  Charges 
and  counter-charges  of  narrowness,  provincialism  and  a  lack 
of  generosity  were  freely  bandied  about.  Certain  states,  it 
was  alleged,  had  failed  to  make  a  fair  contribution  to  the 
expenses  of  the  war.  Certain  others  would  not  bear  their 
proper  burden  in  the  cost  of  government.  Some  were 
oblivious  to  the  dangers  of  foreign  aggression,  and  viewed 
with  apathy  the  injuries  which  might  thereby  accrue  to 
their  fellow-members  of  the  confederacy.  Some,  again, 
called  out  for  treaties  to  secure  their  commerce,  but  found 
their  reasonable  demands  obstructed  by  states  which  had  no 
interest  in  trade. 

The  contemplation  of  our  neighbours'  shortcomings  is  not 
the  likeliest  road  to  union.  Hamilton  denounced  the  ten- 
dency. Washington  dealt  with  it  in  the  grand  manner, 
looking  over  its  head  and  affecting  to  ignore  it.  To  our 
own  ears  there  is  a  curious  familiarity  in  the  phrases. 
Narrowness,  provincialism,  the  shirking  of  burdens,  an  in- 


CONCLUSION  457 

difference  to  the  wider  issues,  are  trite  enough  accusations 
in  our  own  morning  newspapers.  There  is  something  start- 
ling in  the  echo  of  history  describing  a  struggle  which  took 
place  more  than  a  century  ago. 

Before  we  bandy  reproaches  of  this  kind  it  is  well  to 
realise  that  there  are  dangers  in  doing  so.  If  the  charges 
were  entirely  true,  which  they  never  are,  it  would  be  only  a 
degree  less  criminal  to  put  them  forward.  We  may  be  sure 
that  they  will  speedily  beget  counter-charges,  and  we  may 
also  be  sure  that  there  is  another  side  to  our  own  estimate 
of  our  own  virtues.  The  average  Briton  is  convinced  that 
he  understands  his  own  character  and  is  the  victim  of  no 
illusions  in  regard  to  it.  He  sees  himself  in  the  looking- 
glass  of  his  mind  a  free-handed,  hot-tempered,  magnanimous 
fellow ;  businesslike,  incorrigibly  tenacious,  and  entirely  free 
from  pedantry,  except  with  regard  to  the  strict  interpreta- 
tion of  his  own  promises.  He  is,  of  course,  aware  that 
foreign  nations  affect  at  times  to  hold  a  different  opinion ; 
but  he  believes  them  to  be  insincere,  or  charitably  excuses 
them  on  the  plea  of  envy,  ignorance,  or  ill- temper. 

He  is  proud  of  his  colonies,  but  in  the  ordinary  way  he 
does  not  read  their  newspapers.  If  he  did,  he  would  be 
shocked  and  surprised  to  find  that  not  only  the  friends  of 
disintegration,  but  honest,  impatient  persons  who  still  cling 
to  the  idea  of  a  united  empire,  regard  his  character  under  a 
different  aspect.  To  a  considerable  section  of  the  Australian 
people  he  is  held  up  weekly  as  a  hypocritical  usurer,  a 
grasping  mortgagee,  eternally  preaching  sermons  about  thrift 
and  integrity  with  the  object  of  securing  the  punctual  pay- 
ment of  interest  which  is  due  to  him.  Even  his  name 
suffers  the  indignity  of  an  addition  meant  to  be  unflattering : 
he  is  not  plain  'John  Bull,'  but  'John  Bull-Cohen.'  To 
many  of  his  South  African  kinsmen  he  figured,  before 
the  war  and  possibly  to  some  extent  still,  as  a  timid  and 


458  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

vacillating  professor,  arguing  ever  in  phrases  and  con- 
temptuously ignorant  of  the  facts.  In  Canada  there  are 
many  who  consider  him  to  be  of  weak  intellect,  capable  of 
being  'bluffed'  into  any  sacrifice  providing  it  is  at  the 
expense  of  his  friends  and  not  of  himself.  If  John  Bull 
were  to  go  into  retreat  with  a  bundle  of  such  criticisms,  and 
were  to  study  them  patiently  until  he  came  to  an  under- 
standing of  the  element  of  truth  there  is  in  each  unfavour- 
able picture,  he  might  be  less  ready  to  endure  the  superior 
and  often  pharisaical  commentaries  with  which  certain  news- 
papers and  politicians  in  his  own  island  are  prone  to  improve 
every  occasion.  Finding  his  own  motives  misunderstood 
by  the  captious  sections  of  colonial  opinion,  he  might 
coolly  consider  if  perchance  the  cause  of  the  misunder- 
standing is  not  to  be  found  in  utterances  which  he  has 
warmly  applauded.  Criticism  which  is  not  meant  to  im- 
prove a  man,  but  to  hurt  his  feelings  and  disturb  his  peace, 
rarely  fails  to  attain  its  object.  He  is  less  likely  to  strive 
after  self-improvement  than  to  engage  in  recrimination, 
and  once  this  dangerous  game  begins,  the  enemies  of  union, 
of  whom  there  are  many  in  these  kingdoms  and  throughout 
the  empire,  have  an  easy  task  in  feeding  the  flame  with 
fresh  fuel. 

The  worst  difficulties  of  Washington  and  Hamilton  were 
of  this  class.  In  their  case,  however,  matters  were  both 
more  confused  and  more  acute  than  in  our  own.  There 
were  thirteen  critics  and  thirteen  subjects  for  criticism,  and 
no  state  was  ignorant  of  the  unflattering  opinions  held  of  it 
by  its  neighbours.  It  is  not  hard  therefore  to  sympathise 
with  the  wrath  of  Washington  and  Hamilton  against  the 
mischief-makers.  From  a  frequent  contemplation  of  our 
own  imperfections  much  good  may  ensue.  From  the 
vigorous  analysis  and  setting  forth  of  the  imperfections  of 
persons  with  whom  we  wish  to  make  a  solemn  compact, 


CONCLUSION  459 

the  method  is  without  merit,  and  malice  is  ever  on  the 
watch  to  profit  by  the  evil  it  creates. 

The  maker  of  empire  wisely  and  deliberately  miscalcu- 
lates. He  ignores  and  shuts  out  from  view  a  thousand 
plausible  arguments  and  undeniable  facts,  not  because  he  is 
without  reverence  for  truth,  but  because  the  arguments  and 
facts  are  useless  for  his  purpose  and  therefore  irrelevant. 
The  complaints  of  one  state  against  another,  even  when 
they  were  just,  Washington  viewed  as  bad  building  material 
for  the  edifice  he  had  it  in  his  mind  to  construct,  and 
having  come  to  this  judgment,  he  put  them  quietly  aside 
as  often  as  they  came  under  his  hand. 

Allowing  the  case  of  the  United  States  to  be  no  precedent 
for  our  guidance,  it  must  not  therefore  be  assumed  that  their 
difficulties  were  less  formidable  than  our  own.  Indeed,  in 
many  matters  of  high  importance  the  contrary  was  the 
fact.  There  is  no  such  ill-feeling  between  the  states  which 
compose  the  British  Empire  to-day  as  that  which  existed 
between  New  York  or  Massachusetts  and  the  respective 
neighbours  of  each.  There  is  also  a  pride  which  is  very 
serviceable ;  a  pride  not  merely  in  the  vague  idea  of  an 
empire  which  covers  all,  but  a  more  intimate,  keen  and 
particular  pride  which  is  taken  in  the  achievements  of 
each  member  of  the  empire  by  all  the  rest.  Had  Hamilton 
been  equally  fortunate  in  his  conditions,  there  would  have 
been  less  distinction  in  his  achievement.  It  is  no  ex- 
aggeration to  say  that  the  hatred  of  state  against  state 
blazed  out  at  various  times  between  1783  and  1788  with 
a  fury  which  certainly  was  never  surpassed  by  the  popular 
feeling  against  Britain.  War  was  actually  threatened,  and 
within  an  ace  of  being  declared,  between  members  of  the 
confederacy;  and  not  war  merely  for  the  sake  of  State 
Rights  and  to  prevent  the  Union,  but  in  order  to  avenge 
what  were  felt  to  be  burning  injuries. 


460  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

In  the  matter  of  remoteness  from  one  another  and  from 
any  common  centre,  the  thirteen  states  were  at  an  im- 
mense disadvantage  as  compared  with  ourselves.  Whether 
we  consider  the  time  necessary  for  the  transmission  of  news 
or  for  the  conveyance  of  citizens  from  one  point  to  another ; 
whether  we  calculate  by  the  danger  of  the  journey  or  by  its 
relative  cost,  the  conditions  upon  which  Americans  had  the 
courage  to  undertake  a  union  were  miserably  inferior  to  our 
own.  We  are  inclined  to  think  and  talk  as  if  telegraphy 
and  railroads  had  been  then  invented,  and  tend  unconsciously 
to  compare  the  case  of  a  new  country  to-day,  where  these 
means  of  development  form  part  of  any  reasonable  fore- 
cast, with  that  of  America  at  the  end  of  the  eighteenth 
century,  where  they  were  not  so  much  as  dreamed  of. 

In  1787  Boston  was  as  far  removed  from  Philadelphia 
merely  in  time  as  New  York  is  to-day  from  London ;  South 
Carolina  as  remote  as  Cape  Town.  Measured  in  certainty, 
comfort,  or  safety  of  travel,  Boston  and  South  Carolina  were 
far  further  removed  from  the  common  centre.  Relatively 
to  the  standard  of  wealth,  the  expense  of  such  journeys 
was  much  greater.  The  remotest  dependencies  of  Great 
Britain  are  more  accessible  to-day  than  were  then  the 
states  to  north  and  south  along  the  Atlantic  Coast,  with- 
out reckoning  the  ironbound  separation  of  the  east  from 
the  settlements  in  the  Mississippi  valley.  Bad  roads,  rivers 
without  bridges  or  ferries,  roving  Indians,  and  democrats  who 
combined  principle  with  plunder  in  their  warfare  against 
men  who  dared  to  travel  in  their  own  coaches,  created  an 
isolation  which  it  is  difficult  now  even  to  imagine. 

But  the  great  inferiority  of  the  Union  was  in  communica- 
tions. The  thought  or  decision  which  within  a  day  is  now 
flashed  to  every  main  outpost  of  the  British  Empire  would 
have  taken  weeks  or  months  to  penetrate  into  the  chief 
cities  of  the  union.  A  swift  understanding  between  the 


CONCLUSION  461 

states  was  entirely  out  of  the  question.  Simultaneous  feel- 
ing or  utterance  could  not  exist.  And  yet,  in  spite  of  this 
tremendous  disadvantage,  Americans  ventured  boldly  upon 
an  experiment  which  has  succeeded.  The  country  which  at 
the  same  moment  of  time  is  capable  of  being  stirred  by  the 
same  impulse  throughout  its  length  and  breadth,  is  surely 
wanting  in  faith  and  resolution  if  it  puts  forward  the  plea  of 
miles  as  an  obstacle  to  union. 


CHAPTER  IV 

Nationality  and  Empire 

THERE  is  an  essential  difference  between  the  problem  which 
Hamilton  set  himself  to  solve  and  that  which  we  have  to 
consider  at  the  present  time.  His  aim  was  to  make  a  nation : 
our  aim  is  to  make  an  empire.  The  word  '  empire '  figures 
constantly  in  his  writings,  but  the  meaning  which  he 
attaches  to  it  is  merely  that  of  a  vast  extent  of  territory.  It 
is  a  synonym  for  a  great  nation  in  contrast  with  a  small  one. 
The  force  of  nationality  did  not  enter  into  his  calculations, 
or  if  he  considered  it  at  all,  his  object  was  to  nip  the  idea  in 
the  bud.  The  principle  of  separate  nationality  was  the 
enemy  of  his  policy,  and  he  sought  by  every  means  in  his 
power  to  destroy  it. 

In  our  case  any  scheme  of  empire  which  should  ignore 
the  force  of  nationalities  is  predestined  to  ruin.  But  it 
was  different  with  Hamilton.  His  aim  was  practicable,  and 
in  a  great  measure,  though  not  altogether,  he  achieved  it. 
He  did  not  love  the  states.  Their  meanness  and  vanity, 
in  his  judgment,  had  completely  overlaid  their  virtues. 
He  was  ruthless  to  their  plea  of  separate  sovereignty,  and 
equally  contemptuous  of  their  sentiment  for  local  tradi- 
tions. His  one  aim  was  strong  government,  for  he  had 


462  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

suffered  much  from  a  weak  one.  We  view  the  problem 
with  different  eyes.  Local  tradition  has  a  certain  degree  of 
sanctity.  The  principle  of  nationality  is  welcomed,  not  only 
because  it  is  inevitable,  but  for  the  further  reason  that  in 
the  huge  body  of  an  empire  it  is  the  only  means  to  preserve 
vitality.  If  we  would  we  cannot  put  it  on  one  side,  and  if  we 
could  no  one  but  an  academic  architect  in  pasteboard  would 
regard  it  in  the  light  of  an  advantage.  Nationality  is  a 
bugbear  and  a  stumbling-block  to  the  impatient  reformer ; 
to  the  rhetorical  man  of  feeling  it  is  an  end  in  itself;  but  to 
the  statesman  who  has  the  skill  to  use  it,  it  is  possibly  a 
way  to  the  widest  and  the  firmest  union  the  world  has  ever 
known. 

The  one  thing  which  is  harder  to  deal  with  in  our  own 
case  than  in  that  of  the  Americans  is  nationality.  The 
long  growth  and  establishment  of  the  states,  which  must 
be  parties  to  the  intended  union,  are  at  the  same  time 
our  hardest  problem  and  our  strongest  hope.  Between 
the  Declaration  of  Independence  and  the  Convention  of 
Philadelphia  there  was  an  interval  of  only  twelve  years: 
between  the  War  of  Independence  and  the  present  time 
a  period  of  a  century  and  a  quarter  has  elapsed.  Hamilton 
had  to  deal  with  saplings  that  could  be  pleached  and 
trained.  Our  task  is  with  older  and  tougher  timber.  If 
the  British  Colonies  possess  a  less  definite  sovereignty  than 
the  thirteen  states,  they  are  much  more  certainly  inde- 
pendent nations.  Indifference,  faint-heartedness  and  the 
obscure  vision  of  our  ministers,  working  in  alliance  with  the 
estranging  seas  and  the  long  lapse  of  time,  have  built  up, 
during  the  nineteenth  century,  a  proud  and  almost  a 
ferocious  self-reliance. 

The  difficulty  arising  out  of  the  maturity  of  the  timber  is 
the  creation  of  the  nineteenth  century.  That  period  of  time, 
if  we  may  personify  it,  was  used  to  think  and  speak  with 


CONCLUSION  463 

much  complacency  of  its  achievements  in  the  matter  of 
colonial  policy.  It  was  firmly  persuaded  that  the  main 
characteristics  of  this  policy  were  a  lofty  wisdom  and  a 
serene  generosity,  and  that  the  success  of  its  administration 
was  no  less  conspicuous  than  the  virtue  of  its  methods. 

The  new  century  is  like  a  young  heir,  confident  that  he 
can  do  better  with  the  estate.  Bringing  a  fresh  mind  to 
bear,  he  jumps  to  the  conclusion  that  things  have  been 
wofully  mismanaged  and  ill-developed,  and  kept  back  and 
under  in  a  thousand  ways.  Filled  with  eager  projects  of 
improvement  he  is  apt  to  be  irreverent  towards  the  ideas  of 
his  predecessor ;  but  it  is  better  that  he  should  be  irreverent 
than  a  sluggard,  content  to  let  everything  alone,  loving  his 
ease,  and  well  satisfied  with  his  income.  It  is  less  important 
that  he  should  be  respectful  than  that  he  should  be  bold ; 
and  in  a  young  heir  the  two  qualities  are  seldom  found 
together. 

It  is  difficult  to  withhold  our  sympathy  from  the  impatient 
thinkers  of  the  new  school  who  demand  contemptuously  to 
have  the  wisdom  of  the  colonial  policy  of  Britain  from 
Grey  to  Gladstone  explained  to  them.  The  Radical  party 
alone,  during  this  period,  appears  to  have  been  possessed 
firmly  by  any  ideal — the  ideal  of  Bright,  which  aimed  at 
sending  out  strong  sons  into  the  world,  encouraging  them  to 
be  self-reliant,  wishing  them  as  soon  as  possible  to  become 
independent,  and  hoping  sincerely  they  might  turn  out  a 
credit  to  the  family. 

But  this,  it  is  hardly  necessary  to  say,  was  not  the  Whig 
ideal,  if  indeed  the  existence  of  an  ideal  is  not  inconsistent 
with  the  just  conception  of  a  modern  Whig.  The  Whigs,  who 
entertained  a  timid  preference  for  union  in  the  abstract, 
were  terrified  by  the  least  murmur  of  discontent  or  threat 
of  separation.  In  a  manner  at  once  lavish  and  ungracious, 
grudging  yet  hasty,  they  gave  away  concessions  which,  by 


464  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

impoverishing  sovereignty,  made  steadily  for  the  disintegra- 
tion of  the  empire.  They  pretended  to  believe  that  these 
concessions,  made  under  the  unmistakable  influence  of  their 
fears,  would  nevertheless  stamp  the  magnanimity  of  British 
statesmen  upon  the  minds  of  her  colonists,  and  reap  in  the 
fulness  of  time  a  great  harvest  of  gratitude.  The  empire 
was  not  then  invented,  but  the  tie  of  union  could,  in  their 
opinion,  only  be  maintained  by  sentiment.  They  were  full 
of  contempt  for  new  institutions,  and  of  distrust  for  old 
ones. 

The  Tories,  who  never  tired  of  heaping  ridicule  upon  this 
strange  jargon  of  empty  phrases,  who  questioned  its  sincerity 
and  loaded  it  with  accusations  of  hypocrisy  and  cowardice, 
do  not  themselves  cut  a  glorious,  or  even  a  very  creditable, 
figure.  If  we  may  speak  of  them  in  their  own  harsh  terms, 
they  were  no  less  open  than  the  Whigs  to  the  charge  of 
cowardice ;  while,  if  they  may  escape  that  of  hypocrisy,  it  is 
only  because  the  excuses  and  justifications  offered  for  their 
acts  and  negligences  were  the  mere  mumblings  of  an  old 
official  ritual ;  conventions  which  imposed  on  no  man,  for 
the  reason  that  all  meaning  in  them  was  dead.  Their  whole 
behaviour  during  this  period  is  not  unlike  the  inarticulate 
anger  of  a  bullock  driven  to  a  market,  which  some  instinct 
warns  him  may  lead  eventually  to  the  slaughter-house. 

The  real  opposition  was  between  the  Radicals  and  the 
Tories.  Between  Bright  and  Lord  Derby  there  was  no 
agreement  save  in  their  common  contempt  for  the  windy 
pretensions  of  the  Whigs.  But  Bright  held  the  advantage 
and  won,  in  the  sense  that  he  brought  opinion  over  to  his 
side,  because  he  had  an  idea  sufficiently  noble  to  stir  the 
hearts  of  men,  when  contrasted  with  a  gospel  that  dared  not 
make  a  positive  appeal,  but  relied  upon  mere  negation. 
The  Radical  aim  is  worthy  of  honour  in  comparison  with 
the  cheap  criticisms  which  assailed  it.  It  was  misled  by 


CONCLUSION  465 

the  false  light  of  a  metaphor,  and  foundered  on  the  rocks 
of  ignorance.  You  cannot  argue  from  family  life  to 
national  affairs.  Sturdy  sons  launched  into  the  world,  and 
thriving  colonies  encouraged  to  cut  themselves  adrift,  make 
an  alluring  but  a  false  analogy.  To  ignore  the  changes  that 
were  working  round  slowly  among  the  kingdoms  and 
republics  of  the  world  upon  a  well-beaten  road  of  history ; 
to  believe  that  the  ambitions  of  men  and  races  of  men  were 
moving  speedily  to  extinction  under  the  benign  spell  of 
commerce ;  not  to  foresee  that  the  dominant  force  in  inter- 
national affairs  was  not  the  multiplication  of  peaceful 
Switzerlands  and  Hollands,  but  the  consolidation  of  little 
states  into  great  empires,  may  fairly  be  termed  ignorance 
when  the  matter  under  consideration  is  the  action  of  a  great 
statesman,  who  more  profoundly  than  any  other  affected  the 
ideas  of  his  fellow-countrymen  for  the  quarter  of  a  century 
which  ended  in  1880. 

It  must  be  clearly  understood,  that  when  men  now  speak 
with  complacency  of  British  colonial  policy  during  the  nine- 
teenth century,  it  is  precisely  the  action  or  inaction  of  the 
Whigs  and  the  Tories  that  they  are  regarding.  For  the 
policy  of  Bright,  which  alone  is  worthy  of  praise,  has  been 
expressly  disavowed.  Every  one  shrinks  away  with  horror 
from  the  idea  of  separation.  There  is  something  marvellous 
in  the  quiet  and  complete  disappearance  of  this  idea.  It 
could  not  be  killed  by  criticism;  but  it  died  immediately, 
unnoticed,  almost  without  a  struggle  upon  the  appearance 
of  the  counter-idea. 

The  action  of  the  Whigs  and  the  Tories — though  it  is  a 
hard  judgment — appears  to  us  to  merit  all  the  abuse 
which  they  poured  out  so  lavishly  upon  one  another,  which 
Kadicals,  confident  in  a  making-tide,  poured  out  upon  both. 
The  only  puzzle  is  this  new-fangled  admiration  for  things 
which  no  one,  not  even  the  actors  themselves,  believed 

2a 


466  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

in  while  they  lasted.  At  best  their  wisdom  was  but 
negative.  It  is  wise  to  know  what  you  yourself  are  unable 
to  do ;  but  it  is  rash  always  to  assume  that  the  thing  is 
therefore  impossible.  In  this  limited  sense  alone  was 
British  colonial  policy  at  all  worthy  of  praise.  Being  afraid, 
at  least  it  had  the  wisdom  not  to  try  to  appear  brave,  or  to 
attempt  the  heroic  in  anything. 

As  a  result  of  the  wisdom  of  Whigs  and  Tories  during  the 
nineteenth  century  our  self-governing  colonies  are  indepen- 
dent nations  in  all  but  name ;  or  perhaps  it  would  be  more 
true  to  say,  in  all  but  their  loyalty  to  the  idea  of  a  united 
empire,  which  is  in  no  sense  the  work  either  of  Whigs  or 
Tories  but  of  destiny.  The  situation  is  vastly  more  complex 
than  that  of  the  American  States,  and  being  more  complex 
it  demands  a  simpler  solution. 


CHAPTER  V 

Commerce  under  Two  Aspects 

HAMILTON  is  remarkable  among  statesmen  for  the  wide 
extent  of  his  endeavours,  and  fortunate  in  having  left 
behind  him  enough  work — done,  half  done,  and  attempted 
— to  make  us  certain  of  the  vision  which  possessed  his 
mind.  A  commercial  system  was  an  important  part  of  his 
plan  of  national  policy. 

He  held  no  brief  for  manufactures,  merchanting,  or  agri- 
culture. His  aim  was  a  balance,  and  his  idea  of  the  duty  of 
the  state  was  to  regulate  a  just  and  proportionate  develop- 
ment all  along  the  line.  He  was  no  advocate  of  protection 
for  the  benefit  of  any  trade  or  interest  unless  the  advantage 
of  the  community  as  a  whole  appeared  to  him  to  be  involved 
in  such  a  course.  If  it  be  true  that  the  tendency  of  modern 
American  legislation  has  been  to  consider  the  prosperity 


CONCLUSION  467 

of  certain  classes  as  an  end  in  itself,  and  to  ignore  the  equal 
and  concurrent  development  of  other  branches  of  industry, 
his  name  cannot  be  invoked.  The  goal  of  his  policy  was 
a  nation  supplying  the  whole  of  its  own  needs,  which  should 
be  independent  of  foreign  countries  for  its  means  of  subsis- 
tence and  even  for  its  luxuries.  The  aim  may  be  open  to 
attack  on  various  grounds ;  but  in  view  of  the  variety  of  soil 
and  climate  which  is  covered  by  the  United  States,  it  cannot 
be  set  aside  on  the  ground  that  it  was  impracticable.  Nor 
can  it  be  argued  against  him  that  individual  effort  would 
have  been  adequate  to  the  task,  or  that  there  was  any  hope 
of  accomplishing  it  without  the  intervention  of  the  state. 

Like  Adam  Smith,  Hamilton  was  keenly  alive  to  the  advan- 
tage of  the  double  bargain.  Assuming  that  in  any  exchange 
both  parties  as  a  rule  are  benefited,  he  considered  that  it 
was  an  advantage  to  any  country  if  both  parties  were 
citizens  of  that  country.  If  a  grower  of  wheat  required  a 
pair  of  boots,  it  was  better  if  he  bought  them  from  an 
American  cobbler  than  from  a  German,  for  then  the  profits 
on  both  transactions  remained  in  the  States. 

The  wealth  of  a  nation,  according  to  his  philosophy, 
could  never  be  gauged  merely  by  an  addition  of  the  private 
fortunes  of  its  inhabitants.  It  was  necessary  to  regard  the 
manner  in  which  their  capital  was  employed  and  invested. 
From  the  statesman's  point  of  view  a  man  who  had  a  million 
sterling  fixed  in  foreign  securities,  of  one  kind  or  another, 
was  a  much  less  valuable  asset  in  computing  the  wealth  of 
the  nation  than  one  who  was  employing  the  same  sum,  or 
even  an  immensely  smaller  sum,  in  mills  or  farms  in  his 
own  country.  Even  if  the  income  of  the  former  citizen 
were  greater  in  amount,  he  was  still  immeasurably  inferior  in 
the  imperial  balance-sheet.  The  wealth  of  a  community 
is  to  be  reckoned  mainly  by  the  sums  which  are  fixed  within 
its  own  borders,  giving  employment  to  its  own  workers. 


468  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

The  wealth  of  individuals,  in  so  far  as  it  is  placed  abroad, 
is  of  little  value  except  to  the  individual  investor  and  to 
the  fortunate  country  which  he  is  assisting  to  develop. 
The  manner  of  the  investment  is  the  all-important  question 
for  the  statesman  whose  unit  is  the  nation  he  is  called  upon 
to  govern.  The  mere  amount  of  it  is  irrelevant.  To  the 
economist,  on  the  other  hand,  who  regards  the  whole  world 
as  the  unit,  and  not  any  single  country,  the  manner  is  of 
subordinate  interest;  the  chief  object  is  the  amount. 

The  belief  that  commerce  between  nations  is  a  safeguard 
of  peace  has  had  a  remarkable  influence  upon  the  policy  of 
Britain.  The  proposition  cannot  stand  historical  scrutiny. 
Commerce  has  no  more  to  do  with  peace  than  it  has  with 
war;  or  perhaps  it  would  be  juster  to  say  that  in  its  nature 
it  has  much  to  do  with  both.  So  long  as  the  relations  of 
two  men  or  of  two  nations  can  be  kept  mainly  to  the  inter- 
change of  goods  of  one  class  against  goods  of  another  class, 
commerce  is  akin  to  peace,  and  is  a  strong  influence  in 
maintaining  it  between  the  two  parties.  But  when  this 
relation  alters,  and  from  being  seller  and  buyer  they  become 
rival  sellers,  it  is  akin  to  war.  The  former  of  these  cases,  the 
peaceful  relation  of  buyers  and  sellers,  held  good  in  the  main 
when  Britain  first  accepted  free-trade  as  a  practical  rule  of 
statesmanship.  We  supplied  the  world  with  manufactures, 
and  received  in  return  raw  materials  and  food.  The  wealth 
of  Britain  was  for  the  moment  admirably  served  by  the  new 
arrangement.  Ideas  of  national  development  were  then 
unfashionable.  Any  imperial  system,  or  plan  of  regulating 
commerce  in  order  to  promote  political  strength,  seemed, 
in  the  warmth  and  effulgence  of  a  sudden  prosperity,  to  be 
a  rude  device  of  antiquated  error  and  more  savage  times. 
The  policy  of  Britain  from  the  beginning  of  the  sixteenth 
to  the  middle  of  the  nineteenth  century  was  suddenly  and 
somewhat  too  hastily  discovered  to  have  been  a  colossal 


CONCLUSION  469 

error.  No  authority  could  save  it  from  derision.  No  prac- 
tice, however  successful,  in  Britain  or  elsewhere,  was  deemed 
worthy  of  respectful  consideration. 

As  years  have  rolled  slowly  by,  the  aspect  of  things  has 
insensibly  undergone  a  change.  The  growth  of  the  imperial 
idea  throughout  the  world,  the  consolidation  of  races,  hitherto 
held  loosely  together  by  treaties  or  traditions,  have  become  an 
articulate  ambition.  The  utility  of  commerce  as  a  means  of 
binding  together,  strengthening  and  developing  each  separate 
empire  against  the  world  outside  it,  has  gradually  come  to 
be  accepted  everywhere  save  in  our  own  two  islands.  The 
other  states  which  are  united  under  the  British  crown  have 
unanimously  rejected  our  economic  creed,  and  have  used  the 
force  of  commerce  in  order  to  make  nations,  since  it  had 
been  despised  and  discarded  for  the  purpose  of  making  an 
empire. 

Concern  for  the  maximum  prosperity  of  mankind  as  a 
whole  has  ceased  to  colour  with  the  faintest  tinge  the 
policies  of  nations.  The  ideal  which  for  a  brief  time  men 
entertained  when  the  Crystal  Palace  was  set  up  in  Hyde 
Park,  an  ideal  of  national  boundaries  crumbling  into  ana- 
chronisms, of  armies  and  fleets  melting  into  legend,  under 
the  influence  of  a  tepid  fraternity  and  the  interchange  of 
commodities,  is  now  everywhere  abandoned.  It  is  useless 
any  longer  to  pretend  that  commerce  with  free-trade  as  her 
handmaiden  can  act  as  a  peacemaker  when  confronted  with 
a  universal  array  of  deliberate,  vigilant  and  self-conscious 
systems.  Trade,  and  all  that  appertains  to  it,  is  recognised 
by  intelligent  rulers  to  be  the  most  powerful  instrument  of 
empire.  It  is  restricted  indeed,  but  most  lovingly  cherished. 
If  it  cannot  make  a  full  boast  of  freedom,  at  least  it  is  pros- 
perous, and  to  such  a  degree  that  many  people  are  in  doubt 
whether  under  the  economic  as  well  as  under  the  political 
aspect  there  is  not  an  advantage  in  restraints  on  liberty. 


470  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

In  a  comparatively  short  space  of  time  a  great  change  has 
come  over  the  appearance  of  international  affairs.  Before 
the  end  of  the  nineteenth  century  the  greater  part  of  man- 
kind had  returned  to  the  views  of  earlier  epochs.  The 
peaceful  tendency  of  commerce  is  now  less  triumphantly 
insisted  upon.  To  foreign  competition,  rightly  or  wrongly, 
are  attributed  the  phenomena  of  mills  standing  idle,  and  a 
large  number  of  millions  of  our  population  on  the  verge, 
as  it  is  alleged,  of  starvation.  The  explanation  may  con- 
ceivably be  erroneous.  Not  foreign  competition,  but  some 
accident  or  folly  may  be  the  true  cause ;  but  the  fact  still 
remains  as  we  have  stated  it,  that  commerce  appears  to  the 
average  Englishman  of  to-day  to  be  less  akin  to  peace  than 
it  did  to  his  radiant  ancestors  in  the  sixties  and  seventies. 
Its  accent  is  no  longer  friendship,  and  if  it  is  not  actually 
hostility,  it  has  moved  a  long  way  in  that  direction. 

Owing  to  the  growth  of  the  imperial  idea  on  the  one  hand, 
and  to  the  rivalry  of  commerce  on  the  other,  the  firmest 
rule  of  business  among  private  men  has  risen  into  a  great 
political  importance.  The  merchant  or  manufacturer  cannot 
afford  to  buy  in  the  cheapest  market  if  the  cheapest  market 
happens  to  be  the  shop  of  a  rival  trader.  He  does  not  hesitate 
to  put  temptation  on  one  side,  and  to  buy  at  a  dearer  rate 
from  some  independent  source,  selling  for  the  time  being  at 
the  meagrest  profit  rather  than  strengthen  the  hands  of  a 
competitor.  No  trader  is  ignorant  of  the  folly  of  increasing 
his  rivals'  output,  enabling  him  thereby  to  cheapen  still 
further  the  cost  of  his  goods  by  swelling  the  scale  of  his 
operations. 

The  practice  of  the  individual  merchant  is  not  an  infal- 
lible guide  to  the  statesman  who  undertakes  the  regulation 
of  commerce,  but  it  is  at  least  as  valuable  as  the  specula- 
tions of  the  student  who  proceeds  upon  the  single  motive  of 
clear-sighted  acquisitiveness.  In  the  particular  instance, 


CONCLUSION  471 

and  granting,  what  it  is  impossible  to  deny,  the  existence  of 
a  strong  and  jealous  national  objective  in  other  nations,  the 
analogy  of  the  trader  appears  to  apply.  Viewing  the  matter 
from  the  political  standpoint,  taking  the  nation,  and  not  the 
world,  as  the  unit  whose  strength  and  security  it  is  the 
business  of  the  statesman  to  consider,  the  trade  relations  of 
two  independent  countries  stand  upon  an  entirely  different 
basis  from  those  of  allied  states  or  of  a  mother  country  and 
her  colonies. 

Trade  relations  between  the  states  of  the  Union  in  1787, 
between  the  German  principalities  before  1870,  between  the 
various  dominions  of  the  British  crown  to-day,  were  and  are 
desirable  without  a  single  reservation.  The  danger  of 
strengthening  a  rival  does  not  enter  into  the  consideration. 
The  empire  being  the  unit  in  each  of  these  cases,  the  states, 
principalities  and  dominions  have  a  common  object — to 
increase  the  strength  and  prosperity  of  the  whole.  The 
policy  of  free  intercourse  is  obviously  sound.  Its  accom- 
plishment is  by  comparison  more  easy.  Its  results  have  a 
reasonable  prospect  of  permanency. 

But  in  dealings  with  foreign  nations,  even  if  we  ourselves 
are  exempt  from  all  jealousy  and  suspicion,  and  are  content 
to  treat  the  national  object  as  a  foolish  fetish,  the  other 
party  to  the  bargain  is  animated  by  a  wholly  different 
ambition.  For  while  he  is  anxious  to  arrive  at  any  arrange- 
ment which  may  assist  the  prosperity  of  his  industrial 
classes,  he  has  at  the  same  time  the  second  and  predominant 
motive  to  increase  the  strength  of  his  nation,  relatively  to 
the  strength  of  other  nations.  The  joint  prosperity  of  the 
people  of  Great  Britain  and  Canada  may  be  fairly  assumed 
to  be  the  object  of  any  wise  statesman  in  either  country ; 
but  the  joint  prosperity  of  Great  Britain  and  Germany  is 
not,  as  the  world  is  now  constituted,  nearly  so  important  a 
consideration  as  the  relative  superiority  in  riches  and  power 


472  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

of  the  one  empire  over  the  other.  Each  party  is  eager  to 
conclude  a  favourable  arrangement  for  commercial  purposes, 
but  will  always  keep  an  eye  upon  the  political  aim,  and 
be  jealous  of  strengthening  the  sinews  of  a  rival,  or  of 
jeopardising  his  own  empire  as  an  independent,  self-contained 
and  self-sufficing  unit. 

It  would  be  no  less  absurd  than  unjust  to  hold  the  con- 
clusions of  the  classical  economists  up  to  a  cheap  scorn. 
Viewed  in  a  proper  relation  to  public  affairs,  their  labours 
have  been  of  inestimable  value.  The  quarrel,  indeed,  is  rarely 
with  the  men  themselves,  but  with  their  impatient  and  shallow 
misreaders  who  are  unable  to  discriminate  between  the 
principles  of  a  science  and  the  maxims  of  an  art,  These 
disciples  insist  upon  applying  the  cold  conclusions  of  a  study 
whose  matter  is  the  wealth  of  the  world,  as  if  they  were 
practical  rules  for  the  government  of  each  particular  country. 
They  judge  action  and  test  policies  in  the  spirit  of  some 
nervous  reader  of  a  manual  on  chemistry  who,  having 
ascertained  that  arsenic  is  a  poison,  would  therefore  refuse 
to  take  it  as  a  drug. 

In  putting  forward  a  plea  for  the  respectful  consideration 
of  Hamilton's  commercial  policy,  it  is  necessary  to  admit 
that  he  is  in  disagreement  with  the  text-books.  The 
national  aim  was  everything  in  his  philosophy.  He  had 
not  lived  long  enough  to  see  political  economy  uplifted  into 
a  religion.  He  took  the  science  for  what  it  was  worth, 
grateful  for  what  he  could  get  out  of  it.  Orthodoxy  and 
heterodoxy  in  his  day  were  terms  of  no  meaning  in  this  con- 
nection. When  it  served  his  purpose  he  made  use  of  the 
science,  but  he  would  have  viewed  with  astonishment  any 
pretensions  in  it  to  dictate  a  course  of  political  action. 

It  has  happened,  rather  unfortunately  perhaps,  that  free- 
trade,  which  was  a  conclusion  of  the  economists,  has  come 
to  be  a  question  between  political  parties.  What  is  apt  to 


CONCLUSION  473 

be  forgotten  is  that  the  doctrine  of  laisser  faire,  or  the 
devil-take-the-hindmost,  was  equally  an  article  of  their 
faith  in  the  days  of  orthodoxy's  greatest  splendour  and 
authority.  Political  economy  was  as  confident  with  regard 
to  free-contract  as  with  regard  to  free-trade.  Socialists  have 
made  inroads  upon  the  former  doctrine,  and  no  political 
partisan,  however  respectful  to  the  early  writers,  is  pre- 
pared to  take  up  the  position  of  Cobden  in  this  matter. 
State  regulation,  which  he  denounced  and  deplored,  is 
become  the  rule.  The  fanatics  for  free- trade  have  now  to 
bend  the  knee  to  the  Baal  of  factory  acts  and  land  purchase. 
Is  the  one  contention  truer  than  the  other?  From  the 
principles  of  the  classical  economists  it  is  certain  that  the 
one  ensues  as  inevitably  as  the  other.  Logically  the  one 
is  impossible  without  the  support  of  the  other.  And  for  the 
purpose  of  governing  a  people  to  their  best  advantage  the 
one  is  as  unimportant  as  the  other.  Both  are  doomed  to 
be  overridden  by  a  wise  opportunism  which,  finding  itself 
face  to  face  with  a  hotchpotch  of  human  affairs,  has  to  make 
the  best  way  it  can  out  of  the  difficulty. 


CHAPTER    YI 

Sovereignty 

SOVEEEIGNTY  is  an  essential  condition  of  union.  The 
authority  of  the  Continental  Congress  during  and  after  the 
War  of  Independence  was  not  sovereignty.  This  body  had 
a  great  nominal  dignity.  The  roll  of  its  functions  was 
sonorous  and  imposing;  but  there  was  no  reality,  for  it 
lacked  the  power  to  enforce  its  decrees.  Compliance  depended 
upon  the  pleasure  of  the  separate  states.  Although  charged 
with  the  conduct  of  the  war,  it  coukj.  levy  no  taxes. 


474  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

Although  congress  was  entitled  to  make  treaties,  the  states 
could  refuse  to  carry  out  the  terms;  nor  had  they  any 
scruples  in  exercising  their  power.  Congress  could  raise 
foreign  loans  so  long  as  foreign  creditors  misunderstood  the 
situation,  but  was  without  the  means  of  discharging  the 
debt  or  collecting  the  interest.  At  every  turn  it  was  checked 
and  humiliated,  till  in  the  end  it  became  a  pure  farce.  Its 
attitude  towards  the  states  was  that  of  a  man,  hat  in  hand, 
recommending,  advising,  imploring,  and  usually,  after  the 
war  had  ended,  speaking  to  deaf  ears.  Without  sovereignty, 
union  is  merely  a  figure  of  speech.  The  union  of  hearts,  the 
tie  of  kinship,  a  common  sentiment,  were  put  forward,  then 
as  now,  as  something  more  potent  than  any  formal  bond. 
These  were  the  phrases  of  diffidence,  dreading  a  new 
departure,  or  of  malice,  veiled  under  a  thin  civility.  From 
the  statesman's  point  of  view  they  were  merely  words.  So 
far  as  they  corresponded  with  any  genuine  belief,  they  were 
but  the  raw  materials  of  union,  and  not  union  itself;  a 
quarry,  not  a  house. 

In  this  important  matter  of  sovereignty  we  are  some- 
what further  on  the  way  than  the  Americans  in  1787. 
Our  aspiration  towards  the  essential  is  acknowledged  by 
our  affection  for  the  person  and  office  of  the  King,  and  to  a 
certain  extent  by  the  dignified  pre-eminence  of  the  British 
Cabinet.  Popular  opinion  throughout  the  empire  is  not 
outraged  by  the  idea  of  monarchy,  or  even  by  the  thought 
of  a  strong  central  power.  But  the  case  with  which 
Hamilton  had  to  deal  was  very  different.  Not  merely 
kingship,  but  any  force  in  government  was  classed  without 
discrimination  under  the  head  of  tyranny.  Tyranny  was 
even  alleged  to  be  a  danger  inherent  in  all  central  power, 
whether  the  functions  were  exercised  by  one  or  many; 
whether  the  one  or  many  took  by  inheritance,  or  were  chosen 
by  the  broadest  democratic  suffrage ;  whether  the  sovereign 


CONCLUSION  475 

authority  were  elected  for  life  or  for  a  single  year.  This 
dread  of  tyranny  was  the  great  fixed  idea  of  the  times, 
and  the  chief  difficulty  of  the  Federalist  party  was  how  to 
overcome  it.  At  every  turn  we  meet  with  the  blind  and 
disheartening  argument  that  mere  strength  in  government 
is  identical  with  tyranny.  Not  only  on  the  hustings,  but  in 
the  speeches  and  letters  of  serious  men,  the  question  is 
constantly  raised  why  the  states,  having  but  recently  con- 
cluded a  long  and  ruinous  war  to  get  rid  of  a  foreign  tyrant, 
should  create  and  set  up  a  domestic  one  in  its  stead.  It  is 
argued,  with  a  dreary  iteration,  that  the  powers  which  the 
British  Parliament  sought  to  exercise  would  be  no  less 
odious  and  intolerable  if  exercised  by  a  parliament  elected 
by  American  citizens. 

When,  however,  we  come  to  inquire  closely  into  this 
matter  of  sovereignty,  we  are  amazed  to  find  how  strong  a 
likeness  there  is  between  the  States  of  America  before  the 
Union  and  the  British  Empire  at  the  present  day.  The 
difference  lies  in  the  dispositions  of  the  two  peoples,  not 
in  their  political  circumstances.  In  spite  of  our  aspiration 
towards  sovereignty  (so  strong  and  universal  as  almost  to 
amount  to  a  belief  that  somewhere  in  the  empire  a  clear 
sovereignty  does  actually  exist),  in  spite  also  of  the  fact  that 
we  are  haunted  by  no  fixed  idea  which  confounds  strong 
government  with  tyranny,  we  are  victims  of  the  same  disease. 
There  is  no  sovereignty.  Everything  hangs  on  sentiment, 
influence  and  management.  In  the  Three  Kingdoms 
sovereignty  so  far  has  not  been  impaired;  but  outside 
these  islands  it  is  a  very  different  matter.  The  theory  of 
the  empire  seems  hardly  to  have  moved  a  step  forward 
since  the  War  of  Independence.  Now,  as  then,  the  King 
accepts  the  advice  of  the  Prime  Minister  of  Great  Britain 
and  Ireland.  The  Prime  Ministers  of  his  other  dominions 
have  no  direct  access  to  his  confidence,  and  he  is  pre- 


476  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

eluded  from  acting  upon  their  direction  unless  with  the 
approval  of  the  British  Cabinet.  Under  the  guidance  of 
a  dignified  committee  which  meets  in  Downing  Street,  he 
conducts  the  whole  foreign  policy  of  the  empire,  declares 
war,  or  makes  peace,  or  signs  treaties  whereof  the  con- 
sequences may  affect  the  remotest  regions  of  his  realm. 
Under  the  same  guidance  he  assents  to  or  rejects  the 
legislation  of  the  self-governing  colonies,  approves  the  acts 
of  the  Indian  Viceroy,  and  the  measures  devised  by  his 
Colonial  Minister  for  the  good  government  of  the  crown 
colonies  and  territories. 

The  theory,  indeed,  of  sovereignty  is  complete  and 
without  a  flaw,  but  it  is  also  startling  if  we  view  it  from  a 
democratic  standpoint.  The  imperial  sovereignty  which  is 
exercised  in  the  name  of  the  King  actually  resides  in  the 
British  Prime  Minister,  a  gentleman  who  holds  his  office 
at  the  pleasure  of  the  majority  of  the  British  House  of 
Commons.  Therefore,  in  the  ultimate  appeal,  a  majority 
of  British  voters  is  the  supreme  power  in  the  empire.  One 
democracy — for  the  time  being  the  most  numerous — holds 
a  sovereignty,  not  merely  over  those  portions  of  the  King's 
dominions  where,  as  in  the  case  of  India,  the  form  of  govern- 
ment is  frankly  autocratic,  but  over  other  democracies  whom 
we  think  of  and  who  think  of  themselves  as  self-governing. 

It  has  been  the  subject  of  much  discussion  whether  or 
not  a  democracy  is  capable  of  exercising  the  functions  of  a 
despot  over  subject  races,  and  the  matter  is  not  yet  at  rest 
even  with  the  example  of  India  before  our  eyes.  But  what 
has  never  been  questioned  since  the  War  of  Independence  is 
that  a  democracy  pretending  to  a  sovereignty  over  other 
democracies  is  either  a  phantom  or  the  most  intolerable 
of  all  oppressions. 

In  regard  to  the  foreign  affairs  of  the  empire,  sovereignty 
appears  to  best  advantage.  But  even  here,  when  carefully 


CONCLUSION  477 

examined,  its  tenure  is  precarious,  its  warrant,  in  reason  if 
not  at  law,  is  dubious.  The  true  meaning  of  the  situation 
is  no  less  painful  than  it  is  plain.  The  most  powerful 
member  of  a  loose  confederacy  is  content  to  defend  her 
fellow-members  from  foreign  attack  for  so  long  as  they 
are  willing  to  acquiesce  in  her  policy.  Those  whom  she 
so  protects  are  on  their  part  content  to  acquiesce  in  her 
policy,  to  risk  a  considerable  danger,  to  forgo  their  share  in 
an  honourable  authority,  for  the  solitary  advantage  of  the 
evasion  of  a  pecuniary  burden,  if  we  believe  the  mischief- 
makers,  or  from  a  loyal  confidence  in  the  imperial  intention, 
if  we  believe  our  own  instincts.  But  what  is  clear  equally  to 
the  optimist  and  the  cynic  is  that  the  other  states  will  cease 
to  acquiesce  at  the  moment  when  our  foreign  policy  has  the 
appearance  of  being  in  serious  conflict  with  their  interests  or 
their  honour.  The  equilibrium  is  so  unstable  that  no  argu- 
ment upon  tradition  can  persuade  us  it  has  any  of  the 
elements  of  safety.  Even  with  fine  weather  it  is  only  a 
miracle  that  maintains  it,  and  under  rain  or  storm  there 
must  be  a  shifting  of  the  balance  that  can  have  no  issue  but 
disintegration. 

Leaving  foreign  affairs  upon  one  side,  we  are  equally  dis- 
mayed by  the  lack  of  any  efficient  check,  not  merely  upon 
colonial  legislation,  but  also  upon  purely  British  legislation. 
This  want  may  imperil  the  very  existence  of  the  union  if 
there  is  no  power  equal  to  the  task  of  restraint  or  co- 
ordination; no  courage  equal  to  the  exercise  of  such 
power;  no  judgment  capable  of  directing  the  courage. 
And  such  is  unfortunately  the  case.  On  British  legislation 
there  is  not  even  a  formal  veto,  while  the  veto  upon 
colonial  legislation  is  scrupulously  preserved  only  because 
it  is  hardly  ever  exercised.  Even  if  a  colony  desired  to 
institute  polygamy  or  slavery,  or  to  practise  repudiation, 
it  would  be  a  matter  of  the  utmost  delicacy  to  defeat  its 


478  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

intention.  For  the  exercise  of  the  only  veto  which  exists 
is,  in  plain  words,  the  tyranny  of  one  parliament  over 
another — of  one  democracy  over  another. 

The  theory  of  the  British  constitution  is,  as  it  stands, 
clearly  intolerable,  except  in  disuse.  The  powers  which  are 
imagined  to  exist  in  it  would  never  stand  the  strain  of  being 
put  in  force.  The  exercise  of  the  legal  right  of  veto  would 
provoke  greater  and  more  just  resentment  than  if  the  matter 
lay  in  the  sole  discretion  of  the  King.  The  consequences 
being  so  obvious,  we  have  declined  upon  a  timid  make- 
believe,  and  for  the  sake  of  peace  and  goodwill  have  laid 
sovereignty  upon  the  shelf,  regardless  of  the  fact  that 
sovereignty  is  the  very  essence  of  union. 

If  the  government  of  Great  Britain  and  Ireland,  which 
we  term  somewhat  grandiosely  the  Imperial  Parliament, 
desires  anything  to  be  done  which  requires  colonial  co- 
operation, it  must  go  like  the  old  Continental  Congress, 
hat  in  hand,  arguing,  persuading,  cajoling  and  entreating. 
By  a  fine  tradition  it  has  the  full  dignity  of  sovereignty ;  but 
in  reality  it  is  as  impotent  as  the  Continental  Congress,  and 
only  less  ridiculous  because  it  has  learned  from  experience 
the  timid  wisdom  not  to  court  rebuffs. 

Our  real  reliance  is  upon  the  sentimental  quality  of  each 
great  emergency  to  produce  a  dramatic  co-operation.  But 
it  is  wise  to  remember  that  in  a  dramatic  impulse,  though 
there  is  elan,  there  is  not  and  cannot  be  much  staying- 
power.  The  tie  of  affection  or  kinship  is  the  raw  material 
of  union,  not  union  itself.  'Influence,'  said  Washington, 
'  is  not  government.'  A  power  which  we  refuse  to  influence 
we  shall  hardly  grant  to  sentiment.  The  union  we  com- 
placently acknowledge  is  a  mere  shadow — not  a  political 
fact,  but  a  poetical  fancy.  It  has  the  health  of  an  invalid 
who  is  free  from  pain  so  long  as  he  will  lie  still  in  one 
position.  Such  is  its  present  frailty,  that  in  a  protracted 


CONCLUSION  479 

struggle  of  varying  fortune,  it  must  almost  inevitably  fall 
asunder. 

The  hope  and  strength  of  our  great  empire  are  in  popular 
government,  but  the  hope  will  be  disappointed  and  the 
strength  will  fail  if  the  need  of  a  true  sovereignty  be  over- 
looked. Sovereignty  can  never  be  secure  while  it  rests 
upon  a  confusion  of  legal  formulas  and  brittle  sympathies ; 
but  only  when  it  has  been  founded  boldly  upon  the  free  and 
deliberate  choice  of  the  citizens  of  the  empire. 


CHAPTER    VII 

The  Duties  of  Empire 

MANY  ways  have  been  tried  to  the  millennium,  but  experi- 
ence has  shown  that  no  short  cut  leads  there.  There  was 
the  way  of  Rousseau,  obliterating  boundaries  and  distinctions 
by  an  appeal  direct  to  the  heart  of  humanity ;  a  great  aim, 
that  failed  because  it  ignored  the  things  which  are  Caesar's. 
There  was  the  way  in  more  recent  times  of  what  has  been 
called  the  Manchester  School,  among  whose  teachers  John 
Bright  was  incomparably  the  noblest  spirit.  As  we  look 
back  upon  the  period  between  1850  and  1880,  we  are  con- 
scious of  his  moral  force  gradually  increasing  year  by  year, 
until  finally,  having  converted  not  only  the  rank  and  file, 
but  the  leaders  themselves,  it  came  to  dominate  the  policy 
of  the  whole  Liberal  party.  The  cause  of  his  supremacy 
does  not  lie  in  any  argument,  but  in  a  quiet  dogmatism 
and  the  intense  faith  of  a  lofty  and  disinterested  character. 
Almost  alone  among  statesmen  he  had  the  courage  to  be  a 
visionary.  He  sought  peace  in  a  world  of  many  independent 
states,  small  or  moderate  in  size,  and  he  viewed  commerce 
in  rose-colour  as  a  bond  of  amity.  This  way  has  also  failed, 
partly  for  the  reason  that  commerce  is  not  any  nearer  kins- 


480  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

man  of  peace  than  it  is  of  war ;  partly  also  because,  despite 
his  sympathies  with  the  North  in  the  war  of  Secession, 
Bright  was  blind  to  the  centripetal  instinct,  and  negligent 
of  the  eternal  ambition  of  great  races. 

Rousseau  saw  a  short  path  across  a  few  green  fields. 
Bright's  road  was  somewhat  longer,  but  it  was  well  beaten 
highway  and  easy  travelling.  We  have  followed  it  now  for 
two  generations  with  a  virtuous  fortitude,  but  if  we  pause 
to  look  around  us  at  the  landmarks  of  the  region,  their 
appearance  and  position  are  disconcerting.  Either  they 
have  shifted  or  else  we  ourselves  have  wandered  circuit- 
ously;  for  the  goal  is  more  remote  than  when  we  started 
upon  our  journey. 

Another  way  to  the  millennium  has  advocates  who  at 
least  are  not  open  to  the  reproach  of  coming  to  us  with  their 
hands  full  of  alluring  promises  that  are  to  be  immediately 
fulfilled.  Their  goal  is  so  far  off  that  it  can  hardly  enter 
into  the  calculations  of  any  practical  man  who  chooses  the 
road.  Only  visionaries  are  confident  that  the  peace  of  the 
world  can  be  attained  as  the  result  of  a  balance  among  a  few 
gigantic  empires.  But  following  the  analogy  of  commerce, 
there  is  much  to  be  said  for  their  aspiration.  Negotiation 
is  always  swifter,  adjustment  easier  and  less  damaging, 
when  the  principals  are  few  and  great,  than  when  arrange- 
ments have  to  be  concluded  between  a  multitude  of  small 
and  jealous  men.  All  the  personal  obstacles  to  a  good 
settlement  are  much  reduced.  The  main  issues  become 
clearer,  and  interest  asserts  a  greater  influence  than  umbrage. 
It  is  therefore  not  impossible  to  believe  that  if  there  were 
only  a  few  great  empires  in  the  world,  a  permanent  peace 
might  more  easily  be  attained  by  the  methods  of  wise  and 
reasonable  concession,  than  in  the  present  welter  of  the 
competing  interests  and  fantastic  pride  of  innumerable  dis- 
proportioned  principalities. 


CONCLUSION  481 

It  has  been  already  stated  that  the  union  of  the  American 
States  is  not  put  forward  as  a  model  for  the  union  of  the 
British  empire.  Pericles'  advice  to  the  Athenians  may  well 
be  borne  in  mind.  "  Our  state  does  not  enter  enviously  into 
'  a  comparison  with  the  laws  and  systems  of  others.  We  do 
'  not  imitate  them ;  but  rather  we  provide  them  with  an 
4  example."  If  there  be  a  boast  in  these  sentences,  it  is 
desirable  to  remember  that  there  is  also  a  warning.  We. 
who  have  the  right  to  speak  no  less  proudly,  have  need  to 
beware  of  the  same  danger.  As  the  American  States  found 
their  own  way  to  union;  as  the  German  States  followed 
an  entirely  different  road  and  arrived  at  the  same  goal 
— so  must  we  look  at  the  facts  of  our  own  case  and  be- 
ware of  landmarks  that  are  apt  to  mislead  the  traveller  by 
a  treacherous  resemblance.  The  real  usefulness  of  these  in- 
stances is  less  in  showing  precedents  that  are  safe  to  follow, 
than  in  disclosing  to  us  the  true  nature  of  union,  which  is 
sovereignty,  and  its  inexorable  condition,  which  is  sacrifice. 

Any  political  arrangement  in  which  powers  are  withheld, 
or  granted  upon  terms,  or  are  subject  to  revision  at  the  will 
of  any  member  of  the  confederacy,  is  not  a  real  union,  but 
only  an  alliance.  It  is  lacking  both  in  stability  and  per- 
manence ;  for  the  assent  of  the  parties  to  the  contract  may 
at  any  moment  be  withdrawn.  The  test  of  union  is  the 
utter  sovereignty  of  the  central  government,  which  must  be 
free  and  able  to  act  directly  upon,  and  to  touch,  without  the 
favour  of  any  intermediary,  the  humblest  of  its  citizens  in 
the  remotest  corner  of  its  dominions.  Its  subjects  are  not 
states  but  people ;  and  according  to  the  tradition  of  our 
race,  this  power  can  only  be  secure  and  beyond  question  if 
the  government  be  the  choice  of  the  whole  people.  Judged 
by  this  test,  the  British  empire  at  the  present  time  is  not  a 
political  fact,  but  only  a  phrase,  an  influence,  or  a  sentiment. 
As  in  the  case  of  the  states  before  the  Convention  of 


482  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

Philadelphia,  there  are  in  our  case  abundant  materials  out 
of  which  union  may  be  built ;  but  the  same  materials,  unless 
they  are  used  with  courage  and  intelligence  to  this  end,  may 
as  readily  be  turned  to  the  opposite  purpose,  and  out  of 
the  very  virtues  of  our  people  a  fatal  independence  may 
be  irrevocably  assured. 

In  the  matter  of  sacrifice  there  is  equally  no  escape. 
There  is  no  way  round.  The  separate  states  must  be  ready 
to  incur  it  no  less  than  individual  men.  Legislatures  must 
be  prepared  to  part  with  some  of  their  authority,  statesmen 
with  much  of  their  consequence,  the  people  themselves,  for 
the  moment  at  any  rate,  with  things  which  are  dear  to 
them.  The  aim  and  hope  of  this  sacrifice  is  an  immeasur- 
ably greater  benefit  at  some  later  time.  It  may  happen,  as 
in  the  case  of  the  American  Union,  that  the  advantage  will 
be  gained  by  our  own  generation ;  but  for  a  proud  nation 
this  is  of  little  moment  if  our  children  shall  have  reason 
to  acknowledge  that  their  fathers  were  good  citizens.  But 
sacrifice,  whether  of  blood,  or  labour,  or  dignity,  or  riches, 
is  the  price  of  a  secure  union,  and  it  is  impossible  to  escape 
the  payment.  America  and  Germany  have  paid  it,  and  there 
is  no  discordant  voice  among  us  in  acknowledging  their 
virtue.  Japan  also  has  paid  it  with  a  splendour  of  con- 
tempt for  the  present,  and  of  hope  in  the  future,  that  proves 
youth  to  be  a  quality  which  the  oldest  nation  may  renew. 
Britain  has  already  paid  much  on  account;  but  in  order 
that  what  we  inherit  from  our  fathers  may  be  secured  to 
our  children,  we  are  bound  to  fix  our  eyes,  not  upon  our 
private  advantage,  not  even  upon  the  immediate  prosperity 
of  any  particular  state,  but  upon  the  ultimate  strength  and 
happiness  of  the  whole  Union  of  the  Empire. 

It  is  well  to  grasp  clearly  the  conditions  of  union  and  to 
consider,  before  we  make  the  attempt,  what  are  the  main 


CONCLUSION  483 

difficulties  to  be  surmounted.  But  having  made  our  survey, 
having  coolly  appraised  all  the  risks  and  hardships,  it  is  not 
open  to  us  to  make  a  choice.  The  right  of  decision,  whether 
we  shall  remain  where  we  are  or  go  forward  on  a  bold 
adventure,  is  not  in  our  hands.  We  are  confronted,  not  by 
alternatives  of  policy,  but  by  a  plain,  inexorable  duty.  We 
may  choose  indeed,  but  not  as  a  merchant  chooses  between 
courses  which  promise  a  greater  or  a  less  gain.  Our  case  is 
that  of  a  brigade  which,  receiving  orders  to  assault  and 
capture  a  position,  has  a  choice  only  between  obedience  and 
dishonour. 

With  us,  as  with  Hamilton,  the  single  principle  which 
rules  over  everything  is  the  faithful  stewardship  of  the  estate. 
The  plea  of  prudence  will  not  avail  us  if  we  dig  in  the  ground 
and  hide  away  the  talent.  While  we  may  readily  grant  that 
no  task  of  a  like  difficulty  has  ever  yet  called  upon  any 
nation  to  undertake  it,  we  may  also  consider  that  a 
successful  achievement  would  leave  the  works  of  every  age 
far  behind  it.  The  knowledge  that  so  great  a  thing  has 
never  yet  been  done  in  the  history  of  the  world  is  in  itself  a 
reason  to  the  British  race  for  cheerfully  attempting  it. 

When  we  contemplate  the  nature  of  the  opportunity 
'  in  all  its  dimensions  of  length,  breadth,  height,  and  depth/ 
we  tremble  at  the  possibility  that  it  should  be  missed.  The 
mere  numbers  of  our  own  people,  scattered  throughout  the 
empire  at  the  present  time,  are  no  measure  of  our  respon- 
sibility. The  duty  of  stewardship  looks  further  ahead,  at 
a  population  that  may  be,  at  homesteads  that  are  not  yet 
built,  fields  that  are  still  unbroken.  Few  men  would  wish 
to  shirk  the  burden  of  our  inheritance,  but  the  confusion 
is  apt  to  overwhelm  our  understandings  and  misguide  our 
efforts.  We  allow  ourselves  perhaps  to  be  too  much  oppressed 
by  the  maxim  that  charity  begins  at  home.  We  are  dis- 
couraged when  we  contemplate  the  base  and  huddled  poverty 


484  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

of  our  great  cities,  and  are  too  ready  to  turn  with  impatience 
upon  a  teacher  who  reminds  us  sternly  that  this  hideous 
problem  is  only  a  part  of  the  cares  of  empire.  It  is  not  the 
mere  weight  or  number  of  the  burdens  that  renders  them 
intolerable,  but  quite  as  often  faults  of  balance  and  adjust- 
ment. It  is  easy  to  pass  from  pity  to  despair  at  the  sight 
of  black  squalor  and  hungry  discontent  if  we  insist  upon 
regarding  these  alone.  But  if  the  mind's  eye  be  allowed  to 
range  'far  and  wide*  over  the  field  of  duty  we  shall  see 
things  in  a  truer  proportion,  and  may  discover  that  a  double 
load  is  easier  to  carry  than  a  single  one.  If  we  are  responsible 
for  all  the  misery  which  is  packed  in  our  great  towns,  we 
are  no  less  responsible  for  those  wide,  unpeopled  tracts  where 
fresh  winds  blow.  If  England  is  full  of  cities  where  life  is 
sorrowful,  where  clothing,  food  and  shelter — even  air  and 
the  light  of  the  sun — are  hard  to  come  by,  it  may  be  worth 
a  thought  whether  the  true  remedy  is  not  to  be  found  in 
the  acceptance  of  the  whole  imperial  burden,  in  the  de- 
velopment of  an  inheritance  where  men  and  women  of  our 
race  can  live  and  children  be  born  to  them,  where  the  soil 
is  rich  with  the  promise  of  plenty,  and  the  climate  stern 
enough  to  keep  the  vigour  of  our  manhood. 

But  even  if  the  remedy  for  social  disorders  were  not  to 
be  found  in  the  performance  of  the  imperial  duty,  that  duty 
remains  unaltered.  As  we  sit  quietly  at  home  reading  the 
names  of  places  on  Mercator's  Projection,  it  is  natural  to  be 
proud  of  our  ancestors  who  served  under  Burleigh  or  the 
Pitts.  The  results  of  their  indomitable  efforts  lie  around  us 
on  every  side.  In  the  west  there  is  a  great  Dominion,  in 
the  south  a  great  Commonwealth,  in  the  east  a  great  Empire. 
From  Table  Mountain  to  the  delta  of  the  Nile  there  is  a 
chain  of  states,  territories,  protectorates,  and  spheres  stretch- 
ing out  on  either  hand  from  the  Indian  Ocean  to  the 
Atlantic.  There  are  islands  all  the  world  over,  some  as 


CONCLUSION  485 

large  as  European  states,  and  strong  places  in  every  sea 
and  on  every  coast.  Our  obligation  to  the  sixteenth  and 
eighteenth  centuries  is  not  cancelled  or  diminished  because 
the  nineteenth,  wearied  by  a  struggle  that  was  nearly 
fatal,  fell  asleep,  and  awoke  again  to  find  itself  in  a  hum 
of  material  prosperity  which  it  mistook  during  fifty  years 
for  the  millennium.  We  are  still  burdened  with  the  honour 
of  the  stewardship.  The  nature  of  our  duty  has  changed, 
but  the  duty  itself  is  plain.  The  estate  is  of  such  vast 
extent  that  it  is  hard  to  think  of  a  boundary  which  it  would 
be  desirable  to  set  farther  out,  or  of  a  corner  that  needs  to 
be  rounded  off.  The  period  of  acquisition  may  be  said  to 
have  ended.  The  new  task  is  to  make  a  worthy  use. 

The  question  which  now  presses  for  an  answer  is — what 
can  we  make  of  all  this  ?  Can  we  make  more  if  we  stand 
fast  by  the  ideal  of  John  Bright ;  if  each  part  goes  its  own 
way,  thinking  merely  of  its  own  immediate  advantage,  doing 
only  the  duty  which  lies  nearest  to  its  hand,  keeping  a  kind 
heart  and  a  smiling  face  for  all  men,  but  for  its  kinsmen  no 
more  than  for  strangers  ?  Can  we  still  approve  the  ideal  of 
sturdy  sons  whose  destiny  is  independence  ? 

This  solution  has  been  deliberately  rejected,  not  because  it 
is  too  arduous,  but  rather  because  it  is  too  easy.  It  does  not 
cover  the  whole  field  of  duty.  It  misses  the  special  meaning 
of  an  opportunity  which  has  offered  itself  to  us  alone  among 
all  nations  whose  history  has  been  preserved.  During  the 
past  thirty  years  a  new  light  has  been  thrown  upon  our 
affairs.  The  whole  view  has  changed.  Political  duties 
appear  in  a  different  proportion.  Independence,  bustling 
and  shouldering  its  way  along,  is  no  longer  accepted  as  the 
worthiest  aim  for  each  separate  member  of  the  union.  The 
idea  of  a  joint  stewardship  is  gradually  imposing  itself  upon 
every  earnest  mind.  The  goal  is  a  wide  co-operation  whose 
consequences  are  fervently  believed  to  be  an  unexampled 


486  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

order,  prosperity  and  strength.  As  the  thoughts  of  the 
people  have  become  clearer,  statesmen  have  grown  less 
diffident,  and  not  in  one  state  or  in  one  party,  but  in  every 
state  and  hi  all  parties,  there  is  a  stir  and  murmur  of  life. 
The  desire  for  union  is  suddenly  discovered  to  be  deeply 
implanted  in  our  hearts.  Men  are  prepared  for  sacrifices,  if 
only  the  leaders  would  understand,  and  will  hardly  be  satisfied 
that  their  object  has  been  attained  unless  they  are  called 
upon  for  sacrifices.  Confidence  in  the  old  policy  of  dis- 
integration is  utterly  destroyed.  Nor  will  people  believe 
that  the  new  policy  of  union  is  to  be  achieved  without  an 
effort.  They  are  suspicious  of  advice  which  assures  them 
that  true  safety  is  to  be  found  by  drifting  with  the  easiest 
currents.  Their  minds  are  fully  possessed  by  the  greatness 
of  the  endeavour,  and  they  have  judged  rightly  that  the 
difficulties  which  attend  it  must  be  in  proportion.  A  pro- 
blem of  this  magnitude,  in  their  opinion,  cannot  be  solved 
without  guidance  of  the  forces.  The  industrious  cupidity 
of  distracted  individuals,  the  energies,  ambitions  and  rivalries 
of  particular  states  can  never  carry  them  to  their  goal. 

The  final  question  with  us,  as  with  Hamilton,  is  how 
we  may  convert  a  voluntary  league  of  states,  terminable 
upon  a  breath,  into  a  firm  union.  It  is  useless  to  regret 
what  has  been  done  or  left  undone  during  the  past  century ; 
but  it  is  not  altogether  profitless  to  consider  in  what  position 
we  might  have  found  ourselves  to-day  had  British  policy 
during  that  period  proceeded  on  the  centripetal  instead  of 
on  the  centrifugal  principle. 

Few  will  be  found  to  deny  that  the  empire  in  such  case 
might  already  have  become  a  strong  political  fact;  that 
we  might  have  retained  within  our  own  boundaries  a  vast 
population  which  is  now  lost  to  us;  that  the  resources  of 
our  rapidly  accumulating  wealth,  instead  of  being  lent  out 
to  strangers,  might  have  been  employed  in  the  development 


CONCLUSION  487 

of  our  own  estate,  benefiting  us  not  merely  in  usury,  but  in 
the  use.  For  the  currents  of  investment,  no  less  than  those 
of  emigration,  are  capable  of  being  controlled  and  diverted 
by  an  intelligent  policy,  pursuing  a  steady  and  consistent  aim. 

So  much  is  granted  by  many  who  will  grant  no  more. 
True,  they  say,  we  might  have  had  a  stronger  empire,  but  we 
should  have  attained  it  by  the  sacrifice  of  what  is  of  still 
higher  value.  The  whole  might  have  gained  much,  but  the 
parts  would  have  lost  more.  The  spirit  of  freedom  and 
self-reliance  would  have  been  discouraged.  The  growth  of 
material  prosperity  might  have  been  arrested. 

Granting  the  sincerity  of  this  doctrine,  it  is  hard  to  under- 
stand how  it  comes  to  be  held.  If  we  accept  it  we  are 
compelled  also  to  believe  that  the  malcontents  of  New  York 
were  in  the  right,  and  that  their  own  state,  and  probably 
the  remaining  twelve  as  well,  would  have  thriven  better  in 
disunion  than  bound  together.  So  far  as  the  plea  may  be 
tested  by  arithmetic,  it  resolves  itself  into  an  absurdity; 
while  if  we  judge  it  by  our  sentiments,  or  by  those  instincts 
under  whose  guidance  we  go  about  our  daily  business,  we 
have  to  do  violence,  in  accepting  it,  to  every  principle  upon 
which  we  are  wont  to  act  in  our  private  affairs.  It  is  no  less 
opposed  to  all  the  lessons  of  individual  experience  than  to 
those  of  political  history. 

"  But,"  it  will  be  said,  "in  the  eagerness  of  your  argument 
'  the  principle  of  nationality  has  been  overlooked.  The 
'  American  Union  succeeded  because  it  made  a  single  nation. 
'  If  British  Union  is  to  succeed  we  also  must  make  a  single 
'  nation.  An  empire  which  admitted  nationality  would  be 
'  no  true  union,  and  an  empire  which  crushed  nationality 
'  would  be  intolerable."  An  empire,  according  to  this  theory, 
is  either  a  ruthless  tyranny  or  an  empty  abstraction. 

Those  timid  minds  who  dread  the  extinction  of  the 
national  spirit,  while  they  maintain  it  to  be  incompatible 


488  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 

with  a  firm  union,  are  apt  to  ignore  the  facts  which  lie 
nearest  to  them.  The  union  of  Scotland  with  England  has 
lasted  for  three  centuries  if  we  count  from  the  accession  of 
King  James  the  Sixth ;  for  two  centuries  if  we  reckon  from 
the  Act  of  Union.  Yet  Scotland  retains,  as  England  also 
retains,  every  characteristic  of  a  proud  and  self-reliant 
nation.  The  national  life  of  Scotland  is  the  growth  of  a 
thousand  years.  For  more  than  ten  centuries  Scots  kings 
have  ruled  and  Scots  pride  has  remained  unbroken.  If 
we  were  in  search  of  a  type  to  illustrate  the  meaning 
of  the  word  'nation/  we  should  turn  to  Scotland.  Her 
nationality  is  no  abstraction,  but  a  tingling  reality;  a 
living  organism,  and  not  a  mere  legend  of  the  poets. 
She  has  all  the  stern  virtues  of  a  nation  and  all  the  fan- 
tastic punctilios.  The  love  and  fidelity  of  her  children, 
scattered  in  the  four  quarters  of  the  world,  are  proofs 
which  stand  fast  against  the  scorner.  Her  valour,  her 
arrogance,  her  belief  in  her  own  destiny  have  not  been 
quenched  by  the  free  citizenship  of  a  wider  empire.  Her 
traditions  have  suffered  no  wound  or  injury  in  a  loyal  co- 
operation. With  the  example  of  Scotland  before  us  it  is 
wise  to  have  confidence.  The  meaning  of  Empire  to  a  free 
people  is  not  a  stunting  and  overshadowing  growth,  but  a 
proud  and  willing  subordination.  Its  aim  is  the  security  of 
a  great  inheritance,  and  while  it  will  augment  the  resources 
and  the  power  of  every  member  of  the  union,  it  will  also 
touch  each  separate  state  and  private  citizen  with  a  firmer 
courage  and  a  finer  dignity.  ff/^ 


APPENDIX  I 

JAMES  HAMILTON,  the  father  of  Alexander  Hamilton,  was  the 
fourth  of  eight  sons  of  Alexander  Hamilton  of  Grange,  in  Ayr- 
shire, by  Elizabeth,  eldest  daughter  of  Sir  Robert  Pollock  of  that 
Ilk.  Alexander  Hamilton  of  Grange  was  in  direct  descent  from 
Walter  de  Hamilton,  the  second  son  of  Sir  David  de  Hamilton, 
Dominus  de  Cadyow,  the  common  ancestor  of  the  elder  branches 
of  this  famous  house,  head  of  the  family,  and  a  person  of  great 
consideration  during  the  reign  of  King  David  n.  (He  is  mentioned 
as  one  of  the  Magnates  Scotiae  at  a  meeting  of  the  Estates  held  at 
Scone,  27th  March  1371.)  The  Hamiltons  of  Cambuskeith  received 
their  first  grant  from  King  Eobert  in.,  inter  1390  et  1406.  To 
Cambuskeith  were  added  the  lands  of  Grange,  as  appears  from  a 
charter  dated  7th  May  1588.  ARMS  :  gules,  a  lion  rampant  argent, 
betwixt  three  cinquefoils  ermine.  Crest :  an  oak-tree  proper. 
Motto:  "  Viridis  et  fructifera." — Memoirs  of  the  House  of  Hamilton, 
John  Anderson,  1825,  pp.  254-257. 


489 


APPENDIX    II 

CHRONOLOGICAL  TABLE 


1756  Seven  Years'  War  begins. 

1757  [Jan.  11]  Alexander  Hamilton  born 

1758  1 

1759  2        Fall  of  French  power  in  Canada  (Quebec  taken). 

1760  3        Accession  of  George  in. 

Fall  of  French  power  in  India. 

1761  4         Resignation  of  Pitt  the  elder. 

1762  5        Lord  Bute's  ministry. 

1763  6        Seven  Years'  War  ends  (Treaty  of  Paris). 

1764  7 

1765  8        American  Stamp  Act  passed — resistance  of  the 

colonies. 
Lord  Rockingham's  ministry. 

1766  9         Stamp  Act  repealed — Chatham's  ministry. 

1767  10        American  imports  taxed. 

1768  11         Duke  of  Grafton's  ministry. 

1769  12        A.  H.  apprenticed  to  Nicholas  Cruger. 

Boston  occupied  by  British  troops. 

1770  13         Lord  North's  ministry. 

American  import  duties  removed  except  on  tea. 

1771  14 

1772  15        [Oct.]  A.  H.  arrives  in  New  York. 

1773  16        [Autumn]    A.    H.    enters     at    King's    College 

(Columbia). 
[Dec.]  Boston  Tea  Riots. 

1774  17        [July]  A.  H.  speaks  at  Meeting  in  the  Fields. 

Continental  Congress  meets  at  Philadelphia. 

490 


APPENDIX  491 

HaAmgflt°on.  Event' 

1774  17        [Dec.]  A.  H.  pamphlet,  'Full  Vindication/ 

Eepressive    measures   passed    against    American 
colonies. 

1775  18        [Feb.]  A.  H.  pamphlet,  '  The  Farmer  Refuted.' 

[April]  Skirmish  of  Lexington. 

Americans  besiege  Boston. 

[June]  Battle  of  Bunker  Hill. 

Washington  appointed  Commander-in-chief. 

A.  H.  pamphlet,  '  Remarks  on  the  Quebec  Bill.' 

A.  H.  joins  'Hearts  of  Oak'  Volunteers. 

[Dec.]  Failure  of  American  attack  on  Quebec. 

1776  19        British  evacuate  Boston. 

[March]  A.  H.  appointed  captain  of  New  York 

company  of  artillery. 
[July  4]  Declaration  of  Independence. 
[Aug.]  Washington  defeated  at  Brooklyn. 
[Dec.]   Washington   victorious    at    Trenton    and 

Princeton. 
Adam  Smith's  Wealth  of  Nations. 

1777  20        [March]  A.  H.  appointed  A.D.O.  and  Military 

Secretary  to  Commander-in-chief  with  rank  of 

Lieutenant-Colonel. 
[Sept.]  Washington  defeated  at  the  Brandy  wine 

and  [Oct.]  Germantown. 

[Oct.]  Burgoyne  surrenders  to  Gates  at  Saratoga. 
Conway  Cabal  begins. 

1778  21         Americans  enter  into  alliance  with  France  and 

Spain. 
[May]  Death  of  Chatham. 

1779  22        Siege  of  Gibraltar  begins. 

[Sept.]  French  and  American  attack  on  Savannah 
repulsed. 

1780  23        [May]  British  capture  Charleston. 

A.  H/s  first  memorandum  to  Morris  on  establish- 
ment of  National  Bank. 
[July]  French  reinforcements  arrive. 
[Sept.]  Americans  defeated  at  Camden. 
Treachery  of  Benedict  Arnold. 
[Dec.]  A.  H.  marries  Miss  Betsy  Schuyler. 


492  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 


Dat°-    Hlt.  Event. 

1781  24        A.  H.'s  second  memorandum  to  Morris  on  estab- 

lishment of  National  Bank. 
A.  H.  resigns  Military  Secretaryship. 
Second  French  fleet  sails  for  America. 
Dissensions  in  American  army. 
A.  H.  begins  '  The  Continentalist.' 
[Oct.]  Surrender  of  Cornwallis  at  Yorktown. 
A.  H.  captures  1st  Redoubt. 

1782  25        A.  H.  appointed  receiver  of  Continental  Taxes 

for  New  York  State. 
A.  H.  elected  to  Congress. 
A.  H.  called  to  the  Bar. 
Victories  of  Eodney. 

1783  26         [Jan.]  Preliminaries  of  Peace  arranged. 

[Dec.]  Pitt  the  younger's  ministry. 

1784  27        Americans  begin  to  violate  terms  of  the  Treaty  of 

Peace. 

1785  28         Conference  on  waterways  at  Mount  Vernon. 

Paper  money. 

Civil  war  (Shays's  Eebellion). 

1786  29         Convention  of  Annapolis. 

A.  H.  represents  New  York  at  Convention. 

1787  30         Convention  of  Philadelphia. 

1788  31         Convention  of  New  York  state  at  Poughkeepsie. 

Ratification  of  constitution  by  majority  of  states. 

1789  32        Washington  elected  President. 

[May]  Opening  of  States-General. 

[July]  Fall  of  the  Bastille. 

[Sept.]  A.  H.  Secretary  of  the  Treasury. 

[Dec.]  Jefferson  appointed  Secretary  of  State. 

1790  33        A.  H.  reports  on  Public  Credit. 

A.  H.'s  Financial  Policy  accepted. 

Burke's  '  Reflections  on  the  French  Revolution.' 

1791  34        A.  H.'s  plan  for  National  Bank  accepted. 

[June]  The  flight  to  Varennes. 
British  Minister  (Hammond)  arrives  in  U.S. 
American  Minister  (Pinckney)  arrives  in  England. 
Jefferson's  and  Madison's  opposition  to  A.  H. 


APPENDIX  493 


1792  35         Washington  re-elected  President. 

The  French  Kepublic  proclaimed. 
[April]  France  declares  war  on  Austria. 
[Sept.]  Battle  of  Yalmy. 
[Nov.]  Battle  of  Jemappes. 

1793  36        [Jan.]  Execution  of  Louis  xvi. 

France  declares  war  on  Britain  and  Holland. 
Washington  issues  'Declaration  of  Neutrality.' 
A.  H.  writes  letters  of  '  Pacificus.' 
Gen£t  (Minister  of  France)  arrives  at  Charleston. 
Genet  attacks  Washington's  administration. 
[Dec.  31]  Jefferson  resigns. 

1794  37        Jay  goes  to  Britain  to  negotiate  treaty. 

[July]  Eobespierre  beheaded. 
Whisky  Rebellion. 

1795  38        A.  H.  resigns  Secretaryship  of  the  Treasury. 

Jay's  Treaty  with  Great  Britain. 
[Oct.]  Napoleon  fires  on  Paris  mob. 
[Nov.]  The  Directory. 

1796  39        Napoleon's  campaign  in  Italy. 

A.  H.  writes  letters  of  '  Camillus.' 

A.  H.  drafts  Washington's  '  Farewell  Address.' 

1797  40        John  Adams  elected  President. 

[Feb.]  Battle  of  Cape  St.  Vincent. 
[Oct.]  Battle  of  Camperdown. 

1798  41         U.S.  prepare  for  war  against  France. 

Washington  nominated  Commander-in-chief. 
A.  H.  second  in  command. 
[Aug.]  Battle  of  the  Nile. 

1799  42        Napoleon  First  Consul. 

[Dec.]  Death  of  Washington. 

1800  43        Presidential  Election  Tie. 

[June]  Battle  of  Marengo. 
American  Treaty  with  France. 

1801  44        Jefferson    becomes    President    and  Aaron    Burr 

Vice-President. 
Pitt  resigns. 

1802  45         [March]  Treaty  of  Amiens. 


494  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 


Event. 

1803  46         U.S.  purchase  Louisiana  from  France. 

[May]  Britain  declares  war  on  France. 

1804  47         [May]  Napoleon  Emperor. 

[July  11]  A.  H.  killed  in  a  duel  with  Aaron  Burr. 
Pitt's  second  ministry. 


INDEX 


ABRAHAM,  Heights  of,  37. 
Adams,  John,  101. 

Hamilton's  attack  on,  402  et  seq. 
Inauguration  as  President,  350. 
Influence  of  Hamilton  over  his  cabi- 
net, 372. 

Presidency  of,  390-6. 
Adams,  Samuel,  27,  101. 
Aide  -  de  -  Camp,  Hamilton  appointed, 

69. 

Alien  Act,  396. 
Allen,  Ethan,  captures  Crown  Point  and 

Ticonderoga,  31. 
Americanus,  letters  of,  351. 
Ames,  Fisher — 

Description  of  Washington's  inaug- 
uration as  President,  183. 
Laments  condition  of  Public  Credit, 

215. 
Annapolis — 

Convention  of,  141-3. 

Hamilton's   address    to   Convention 

of,  142. 
Aristocratic  element  in  the  Constitution, 

Hamilton's  anxiety  to  secure,  161. 
Army,  American — 
Disbanded,  68. 
Sedition  on  account  of  non-payment, 

66-7. 

Starved  and  mutinous,  59. 
Arnold,  Benedict,  101. 

Captures   Crown  Point  and   Ticon- 
deroga, 31. 
In  British  service  invades  Virginia, 

60. 

Invades  Canada,  37. 
Treachery  of,  59. 

Artillery  Company  of  New  York— Hamil- 
ton appointed  to  command,  68. 
Asia,  H.M.S.,  fires  on  Hamilton's  volun- 
teer corps,  31. 


Assumption  of  State  Debts — Hamilton's 
plan  rejected  and  afterwards  carried, 
223. 

Attacks  on  Hamilton's  integrity,  277  et 
seq. ,  291  et  seq. 

BANK,  National — Hamilton's  plan  adop- 
ted, 225  et  seq. 
Bar  of  New  York— Hamilton  admitted 

to,  113. 

Barras,  Admiral  de,  61. 
Bentham,  Jeremy,  418. 
Boston — 

Evacuation  of,  by  Sir  William  Howe, 

39. 

Hamilton  visits,  18. 
Siege  of,  36. 
Tea  riots,  19. 

Brandy  wine,  battle  of,  47. 
Bright,  John — 

Colonial  idea,  485. 

Influence    on    the    Liberal    party, 

479. 
Opposition    to    Whigs    and    Tories, 

464-5. 
Britain- 
Hamilton's  desire  for  good  relations 

with,  311. 
Hamilton  urges  preparations  for  war 

against,  342. 
Oppressive     shipping     regulations, 

341-2. 

Treaty  with,  341-50. 
British  Agent  accredited  to  United  States, 

227. 

British  Constitution — Hamilton's  admira- 
tion for,  155. 
Brooklyn,  battle  of,  41. 

Hamilton's  conduct  at,  69. 
Burr,  Aaron- 
Challenges  Hamilton,  420. 
495 


496 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 


Burr,  Aaron — continued. 
Character  of,  406  et  seq. 
Conduct  before  duel  with  Hamilton, 

422. 

Great  party  organiser,  398  et  seq. 
Opposed  by  Jefferson  and  Democrats, 

406-7. 
Receives  equal  votes  with  Jefferson 

for  Presidency,  403. 
Bunker  Hill,  battle  of,  31. 
Burgoyne,  General — 

Moves  from  Canada  on  New  York, 

45. 

Surrenders  at  Saratoga,  48,  49. 
Burke,  Edmund,  26. 

CALLENDER — newspaper   editor,    386   et 

seq. 

Camden,  battle  of,  59. 
Camillus  letters  of,  351  et  seq. 
Canadian  War — its  legacy  of  ill-feeling 

between  Britain  and  Colonists,  25. 
Carleton,  Colonel — holds  Quebec,  37. 
Carrington,  Colonel — Hamilton's  letter 

to,  286  et  seq. 
Charleston — 

Evacuation  of,  64. 

Siege  and  capture  of,  by  Sir  Henry 

Clinton,  57,  58. 
Cincinnati,    society    of — Hamilton    and 

Burr  meet  at  dinner,  425-6. 
Clingman,  382  et  seq. 
Clinton,  Governor — 

At    Convention     of    Poughkeepsie, 

176-9. 
Opposes  fulfilment  of  terms  of  Peace, 

118, 119,  120. 
Clinton,  Sir  Henry,  45,  46. 

Plan  for  kidnapping,  74,  75. 

Siege  and  capture  of  Charleston,  57, 

58. 

Supersedes  Sir  William  Howe,  51. 
Too  weak  to  move  to  assistance  of 

Burgoyne,  48. 

Commercial  policy   of  Britain  towards 

the  states  after  Treaty  of  Peace,  127-31. 

Commercial   policy  of  United    States — 

Hamilton's  Keport  on,  228-48. 
Commercial   Treaties — difficulty   of   ob- 
taining, 134. 
Conciliatory  Bills,  51. 
Confederation    and    perpetual    union- 
articles  of,  99. 


Congress — 

Army,  neglect  of,  and  lack  of  fair 

dealing  with,  38,  45,  57,  66,  112. 
Attack  on,  by  Dr.  Seabury  ;  defence 

of,  by  Hamilton,  28. 
Conduct  of  the  war  by,  96-110. 
Convention  of   Annapolis,   indigna- 
tion with,  143. 
Election  of  New  York  delegates  to, 

28. 

Hamilton  elected  to,  125. 
Hamilton's  prominent  part  in,  125, 

126. 

Impotency  of,  after  peace,  125. 
Philadelphia    being  threatened,  re- 
moves to  Baltimore,  42. 
Want  of  power  and  ability  in,  55. 
Congresses  following  Union— their  dura- 
tion, 200  n. 
Continentalist,  The,  pamphlet  on  need  of 

Union,  89-95. 

Convention    of   New    York    at    Pough- 
keepsie, 176-9. 
Convention  of  Philadelphia,  account  of, 

147-65. 

Conway  Cabal,  103. 
Cornwallis,  Lord — 

Battle  of  Monmouth  Court-House, 

52. 

Defeats  Greene  at  Guilford  Court- 
House,  and  retreats  to  Wilming- 
ton, 60. 

Left  in  command  in  south,  58. 
Meets  Arnold    at    Petersburg,  and 
sends    him    back   to  New  York, 
61. 
Pursues    Washington    across    New 

Jersey,  42,  43. 

Surrender  at  Yorktown,  61-4. 
Credit,  the  public — 

Hamilton's  first  report  on,  216. 
Hamilton's  policy,  account  of,  215- 

28. 
Crown  Point  falls  into  hands  of  rebels, 

31. 

Cruger,  Nicholas,  effects  of  Hamilton's 
apprenticeship  to,  16, 17,  33. 


DEBT— 

Divisions  of  the  public,  216. 
The  domestic— Hamilton's  proposals 
for,  217  et  seq. 


INDEX 


497 


Debt — continued. 

The  foreign — Hamilton's  proposals 

accepted,  217. 

Democratic  Party,  origin  of,  270  et  seq. 
Difficulties  of  Union  (1787),  460. 
Disraeli,  451. 
Divine  Eight,  451. 

Dorchester  Heights  occupied  by  Wash- 
ington, 39. 

Duane,  Hamilton's  letter  to,  87-9. 
Duel  of  Hamilton  with  Burr,  420-8. 
Dumouriez,  General,  324. 

ELECTION  TIE,  403. 
Empire,  the  duties  of,  479-88. 
Esprit  des  Lois,  V,  173-4. 
Estaing,  Admiral  d',  50. 

Eepulse  of,  at  Savannah,  56. 

Eeturns  to  West  Indies,  54. 

Eetires    a    second    time    to    West 
Indies,  56. 

Sails  for  France,  56. 

Sails    to    New    York    and    Ehode 

Island,  53. 
Eutaw  Springs,  battle  of,  62. 

FAREWELL  ADDRESS,  Washington  issues, 

349,  351  et  seq. 
Farmer    Refuted,    The,    pamphlet    by 

Hamilton,  29. 
Faucette,  Eachel,  mother  of  Alexander 

Hamilton,  15. 

Federalist  Party,  its  beginning,  191. 
Federalist,  The,  165-76. 
Federalists    favour    Burr's    election    to 

Presidency,  404. 
Fort  Washington,  Hamilton  volunteers 

to  retake,  69. 
France — 

Advantages  of  war  with,  394-5. 
Alliance  with  (1778),  50. 
Danger  of  war  with  (1798),  393. 
Franklin,  Benjamin,  27,  39. 

Description  of  John  Adams,  390. 
Gates  and  French  parties  wish  to 

nominate  for  Presidency,  185. 
Fraunces'  Tavern,  Washington  says  fare- 
well to  his  officers  at,  34. 
French  E  evolution — 

Influence  on  American  politics,  303- 

41. 

Popular  feeling  in  United  States  in 
favour  of,  315  et  seq. 


Freneau  starts  the  National  Gazette,  277. 

Frontier  posts,  retention  of,  by  Britain, 
127. 

Full  Vindication,  pamphlet  by  Hamil- 
ton, 29. 

GAGE,  General,  holds  Boston,  36. 
Gallatin— 

Becomes  eminent  in  Congress,  349. 
Connection  with  Whisky  Eebellion, 

344. 
Gates,  General  Horatio,  103. 

Adherents  wish  Franklin  to  be 
President  instead  of  Washington, 
185. 

Captures  Burgoyne  at  Saratoga,  48. 
Defeated  at  Cam  den,  59. 
Hamilton    sent   to    seek   reinforce- 
ments from,  71-3. 

Intrigues  to  destroy  army's  attach- 
ment to  Washington,  67. 
Strong  party  in  favour  of,  against 

Washington,  71. 

Superseded  by  General  Greene,  60. 
Genet,  Citizen — 

Arrives  in  America,  332. 
Character  of,  336-41. 
George  in.,  King- 
Influence  upon  Eebellion,  27. 
Sense  of  duty,  68. 
Germaine,  Lord  George,  45,  46. 
Germantown,  battle  of,  48. 
Gibraltar,      destruction     of     attacking 

batteries,  68. 

Giles  of  Virginia,  character  of,  292-5. 
Grasse,  Admiral  de,  sails  from  Brest,  60. 
Graves,  Admiral,  62. 
Greene,  General,  101. 

Guilford  Court-House,  defeated  at, 

60. 

Hobkirk  Hill  defeat  at,  60. 
Takes  command  in  the  south,  60. 
Guilford  Court-House,  battle  of,  60. 

HALIFAX,  Sir  William  Howe  retires  to,  39. 

Hamilton,  James,  father  of  Alexander 
Hamilton,  15. 

Hamilton's  plan  at  Convention  of  Phila- 
delphia, 153. 

Harlem,  Hamilton's  earthworks  at,  69. 

Harrison,  General,  70. 

Hearts  of  Oak  volunteer  corps,  Hamilton 
joins,  31. 


2i 


498 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 


Hdvetius,  letters  of,  351. 

Henry,  Patrick,  27. 

Heth,  Colonel,  letter  to  Hamilton,  299. 

Hobkirk  Hill,  battle  of,  60. 

Holland,    loan    successfully  floated    in, 

227. 
Holt's  J&wrnal,    Hamilton    writes    for 

29. 

Hood,  Admiral,  62. 
Horatius,  letters  of,  351. 
House  of  Lords,  Hamilton's  admiration 

for,  157. 
Howe,  Admiral  Lord — 

Defence  of  New  York,  53. 
Moves  against  French  fleet,  54. 
Transports  army  across  bay  to  New 

York,  53. 

Withdraws  resignation  on  hearing  of 
approach  of  French    in    superior 
strength,  51. 
Howe,  Sir  William- 
Drives  Washington  from  his  positions 
at  White  Plains ;  captures  Ameri- 
can forts,  42. 
New  York,  attack  on,  40. 
Philadelphia,  moves  on,  47. 
Succeeds  General  Gage,  39. 
Hudson  River — importance  of  waterway, 
39. 

IMPLIED  POWERS — Hamilton's  doctrine 
of,  225  et  seq. 

Independence,  Declaration  of,  41 ;  com- 
parison with  Washington's  Farewell 
Address,  363  et  seq. 

Independence — the  object  of  Hamilton's 
threefold  policy,  194-6. 

Independence,  War  of — its  period,  33. 

JAY,  JOHN— 

Hamilton's  letter  to,  on  difficulties  of 
Union,  125. 

Helps  Hamilton  to  write  the  Feder- 
alist, 168. 

Nominated  to  negotiate  treaty  with 
Britain,  344. 

Policy  with  regard  to  navigation  of 
Mississippi,  140. 

Refuses  Hamilton's  suggestion  for 
altering  method  of  New  York 
election,  402. 

Success  of  mission  to  Britain.  348. 


Jefferson,  Thomas — 

Anas,  allegations  in,  that  Hamil- 
ton's measures  were  grounded  in 
corruption,  281. 

Antipathy  to  Britain,  313. 

Assists  Freneau  to  start  the  National 
Gazette,  277. 

Attacks  Hamilton  through  Washing- 
ton, 289. 

Attitude  to  Slavery  and  State 
Rights,  433-7. 

Burr,  opposition  to  ;  refuses  him  any 
post,  407. 

Character  of,  251  et  seq. 

Declaration  of  Independence  written 
by,  40. 

Doubts  about  ratification  of  Con- 
stitution, 178. 

Execution  of  Louis  xvi.,  opinion  as 
to,  327. 

Hamilton's  attack  on,  290-1. 

Influence  upon  Rebellion,  27. 

Kentucky  Resolutions  drafted  by, 
397. 

National  Bank,  opposition  to,  225. 

Receives  equal  votes  with  Burr  for 
Presidency,  403. 

Secretary  of  State,  appointment  as, 
213. 

Shrewdness  in  dealing  with  men, 
258-9. 

September  massacres,  opinion  as  to, 
326. 

Tour  in  France,  317-18. 

With  Madison  founds  the  Demo- 
cratic party,  273. 

KENTUCKY  RESOLUTIONS,  397-8. 
King's  College — 

Hamilton  entered  at,  19. 
Hamilton  protects  the  Principal,  32. 
Knox,  Dr. — a  Presbyterian  minister,  early 

friend  of  Hamilton,  18. 
Knox,   General,   appointed  Minister    of 
War,  212. 

LAFAYETTE,  MARQUIS  OF,  77,  315,  323. 
Commands  light  corps  in  the  south, 

61. 
Hamilton's    letter    to,     on    French 

Revolution,  319. 
Washington's  letter  to,  on  sea-power, 

35. 


INDEX 


499 


Ledyard,  121. 
Lee,  General,  52. 
Lexington,  skirmish  of,  31,  34. 
Lincoln,  Abraham,  376. 

Confirms  Hamilton's  work,  437. 
Louis  xvi. ,  King,  49. 
Louisiana,  purchase  of,  405. 
Loyalists,  oppressive  acts  in  relation  to, 
after  peace,  119-20. 


MACHIAVELLI,  173-4. 

M 'Henry,     Secretary    of    War    under 

John  Adams,  396. 
Madison,  James — 

Accuses    Hamilton    of   dishonesty, 

285. 
Advises     Washington     to    appoint 

Jefferson  Secretary  of  State,  213. 
Character  of,  219  et  seq. 
Conversion  of,  by  Hamilton,  alleged, 

149. 
Commercial  war  with  Britain,  anxious 

for,  311. 
Declaration  of  Neutrality  denounced 

by,  339. 
Favours  modified  repudiation,  218- 

19. 

Helps  Hamilton  to  write  the  Feder- 
alist, 168. 
Laments  condition  of  public  credit, 

215. 

National  Bank,  opposition  to,  225. 
Preparation  for  war  against  Britain, 

opposition  to,  343. 
Slavery  and  State  Rights,  opposition 

to,  433-7. 
Warning  to  Hamilton  of  intended 

attacks  on  constitution,  273. 
With  Jefferson  founds  the  Demo- 
cratic party,  273. 
Manufactures,     Hamilton's    report    on, 

228-48. 
Marriage  of  Hamilton  with  Miss  Betsy 

Schuyler,  75. 
Meeting  in  the  Fields,  Hamilton's  speech 

at,  27,  28. 
Military  Secretaryship — 

Hamilton  appointed  to,  69. 
Hamilton  resigns,  76-78. 
Mississippi,  navigation  of,  140. 
Monmouth     Court -House,    battle     of, 
52. 


Monroe  Doctrine,  358-9. 
Monroe,  James- 
Connection     with     the      Reynolds 

scandal,  380-9. 
Declaration  of  Neutrality  denounced 

by,  339. 
Ratification  of  Constitution  opposed 

by  at  Virginia  Convention,  178. 
Recalled  from    Paris  for    incompe- 

tency,  385. 
Slavery  and  State  Rights,   attitude 

towards,  433-7. 
Montesquieu,  173-4. 
Montgomery  invades  Canada,  37. 
Montreal,  surrender  of,  37. 
Morris,  Robert,  105,  133. 
Financial  Minister,  84. 
Hamilton's   first   memorandum    to, 

85. 
Hamilton's  second  memorandum  to, 

86. 

Morristown,  Washington's  winter  quar- 
ters, 44. 

Mount  Vernon,  conference  at,  138. 
Muhlenberg,  F.  A.,  Speaker  of  House  of 
Representatives,  382  et  seq. 


NARRAGANSETT  BAY,  Lord  Howe  appears 
off,  54. 

Nationality,  461-6. 

Neutrality,  Declaration  of,  330-2. 

Nevis,  island  of,  birthplace  of  Hamilton, 
15. 

New  Jersey  Plan  at  Convention  of  Phila- 
delphia, 151. 

North,  Lord,  26,  40. 


PACIFICUS,  letters  of,  335,  351  et  seq. 
Paper  money,  135-7. 

Issued  by  Congress,  100. 
Parties  in  the  United  States,  origin  and 

growth  of,  270-85. 
Patterson  introduces  New  Jersey  Plan, 

151. 
Peace  with  Britain,  preliminary  articles 

of  signed,  68. 

Phocion,  letters  from,  115. 
Pickering,    member   of   John     Adams's 

cabinet,  396. 
Pinckney,   Thomas,   elected  Vice-Presi- 

dent,  392. 


500 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 


Pitt,  the  younger — 

Commercial  policy,  127-9. 
Comparison  with  Hamilton,  429. 
French   Revolution    interferes  with 

his  policy,  304-5. 
Poughkeepsie,  Convention  of  New  York 

at,  176-9. 
Princeton — 

Washington  captures,  43. 
Washington  retires  to,  42. 
Princeton  College,  Hamilton  applies  for 

admission  to,  18. 
Principe,  II,  173-4. 
Publius,  a  pamphlet  against  peculation, 

84. 

Putnam,  General— Hamilton  requires  to 
send  reinforcements  to  Washington, 
72,  73. 


QUEBEC,  American  attack  on,  repulsed  by 
Carleton,  37. 

Quebec  Bill- 
Effect  on  Canadian  feeling,  31. 
Pamphlet  by  Hamilton,  29. 


RANDOLPH,  EDMUND— 

Applies  to  French  ambassador  for 

money,  346. 
Attorney-General,   appointment  as, 

212. 

Introduces  Virginia  Plan,  150. 
Opposed  to  measures  for  suppres- 
sion of  Whisky  Rebellion,  346. 
Raritan,  crossing  of,  Hamilton's  conduct 

at,  69. 

Rawdon,  Lord,  defeats  Greene  at  Hob- 
kirk  Hill,  60. 
Receiver  of  taxes  for  New  York  state, 

Hamilton's  appointment  to,  113. 
Repudiation,  217-18. 

Advocated  by  Monroe,  343. 
Resignation  of  office,  Hamilton's  motives 

for,  372-3. 

Revolutionary  epoch,  254. 
Reynolds  scandal,  380-9. 
Rivington's  Press,  Hamilton's  attempt  to 

prevent  destruction  of,  32. 
Rochambeau,  Count  de,  35,  61. 

Arrives  with  fleet  at  Rhode  Island, 

59. 
Rockingham,  Marquis  of,  26. 


Rodney,  Admiral,  62. 

Arrives  at  New  York,  59. 

Defeats  de  Grasse,  68. 
Rousseau,  145-6. 

Ideal  of,  479-80. 


ST.  CROIX,  island  of,  Hamilton  appren- 
ticed in,  16. 
St.  John,  surrender  of,  37. 


Burgoyne  surrenders  at,  48,  49. 
Military  and  political  consequences 

of  surrender  of,  49. 
Savannah — 

Capture  of,  by  the  British,  54. 

Evacuation  of,  64. 

French    and   American    attack    on, 

repulsed,  56. 
Schuyler,  General,  113. 

Hamilton's  letter  to,  on  resignation 

of  Military  Secretaryship,  77. 
Strategy  before  Saratoga,  75. 
Schuyler,  Miss  Betsy — Hamilton's  mar- 
riage with,  75. 
Scotland  the  type  of  a  nation  within  an 

empire,  488. 
Seabury,  Dr.— pamphlet,    West  Chester 

Farmer,  28. 

Secession,  War  of.  189-90. 
Secretary  of  Treasury — 

Appointment  of  Hamilton,  199. 
Hamilton's    friends    averse    to    his 

accepting  the  post,  206. 
Inadequate  salary  of  office,  207. 
Resignation  of  office  by  Hamilton, 

300. 

Sedition  Act,  396. 
Shays's  Rebellion,  137. 
Shipping,  American — British  regulations 

with  object  of  crippling,  131. 
Smith,  Adam —  Wealth  of  Nations  ;  in- 
fluence on  Hamilton's  report  on  manu- 
factures, 229. 
Smith,   Melancthon,   at    Convention    of 

Poughkeepsie,  178. 
Sovereignty   the    condition    of    Union, 

473-9. 
Speaker,    the,     Hamilton's    letter    to, 

298. 

Speculation  (1791),  227. 
Stevens,  Edward,  Hamilton's  letter  to, 
16. 


INDEX 


501 


Sullivan,  General- 
Abandonment     of     operations     in 

Bhode  Island  on  withdrawal    of 

French  fleet,  54. 
Endeavours  to  drive  British  out  of 

Newport,  53,  54. 

TALLEYRAND — opinion  of  Hamilton,  6, 

319. 
Tariff  war  between  the  various  states, 

135. 
Ternay,  Chevalier  de,  35. 

Arrives  with  fleet  at  Rhode  Island,  59. 
Textbook  on  law  by  Hamilton,  122. 
Ticonderoga — 

Burgoyne  retakes,  48. 
Falls  into  hands  of  rebels,  31. 
Tories- 
American,  their  reasons  against  re- 
bellion, 23. 
Hamilton   a   Tory  statesman,   448- 

54. 
Persecution  of,  after  Treaty  of  Peace, 

124. 
Policy  of,  in  Britain  in  nineteenth 

century,  464. 
Treaty  of  Paris,  138. 
Treaty  of  Peace—breaches  of,  by  the 

states,  116-23. 

Trenton,  Washington  storms,  43. 
Trespass  Act,  120. 

Troup,  Robert — early  friend  of  Hamil- 
ton's, 19. 

UNION,  resolutions  in  favour  of,  drafted 
by  Hamilton,  126. 

VALLEY  FORGE— 

Hamilton  engaged  with  Committee 

of  Congress  at,  73,  74. 
Washington's  winter  quarters,  50. 
Venables,  a  Democratic  politician,  383  et 

seq. 

Virginia  Plan  at  Convention  of  Philadel- 
phia, 150. 

WAR  OF  INDEPENDENCE— 
First  year  of,  36-8. 
Second  year  of,  39-44. 
Third  year  of,  44-50. 
Fourth  year  of,  50-4. 
Fifth  year  of,  54-6. 
Sixth  year  of,  56-9. 


War  of  Independence — continued. 

Seventh  year  of,  60-5. 

Eighth  year  of,  65-6. 

Ninth  year  of,  66-8. 
Washington — 

Attacks  on,  for  signing  treaty  with 
Britain,  348. 

Attitude  of  Congress  towards  army, 
Hamilton's  letter  on,  112. 

Burning  of  New  York  advocated  on 
military  grounds,  42. 

Cabinet  Government,  mistaken  con- 
ception of,  202-5. 

Campaigns,  brilliant  autumn  cam- 
paign (1776),  44. 

Effect  on  Hamilton's  character,  33. 

Censure  of  General  Lee  by,  53. 

Centrifugal  and  centripetal  tenden- 
cies, Hamilton's  letter  on,  107-8. 

Charges  that  Hamilton  exercised 
undue  influence  over,  73. 

Circular  letter  to  Governors  of 
states,  108. 

Clemency  in  spite  of  Congress,  56. 

Commander  -  in  -  Chief,  appointment 
as  31,393. 

Concealing  departure  from  Clinton, 
marches  south,  62. 

Conference  at  Mount  Vernon,  138. 

Convention  of  Philadelphia,  presides 
at,  147. 

Democratic  press,  denunciation  by, 
349. 

Desires  that  Hamilton  should  under- 
take mission  to  Britain,  343-4. 

Dictatorship,  suggestions  of,  66. 

Difficulties  in  making  army  efficient, 
37,  38. 

Discusses  with  Rochambeau  whether 
to  attack  Clinton  in  New  York  or 
Cornwallis  in  the  south,  61. 

Dread  of  'habit  of  trade'  with 
Spain,  139. 

Dream  of  development  of  western 
lands,  138. 

Efforts  to  keep  army  in  being  after 
Yorktown,  65. 

Elected  President,  183. 

Farewell  Address,  issue  of,  349. 

Federalist  policy,  sends  Hamilton 
list  of  objections  to,  289. 

Genet's  attack  on,  340. 

Holds  New  York,  41. 


502 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 


Washington — continued. 

Letter  to  Hamilton  urging  that  Con- 
gress should  be  invested  with 
powers,  107. 

National  Bank,  doubts  about  legality 
of,  225. 

Official  correspondence  during  war 
mainly  written  by  Hamilton,  70, 
71. 

Praise  of  Hamilton's  action  at  York- 
town,  79. 

Eeluctance  to  become  President,  186. 

Severe  discipline  of,  60. 

Speech  to  officers  against  sedition, 
67. 

Strategy  of,  34. 

Too  weak  to  press  attack  on  New 
York,  55. 

Tories  denounced  by,  20. 


Waterways,  conference  regarding,  138. 

Weehawken,  duel  fought  at,  426. 

West  Chester  Farmer,  pamphlet  by  Dr. 
Seabury,  28. 

Whiggism,  the  principles  of,  121. 

Whigs,  the  policy  of,  in  Britain  in  nine- 
teenth century,  463. 

Whisky  Rebellion,  344-8. 

White  Plains- 
Hamilton's  conduct  at,  69. 
Washington  retires  to,  42. 

Wolcott,  Oliver,  384. 

Expulsion  of,  from  cabinet,  by  John 
Adams,  396. 

Wyoming,  135. 

YORKTOWN,  capture  of  redoubts,  63. 
Surrender  of,  34,  61-4. 
Hamilton's  part  in,  78. 


Printed  by  T.  and  A.  CONSTABLE,  Printers  to  His  Majesty 
at  the  Edinburgh  University  Press 


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Series  2373 


'I   II  I  I  I II    I  II I  II   I 
32106013664385 


